Plaintiff Mark Craighead (“Plaintiff” or “Craighead”) brought this wrongful conviction action against Defendants for, among other things, malicious prosecution and coerced confession related to his conviction for the 1997 Murder of Chole Pruett.
Plaintiff sought damages for mental and emotional injuries allegedly caused by his arrest, interrogation, conviction, and incarceration.
The Plaintiff disclosed Errol Liverpool, his treating counselor, who treated him for nearly nineteen months and diagnosed him with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and adjustment disorder. Defendants retained Dr. Sami Farhat to compile a forensic rebuttal report in which he concluded that he could not substantiate a clear loss of functional impairment or significant psychological injury resulting from Craighead’s wrongful incarceration.
Dr. Steven Farmilant, Plaintiff’s rebuttal expert, administered a series of diagnostic tests, diagnosed Plaintiff with Complex Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (CPTSD) and major depressive disorder, and subsequently compiled a surrebuttal expert report in which he concluded that Plaintiff’s diagnoses were attributable to his wrongful incarceration.
Defendants filed motions to strike the testimony of experts Errol Liverpool and Steven Farmilant while Plaintiff filed a motion to strike the opinions of Defendants’ retained expert, Dr. Sami Farhat.
Mental Health Expert Witness
Dr. Errol E. Liverpool has been a licensed professional counselor for many years. He got his Ph.D. in counselor education from an accredited university in 2001.
Psychology Expert Witnesses
Dr. Steven R. Farmilant received his MA in counseling psychology in 1992 and his doctor of psychology in 1995, and has been a licensed clinical psychologist since 1997. He taught courses at the Adler School of Professional Psychology for 15 years, including courses in trauma and victimology.
Sami Farhat, Ph.D., is a clinical and forensic psychologist based in the Metro Detroit region of Michigan. Farhat obtained his Ph.D. from the University of Detroit Mercy.
He completed a postdoctoral fellowship in Forensic Psychology at the Arkansas State Hospital through the University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences (UAMS), where he was subsequently appointed as Assistant Professor of Psychiatry conducting court ordered evaluations and serving as an expert witness. He participated in training and education, including supervising doctoral interns and presenting at the state wide training for community evaluators. During his time with UAMS, he also maintained a part time private practice where he conducted criminal and disability evaluations.
Discussion by the Court
A. Errol E. Liverpool
Defendants argued that Liverpool is not qualified to diagnose PTSD or offer opinions concerning its cause because he is a licensed professional counselor rather than a psychologist, psychiatrist, or forensic clinician; has not published on PTSD or trauma; lacked forensic training; and testified that he was appearing as a treating clinician rather than an expert witness.
Defendants further challenged the reliability of Liverpool’s PTSD diagnosis because he made it during the first treatment session, did not conduct a structured diagnostic interview or symptom-validity testing, did not review collateral records, and was unfamiliar with certain provisions of the DSM-5-TR.
The Court found that Liverpool may testify as to Craighead’s PTSD diagnosis and treatment. His opinions regarding his time as Plaintiff’s treating clinician define the scope of his testimony; they do not disqualify him from offering opinions formed during treatment altogether.
Defendants’ attacks on Liverpool’s PTSD diagnosis go to weight, not Liverpool’s overall qualification to testify as an expert on Craighead’s treatment and PTSD diagnosis, and Defendants are free to challenge its veracity during cross-examination at trial. A treating provider may rely on interviews, reported history, observed symptoms, and the course of treatment in offering opinions.
The Court further held that it will not prohibit Plaintiff from eliciting Liverpool’s causation opinion attributing Craighead’s PTSD diagnosis to his wrongful incarceration.
Accordingly, Liverpool may testify that, in his clinical opinion formed during the course of treatment, Plaintiff’s arrest and incarceration caused or contributed to the PTSD and related symptoms he treated. His testimony must remain confined to opinions formed during treatment and based on the clinical history, observations, training, and experience he relied upon in treating Plaintiff; he may not offer causation opinions developed at counsel’s request or from sources extraneous to that treatment.
B. Sami Farhat
Plaintiff argued that Farhat relied on incomplete data, offered only a “null” opinion, focused on functional impairment Plaintiff does not claim, and prepared an untimely surrebuttal.
The Court found that Farhat may offer opinions as to his timely rebuttal report, subject to certain limitations, and that he may not testify as to any opinions offered in his notes critiquing Farmilant’s report.
With respect to Farhat’s rebuttal report, his interview and record review provide a reasonable basis for an evaluation-specific opinion. Rule 702 does not require an expert to review every available record or contact every collateral witness before offering an opinion. The omitted treatment records and family interviews are proper subjects for cross-examination.
The Court held that Farhat may describe his examination, the materials he considered, his clinical observations, and his conclusion that the information available to him did not substantiate clinically significant functional impairment or a diagnosable psychological condition. He may not offer the broader opinion that Plaintiff experienced no functional impairment throughout the relevant period or equate the absence of clinically significant impairment during his evaluation with the absence of emotional injury or compensable damages.
Plaintiff also sought to exclude a surrebuttal critique prepared by Farhat after reviewing Farmilant’s report. Plaintiff argued that the critique was untimely, exceeded the scope of permissible rebuttal, and introduced new opinions after the expert-disclosure deadlines had passed.
The Court will not excuse an unauthorized and untimely expert disclosure based on a materially inaccurate account of the discovery record. Accordingly, Farhat may explain and defend the opinions contained in his timely report only. He may not offer any additional opinions first expressed in his notes critiquing Farmilant’s rebuttal.
C. Steven Farmilant
Defendants challenged Farmilant’s qualifications, SIMS and PAI analysis, CPTSD diagnosis, and causation opinion.
The Court found that Farmilant is qualified. He has been a licensed clinical psychologist since 1997, taught trauma and victimology, and provides clinical and forensic trauma services. The absence of board certification, memberships, or publications on the precise subjects affects weight, not qualification.
The testing disputes also go to weight. Farmilant explained how he integrated recognized instruments with records, interviews, observed behavior, and other indicators, including why the SIMS did not establish malingering and why the PAI coefficient did not support schizophrenia. Defendants may challenge the SIMS-score discrepancy, the supporting literature, the PAI interpretation, and the absence of CAPS-5 or PCL-5 testing; but Rule 702 does not require perfect methodology for expert testimony to be admissible.
Farmilant may testify to CPTSD. Its absence from the DSM-5 is not dispositive because it appears in the ICD-11 and Farmilant explained the criteria applied. Plaintiff does not intend to elicit PICS testimony. If it arises, Farmilant may describe Post Incarceration Syndrome (PICS) as a literature-based concept or PTSD subtype, but not as an official DSM-5 or ICD-11 diagnosis. Farmilant’s causation opinion is also admissible. He considered treatment and correctional records, collateral information concerning pre- and post-incarceration functioning, testing, and alternative stressors. Differential etiology requires consideration, not elimination, of every conceivable contributing cause.
The weight assigned to particular alternatives is for cross-examination.
Held
- The Court granted in part and denied in part the Defendants’ motion to strike the testimony of Dr. Errol Liverpool. Liverpool may testify regarding PTSD diagnosis and treatment, longitudinal observations, Plaintiff’s disclosures and symptoms, causation, and treatment-related trauma concepts. He may not testify concerning adjustment disorder, Farhat’s forensic methodology, or false-confession science.
- The Court granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiff’s motion to bar Dr. Sami Farhat. Farhat may testify to his timely report subject to the stated limitations but may not offer opinions first expressed in the rebuttal critique.
- The Court granted in part and denied in part the Defendants’ motion to strike the testimony of Dr. Steven Farmilant. Farmilant may testify regarding his diagnoses, validity testing and malingering analysis, and causation. Any PICS testimony is limited as stated above.
Key Takeaway
An expert’s factual foundation must be sufficient for the particular opinion offered, and the Court may prevent an expert from extending a limited dataset beyond what it can reliably support.
Please refer to the blog previously published about this case:
Psychology Expert Allowed to Opine on False Confessions
Case Details:
| Case Caption: | Craighead V. Simon |
| Docket Number: | 2:23cv12243 |
| Court Name: | United States District Court, Michigan Eastern |
| Order Date: | July 21, 2026 |
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