Expert Witness Profiler

Category: Credit Reporting Expert Witness

  • Credit Reporting Expert Not Allowed to Opine on Intentions

    Credit Reporting Expert Not Allowed to Opine on Intentions

    In 2022, Plaintiff Rick Fox received a letter from his student loan provider stating that it extended condolences to Plaintiff’s family concerning Plaintiff’s death. Several weeks later, Plaintiff learned that his insurance benefits through the Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) had been terminated after the VA received a report that Plaintiff was deceased. On July 29, 2022, Plaintiff discovered that the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) had marked him as “deceased.” Plaintiff later discovered that both Equifax and Trans Union were reporting him as deceased on a Discover account listed on his consumer reports. After disputing this designation, Plaintiff alleged that he received a communication from Experian stating that the Discover account had been corrected, and, because credit bureaus share information, Plaintiff assumed that Trans Union would correct the mistake in its report as well.

    On August 15, 2022, Plaintiff applied for a car loan with five non-party entities, each of which obtained a copy of Plaintiff’s Experian credit report, and all five loan applications were ultimately denied. Plaintiff alleged, on information and belief, that all five applications were denied because he was still being reported as “deceased” on his consumer reports.

    Plaintiff proffered the opinion of Evan Hendricks in support of his claims brought in this case. Experian Information Solutions, Inc. filed a motion to exclude or limit the testimony of Hendricks.

    Credit Reporting Expert Witness

    Evan D. Hendricks has worked in the field of data privacy and credit reporting for over forty years. He was the Editor and Publisher of Privacy Times from 1981-2013.

    Hendricks has also given many presentations on the FCRA at conferences offering continuing legal education and other professional seminars. Hendricks has served as an FCRA expert witness since 1992, has testified as an expert in at least 25 trials in both federal and state court, and has testified before Congress and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) on credit reporting practices. He wrote the book Credit Scores and Credit Reports: How the System Really Works, What You Can Do (“Credit Scores and Credit Reports”).

    Want to know more about the challenges Evan Hendricks has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    In its motion, Defendant sought to exclude the testimony of Hendricks regarding: (1) Defendant’s policies and procedures surrounding its product, Fraud Shield; (2) Plaintiff’s damages; (3) Defendant’s knowledge, motivations, intentions, state of mind, and subjective beliefs; (4) prior cases, administrative actions, and consent orders; and (5) the reasonableness of Defendant’s policies and procedures.

    A. Fraud Shield

    Defendant contended that Hendricks’ opinion regarding its Fraud Shield product must be excluded because Hendricks is unqualified to opine on it.

    As a preliminary matter, Hendricks is not automatically unqualified to offer an opinion about the Fraud Shield product just because he lacked direct experience with it. Even more specifically, the Fraud Shield product is “within the reasonable confines of his subject area” because that product is part of the credit reporting process. Therefore, the Court concluded that Hendricks is qualified to offer an expert opinion about the product and how it functions.

    As to reliability, where, as here, the expert’s opinion is non-scientific in nature, “reliability depends heavily on the knowledge and experience of the expert, rather than the methodology or theory behind it.”

    As noted above, in his report Hendricks stated that he formed his opinions in this case based on, among other things, the allegations of Plaintiff’s complaint and his own extensive experience in the credit reporting industry. These facts establish a sufficient basis as to the reliability of his opinion.

    B. Damages

    Defendant also argued that, as evidenced by his report and deposition testimony, Hendricks is not qualified to offer expert opinion or testimony on Plaintiff’s damages.

    As a preliminary matter, Hendricks’ failure to review certain materials again bears on the weight of his opinion, not its admissibility.

    In his expert report in this case, Hendricks has conceded that, other than the impact on Plaintiff’s creditworthiness, “most, if not all, of the testimony regarding Plaintiff’s specific, actual damages will come from fact witnesses.” Nonetheless, Hendricks’ report addressing damages largely consists of a list of eight categories of “typical negative impacts of unreasonable credit report inaccuracy” that he believes will aid the fact finder in assessing damages in this case, given his belief that Plaintiff experienced “many” of these categories of harm.

    Those eight categories are: (1) inaccurate descriptions of creditworthiness to third parties; (2) improper denial of credit; (3) loss of time, energy, and opportunities due in part to correcting the mistakes on one’s credit report; (4) wrongfully receiving debt collection calls; (5) being chilled from applying for credit; (6) sleeplessness and physical symptoms; (7) sense of helplessness and loss of control over personal data; and (8) emotional distress.

    The Court concluded that Hendricks is qualified to testify regarding the categories of damages that individuals often suffer from inaccurate credit reporting.

    C. Defendant’s State of Mind

    Defendant next argued that Hendricks has proffered opinions regarding Defendant’s knowledge, motivations, intentions, objective state of mind, and subjective beliefs which “plainly failed to satisfy Rule 702” of the Federal Rules of Evidence.

    Upon review of the expert report, the Court observed several instances in which Hendricks opines on Defendant’s state of mind. Courts routinely exclude expert testimony as to intent, motive, or state of mind as issues better left to a jury. Accordingly, the Court held that Hendricks will be prohibited from offering his opinions regarding Defendant’s state of mind, specifically, whether Defendant acted with disregard or knowingly.

    However, Hendricks will not be precluded from offering expert testimony regarding industry standards regarding accurate credit reporting even if that testimony could reasonably reflect Defendant’s subjective awareness about those standards when it developed and launched the Fraud Shield product.

    D. Prior Actions

    Defendant argued that Hendricks’ opinions should be excluded to the extent that he describes consent orders entered into by Defendant’s predecessor, prior cases, and administrative actions.

    Expert testimony as to prior actions, consent orders, and administrative actions “is unnecessary because no specialized knowledge or expertise is needed to understand the existence of those prior actions and to draw reasonable inferences from them.”

    The Court concluded that expert testimony of this nature will not be helpful to the jury in this case.

    E. Legal Conclusions

    Finally, Defendant argued that Hendricks offered several opinions that involved legal conclusions on ultimate issues in this case and that should be excluded as impermissible under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.

    An opinion is not objectionable just because it embraces an ultimate issue. Because he is an expert on credit reporting, the Court held that Hendricks may offer opinions regarding industry standards of credit reporting practices, how Defendant’s practices did or did not comport with those standards, and even what measures Defendant could have implemented to improve credit reporting accuracy.

    Moreover,  it did not appear to the Court that the Defendant sought to exclude any specific opinions regarding the reasonableness of Defendant’s policies

    Held

    The Court granted in part and denied in part the Defendant’s motion to exclude or limit the expert opinion of Evan Hendricks.

    Key Takeaway

    With respect to corporations, the opinions of expert witnesses on the intent, motives, or states of mind of corporations, regulatory agencies and others have no basis in any relevant body of knowledge or expertise.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Fox V. Experian Information Solutions, Inc.
    Docket Number: 1:22cv1197
    Court Name: United States District Court, California Eastern
    Order Date: March 31, 2026
  • Credit Reporting Expert’s Testimony on Emotional Harm Excluded

    Credit Reporting Expert’s Testimony on Emotional Harm Excluded

    This case involves alleged violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act. The Plaintiff, Fabian Huizar, claims that Experian Information Solutions repeatedly reported inaccurate information on his credit report relating to a car loan that was the subject of a judgment rendered in state court. Huizar hired experts, Douglas Hollon and Evan Hendricks to help him prove his case, and Experian filed a motion to exclude or limit their testimony.

    Consumer Credit Expert Witness

    Douglas A. Hollon holds a Bachelor of Science in Business Finance. He has received FCRA certifications from the Consumer Data Industry Association, and he has earned additional certifications.

    He has worked in the consumer finance reporting industry since 2005, when he began working for Experian. His work for Experian spanned 14 years from 2005 through 2019 in the National Consumer Assistance Center—Experian’s main dispute processing center—where he helped consumers “resolve their issues” and “[p]rovid[ed] leadership advice to current supervisors.”

    He handled “escalated credit report disputes” submitted on consumers’ behalf by attorneys and government entities. He has also received “specialized training involving fraud (identity theft) disputes” and testified on Experian’s behalf as a Rule 30(b)(6) witness. In addition to his experience at Experian, he has studied “regulatory agency publications, case law, deposition transcripts, company manuals or publications, and other related documents,” contributing to his “extensive knowledge of other Consumer Reporting Agencies’ (CRAs) and Data Furnishers’ credit dispute operations.” Since 2020, Hollon has been the owner of Credit Experts of North Texas, LLC. Over the course of his career, he has “assisted tens of thousands of customers.”

    Want to know more about the challenges Douglas Hollon has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report. 

    Credit Reporting Expert Witness

    Evan D. Hendricks has worked in the field of data privacy and credit reporting for over forty years. He was the Editor and Publisher of Privacy Times from 1981-2013.

    He has consulted on FCRA cases for over 30 years and has served as an expert witness well over 100 times. Hendricks has testified before Congress and the Federal Trade Commission dozens of times on issues relating to credit reporting and the importance of credit scores. He is the author of a book on how credit scores work and credit reports work.

    Want to know more about the challenges Evan Hendricks has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    A. Douglas Hollon

    First, Experian stated that Hollon is unqualified to provide his opinion on the correct interpretation of the Tippecanoe Circuit Court orders which are the subject of this litigation. The Court held that Hollon’s decade-plus experience working on credit reporting at Experian qualifies him to opine on how Experian would have read and understood the legal orders as well as how reporting should have been conducted following a review of the orders.

    Experian next argued that Hollon is unqualified to opine on whether Experian’s processes and procedures resulted in inaccurate, damaging information remaining in Huizar’s Experian file. Because the jury can assess Huizar’s own damages testimony and Hollon adds no specialized knowledge or experience related to damages, he will not be allowed to provide expert testimony on Huizar’s damages, emotional or otherwise. Accordingly, any statements concerning damages, emotional or otherwise, included in Hollon’s report will not be considered by the Court.

    Experian’s motion to exclude also attacked Hollon’s methodology and argued that the Hollon Report “totally failed to outline any reliable principles or methods.” However, Hollon drew on his decade of experience working on credit reporting at Experian to review the materials in this case and form an expert opinion on Experian’s alleged actions. Although his methodology was not highly technical, the Court considered it reliable for forming an expert opinion.

    B. Evan Hendricks

    Experian argued that Hendricks is unqualified to provide expert opinion on several topics for which he opined. First, Experian argued that, like Hollon, Hendricks was unqualified to provide his opinion regarding how Experian should have interpreted the Tippecanoe Circuit Court orders.

    However, the Court held that Hendricks’ extensive knowledge of credit reporting and credit reporting agencies will be helpful to the trier of fact. And while Experian is correct that Hendricks does not have a specialized background in law, he is qualified to opine as to how Experian, a consumer reporting agency, should have viewed the legal orders at issue in this case.

    Hendricks’ experience and expertise also qualify him to provide his opinion on how Experian’s reporting would have impacted Huizar. In 2003, Hendricks provided testimony to the House Financial Services Subcommittee on Financial Institutions & Consumer Credit regarding “The Role of FCRA in the Credit Granting Process.”

    While Hendricks will be allowed to offer his opinion on how creditors would have viewed Experian’s reporting, he will be prohibited from offering opinions on any emotional or psychological harm suffered by Huizar.

    As for the reliability of Hendricks’ methodology, the Court found Hendricks’ methodology of applying his experience to the facts and evidence reliable. However, Hendricks was not permitted to provide testimony about prior cases, administrative actions, and consent decrees because an information dump from long ago cases will more likely confuse the jury than
    provide helpful information relevant to this case.

    Finally, Experian argued that Hendricks should be precluded from testifying about Experian’s knowledge, motivations, intentions, objective state of mind, and subjective beliefs. As the parties agreed that Hendricks should not testify as to the CRAs’ state of mind, Hendricks will not be permitted to provide testimony on that topic.

    Held

    The Court granted in part and denied in part Experian’s motion to exclude or limit the testimony of Plaintiff’s expert witnesses, Douglas Hollon and Evan Hendricks.

    Key Takeaway:

    When a qualified expert uses their expertise and experience to arrive at an opinion based on an assumed set of relevant facts, that is a reliable methodology. An expert’s reliance upon his or her experience to assess the relevant documents has been repeatedly viewed as a reliable methodology in various settings.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Huizar V. Experian Information Solutions Inc.
    Docket Number: 4:22cv85
    Court Name: United States District Court, Indiana Northern
    Order Date: November 05, 2025
  • Expert Testimony Limited in Identity Theft Credit Reporting Dispute

    Expert Testimony Limited in Identity Theft Credit Reporting Dispute

    Oleksandr Panchenko, a Ukrainian national, first entered the U.S. in 2009 on a J-1 visa and received a Social Security Number. He lived intermittently in the U.S. until 2019, then returned permanently in April 2023 for work.

    In May 2023, he discovered over $120,000 in fraudulent accounts on his credit report, including unauthorized cards, bank accounts, addresses, and employment records from periods when he was outside the U.S., confirmed by travel records. He reported the identity theft to Mountain View police, filed an FTC affidavit, and disputed the accounts with multiple banks and credit bureaus. Despite supporting evidence, the institutions allegedly failed to investigate or correct the inaccuracies.

    As a result, false debts remained, leading to denied credit, higher deposits, and emotional and financial harm. To counter Comenity’s expert, Panchenko disclosed Douglas A. Hollon, a credit reporting professional, as his rebuttal expert witness.

    Credit Reporting Expert Witness

    Douglas A. Hollon is the Owner of Credit Experts of North Texas, LLC and has worked in the consumer reporting industry since 2005. At Experian, he handled escalated credit disputes for attorneys, regulators, and government agencies, served as Government Liaison, and testified as a Rule 30(b)(6) witness in about 20 Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) cases.

    He has extensive expertise in identity theft disputes, credit bureau operations, credit scoring, and industry standards for FCRA compliance. Qualified as an expert in federal and state courts, Hollon holds a B.S. in Business Finance and multiple certifications in credit analysis, risk modeling, scorecard development, and lending compliance.

    Want to know more about the challenges Douglas A. Hollon has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.  

    Discussion by the Court

    Proper Rebuttal

    The Court found that Hollon’s opinion on the adequacy of Comenity’s investigation was proper rebuttal to Ulzheimer’s testimony. Both experts reviewed ACDV forms and addressed whether Comenity’s investigation met industry standards. However, Hollon’s opinion that Panchenko was a victim of identity theft did not rebut Ulzheimer’s report and thus was untimely.

    Exclusion of Identity Theft Opinion

    Because Panchenko had asserted identity theft from the outset, he had ample opportunity to timely disclose expert testimony on the issue. The late disclosure was neither justified nor harmless, as it deprived Comenity of a chance to prepare a counter-expert. Accordingly, the Court excluded Hollon’s identity theft opinion.

    Expert Qualifications

    Comenity argued Hollon lacked qualifications because his background was with a consumer reporting agency, not a furnisher. The Court disagreed, finding Hollon’s 19 years in the credit reporting industry and his experience handling tens of thousands of identity theft disputes sufficient to qualify him as an expert on FCRA investigations and industry standards.

    Legal Conclusions and Terminology

    The Court emphasized that experts may not offer legal conclusions. While Hollon could critique Comenity’s investigation, he could not characterize it as “unreasonable” under the FCRA, as that term has a distinct legal meaning. Instead, he must explain inadequacies in practical terms without invoking legal standards.

    Sufficiency of Facts and Data

    The Court rejected Comenity’s claim that Hollon relied on insufficient facts. As a rebuttal expert, Hollon was not required to conduct his own investigation but could rely on his expertise to critique Ulzheimer’s analysis. Any perceived gaps affected the weight, not admissibility, of his testimony.

    Held

    The Court partially granted Comenity’s motion, excluding Hollon’s identity theft opinion and barring use of FCRA legal terms, but allowing him to rebut Comenity’s investigation and industry standards.

    Key Takeaway:

    The Court limited Douglas Hollon’s testimony, excluding his opinion that Panchenko was a victim of identity theft and restricting use of legal terms like “reasonable” under the FCRA. However, Hollon remains qualified to testify as a rebuttal expert on industry standards and the adequacy of Comenity’s investigation, ensuring the jury hears his critique while preventing him from offering legal conclusions or untimely opinions.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Panchenko V. Comenity Cap. Bank
    Docket Number: 5:23cv4965
    Court Name: United States District Court for the Northern District of California
    Order Date: August 13, 2025
  • Credit Reporting Expert May Not Opine as to Whether the Procedures were Reasonable or Unreasonable

    Credit Reporting Expert May Not Opine as to Whether the Procedures were Reasonable or Unreasonable

    Plaintiff Barbara Cooper alleged that Defendant Milliman, Inc. (“Milliman”) violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act in two ways: first, when
    it issued a report about her medical and prescription history that mixed her with another individual; and second, when it issued a second report wherein Milliman reinserted information it had previously deleted after purportedly reinvestigating Plaintiff’s dispute.

    Milliman principally attributes its repeated errors to a “glitch” with the software that matches information about consumer identity with medical
    record information.

    Milliman’s expert Rebecca Kuehn’s report states she will offer the following opinions:

    A. Milliman’s process for matching consumer records is consistent with industry practice and otherwise reasonable.

    B. Milliman’s procedure for blocking information that was previously removed from a consumer report is consistent with industry practice and reasonable.

    Plaintiff argued that Kuehn is unqualified and her proffered testimony is unreliable. “As such,” Plaintiff contended, “her opinions are nothing more than bare legal conclusions that are pasted on to Milliman’s factual theories.”

    Credit Reporting Expert Witness

    Rebecca Kuehn is an attorney focusing on consumer financial services and consumer protection matters in the Washington, D.C. office of Hudson Cook, LLP.

    She is an expert in the policies, procedures, and practices that consumer reporting agencies (“CRAs”) use to ensure compliance with the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). She developed this expertise through substantial experience in the industry, advising CRAs, lenders, and other users of credit reports on the development of procedures designed to comply with the FCRA.

    Get the full story on challenges to Rebecca Kuehn’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study. 

    Discussion by the Court

    Kuehn’s Expert Qualifications

    Kuehn’s resume shows that Kuehn graduated near the top of her class at George Washington Law School. She served five years at the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), as an Assistant Director, where she was “[p]rimarily
    responsible for the [FCRA] program, leading the Commission’s enforcement, policy, outreach, and rulemaking activities in that area.”

    In addition, Kuehn has served as co-chair of the FCRA Litigation Subcommittee in the American Bar Association, given numerous presentations on the FCRA, authored various publications on the FCRA, and “testified before the U.S. House Committee on Financial Services . . . on behalf of the Consumer Data Industry Association, at a hearing on ‘Consumer Credit Reporting: Assessing Accuracy and Compliance.’”

    When Plaintiff argued that Kuehn is unqualified to opine on industry standards because of any lack of experience as to reporting of medical information, she essentially argued that the FCRA requires specificity as to each area it applies. But the FCRA deals with CRAs in general and whether their procedures are reasonable.

    It requires all CRAs, regardless of industry, to follow or maintain reasonable procedures and nothing in the Act provides separate rules based on the type of information collected and reported. Same goes for Plaintiff’s argument that Kuehn must have direct knowledge about Milliman’s identity matching or software.

    As Plaintiff herself admits, Kuehn has “impressive credentials” at first sight. Even Plaintiff’s own expert has recognized Kuehn’s FCRA qualifications.

    The Court held that Plaintiff’s arguments against Kuehn’s qualifications failed because they concerned the weight of Kuehn’s proffered testimony, not its admissibility.

    Reliability of Methodology

    Kuehn has published numerous works on the FCRA. One publication was at the FTC, which can set guidance as to what procedures are or are not reasonable.

    Her knowledge has been tested at various presentations, in Court, and before Congress. As a result, the Court finds Kuehn possesses the required knowledge and experience to provide reliable testimony that is not merely ipse dixit. Other arguments, like that Kuehn’s opinion is unreliable because of her lack of knowledge about identity matching or Milliman’s software and her excessive reliance on information supplied by Milliman’s corporate representative, as discussed earlier, are unpersuasive because they go to the weight of Kuehn’s testimony, not its admissibility.

    However, Kuehn will be able to testify to compliance or non-compliance with industry customs and standards, but not whether Milliman’s procedures were reasonable or unreasonable. The consensus in the Middle District of Florida is that an FCRA expert cannot testify whether procedures were “reasonable” or “unreasonable.”

    Helpfulness

    An average lay person does not know the industry-standard procedures used by CRAs.

    Therefore, the Court ruled that Kuehn’s testimony could help the jury determine whether Defendant’s procedures were reasonable and if any violation was willful.

    Rule 403

    Kuehn satisfies all three prongs of Daubert and except for the exclusion of witness testimony as to “reasonableness” or “unreasonableness”, the Court finds no undue prejudice from the anticipated testimony.

    Held

    The Court granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiff’s motion to exclude opinion evidence from Rebecca Kuehn.

    Key Takeaways:

    • The reliability of non-scientific expert opinions depends heavily on the knowledge and experience of the expert, not the exactness of the methodology. Evidence of compliance or non-compliance with a custom within a particular industry, though not conclusive, is a factor the trier of fact may consider.
    • While a witness may testify concerning an ultimate issue of fact, the witness may not “tell the jury what result to reach.”

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Cooper V. Milliman, Inc.
    Docket Number: 2:23cv28
    Court Name: United States District Court, Florida Middle
    Order Date: April 07, 2025
  • Credit Reporting Expert Witness’ Testimony on Consumer Access to OFAC Information Admitted

    Credit Reporting Expert Witness’ Testimony on Consumer Access to OFAC Information Admitted

    The present consumer class action stemmed from Defendant Experian Information Solutions, Inc.’s (“Defendant” or “Experian”) violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) and the California Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act (“CCRAA”). Experian violated consumers’ rights under these laws by failing to implement procedures that ensure the highest possible accuracy of the consumer background records it creates and sells. As a result, it produced inaccurate consumer reports that were then sold to third parties.

    Experian specifically breached the FCRA and CCRAA by improperly linking innocent consumers to individuals involved in illegal activities, such as terrorists, narcotics traffickers, money launderers, and arms dealers subject to U.S. government sanctions.

    Experian filed a motion to exclude or limit the opinions and testimony of Plaintiff’s credit reporting expert witness Evan Hendricks. Plaintiff Maria Pena (“Plaintiff” or “Mrs. Pena”), successor in interest to Jose Pena (“Mr. Pena”), opposed the Motion.

    Credit Reporting Expert Witness

    Credit Reporting Expert Witness

    Since 1981, Evan Hendricks has been Editor/Publisher and founder of Privacy Times, a newsletter based in the Washington, D.C. area.

    He has written a book on credit reports, testified before Congress and the Federal Trade Commission on credit reports a dozen times, maintains an FCRA Certification from the National Credit Reporting Association.

    Hendricks has served as a consultant on privacy issues to Federal and State governmental organizations, and businesses.

    Want to know more about the challenges Evan Hendricks has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Experian filed a motion to exclude two statements made by Evan Hendricks from the Court’s consideration.

    Opinion One: Legal Opinion on Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) Information

    Experian argued that Hendricks’ statement that Ramirez v. TransUnion, LLC and follow-on decisions “provided that OFAC information is subject to the FCRA and engaging in loose or name-only matching violated the FCRA,” amounts to an improper legal opinion.

    The challenged statement is offered in support of Hendricks’ first proffered opinion that “credit reporting agencies have been provided ample guidance on the need for multi factor matching to assure the accuracy of information on credit reports, including OFAC information.” In bolstering his opinion, Hendricks quotes from two court cases, as well as other government bodies such as the Consumer Financial Protection Board.

    The Court held that Hendricks’ statement is not an ultimate issue of law because Hendricks is not offering a legal opinion on whether Experian’s specific matching procedures were “reasonable,” a legal standard articulated by the Federal Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) and left for the factfinder. Instead, Hendricks is stating there are certain procedures that enforcement authorities, such as courts, found to be lacking in accuracy and Experian is on notice of those deficient procedures. 

    The Court held that a statement explaining how Experian was on notice of certain procedures courts found to be deficient is testimony within the reasonable confines of Hendricks’ subject area.

    Opinion Two: Consumer Access to OFAC Information

    Second, Experian stated Hendricks’ opinion that “consumers do not typically have access from third parties to OFAC information on credit reports” is based on “raw speculation.” Experian alleged each source referenced by Hendricks’ in this part of his report is inadequate to establish Hendricks’ opinion. 

    The Court held that Hendricks’ opinion would be permissible based on his experience alone considering Hendricks has a wealth of experience evaluating the credit reporting industry. Additionally, the sources Hendricks’ cites to bolster his opinion are not speculation or cherry-picked evidence, as Experian argues. For instance, the undisputed fact that the Department of Treasury does not require creditors to notify consumers of OFAC hits on their credit report does make it more likely that consumers are unaware of this information and its effect on their credit score. Further, if Experian takes issue with the basis for Hendricks’ opinion, it is best challenged in front of the ultimate factfinder.

    Held

    The Court denied Experian’s motion to exclude Plantiff’s credit reporting expert witness Evan Hendricks’ testimony.

    Key Takeaway:

    Hendricks’ report does not assess the reasonableness of Experian’s specific matching procedures or offers legal conclusions; instead, the report provides a general overview of the industry standards shaped by courts for the purpose of demonstrating what Experian knows or should have known. Hendricks is qualified to provide this relevant opinion.

    Case Details:

    Case caption: Jose Pena V. Experian Information Solutions, Inc. Et Al
    Docket Number: 8:22cv1115
    Court: United States District Court for the Central District of California
    Dated: November 13, 2024
  • Credit Reporting Expert Witness’ Testimony About Actual Damages Sustained by Plaintiff Excluded

    Credit Reporting Expert Witness’ Testimony About Actual Damages Sustained by Plaintiff Excluded

    Plaintiff, Noah Ford rented an apartment in Colorado. He signed a Lease Agreement and additional lease documents and moved into the apartment on or about September 3, 2020. On or about July 4, 2021, Ford signed another Lease Agreement and additional lease documents to rent the same apartment for an additional year, for the period August 2, 2021 to August 1, 2022. On or about September 2, 2021, Ford gave notice that he intended to move out and did move out of the apartment. However, pursuant to the terms of the first Lease Agreement, and the second Lease Agreement, and as a result of his breach of such terms, Ford owed payment for the remainder of the lease term, along with additional other charges.

    Ford failed to pay any part of the balance due, and the account was assigned to Defendant I.Q. Data for collection. I.Q. Data also marked the account as disputed for all purposes, including credit reporting. This disputed status remains on the account to date.

    As a result of re-renting the apartment, the landlord later revised the balance due. As a result of identifying a duplicate entry, the landlord later revised the balance again. The current principal balance is $12,215.38, and that amount remains due. Ford purports to have disputed the debt with each CRA.

    Plaintiff’s proposed expert, Thomas Tarter, sought to offer opinions on (1) whether Defendants violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”); (2) whether Defendants violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”); and (3) whether Plaintiff was damaged by the conduct of Defendants.

    Defendant filed a motion to exclude the expert testimony of Tarter.

    Credit Reporting Expert Witness

    Thomas Tarter is the Managing Director of The Andela Consulting Group, Inc. (“ACG”), banking, business, credit industry, management and corporate finance consulting firm. He has more than 50-years of experience in commercial and consumer credit reporting, debt collection, credit origination, dispute resolution industry customs, standards and practices and credit damages.

    Fortify your strategy by reviewing a Challenge Study detailing grounds for excluding Thomas Tarter’s expert testimony. 

    Discussion by the Court

    The Court held that Tarter is not qualified to testify about the legal standards of, alleged violations of, or defenses to, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and Fair Credit Reporting Act.

    In his expert report, Tarter admitted he had could not provide an estimate of Ford’s economic credit damages, the value of Ford’s lost sleep, or the value of time and energy Ford spent to correct his credit, because Tarter had not reviewed any supporting documentation. In his deposition, Tarter conceded he had not reviewed any discovery at the time of his report concerning Defendant’s policies on providing information to credit reporting agencies or how Defendant investigates disputed debts and claims of inaccurate reporting.

    Ford stated that, at trial, Tarter will not quantify or assign a dollar value to Ford’s credit stigma, chilling, credit availability, credit expectancy, employment, or impact of a lower credit score. The Court excluded Tarter’s testimony about actual damages sustained by Ford and sought to exclude any testimony from Tarter regarding topics not set forth in either his expert report or deposition testimony.

    However, Tarter has significant experience working in the financial and credit reporting industry, such as involvement in debt collection practices and seeking loan approvals involving personal lines of credit. The Court believed that this experience provides him with a reliable basis from which he may opine on these topics.

    Held

    The Court limited the testimony of Plaintiff’s expert Thomas Tarter.

    Key Takeaway:

    Even thought Tarter admitted he had could not provide an estimate of Ford’s economic credit damages, the value of Ford’s lost sleep, or the value of time and energy Ford spent to correct his credit, because Tarter had not reviewed any supporting documentation, his only saving grace remains his extensive experience.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Ford V. Iq Data International Inc Et Al
    Docket Number: 2:22cv1791
    Court: United States District Court, Washington Western
    Order Date: September 05, 2024

     

  • Credit Reporting Expert Witness’ Testimony about Difficulties Resulting from Misreporting on a Credit Report Limited

    Credit Reporting Expert Witness’ Testimony about Difficulties Resulting from Misreporting on a Credit Report Limited

    Plaintiff, Jamaal Nelson applied for housing with Younger Developments in Texas around February 2023. He alleged he was denied housing on February 7, 2023 because Defendant’s consumer credit report reported Plaintiff as “Deceased” on a Capital One tradeline and this happened because Defendant failed to investigate the alleged inaccuracy. He added that due to his being denied housing in Texas he had to take a lower paying job in Florida where he paid higher rent. Against Defendant, Plaintiff pursued claims for (1) violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) for failure to assure maximum possible accuracy and (2) violation of the FCRA for failure to investigate.

    Defendant Experian Information Solutions, Inc. filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff’s expert Douglas A. Hollon.

    Credit Reporting Expert Witness

    Douglas A. Hollon is currently the President and Owner of Credit Experts of North Texas, LLC. He began his career in the consumer reporting industry in 2005 as a Dispute Agent with Experian Information Solutions, Inc. Initially, he helped consumers with their mail or telephone disputes of items listed on their consumer file. Hollon was later promoted to Consumer Affairs Special Services (CASS), now known as Experian Consumer Affairs (ECA). In ECA, he handled escalated credit report disputes.

    In addition to his dispute training, he received specialized training involving fraud (identity theft) disputes and mixed file disputes.

    Want to know more about the challenges Douglas Hollon has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    The Court has reviewed Hollon’s report in its entirety. Hollon’s principal conclusion is that that Defendant “failed to follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possibly accuracy” and that if Defendant “had reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy, it would have verified a deceased notation reported by a data furnisher before storing the information on an [individual’s] file.”

    Hollon never explains the factual materials on which he bases his conclusion 

    After a careful review of the parties’ briefing and Hollon’s expert report, the Court excluded Hollon’s testimony as to whether Defendant’s credit accuracy procedures are reasonable. As to the conclusion that it is not reasonable for Defendant to rely on data furnishers, the Court found that Hollon did not articulate concrete factual materials or sources on which he based his conclusion.

    At best, Hollon attempted to rely on his prior experience working for Defendant to reach his conclusions. For example, Hollon alleged that while he worked for Defendant, he observed that Defendant prioritized “costs of doing business . . . over doing what was right.” 

    The Court held that Hollon never explained concretely, however, how such financial incentives were relevant to his conclusion that Defendant failed to follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy.

    Hollon also claimed Defendant’s dispute resolution system is “biased,” “cost driven,” and that his conclusion is supported by “[his] own personal experience.” The Court, once again, noted that Hollon never explained the factual materials on which he based his conclusion that it is unreasonable for Defendant to rely on Data Furnishers.

    Hollon also opined about the economic difficulties consumers faced due to “misreporting on a credit report.” Further, in a declaration submitted with Plaintiff’s opposition to Defendant’s motion, Hollon attempted to explain why he was qualified to opine on the psychological impact of inaccuracies in a credit report.  The Court, however, excluded Hollon’s testimony as to Plaintiff’s non-emotional and emotional damages.

     The Court found that Hollon is qualified to speak, in general terms and as found relevant at trial, about the sort of damages that are typically caused by errors on credit reports.

    Held

    The Court granted in part and denied in part the motion to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff’s expert Douglas A. Hollon.

    Key Takeaway:

    Hollon’s testified about whether Defendant’s credit accuracy procedures are reasonable. He also opined about the economic difficulties consumers faced due to “misreporting on a credit report.” After a careful review of the parties’ briefing and Hollon’s expert report, the Court excluded Hollon’s testimony as to whether Defendant’s credit accuracy procedures are reasonable.

    The Court, however, excluded Hollon’s testimony as to Plaintiff’s non-emotional and emotional damages.

     The Court found that Hollon is qualified to speak, in general terms and as found relevant at trial, about the sort of damages that are typically caused by errors on credit reports.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Nelson V. Experian Information Solutions Inc
    Docket Number: 2:23cv1634
    Court: United States District Court, South Carolina
    Order Date: June 27, 2024
  • Credit Reporting Expert Witness’ Opinions Based on his Experience And Research In Understanding Credit Score Risk-Analysis Admitted

    Credit Reporting Expert Witness’ Opinions Based on his Experience And Research In Understanding Credit Score Risk-Analysis Admitted

    A district judge in Florida admitted the opinions of a credit reporting expert witness after ruling that his opinions were an application of industry standards to facts that, if proven, might have helped demonstrate the satisfaction of Fair Credit Reporting Act standards by implication.

    Facts of the Case

    Plaintiff, Pablo Antonio Garcia (“Garcia”), as the owner of Kandela Productions Inc. (“Kandela”) and Real Rebate Realty, LLC (“Real Rebate”), entered into three loan agreements with Synovus pursuant to which Synovus loaned money to his companies and those companies were obligated to repay Synovus (the “Business Loans”).

    Beginning on January 29, 2021, and continuing through May 18, 2021, Garcia received notice that his Business Loans were in default and that, as a result thereof, Synovus was exercising its right to accelerate the remaining unpaid amounts due under the Business Loans.

    In accordance with Synovus’s internal procedures and the default provisions of the LOC Agreement, on August 24, 2021, Synovus elected to charge off all loans encompassed in Garcia’s loan relationship with Synovus, including the Subject Account.

    This case involves Garcia’s disagreement with Synovus’ decision to charge off Garcia’s account with Synovus; Garcia’s disputes as to the accuracy of such charge offs as reflected on his credit reports; and Synovus’ proper investigation and verification that, in fact, Garcia’s subject personal account was charged off.

    Defendant Synovus Bank’s expert John Ulzheimer offered three general opinions in his expert report: Firstly, consumers can default on loans even if they’ve never missed a payment. As such, reporting a charged off loan to a credit reporting agency as a ‘charge off’ does not constitute incorrect information. Secondly, the Bank’s investigation responses to Garcia’s credit reporting disputes regarding the subject account were appropriate and in line with industry standards and practices; and Garcia did not experience the credit related damages as alleged.

    Garcia argued that each of these opinions were impermissible for various reasons and hence outside the scope of Federal Rule of Evidence 702.

    Credit Reporting Expert Witness

    John Ulzheimer is the President of The Ulzheimer Group, LLC and Founder of www.creditexpertwitness.com. He specializes in credit reporting, credit scoring and identity theft.

    He is twice FCRA certified by the Consumer Data Industry Association (the trade association of the credit reporting agencies) and has over 32 years of experience in the consumer credit industry including positions with Equifax Credit Information Services (6 years), Fair Isaac, which is the inventor of the FICO® credit scoring system (7 years), Credit.com (6 years), and years of concurrent work with a number of consumer credit related companies.

    A nationally recognized expert, Ulzheimer currently is or was the credit blogger for the New York Times, Mint, CreditSesame, CreditSimple, CreditVersio, Zillow, JD Byrider Systems, Credit.com, SmartCredit, VantageScore Solutions, The Simple Dollar and the National Foundation for Credit Counseling. He has authored or coauthored numerous educational materials on the subject of consumer credit.

    To learn about other cases where John Ulzheimer has been involved as an expert witness, order an Expert Witness Profile report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Opinion One

    Garcia first argued that Opinion One consisted of impermissible legal conclusions about an ultimate issue because it stated that “reporting a charged off loan to a credit reporting agency as ‘charge off’ did not constitute inaccurate information.” Garcia pointed out that accuracy or inaccuracy is a threshold issue under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b). He consequently maintained that the aforementioned statement “usurped the roles of the Court and the jury.” 

    While an expert cannot opine on ultimate issues of law, they “may offer their opinion as to facts that, if found, would support a conclusion that the legal standard at issue was satisfied.” 

    Ulzheimer, instead of opining that the Bank’s reporting was accurate under the FCRA, opined that the Bank’s reporting was not factually “inaccurate” or “incorrect” under industry standards provided by the Consumer Data Industry Association’s Credit Reporting Resource Guide (“CRRG”). The Court is capable of clearing up any jury confusion regarding the relevant meaning of “accuracy” by properly instructing them as to that term’s meaning under the FCRA.

    The Court also found fault with Garcia’s second argument—that Opinion One will confuse the jury by usurping the Court’s authority to define the applicable legal standards. The fact that Opinion One failed to address whether the Bank’s reporting was misleading (a component of FCRA accuracy) provided Garcia with ammunition for cross-examination. It was not grounds for exclusion under Daubert.

    Opinion Two

    Legal Conclusions

    Garcia contended that, like Opinion One, Opinion Two contained impermissible legal conclusions about an ultimate issue. Specifically, Garcia averred that it was improper for Ulzheimer to conclude that the Bank’s investigations of Garcia’s credit reporting disputes were ‘appropriate and in line with industry standards and practices.’ Garcia noted that this was typically a question for the jury, and that Ulzheimer’s reasoning was circular.

    As an expert with significant experience, Ulzheimer was allowed to address whether the Bank’s ‘procedures matched industry standards’ as long as ‘he dissected the basis for his knowledge of industry standards, explained how he applied his experience to the facts, and how such application yielded his opinion.

    Ulzheimer accomplished all these things without attempting to offer legal conclusions concerning “reasonableness” under the FCRA. Of course, the Court recognized that certain aspects of Opinion Two may be circular in nature. This, however, is another matter to be addressed by robust cross-examination.

    Reliability

    Garcia next argued that Opinion Two was unreliable because it failed to account for, or ignored, contradictory facts in evidence. Garcia pointed to Ulzheimer’s failure to address the deposition of William Manning as well as data discrepancies contained within the record.

    Ulzheimer (an expert with over thirty years’ experience in the consumer credit industry) explained that, as a former employee of Equifax, FICO, and Credit.com, he “worked with, helped train, and supervised employees on processes and procedures involved in credit reporting, credit report dispute resolution, Fair Credit Reporting Act compliance, credit score model design and development, and consumer credit risk management.”

    Ulzheimer applied this experience, and as well as his intimate knowledge of the Credit Reporting Resource Guide, to review a number of pertinent documents surrounding Garcia’s charge-off. This review of factual evidence led  Ulzheimer to conclude that “there was simply no reason to believe that Garcia was not liable for the subject account” and that the charge off was proper. Accordingly, Ulzheimer opined that the Bank’s verification of the charge off to credit reporting agencies must have been technically accurate and in line with industry standards because the subject account was itself properly charged-off.

    The Court held that Ulzheimer’s failure to consider the Manning Deposition and other tangential documents did not undermine the reliability of Opinion Two under Rule 702 or suggest that Ulzheimer’s experience was inadequate. It was important to note that Ulzheimer was not offering a legal opinion on whether the Bank’s investigation was ‘reasonable’ under the FCRA. Instead, his opinion was an application of industry standards to facts that, if proven, might have helped demonstrate the satisfaction of FCRA standards by implication.

    Opinion Three

    Qualifications

    As previously mentioned, Opinion Three stated that Garcia “did not experience the credit related damages as alleged.” Garcia offered three arguments for the exclusion of this opinion: (1) Ulzheimer is unqualified to make this opinion; (2) Ulzheimer has no recognizable methodology in formulating this opinion; and (3) Ulzheimer relies on speculation, making this opinion unreliable.

    The Court held that Ulzheimer is undoubtedly the type of person who should or could testify to the thought process of creditors who were evaluating Garcia’s mortgage and loan applications. As previously noted, Ulzheimer has over thirty years’ experience in the consumer credit industry. And, in his first four years at “FICO (formerly known as Fair Isaac Corporation),” Ulzheimer taught “trade associations, large national mortgage lenders, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac how FICO scoring worked, how consumer risk changed as deal variables changed, and how to educate their home-buying customers on the importance of solid credit management.”

    His lack of experience in making mortgaged-based credit assessments himself did not render him unqualified. Nor did his apparent failure to specifically address non-qualified mortgages.

    Lack of Scientific Methodology

    Moreover, Ulzheimer’s lack of scientific methodology was also no reason to exclude Opinion Three on the basis of reliability. Courts have found that, where an expert’s testimony is “based on his experience and research in FCRA matters[,]” the expert’s testimony may be reliable even where “‘his method is simply an application of his experience with and understanding of the FCRA and the credit reporting industry to the facts at hand.’”

    Opinion Three was based on Ulzheimer’s experience and research in understanding credit score risk-analysis. His method of reaching the conclusions expressed in Opinion Three were simply an application of this experience and research. 

    The Court recognized that Ulzheimer did not speak to the individuals assessing the subject loan applications. He nevertheless reviewed documents assessing Garcia’s credit and income at the time of the subject loan applications, as well as the subject loan denials, and then applied his extensive experience to opine on the thought process behind said denials.

    Held

    The Court denied Garcia’s Motion to Exclude the Opinions of John Ulzheimer.

    Key Takeaways:

    • The expert’s testimony may be reliable even where his method is simply an application of his experience with and understanding of the FCRA and the credit reporting industry to the facts at hand.
    • Ulzheimer is not offering a legal opinion on whether the Bank’s investigation was “reasonable” under the FCRA. Instead, his opinion is an application of industry standards to facts that, if proven, might help demonstrate the satisfaction of FCRA standards by implication.
    • Ulzheimer’s failure to consider the Manning Deposition and other tangential documents did not undermine the reliability of Opinion Two under Rule 702 or suggest that Ulzheimer’s experience was inadequate. His opinion was an application of industry standards to facts that, if proven, might have helped demonstrate the satisfaction of FCRA standards by implication.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Garcia V. Equifax Information Services, Llc Et Al
    Docket Number: 8:22cv1987
    Court Name: United States District Court, Florida Middle
    Order Date: April 23, 2024