Expert Witness Profiler

Category: Economics Expert Witness

  • Healthcare Expert Not Allowed to Opine on Information Blocking

    Healthcare Expert Not Allowed to Opine on Information Blocking

    Intus and RTZ both work with Program of All-Inclusive Care for the Elderly (“PACE”) facilities, which provide care to elderly patients who live in non-institutional settings in the community. RTZ developed the PACECare software system and licenses it to PACE facilities to help manage data, including patients’ electronic health information (“EHI”). Some PACE facilities also contract with Intus, which designed a product to analyze data from patients’ electronic health records to help identify risks and improve care.

    The parties dispute whether RTZ has improperly blocked Intus’ access to data, including EHI, contained in PACECare. Intus asserts three claims for relief: intentional interference with contractual relations; intentional interference with prospective economic advantage; and violation of California’s unfair competition law (“UCL”).

    Its UCL claim is based on its contention that RTZ unlawfully engaged in “information blocking,” in violation of the 21st Century Cures Act and its implementing regulations.

    RTZ has asserted four counterclaims: violation of the California Comprehensive Computer Data Access and Fraud Act; violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act; trespass to chattels; and violation of the UCL.

    RTZ Associates, Inc. sought to exclude the testimony of Intus’ experts, Shawn Fleury and Dr. Kristopher Hult while Intus sought to exclude the testimony of RTZ’s experts, Traci Creegan and Peter Schwechheimer.

    Economics Expert Witnesses

    Dr. Kristopher J. Hult received a Ph.D., M.A., and B.A. in Economics from the University of Chicago, and a B.S. in Mathematics from the University of Chicago.

    Hult’s areas of expertise are in the economics of antitrust, competition, industrial organization, and healthcare.

    Get the full story on challenges to Kristopher Hult’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Peter Schwechheimer is an economic consultant and testifying expert with nearly three decades of professional experience in the economics of intellectual property, antitrust, commercial damages, transfer pricing, and technology licensing including the licensing of standard essential patents (SEPs).

    Gain a comprehensive understanding of Peter Schwechheimer’s qualifications and casework history with his Expert Witness Profile report.

    Cybersecurity Expert Witness

    Shawn R. Fleury is a cybersecurity expert with approximately twenty-nine (29) years of risk management, incident response, and consulting experience.

    Want to know more about the challenges Shawn Fleury has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Healthcare Expert Witness

    Traci Creegan has over twenty-five years of healthcare and management experience focused on health information technology (IT) and regulatory compliance.

    Get the full story on challenges to Traci Creegan’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Discussion by the Court

    Traci Creegan

    Intus sought to exclude Traci Creegan, one of RTZ’s experts, from offering four opinions relating to liability: “1) that RTZ is not an actor under the Cures Act, 2) that RTZ did not violate the Cures Act [by engaging in information blocking], 3) that the manner exception applies to RTZ’s conduct, and 4) that Intus departed from industry standards.”

    The parties dispute whether the Court has already decided that RTZ is an actor under the Cures Act and that RTZ engaged in information blocking. The Court did not decide the former, but it did decide the latter.

    As a result, Creegan’s testimony on whether RTZ engaged in information blocking is excluded because that issue is “deemed established for purposes of the trial of the case.”

    Analysis

    In addition, her opinion on that question, as well as her opinions that RTZ is not an actor and that the manner exception applies, is improper expert testimony because an expert witness cannot give an opinion as to her legal conclusion, i.e., an opinion on an ultimate issue of law.

    In this case, Creegan opined that “RTZ is not ‘an actor’ subject to the information blocking regulations”; that “RTZ’s conduct did not constitute information blocking as defined by federal regulation”; and that “even if RTZ’s conduct could be construed as information blocking, which it was not, the circumstances satisfy the factual conditions of the Manner Exception.”

    These opinions are improper expert testimony. According to the Court, whether RTZ is liable for violating the information-blocking provisions of the Cures Act—including whether RTZ is a covered “actor” and whether an exception applies—is for the jury to decide.

    Creegan may, however, testify as to industry standards and whether the parties complied with them. Such testimony does not improperly embrace the ultimate issues the jury must decide.

    Intus argued that Creegan’s opinions on industry standards are irrelevant, but that is incorrect. To determine whether the manner exception applies, the jury will need to consider whether RTZ made “at least some reasonable efforts” to reach an agreement with Intus to share information.

    Whether the parties complied with industry standards bears on that question and is therefore relevant.

    As a result, Creegan may not testify that RTZ is not an actor under the Cures Act; that RTZ did not engage in information blocking as defined in the Cures Act; or that, even if RTZ did engage in information blocking, the manner exception applies to RTZ’s conduct. However, Creegan may testify on compliance with industry standards.

    Shawn Fleury

    Although RTZ correctly observed that much of this testimony interprets email correspondence that presumably will be before the jury, it also opined on how the requests expressed in the emails relate to standard industry practice.

    RTZ is incorrect when it argued that Fleury’s opinions “would not assist the jury’s understanding.” Intus is entitled to present Fleury’s testimony to counter Creegan’s testimony regarding industry standards. To the extent RTZ disagreed with Fleury’s reading of the email correspondence, it is free to challenge Fleury’s interpretations on cross-examination.

    Fleury stated, “The email notes that Medications are included under the Patient data that is being requested, which likely corresponds to the ‘redirect.main.meds.new’ module. As such, Creegan’s opinion that this module falls outside of the request is unsupported and factually incorrect.” He continued, “Also significant is the inclusion of the abbreviation ‘etc.’ in the requirements, which indicates that additional data elements may be necessary to complete [Intus’s] responsibilities to its customer.”

    Fleury has no basis for opining on what “etc.” in an email not written by him might refer to. Moreover, he testified at his deposition that he was “not trying to interpret what other data elements [the author of the email] could have meant by having et cetera in there.”

    However, the Court found no basis to exclude the remaining paragraphs in this section of Fleury’s report. RTZ did not argue, for example, that it is improper for Fleury to comment on “the number of times that certain modules were accessed by Intus’ assigned accounts” to conclude that he “would expect a higher volume of audit log entries if there was systematic data mapping occurring by Intus,” or to opine that the audit logs contain no evidence “that Intus exceeded the permissions of the accounts which had been provisioned by RTZ.”

    Kristopher Hult

    Hult bases his analysis on his “understanding that starting in September 2022, RTZ refused to allow Intus access to the electronic medical records (EMR) data stored in RTZ’s PACECare and later prohibited Intus’s clients from providing access to Intus.”

    He stated that his “calculations can be adjusted should the finder of fact determine an alternative appropriate timeframe.”

    RTZ did not challenge Hult’s economic expertise or the economic principles that he applies, but it did challenge the factual bases for some of his opinions.

    RTZ argued that Hult’s testimony incorrectly assumes that any information blocking started in September 2022, when RTZ sent Intus a cease-and-desist letter, even though Intus acknowledged in discovery responses that it continued to log in to PACECare after that date. Hult testified at his deposition that the relevant question is whether Intus had “a loss of access that affected their ability to perform their services,” and not whether Intus had “no access to data.”

    RTZ disputes the factual basis for Hult’s testimony, but that does not render Hult’s opinions unreliable. If the jury agrees with RTZ’s interpretation of the facts and concluded that Intus still had access to data after September 2022 that was sufficient for Intus to perform its services, then it can discount Hult’s testimony accordingly.

    Although RTZ has presented reasons why a jury might discount the weight of Hult’s opinions, whether to credit his testimony is for the jury to decide. The Court is satisfied that Hult’s testimony is admissible under Rule 702 and denied RTZ’s motion to exclude it.

    Peter Schwechheimer

    Intus sought to exclude Schwechheimer’s opinions regarding RTZ’s damages if RTZ were to prevail on its counterclaims. Schwechheimer opined on the “economic damages resulting from Intus’ unauthorized access to and use of RTZ’s PACECare software,” providing one figure for June 2021 through December 2024 and a second figure if the jury were to determine that the unauthorized access continued through at least December 2025.

    He opined that Intus “was unjustly enriched by its ongoing system access to RTZ’s PACECare software,” and that this “would likely manifest in a shorter development cycle, accelerated market entry, and additional venture capital funding.”

    Some of Intus’s criticisms of Schwechheimer’s testimony go to weight and not admissibility. For example, Intus argues that Schwechheimer improperly attributes lost profits to RTZ based on contracts that Intus contends were acquired by Collabrios Health. However, as the Court has previously observed, Intus has cited no “evidence that [Schwechheimer’s] report characterizes the contracts as belonging to or having been assigned to Collabrios.”

    Intus’s remaining challenges do go to admissibility, and the Court accordingly excluded portions of Schwechheimer’s testimony. First, Schwechheimer may not testify about the classification by Laura Emery, Senior Product Manager at Collabrios, of various PACECare modules accessed by Intus as High, Medium, or Low, with High modules being ones “that provided insight into PACECare’s organizational structure and/or included features or functions common to standard EHR software.” Second, Schwechheimer may not testify that accessing PACECare allowed Intus to develop CareHub on an accelerated schedule. Third, Schwechheimer may not testify about Intus’ raising of capital. Finally, Schwechheimer may not testify about what the law requires, including that disgorgement of profits is an available remedy under the California Comprehensive Computer Data Access and Fraud Act.

    Held

    In sum, the Court denied the motion to exclude the testimony by Kristopher Hult. It granted in part and denied in part the motions to exclude testimony by Traci Creegan, Shawn Fleury, and Peter Schwechheimer.

    Key Takeaway

    The Court’s role at this stage of the proceedings is not “to engage in freeform factfinding, to select between competing versions of the evidence, or to determine the veracity of the expert’s conclusions.”

    Instead, the Court “is to determine the scientific validity of an expert’s principles and methodology, not to determine whether their hypothesis is correct, or to evaluate whether it is corroborated by other evidence on the record. That is for the litigants to argue, and for the jury to decide.” 

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Intuscare, Inc. V. Rtz Associates, Inc.
    Docket Number: 4:24cv1132
    Court Name: United States District Court, California Northern
    Order Date: July 08, 2026
  • Economics Expert Not Allowed to Opine on Income Losses

    Economics Expert Not Allowed to Opine on Income Losses

    Plaintiffs Shazad Buksh (“Buksh”) and Krishna Gathani (“Gathani”) brought this case alleging, among other causes, discrimination and retaliation by Defendants William Sarchino, Southwestern Vermont Medical Center and Southwestern Vermont Health Care. To calculate their damages, both Plaintiffs disclosed the economic expert witness Stephanie Seguino, Ph.D.

    Economics Expert Witness

    Stephanie Seguino, Ph.D. is “Emerita Professor Economics at the University of Vermont (UVM) with expertise in quantitative data analysis as well as gender and racial inequality and labor market discrimination,” who held her position at UVM from 1995 to 2022, as well as the positions of Chair of the Economics Department and Associate Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences.

    She received a Ph.D. in Economics from American University in 1994. Seguino has also “published extensively in peer-reviewed journals,” has “two co-authored edited books,” serves “as associate editor of two economics journals,” and is on the editorial board of a third economics journal.

    Want to know more about the challenges Stephanie Seguino has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    I. Updated Buksh Report

    On December 10, 2024, Seguino signed a new expert report for Buksh. The purpose of this report was to “provide an estimate of the Plaintiff’s loss in earnings… and the present value of lifetime medical costs associated with bladder cancer treatment.” Seguino now estimates Buksh’s lost income at $1,844,549, and the “present value of projected medical costs for bladder cancer treatment” at $10,054,800.

    II. Updated Gathani Report

    On December 10, 2024, Seguino signed a new expert report for Gathani.The updated report calculates Gathani’s “lost income due to retaliation at SVMC” in the amount of $384,940.96.

    In her report, Seguino writes that “Gathani was delayed in attaining the qualifications for licensure as a surgical podiatrist by one year and three months due to the defendants’ alleged conduct, which required the plaintiff to pursue his residency in another program.” Seguino thus estimates his income losses “using information from his pay stubs and bonus payment from his first employment since completing his residency.” Accordingly, Seguino calculates Gathani’s “lost income” as “1.25 years of salary as a surgical podiatrist.”

    A. Motion to Exclude Seguino’s Opinion on Buksh

    Defendants sought to exclude Seguino’s expert testimony, arguing in part that Seguino’s opinion is not based upon reliable data and methodology. The Court agreed.

    In Parts I, II, and III of her opinion, Seguino used only two data points to calculate what Buksh’s salary would have been as a surgical podiatrist: the salaries she had access to, those of the other two Plaintiffs in this case (Gathani and Saman).

    If the two data points are considered a sample that is meant to represent surgical podiatrists, then the problem here is not necessarily the use of a small sample of data to estimate the salary of a group; the problem is that no explanation has been given about why the sample set of two could be representative of the entire group.

    Buksh argued that “there is government data on the earnings of podiatrists but not surgical podiatrists” and thus “the defense criticizes Seguino for not using a large sample of incomes from surgical podiatrists across the country but does not state that such a resource is available.” Yet Buksh has the burden to show at least that it is “more likely than not” that his expert’s testimony is based on sufficient facts or data, and is the product of reliable principles and methods.

    Buksh also argued that Seguino’s calculations are conservative and they favor the defense because she took the difference between the BLS data for nonsurgical income to calculate the difference between that and surgical income, rather than using Buksh’s actual income figures—if she had used his actual income, then “the loss in Part II would have been considerably higher.”

    But this argument echoes the problems the Defendants pointed out with Seguino’s methods—why is the BLS data for nonsurgical income “considerably” higher than Buksh’s actual income? And why didn’t Seguino consider that in her calculations—if there is a factor that is depressing Buksh’s salary as a non-surgical podiatrist below the average of what other non-surgical podiatrists make, might that same factor mean that he could make considerably less than the population of two she is comparing his salary to?

    B. Motion to Exclude Seguino’s Opinion on Gathani

    Seguino bases her estimate of Gathani’s lost income for his first year. She did not subtract his actual income in that year (earned in New York, at a new podiatry residency program) from the amount of “lost income.” Nor did she adjust the amount at all, for the reasons explained in footnote one of her report. Essentially, then, Seguino has copied the exact income that Gathani earned as a surgical podiatrist in his first year and estimated that this amount is his lost income in this case.

    There is not much analysis that Seguino adds, nor does she use much “methodology” for the Court to evaluate. In her report, she stated that: “I estimate Gathani’s income losses, using information from his pay stubs and bonus payment from his first employment since completing his residence.” As explained above, this means that Seguino copied the number from Gathani’s first year of practice.

    Held

    The Court granted both motions to exclude Stephanie Seguino’s testimony.

    Key Takeaway

    Here, the trier of fact is not helped by an expert explaining that Gathani could have earned the exact amount in his first year of practicing as a surgical podiatrist as what he did, in fact, earn in his first year of practicing as a surgical podiatrist.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Buksh V. Foot
    Docket Number: 2:21cv190
    Court Name: United States District Court for the District of Vermont
    Order Date: July 06, 2026
  • Economics Expert Was Not Allowed to Opine on Punitive Damages

    Economics Expert Was Not Allowed to Opine on Punitive Damages

    Plaintiff Kimberly McKinney filed a wrongful termination action against Land O’Lakes, citing its failure to accommodate her disability and work limitations stemming from injuries she sustained due to an unsafe condition at work.

    Defendant sought to preclude the testimony of Plaintiff’s retained experts Dr. Joseph Penbera and Dr. Julie Armstrong.

    Economics Expert Witness

    Joseph J. Penbera earned a B.A. from Rutgers in 1969, a masters in public administration from The Baruch School (CUNY) in 1970 and a Ph.D. from American University in 1973.

    He is forensic economist whose work has been accepted in local, state, and
    Federal jurisdictions as well as in various international venues.

    Want to know more about the challenges Joseph Penbera has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Psychology Expert Witness

    Julie Armstrong earned a bachelor of science in nursing from the Consortium of Cal. State Colleges and Universities in 1988, a Masters in nursing/clinical nurse specialist from U.C.L.A. in 1990 with a specialty in psychiatric/mental health nursing, and a Doctor of Psychology degree from Pepperdine University in 1996.

    She has conducted more than a thousand clinical interviews or evaluations for psychological injury or impairment for the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board in California. As of 2025, she has testified in Court or Administrative hearings approximately 60 times.

    Get the full story on challenges to Julie Armstrong’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Discussion by the Court

    I. MOTION IN LIMINE TO PRECLUDE TESTIMONY BY PENBERA

    Defendant sought to preclude Plaintiff’s expert, Dr. Joseph Penbera, from: (1) testifying to lost wages that allegedly accrued after January 1, 2024 through trial, (2) offering opinions based on unreliable methodology and testifying as to legal conclusions; and (3) testifying as to punitive damages.

    A. Opinions on lost income and benefits since May 28, 2023

    1. Admissibility of Penbera’s expert testimony

    Penbera calculated Plaintiff’s lost income and benefits based on Plaintiff’s past wages. Defendant raised several objections regarding the method Penbera utilized in calculating lost wages, but such objections go to the weight of Penbera’s opinion, not its admissibility. Penbera’s report indicates that, among other information, he reviewed Plaintiff’s earnings statements from “12/23/2018 to 1/13/2024” and from “6/15/2023 to 5/15/2025.” Those include Plaintiff’s earnings statements showing her 2023 income and deductions through May 2023, when she was put on leave or terminated, and showing her 2024 income and deductions through mid-December 2024.

    To the extent the Defendant argued that Penbera relied on incomplete pay data from the relevant years or failed to adequately consider Plaintiff’s earnings in earlier years, “it is not the role of the trial court to evaluate the correctness of facts underlying one expert’s testimony.”

    The Court made it clear that Penbera is not precluded as a general matter from offering expert opinions on Plaintiff’s lost income and benefits.

    2. Lost income and benefits damages based on events occurring between Plaintiff’s 2022 injury and her starting a new position in March 2024

    Defendant asserted that Penbera’s opinions rest “entirely” on 2024 and 2025 factual allegations that are not part of plaintiff’s claims in this action. But that is incorrect. For example, Penbera’s report reflects that, among other data, he considered Plaintiff’s past wages from January through May 2023 in calculating Plaintiff’s lost income for the period from her alleged constructive termination in May 2023 through her starting a new position in March 2024.

    Penbera’s report also included calculations of Plaintiff’s future lost income and benefits after December 2024. But the parties agreed that Plaintiff obtained a new job position with Defendant in March 2024. And while Plaintiff was allegedly terminated from that new position in December 2024, that termination is not part of Plaintiff’s claims in this action. 

    To the extent Plaintiff’s future lost income and benefits are based on Plaintiff’s alleged wrongful termination in December 2024, which is not a claim at issue in this case, testimony as to such damages would not be relevant to Plaintiff’s claims at trial. The Court held that Penbera will be precluded from testifying as to lost income and benefits damages that are due to Plaintiff’s December 2024 termination. However, to the extent certain such future losses are attributable to actions that are the subject of Plaintiff’s claims—for example, Plaintiff’s loss of future benefits due to her lost income in the period from May 2023 to March 2024—then Penbera’s testimony as to such specific future losses would be admissible to that extent.

    B. Punitive Damages

    Defendant argued that Penbera should be precluded from testifying about punitive damages because he was not designated to testify about punitive damages.

    Plaintiff appeared to concede that Penbera cannot provide expert testimony as to punitive damages. Plaintiff did not disclose Penbera as an expert on any punitive damages issue, and Penbera’s expert report did not include an opinion regarding punitive damages. 

    Penbera was therefore precluded from testifying as an expert as to punitive damages and may not offer any opinion as to Defendant’s financial documents or financial condition. Plaintiff did not dispute the exclusion of expert opinion or expert testimony on this issue.

    II. MOTION IN LIMINE TO PRECLUDE TESTIMONY BY ARMSTRONG

    Defendant sought (1) to preclude Plaintiff’s expert Julie Armstrong from testifying as to Plaintiff’s emotional distress and non-economic damages because, Defendant claims, Armstrong’s testimony is based on events in 2024 that are outside the scope of the litigation, (2) to preclude Armstrong’s testimony because it is not based on any medical or employment records, and (3) to preclude Armstrong from offering opinions regarding the causation of Plaintiff’s emotional distress damages.

    Analysis

    First, Defendant argued that Armstrong’s opinions should be precluded because they are based on Plaintiff’s factual allegations concerning events outside the scope of Plaintiff’s claims, including Plaintiff’s assertion that in December 2024 Defendant wrongfully terminated her from her new position, and that in September 2024 Defendant posted graphic photos of Plaintiff’s injury.

    While Defendant argued that Armstrong relied insufficiently on the relevant period in reaching her expert opinions, that is incorrect. Armstrong’s report refers at length to Plaintiff’s account of her circumstances from her injury in November 2022 to her re-hiring by Defendant in March 2024.

    Second, Defendant also objects that Armstrong’s opinion relies solely on her experience and her interview and testing of Plaintiff and not on medical or employment records. This argument likewise goes to the weight of Armstrong’s testimony, not to its admissibility.

    Armstrong explained that her opinion is based largely on her clinical interview of Plaintiff, during which Armstrong administrated the Structured Inventory of Malingered Symptoms (SIMS) and Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory-IV (MCMI-IV) tests.

    Third, Defendant sought to preclude Armstrong from offering opinions regarding the causation of Plaintiff’s emotional distress damages. Armstrong was not Plaintiff’s treating provider and did not review Plaintiff’s contemporaneous medical records, and she did not observe Plaintiff’s emotional state or symptoms during the period from 2022 to March 2024.

    But the Court held that Armstrong may testify to her observations of Plaintiff’s emotional distress symptoms and disorder when she evaluated plaintiff in July 2025, and the extent to which plaintiff’s account of her alleged adverse workplace experiences from her 2022 injury to her rehiring in March 2024, if true, could substantially contribute to such ongoing emotional distress symptoms.

    Held

    The Court granted in part and denied in part Defendant’s motions in limine to preclude the testimony of Dr. Joseph Penbera and Dr. Julie Armstrong.

    Key Takeaway

    Under Daubert, the district court is not tasked with deciding whether the expert is right or wrong, just whether his testimony has substance such that it would be helpful to a jury.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: McKinney V. Land O’Lakes, Inc.
    Docket Number: 1:23cv1304
    Court Name: United States District Court, California Eastern
    Order Date: June 21, 2026
  • Compensation Expert Not Allowed to Opine on Company Reactions 

    Compensation Expert Not Allowed to Opine on Company Reactions 

    In October 2015, Apple expanded its restricted stock units (“RSU”) offerings to cover all employees working for the company—including those classified as non-exempt or eligible for overtime.

    The Named Plaintiffs in this case all worked in jobs Apple classified as non-exempt or overtime eligible, which Apple pays on an hourly basis. Plaintiffs each received RSU awards from Apple. As a matter of policy, Apple did not include the value of the vested RSUs when calculating the regular rate for non-exempt/overtime eligible employees.

    Plaintiffs brought this case to challenge that policy. In their view, RSUs should not be excluded from the regular rate of pay calculations under the FLSA, and they are therefore entitled to damages.

    Plaintiffs’ primary expert witness, Dr. Dwight D. Steward, Ph.D., sought to provide a methodology to calculate damages should RSUs be incorporated into overtime calculations.

    Apple, in response, brought two expert witnesses: (1) Dr. Valentin Estevez, Ph.D., who opined on Steward’s methodology and the feasibility of damages calculations; and (2) Barbara Baksa, who sought to compare RSUs to stock options and similar equity-based programs.

    Named Plaintiff Francis Costa and Apple both filed motions to exclude the other party’s expert witnesses.

    Economics Expert Witnesses

    Dr. Dwight D. Steward holds a Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Iowa, and a B.A. in Economics from the University of Texas at Austin. He is the author of three professional economics textbooks and was previously a Senior Lecturer in the Economics department at The University of Texas at Austin and was a Visiting Assistant Professor in the Finance Department in the College of Business at Sam Houston State University in Huntsville, Texas.

    Discover more cases with Dwight Steward as an expert witness by ordering his comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

    Dr. Valentín Estévez has worked as a labor economics consultant and testifying expert in class action and single-plaintiff matters for clients in numerous industries.

    Estévez performs economic and statistical analyses of employment discrimination claims in pay, hiring, promotions, terminations, and other employment actions and alleged violations of the FLSA and state wage and hour statutes, such as those in California, New York, and Massachusetts.

    Get the full story on challenges to Valentín Estévez’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Compensation Expert Witness

    Barbara Baksa is the Executive Director of the National Association of Stock Plan Professionals (NASPP).

    Baksa began her career in equity compensation more than 20 years ago. She is a member of the Curriculum Committee and the Advisory Board of the CEP Institute at Santa Clara University and an Executive Fellow of the Institute for the Study of Employee Ownership and Profit Sharing at Rutgers University School of Management and Labor Relations. Baksa has a BA in English from the University of Iowa.

    Gain a comprehensive understanding of Barbara Baska’s qualifications and casework history with her Expert Witness Profile report.

    Discussion by the Court

    I. Motions to Exclude

    If two contradictory expert witnesses can offer testimony that is reliable and helpful, both are admissible and it is the function of the finder of fact, not the trial court, to determine which is the more trustworthy and credible.

    The Court refused to exclude the testimony of Steward and Estevez because both parties raised issues of credibility that are “within the province of the jury.”

    The more pertinent question concerns the report written by Apple’s second expert, Barbara Baksa. Costa maintained that Baksa’s report must be excluded because Baksa is “not qualified to testify as an expert on the issues the Court must decide in this case,” and that “Baksa’s opinions are not reliable or relevant, but rather, seek to advance improper legal conclusions and advocate for change in the law.”

    1. Qualifications

    Plaintiffs attacked Baksa’s qualifications on multiple grounds. First, they noted that the NASPP, for which Baksa works, “profits from companies that have equity compensation programs by providing them with resources and conferences.”

    Plaintiffs’ arguments are not well taken. Baksa’s work with the NASPP and on the CEP advisory board do not disqualify her from testifying in this case on the matter of equity awards. Membership in the same professional organization with a party does not create an impression of possible bias.

    Additionally, that Baksa lacked robust experience with legal cases did not disqualify her from providing expert testimony in this matter. Baksa has significant experience dealing with equity-based awards, of which she is being introduced to testify.

    These qualifications render her able to testify about the “economic characteristics of RSUs and equity award practices in order to inform the factfinders’ determination on the merits of Apple’s argument that RSUs are excluded from the regular rate of pay under the equity exception.”

    2. Reliability and Relevance

    a. FLSA and Congressional Intent

    Plaintiffs argued that Baksa’s “beliefs about what the FLSA should exclude are irrelevant because the FLSA’s stock exception does not include RSUs as one of the three stock programs that may be excluded.”

    Whether the value of vested RSUs is excludable from the regular rate under the so-called “equity exclusion” under the FLSA is central to this case. Apple argued that to reach this answer, a “factfinder will need to determine whether Apple RSUs have the characteristics necessary to exclude them from the regular rate of pay, including under the equity exclusion,” which Baksa’s report “squarely addresses.”

    Plaintiffs argued that Baksa is going further than just providing factual background: instead, they claimed that Baksa “speculates” on Congress’s intent in amending the FLSA, as well “advances the legal conclusion that RSUs are ‘discretionary awards’ and labels them ‘discretionary equity vehicles.’”

    As a professional in compensation, the Court held that Baksa is entitled to present her analysis on the historical development of RSUs. Indeed, her opinions concerning the similarities between RSUs and stock options, as well as other equity-based programs, are important in resolving the dispute in question. But her analysis of the legislative history of the FLSA constitutes a legal opinion that she is not qualified to opine on (nor was she retained to provide).

    b. Company Reactions to Vested RSUs

    In her report, Baksa noted that should RSUs be included in overtime payment calculations, “public companies will likely cease offering equity awards to non-exempt employees,” which would “introduce significant volatility into overtime wages, which must be paid in cash.”

    Plaintiffs claimed that this testimony is “unsubstantiated speculation” that is “not reliable and has zero relevance to the issues the Court must decide in this case.”

    The Court agreed and excluded Baksa’s opinions about how companies may react to vested RSUs being incorporated into employee overtime pay calculations.

    c. Apple’s Practices as Compared to Other Companies

    Plaintiffs filed a motion to exclude Section 4 of Baksa’s report, entitled “How Apple’s Practices Align with Other Public Companies.”

    There, Baksa noted that Apple’s equity practices “align with those of other technology companies,” as well as “those of stock options granted by public companies.”

    Plaintiffs objected to this section on grounds of relevance, as “Apple cannot demonstrate how other companies’ pay practices are relevant to whether the law demands that Apple include vested RSUs in the regular rate.”

    Because this section is marginally relevant to the issue of wilfullness and good faith, the Court declined to exclude it.

    Held

    The Court denied both parties’ motions to exclude expert witnesses, except for Plaintiffs’ motion to exclude portions of Barbara Baksa’s report.

    Key Takeaway

    Expert opinions must be excluded if rooted in “unsubstantiated speculation and subjective beliefs.” Basically, Baksa’s testimony appears focused on the potential policy consequences of plaintiffs’ interpretation of the FLSA, not what RSUs are or how they function.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Costa V. Apple, Inc.
    Docket Number: 3:23cv1353
    Court Name: United States District Court, California Northern
    Order Date: June 11, 2026
  • Human Factors Expert Allowed to Opine on Foreseeable Behavior 

    Human Factors Expert Allowed to Opine on Foreseeable Behavior 

    This is a strict products liability and negligence case against Adams, the manufacturer of a plastic Adirondack chair that failed and rendered Ronald Scanlan a quadriplegic.

    The Defendant filed motions to exclude opinions of three of the Plaintiff’s expert witnesses: Russell Dunn, Clifford Tribus and Joellen Gill. The Plaintiff filed a motion to exclude opinions of the Defendant‘s expert witness, Dr. David Jones. 

    Economics Expert Witness

    David DeHaven Jones has over 40 years of experience in Economics and Forensic Economics. He earned his BA from the College of Wooster in 1966, and his MA and Ph.D. from Indiana University in 1968 and 1975, respectively.

    Among other roles, Jones served as a Professor of Economics at the
    University of St. Thomas and as the Director of Policy Analysis at the Minnesota Department of Economic Development. He has authored numerous publications, including “A Note on Life Expectancy and Mortality Adjustment,” Journal of Legal Economics.

    Want to know more about the challenges David DeHaven Jones has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Chemical Engineering Expert Witness

    Russell Franklin Dunn is a Ph.D. chemical engineer, who has spent his career working in plastics manufacturing and teaching plastics engineering and safety at Vanderbilt University.

    Discover more cases with Russell Dunn as an expert witness by ordering his comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

    Spine Surgery Expert Witness

    Clifford Boehe Tribus is a fellowship-trained, board-certified spine surgeon. He is a graduate of Johns Hopkins Medical School. His fellowship training was in spine surgery. He has been a professor of neurosurgery and orthopedics at the University of Wisconsin Medical School for over 30 years.

    Get the full story on challenges to Clifford Tribus’ expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Human Factors Expert Witness

    Joellen Gill attended Georgia Tech and Wright State Universities for her undergraduate work, earning a BS in human factors engineering in 1979. Her nearly four-decade career includes 15 years in aerospace and national defense industries as a human factors engineer specializing in safety and risk management.

    Gill started part time at ACS in 1994 after completing a master’s degree in engineering, accepted a full-time position in 2005, then, after obtaining certification as a Human Factors Professional, was lead engineer on her first case just a year later. She is also a licensed tribometrist and a Certified Safety Professional.

    Want to know more about the challenges Joellen Gill has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    David Jones

    The Plaintiff sought to exclude Jones’ testimony regarding the “mortality adjustment” and “worklife adjustment” applied to reduce the Plaintiff’s future damages.

    Jones’s worklife adjustment to the Plaintiff’s future earning capacity is improper under Wisconsin law. To calculate the Plaintiff’s lost future earning capacity, the finder of fact must determine how many years the Plaintiff is expected to work and then assess the Plaintiff’s earning capacity for those years. For example, it would not make sense for the jury to determine that the Plaintiff could have worked until age 65, but then to reduce his earning capacity based on the likelihood that he would not be working at age 65. Jones’ “potential earnings loss” table reduced the Plaintiff’s potential earnings in each year based on a probability that the Plaintiff would not be working.

    That necessarily underestimated the Plaintiff’s future earnings in the years that the jury decided the Plaintiff likely would be working. The Court granted the Plaintiff’s motion to exclude evidence of Jones’ worklife expectancy opinions as irrelevant and confusing to the jury.

    The Court also excluded Jones’ “mortality adjustment” opinions for similar reasons. To support an award of future health care expenses under Wisconsin law, (1) there must be expert testimony of permanent injuries, requiring future medical treatment and the incurring of future medical expenses; and (2) an expert must establish the cost of such medical expenses.

    Russell Dunn

    The Defendant contended that Dunn’s opinions are not reliable because he relied solely on testing that ATS performed on the chair. This argument has no merit; an expert is entitled to base his opinion on reports or data generated by another.

    The Defendant next argued that Dunn’s opinions related to risk management lacked sufficient scientific and factual foundation because he relied on two documents when forming these opinions and excluded consideration of the Defendant’s quality assurance standard operating procedures.

    At trial, the Defendant will have the opportunity to cross-examine Dunn regarding the documents he did or did not consider when forming these opinions.

    Next, the Defendant argued that Dunn’s alternative design proposals are not supported by sufficient facts or data or are not the product of reliable principles and methods. However, the Court found that Dunn’s report was sufficient to place the Defendant on notice that the Plaintiff may argue that the addition of antioxidants to the chair’s polymer is a safer alternative design.

    The Defendant argued that Dunn’s opinions on the root cause of the chair’s failure are not reliable because he failed to consider the Plaintiff’s intoxication at the time of the accident. The fact that an alternative explanation or contributing cause existed did not make Dunn’s opinion unreliable.

    The Defendant argued that Dunn’s opinions related to the Defendant not meeting the outdoor furniture industry’s standard of care were not supported by sufficient facts or data. Dunn was entitled to rely on the representative’s sworn testimony to conclude that the Defendant did not test for oxidative degradation. Therefore, the Court cannot conclude Dunn was wrong in relying on the information the Defendant produced in discovery.

    Clifford Tribus

    The Defendant argued that the Court should exclude the Plaintiff’s expert Clifford Tribus because he was not timely disclosed as a principal expert and was improperly designated as a rebuttal expert.

    Tribus’ report rebuts the Defendant’s biomechanical expert’s conclusion that the severity of the injury indicates the Plaintiff must have been in motion when the injury occurred. Tribus was properly designated as a rebuttal expert.

    The Defendant also argued that Tribus’ opinions are not based on sufficient facts or data and are unreliable. Tribus testified that he relied on the Plaintiff’s CT scan and MRI imaging to determine that a low velocity fall could have caused the Plaintiff’s injuries; he did not review any scholarly publications or perform additional research. This is despite the fact Tribus wrote in his report that he had reviewed literature regarding Diffuse Idiopathic Skeletal Hyperostosis (DISH). 

    Moreover, Tribus’ repeated statements that he formed his opinion based on a “generic approach” to DISH injuries does not explain the “methodologies and principles” underlying his opinion in this specific case. Further, though Tribus stated in his opinion that “the literature demonstrates” that DISH patients could suffer severe consequences from slow falls, his testimony reveals that he could not identify any piece of “literature” upon which he relied to form this opinion. That calls into question the reliability of his conclusions. The Court cannot determine if the “literature” on which Tribus relied is sufficient because Tribus does not identify that literature.

    Joellen Gill

    The Defendant contended that Gill is not qualified as a chair designer and cannot opine about the chair’s design.

    Gill never opined about how the Defendant could remedy the alleged hazards of the chair by changing the physical design of the chair. Gill did opine about possible warnings that the Defendant could have used to reduce the risk inherent in the design, using her knowledge of human behavior. But the presence or absence of a warning label has nothing to do with the physical design of the chair. Gill did not opine on chair design, so whether she is qualified to opine on chair design is irrelevant. Because the Defendant provided no other basis for exclusion, the Court denied the Defendant’s motion to exclude with regard to these opinions.

    The Defendant also argued that Gill did not consider any facts outside of the Plaintiff’s counsel’s version of events. 

    Gill’s opinion is that the Plaintiff’s decision to sit on the chair arm was foreseeable human behavior. Gill elaborated in her deposition that her “opinions are focused on were the actions that were engaged in by this person who was injured, were they consistent with foreseeable human behavior. And, in this case, somebody sitting on the arm of a chair to facilitate a conversation is—it was certainly foreseeable behavior.”

    The Plaintiff’s state of mind or motivations—that is, why he chose to sit on the chair arm—are not encompassed in Gill’s opinion about whether the decision to sit on the arm of a chair is foreseeable human behavior. So the Plaintiff’s decision-making process and whether that decision-making process was impaired by his intoxication are not relevant to Gill’s opinion that his actions were consistent with the foreseeable behavior of an outdoor chair user.

    Held

    • The Court granted the Plaintiff’s motion to exclude portions of Dr. David Jones’ opinions. 
    • The Court denied the Defendant’s motion to exclude portions of Dr. Russell Dunn’s opinions. 
    • The Court granted the Defendant’s motion to exclude Dr. Clifford Tribus’ opinions.
    • The Court denied the the Defendant’s motion to exclude Joellen Gill’s opinions. 

    Key Takeaway

    The expert must explain how that experience leads to the conclusions reached, why that experience is a sufficient basis for the opinion, and how that experience is reliably applied to the facts.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Scanlan V. Adams Manufacturing Company
    Docket Number: 2:22cv586
    Court Name: United States District Court, Wisconsin Eastern
    Order Date: February 24, 2026
  • Security Expert’s Legal Conclusions Excluded

    Security Expert’s Legal Conclusions Excluded

    This case arises from the shooting death of John Fuller, (the “Decedent”), and wounding of DaJohn Foster at the Winbranch Apartment Complex (the “Property”). Plaintiffs assert a premises liability claim based on Defendants’ alleged failure to take adequate steps to protect them from violent crimes committed by third parties not resident at the Property. Defendant Winbranch Complex, LLC owned the Property and Defendant My Management, LLC served as the third-party fee manager for the Property.

    Plaintiffs retained Jennifer C. St. Clair, an economist, to provide expert testimony on the pecuniary and/or monetary value of the Decedent’s life, and Thomas R. Stutler, a “security specialist.”

    Defendants, Winbranch Complex, LLC, and My Management, LLC d/b/a Apartments Near Me (together, the “Defendants”) filed a Daubert motion to exclude Plaintiff’s experts.

    Security Expert Witness

    Thomas R. Stutler, CPP, JD served as leader for security at two corporations, spanning approximately ten years.

    Want to know more about the challenges Thomas Stutler has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Economics Expert Witness

    Jennifer Coats St. Clair, MA is a self-employed Labor Economist with over nine years of experience calculating litigation damages, specifically focusing on the economic, financial, and business issues arising in legal disputes. She earned a Master of Arts in Economics from the University of Memphis in 2016, where she also achieved All But Dissertation (“ABD”) status after passing doctoral comprehensive examinations.

    She has taught Economics at the University of Memphis and Christian Brothers University. Since 2017, St. Clair has served as a consulting economist or econometrician on over 130 federal and state cases, with a substantial portion of her practice involving the calculation of economic losses in personal tort claims.

    Get the full story on challenges to Jennifer St. Clair’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Discussion by the Court

    I. Thomas R. Stutler, CPP, JD

    After summarizing a version of the events underlying the lawsuit, Stutler’s report announces various legal conclusions, including that “the victims were legally on the property” and that “as tenants and guests on the property the Defendants owed a duty to the victims to provide a reasonable safe environment.”

    He then summarized crime statistics for the surrounding area—apparently in support of his assertion of foreseeability—before listing various failures that, if they occurred, “would be a major security failure.”

    The Court held that Stutler’s report did not satisfy Rule 702 and therefore must be excluded.

    Finally, Stutler offered a few opinions that could—depending on the analysis—be the stuff of expert testimony, including: an assessment of Property’s security posture, ten bullet-pointed recommendations for improving that posture; something that looks vaguely like an opinion on breach (although couched in terms of inactions that would be a “serious security failure”); and opinions on causation. The problem is that these opinions are wholly unexplained—they are assertions more than opinions, with no indication that they are the result of a reliable methodology reliably applied.

    II. Jennifer C. St. Clair, MA

    Plaintiffs retained St. Clair to calculate the present value of the economic losses arising from the shooting death of Decedent.

    St. Clair first assumed that Fuller worked for the entire duration of his life. She calculated this to be 18.17 years based on the Markov Process Model of Labor Force Activity. In that scenario, St. Clair found that the value loss would be $830,828. In the second scenario, she assumed that Fuller worked until the Social Security retirement age of 67. The value loss would be $896,139 in that case.

    It should be noted that Defendants did not point to any unique facts or specific medical history that might render any opinion concerning Decedent’s future earnings or household services wildly misleading if not accounted for. 

    Next, Defendants argued that St. Clair failed to accurately calculate income lost because she relied on national average wages as opposed to Fuller’s actual income. Defendants also noted that they have never received income information from Plaintiffs. St. Clair relied on the American Community Survey to determine income specifically for barbers. Defendants also argued that St. Clair committed the same errors in her household services calculation, pointing to her failure to consider Fuller’s actual contributions to the household. St. Clair relied on expectancy data from The Dollar Value of a Day: 2020 Dollar Valuation.

    The Court held that historical earnings and household services are “relevant” to the earnings calculation but not dispositive. St. Clair’s determination that Fuller would have earned more over the course of his working life than the earning capacity that may have been suggested by his salary “is not unreasonable as a matter of law.”

    St. Clair’s analysis “involved a degree of speculation, as does all analysis of future damages, but not unrealistic speculation.”

    Held

    The Court denied Defendants’ motion regarding Jennifer St. Clair’s expert report and granted Defendants’ motion regarding Thomas Stutler’s report.

    Key Takeaway

    Stutler purports to rest his opinion on his “knowledge, training, skill, and expertise,” but even experts who base their opinion on honed expertise must explain how they applied their methodology in the case at hand to arrive at their opinions. Experts must show their work, and if they do not, their opinions must be excluded. The Court’s gatekeeping function under Daubert requires more than simply taking the expert’s word for their testimony.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Foster V. Winbranch Complex LLC
    Docket Number: 2:24cv2433
    Court Name: United States District Court, Tennessee Western
    Order Date: May 15, 2026
  • Economics Expert Was Allowed to Opine on the Value of Companionship Services

    Economics Expert Was Allowed to Opine on the Value of Companionship Services

    Plaintiff Tabria Montgomery’s father, Michael Montgomery sustained fatal injuries while operating a Bobst Mastercut 145 PER 2.0 Die-Cutter machine. She asserted claims individually on behalf of herself and her father’s estate against Defendant Bobst Group North America, Inc. (“Bobst NA”) for strict products liability, negligence, wrongful death, and survival.

    Bobst NA filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff’s economic expert, Kristin K. Kucsma, M.A.

    Economics Expert Witness

    Kristin K. Kucsma, M.A. has worked extensively on cases involving personal injury, wrongful death, employment law, wrongful incarceration, mass torts, punitive damages and lost profits.

    She spent over 13 years teaching economics at the undergraduate and graduate level at Saint Peter’s College, Rutgers, Seton Hall and Drew Universities. Her areas of expertise include American Economic History, Applied Micro Economic Theory, banking and financial markets and corporate finance. Ms. Kucsma is an active member of the National Association of Forensic Economics and the Eastern Economics Association, a member of the American Economics Association, and a former Member of the District Ethics Committee, Office of Attorney Ethics of the Supreme Court of New Jersey. She earned a B.A., summa cum laude, in Economics from Seton Hall University, an M.A. from Rutgers University, and currently is ABD at Rutgers University.

    Want to know more about the challenges Kristin Kucsma has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    A. Reliability

    1. Lost Future Earnings

    Bobst NA argued that Kucsma’s selection of Montgomery’s 2020 earnings as his “projected earnings base” is unsupported and “driven by assumptions supplied by counsel rather than by verifiable employment data.”

    It argued that 2020 was a “marked spike” in earnings because Montgomery worked significant amounts of overtime as a feeder that he never did as a die cutter operator. Bobst NA also highlighted that Kucsma could not state when Montgomery changed roles or how long he was out of work in 2021 during her deposition.

    The Court found that Kucsma’s opinion on Montgomery’s lost future earnings is reliable and may be offered to a jury. She bases it on her significant knowledge, experience, and review of the record, including Montgomery’s paystubs from November 2016 until February 2022, his federal tax documents from 2017 to 2022, and responses to a general “preliminary fact-finding questionnaire.”

    Bobst NA repeatedly contended that Kucsma’s deposition testimony shows that she relied on Plaintiff’s counsel’s representations rather than the objective record. In any event, Bobst NA cited no authority for the proposition that an economics expert may not partially rely on an attorney’s representations.

    Bobst NA also attacked Kucsma’s conclusions as inconsistent with the record. It maintained that the work detail report shows Montgomery worked less overtime as a die cutter operator than as a feeder and only worked as a feeder in 2020. These are not “significant errors” that go to the admissibility of Kucsma’s opinion. They go to its weight.

    Kucsma can rely on Montgomery’s 2020 earnings because that figure is not “substantially higher than his average annual income.” While a jury may find that “an average or median of Montgomery’s earnings over several years is a more sensible approach” to calculate future earnings loss, Kucsma’s use of Montgomery’s last full year of earnings did not render her opinion unreliable for Rule 702 purposes.

    2. Intangible Damages

    Bobst NA argued that Kucsma’s opinions regarding damages for loss of companionship and advice-related services are unreliable and unsupported.

    It maintained that Kucsma provided “no analysis” or peer-reviewed studies showing that parental interaction is economically equivalent to hourly wages for paid companions, social workers, and financial advisors.

    In rendering her opinion, Kucsma relied on certain facts and assumptions about Montgomery, his adult children, and their relationships. There is no indication that Kucsma exaggerated, falsified, or misinterpreted the children’s responses. Indeed, she testified that Montgomery’s children had the opportunity to review the information in her report for its accuracy. Kucsma testified that she followed “the generally accepted method among economists” to attribute a pecuniary value to the intangible losses for which Plaintiff seeks to recover.

    The Court held that Kucsma has “good grounds” for her opinion based on her professional experience as a forensic economist and her testimony that her application of a services-based valuation framework is generally accepted within the relevant professional community.

    B. Fit

    Bobst NA also argued that Kucsma’s intangible damages opinion will not assist the jury, i.e., it does not fit, because it “invades the province of the jury.”

    The Court found that Kucsma’s explanation of the pecuniary value of advice, counsel, and companionship services will be “helpful in providing the jury with guidance and in avoiding the potential for undue speculation.” Specifically, her testimony regarding the hourly rates for companionship and advice-related services will assist the jury in assigning value to Plaintiff’s intangible losses.

    However, testimony concerning the frequency with which Montgomery provided such services is more appropriately elicited from his children themselves. Likewise, Kucsma’s presentation of specific damages calculations—derived from mathematical formulas incorporating the average hours of services rendered—would not assist the jury in assessing Plaintiff’s damages. As such, “there is no need for her expert testimony on these issues.”

    Held

    The Court granted in part and denied in part Bobst NA’s motion to exclude the testimony of Kristin K. Kucsma. Bobst NA’s motion is granted to the extent it sought to exclude Kucsma’s opinions as to the number of hours that Montgomery provided advice, counseling, and companionship services to his children, as well as her calculation of Plaintiff’s damages based on those estimates. Bobst NA’s motion is denied to the extent that it sought to exclude Kucsma’s opinions about Montgomery’s lost future earnings and the pecuniary value of advice, counseling, and companionship services.

    Key Takeaway

    It is within the trial court’s discretion to determine when a Plaintiff’s testimony about the decedent’s services will suffice and when an expert’s further testimony will aid the jury to make a reasonable evaluation of those services. Where such testimony is admitted, it should be followed by a charge that the expert’s opinion is only advisory, and that the jury should make its own determination of the economic value of decedent’s lost services.

    Please refer to the blog previously published about this case:

    Biomechanics Expert Allowed to Opine on the Cause of Death

    Pathology Expert Allowed to Opine on Pain and Suffering

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Montgomery V. Bobst Mex SA
    Docket Number: 2:24cv367
    Court Name: United States District Court, Pennsylvania Eastern
    Order Date: April 30, 2026
  • Economics Expert Allowed to Opine on Constant Inflation 

    Economics Expert Allowed to Opine on Constant Inflation 

    This is a consolidated action for securities fraud brought by Lead Plaintiff Los Angeles County Employees Retirement Association on behalf of a putative class of investors in the Ohio-based electrical utility company FirstEnergy Corporation. Plaintiffs alleged violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Securities Act of 1933 by FirstEnergy, its named officers and directors, and a group of underwriters, in connection with the Ohio House Bill 6 scandal.

    W. Scott Dalrymple was retained as an expert witness on behalf of Plaintiffs, and submitted an expert report in June 2022 analyzing whether FirstEnergy’s common stock traded in an efficient market and addressing whether damages could be calculated using a common methodology. Defendants filed a motion to exclude Dalrymple as an expert.

    Defendants did not challenge Dalrymple’s qualifications, nor did they challenge the reliability of an event study methodology generally. Instead, the issue advanced by Defendants is whether Dalrymple has sufficiently explained how he would or could apply his proposed methodology to the facts as alleged in the Complaint.

    Plaintiffs argued that Dalrymple has reliably applied his proposed technique to the facts of the case and has offered a reasonable view of constant inflation that could, at any rate, rest on assumptions of liability at this stage in the case.

    Economics Expert Witness

    William Scott Dalrymple is an economist and a CFA charter holder with extensive experience in economic, financial, and statistical analyses. During his career, he has worked on issues relating to the analysis of economic damages involving securities litigation, business valuation, structured finance, financial derivatives, antitrust, intellectual property, and breach of contract.

    Moreover, Dalrymple holds a Master of Science in Economics from the London School of Economics and Political Science and a Bachelor of Business Administration in Finance and Business Honors from the University of Texas at Austin. 

    Get the full story on challenges to W. Scott Dalrymple’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study. 

    Discussion by the Court

    To begin with, Defendants did not contest the testing, peer review and publication, or acceptance of event study methodologies generally; instead, they attempt to undermine the possible accuracy of Dalrymple’s proposed methodology in this particular instance. But Defendants advance this argument by misconstruing Dalrymple’s testimony and recharacterizing Plaintiffs’ theory of the case.

    Plaintiffs have presented a viable, consistent, and classwide approach to damages. Their theory is that Defendants “concealed corrupt conduct,” causing “FirstEnergy’s stock to trade at an inflated price throughout the Class Period” such that “revelations of Defendants’ corruption, beginning in July 202, caused this inflation to dissipate, damaging investors.” Under Plaintiffs’ theory, it may be the case that inflation is constant, or it may be variable. The Court need not reach that argument, or Defendants’ concern about Plaintiffs’ supposedly new criminal enterprise theory. Even if the inflation is time-varying, the fact that a damages model does not account for such variation is not a reason to discount the damages model at this stage.

    In sum, the Court is satisfied by Dalrymple’s testimony that any potential time variation in inflation could be accounted for under his proposed event study (or out-of-pocket) damages methodology. Overall, Defendants’ challenges to the accuracy of Dalrymple’s proposed methodology go to the weight of the evidence, not to its admissibility.

    To the extent that Defendants challenge Dalrymple’s testimony as inconsistent with his earlier expert reports or violative of Rules 26 or 37, neither argument is availing.

    Rule 26 “contemplates that the expert will supplement, elaborate upon, explain and subject himself to cross-examination upon his report.” That is what Dalrymple did, at Defendants’ request.

    Held

    The Court denied the Defendants’ motion to exclude the testimony of W. Scott Dalrymple.

    Key Takeaway

    Experts are permitted wide latitude in their opinions, including those not based on firsthand knowledge, so long as the expert’s opinion has a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of the discipline.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: In re Firstenergy Corp. Securities Litigation
    Docket Number: 2:20cv3785
    Court Name: United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Division
    Order Date: April 30, 2026
  • Economics Expert Allowed to Opine on Historic Losses

    Economics Expert Allowed to Opine on Historic Losses

    Plaintiff Sergio Romero was hired by Defendant Tribune Media Company (“Tribune”), a national media company that owns and operates various news outlets and television stations, as an Account Executive.

    On or around June 21, 2023, Plaintiff was diagnosed with gastric adenocarcinoma, also known as stomach cancer. To accommodate Plaintiff’s cancer diagnosis, Defendant authorized a medical leave of absence for Plaintiff on October 23, 2023. By February 28, 2024, Plaintiff’s approved FMLA/CFRA leave had been fully exhausted.

    After accommodating Plaintiff’s absence since October 2023, Defendant notified Plaintiff by letter on June 14, 2024 that his employment would be terminated on July 1, 2024 for failure to return from exhausted leave, resulting in Plaintiff filing a wrongful termination suit.

    Defendant filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff’s expert witness George A. Jouganatos, Ph.D. while Plaintiff filed a motion to strike or exclude the testimony of Defendant’s expert June Hagen, Ph.D. 

    Economics Expert Witness

    George A. Jouganatos, Ph.D. has been a college lecturer for more than 35 years. He has taught economics, finance, management, ethics, and quantitative analysis at University of California, Davis, University of California,
    Santa Cruz, California State University, Sacramento, and University of San Francisco.

    Discover more cases with George Jouganatos as an expert witness by ordering his comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

    Vocational Rehabilitation Expert Witness

    June Hagen is a vocational expert and Certified Disability Management Specialist with decades of experience in vocational assessments, labor market research, and disability evaluations. Hagen holds a Ph.D. in Clinical Psychology from the California Graduate Institute, an M.A. in Community/Clinical Psychology from Pepperdine University, and a B.A. in Psychology from Pepperdine University. She is certified by the American Board of Vocational Experts and has extensive experience in vocational rehabilitation and disability management.

    Want to know more about the challenges June Hagen has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    A. Defendant’s Motion to Exclude Plaintiff’s Expert

    Defendant argued that Jouganatos failed to submit a detailed and complete written expert report as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 as his report failed to contain the facts or data considered by Jouganatos in forming his opinions.

    To begin with, Jouganatos submitted a declaration in which he described his background and qualifications. In relevant part, he stated that his “assignment was to analyze the historic (‘back pay’) economic loss and the present value of future (‘front pay’) economic loss for Sergio Romero.” Moreover, he stated that he “employed a standard forensic economic methodology consisting of: (1) establishing a baseline earnings stream, (2) projecting earnings over worklife expectancy, (3) accounting for benefits, (4) applying wage growth, and (5) discounting to present value using a risk-free rate.”

    The following relevant documents were among those reviewed: Complaint, Romero’s employment record at Tribune, pay advices 2020-2024, resume, and responses to economist’s questionnaire and follow-up questions. Jouganatos calculated back pay as extending from July 1, 2024 to June 1, 2026, and front pay from June 1, 2026 going forward 3.58 years, the remainder of Plaintiff’s projected “worklife.”

    Having reviewed Jouganatos’s report, the Court found it sufficient for the purposes of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B)(ii). The report did not reproduce the questionnaire or responses and follow-up questions upon which the expert expressly relied. However, the scope of what Jouganatos testified to is limited and is adequately supported by documents in Defendants’ possession or that were obtainable by Defendant.

    B. Plaintiff’s Motion to Exclude Defendant’s Expert

    Plaintiff moved to exclude the statement of Defendant’s expert witness, vocational rehabilitation expert June Hagen, Ph.D., that Plaintiff could have found work within 23 weeks of his termination. Plaintiff asserted that this testimony should not be permitted because Hagen’s expert witness report failed to identify any substantially comparable positions that were available in December 2024; (2) Hagen’s reliance on Bureau of Labor Statistics to determine Plaintiff could have found comparable employment within 23 weeks from his termination is not based on any facts or evidence of substantially comparable positions in the Sacramento area; and (3) none of the open positions identified in Hagen’s expert witness report met the standard for “substantially similar employment.”

    Hagan’s report identified the documents she reviewed, which included deposition transcripts, court filings, and discovery responses. The report included a summary of Plaintiff’s personal, medical, educational, and work history, as well as his employment skills and history of compensation. The report included a timeline of Romero’s job search, which Hagen stated that she sourced from Plaintiff’s deposition.

    As a result, Plaintiff did not identify any procedural defect in the disclosure of Hagen under Rule 26.

    Held

    • The Court denied Plaintiff’s motion to exclude the testimony of Defendant’s expert, June Hagen, without prejudice to a motion in limine to be scheduled at the Final Pre-Trial Conference.
    • The Court denied Defendant’s motion to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff’s expert, George Jouganatos, without prejudice to a motion in limine to be scheduled at the Final Pre-Trial Conference.

    Key Takeaway

    The expert report must be complete such that opposing counsel is not forced to depose an expert in order to avoid ambush at trial; and moreover the report must be sufficiently complete so as to shorten or decrease the need for expert depositions and thus to conserve resources.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Romero V. Tribune Media Co.
    Docket Number: 2:24cv3143
    Court Name: United States District Court, California Eastern
    Order Date: April 23, 2026
  • Human Resources Expert Allowed to Opine on Termination

    Human Resources Expert Allowed to Opine on Termination

    This action arises out of Plaintiff Jon Evans’ employment with Defendant Critter Control Operations, Inc.

    During this employment, Plaintiff brought multiple concerns to Defendants’ Human Resources (HR) staff Ms. Rebecca Dye regarding “unfair treatment, safety concerns, and potentially fraudulent activity.” After eight and a half months of employment, Defendants terminated Plaintiff on October 18, 2021. Since then, Plaintiff has become employed elsewhere.

    Defendants filed Daubert motions to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff’s experts Laura Ingegneri and Michael J. Stokes.

    Human Resources Expert Witness

    Laura Ingegneri has over thirty years of HR experience and has conducted or reviewed over three hundred investigations.

    Discover more cases with Laura Ingegneri as an expert witness by ordering her comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

    Economics Expert Witness

    Michael J. Stokes earned an MBA from the Isenberg School of Management at the University of Massachusetts Amherst with a focus in entrepreneurship. He has 8 years of experience in providing expert analysis and testimony related to forensic economics, accounting, finance and statistics.

    Want to know more about the challenges Michael J. Stokes has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report. 

    Discussion by the Court

    Laura Ingegneri

    In preparation of her report, Ingegneri reviewed the operative pleading, deposition transcripts of Ms. Dye and other employees of Critter Control, and over two dozen documents that were referenced during those depositions.
    She concluded that Plaintiff’s allegations of serious misconduct are required to be “investigated promptly and thoroughly,” but “this did not appear to occur.”

    Analysis

    First, Defendants argued that Ingegneri’s testimony will not help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact at issue because she did not use any specialized knowledge. Whether Defendants—specifically, their HR staff—faithfully applied those policies and practices is not as intuitive as Defendants contend, as it would require some baseline knowledge of the HR industry.

    Second, Defendants argued that Ingegneri failed to “identify any specific principles or methods,” failed to “apply any specific principles and methods to the facts,” and made speculative conclusions. The content of the report showed otherwise. Ingegneri expressly stated the standards of internal investigations and handling employee complaints established by publications, reviewed Defendants’ own policies, and applied those standards and policies to specific facts she derived from a list of documents and party testimony.

    Third, Defendants argued that Ingegneri’s testimony is unreliable because she based her report on incomplete information or false assumptions. According to Defendants, at Ingegneri incorrectly assumed that Defendants never investigated Plaintiff’s allegations. The Court did not adopt Defendants’ interpretation. Ingegneri concluded that a prompt and thorough investigation “did not appear to occur,” not that no investigation occurred at all.

    Fourth, Defendants argued that Ingegneri’s conclusions pertaining to Defendants’ investigation are not relevant to Plaintiff’s wrongful termination claim. According to Defendants, Ingegneri analyzed and opined “on allegations unrelated to the live claims” by listing the various categories of complaints made by Plaintiff before his termination that include, for example, wage and hour issues. But several of these complaints relate to the alleged “unlawful business practices” in which Plaintiff refused to participate, and those complaints are relevant to Plaintiff’s wrongful termination claim.

    Michael Stokes 

    In preparing his report, Stokes reviewed three “alternative” pre-termination annual salaries ($100,000; $130,000; and $165,000), Plaintiff’s work life expectancy based on his age at the time of termination, and an allocation of fringe benefits. Based on this information, Stokes concluded that the present value of loss of Plaintiff’s earnings and benefits ranged from $442,661 to $1,206,330.

    Analysis

    Defendants argued that the three base earnings Stokes used to calculate damages are improper because they are “aspirational” and higher than Plaintiff’s actual earnings in the eight months he was employed by Defendants ($51,589) or that he could have earned over the entire year ($72,703). But they did not argue that Stokes’ methods and application of those methods to those numbers, aspirational as they might be, were unreliable. Plaintiff contended, and the Court agreed, that the use of hypothetical base earnings goes to the testimony’s weight, not admissibility

    Defendants further took issue that the salary hypotheticals are borne only from Plaintiff’s counsel’s assumptions, so Stokes’ report violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B). Here, Stokes’ report openly recited what base earnings he relies upon for his calculations and explains that the source of those earnings was Plaintiff’s counsel. The Court found that this disclosure sufficient for the purposes of Rule 26.

    Defendants’ concern that there is no evidence Plaintiff ever made, or was on track to make, $100,000, $130,000, or $165,000 while in Defendants’ employ is well-taken, however. In response, Plaintiff alludes to evidence that supports these numbers but has not yet made a specific showing of it apart from stating that a co-worker made “nearly $120,000.” The Court will entertain Defendants’ objection if that foundational evidence is not admitted before Stokes testifies.

    Moreover, the fact that Stokes did not account for Plaintiff’s supposed mitigation of damages is another example of a point Defendants may test before the jury.

    Finally, Defendants argued that Stokes’ declaration is an improper supplement to his report. It is not. Stokes’ declaration is only used to support Plaintiff’s responsive brief to Defendants’ motion, and the Court reviews it as such.

    Held

    The Court denied Defendants’ Daubert motions to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff’s experts Laura Ingegneri and Michael J. Stokes.

    Key Takeaway

    The use of hypotheticals, on its own, does not render an expert’s testimony unreliable. Rather, the proper vehicle through which the hypotheticals can be tested is cross-examination and introduction of contrary evidence.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Evans V. Critter Control Operations Incorporated
    Docket Number: 2:22cv2049
    Court Name: United States District Court, Arizona
    Order Date: April 21, 2026