Expert Witness Profiler

Category: Emergency Medicine Expert Witness

  • Emergency Medicine Expert Not Allowed to Opine on Implicit Bias

    Emergency Medicine Expert Not Allowed to Opine on Implicit Bias

    Following her husband’s death from COVID-19 complications, Plaintiff I’Esha Short (I’Esha) brought this action seeking damages for the medical care he received at the St. Charles County Jail.

    Defendants sought to exclude the testimony of I’Esha’s lone expert, Joel Blackburn, a former medical director at a jail with extensive experience in emergency medicine.

    Emergency Medicine Expert Witness

    Joel M. Blackburn has practiced Emergency Medicine for over 24 years. He was the facility medical director for the emergency department at Capital Region Medical Center in Jefferson City for nearly 2 years during the COVID pandemic. Blackburn has treated hundreds of patients with COVID infection.

    Want to know more about the challenges Joel Blackburn has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    I. Motion to Exclude Blackburn

    a. Blackburn can testify as to medical causation.

    Defendants offered three main arguments for why Blackburn cannot provide testimony regarding causation. First, they contended that Blackburn lacked relevant expertise. Second, Defendants argued that Blackburn utilized unreliable principles and methods or that he unreliably applied his methodology to the facts. Third, Defendants suggested that Blackburn’s opinions provide little probative value.

    1. Blackburn lacked relevant expertise

    Defendants first argued that Blackburn lacked expertise to testify as to causation. In particular, they emphasize that he “did not practice medicine in a correctional setting during the COVID-19 pandemic,” specialize in various relevant fields, or conduct research into COVID.

    While the fact that he did not practice medicine in a correctional facility during the COVID pandemic may prove fertile ground for cross-examination, it does not override his relevant expertise. As such, Blackburn’s testimony is not excludable on that basis.

    2. Blackburn utilized unreliable principles and methods

    First, Defendants contended that Blackburn failed to consider alternative explanations for Timothy’s death, including his decision to “remain unvaccinated,” his “non compliance with his healthcare needs,” and the “substantial intervening medical care that [he] received at a hospital.”

    However, Blackburn did consider the bulk of the alternative causes that Defendants highlight.

    Second, Defendants contended that Blackburn “cannot reliably conclude under oath that any alleged delay in escalation of care . . . caused Short’s death” because he discounted the possibility that earlier administration of medication could have prevented that outcome.

    While Blackburn opined that earlier administration of the drug alone would not have changed the outcome, he indicated that Timothy needed a combination of interventions and that earlier admission to the hospital would have prevented his death.

    In any event, “an expert’s contradictions or concessions go toward the weight of the evidence put forth by the expert, not toward its admissibility.”

    Third, Defendants claimed that Blackburn offered only impermissible “sooner is better” testimony. In reality, he testified that earlier and more extensive intervention would “more likely than not” have prevented Timothy’s death.

    Finally, Defendants claimed that Blackburn’s testimony is not supported by medical literature. But “while published studies tending to support an expert’s opinion often are a hallmark of admissible testimony, . . . there is no requirement that a medical expert must always cite published studies on general causation.” Thus, Defendants failed to show why Blackburn should be excluded on the basis of unreliable methodology.

    3. Blackburn’s opinions provide little probative value

    Finally, Defendants contended that Blackburn’s testimony is more prejudicial than probative. The Court held that Blackburn’s testimony as to causation is admissible because he has relevant expertise, is sufficiently reliable, and will not create undue prejudice.

    b. Blackburn’s opinions as to implicit bias are excludable under Rule 702.

    Defendants also argued that Blackburn’s testimony regarding implicit bias should be excluded under Rule 702.

    Defendants are right that Blackburn cannot testify as to implicit bias. As an initial matter, it is far from clear how implicit bias testimony would be relevant to the key issues underlying a deliberate-indifference claim, which requires a conscious awareness of a serious medical need.

    More importantly, as the proponent of his opinion, I’Esha “must show by a preponderance of the evidence both that Blackburn is qualified to render the opinion and that the methodology underlying his conclusions is scientifically valid.”

    But Blackburn’s own testimony reveals that, while he lectured in the area of cognitive bias in prison medicine, he is not otherwise qualified in this area.

    c. Blackburn cannot opine on credibility, legal conclusions, or medical bills.

    Defendants also noted that Blackburn impermissibly commented on witness credibility in his report and during his deposition, offered opinions as to legal conclusions, and commented on medical bills.

    I’Esha agreed that Blackburn cannot offer those kinds of opinions.

    II. Motion to Strike Blackburn’s Rebuttal Report

    Defendants asked the Court to strike portions of Blackburn’s rebuttal report addressing the Nurse Defendants, claiming that he should have included these opinions in his initial report.

    But as I’Esha noted, Blackburn added these opinions only after Defendants designated the four nurses as non-retained experts, which happened well after he issued his original report.

    She contended that the rebuttal report does not contain new opinions and, even if so, it would not be procedurally improper.

    Defendants’ arguments fall short for multiple reasons. First, given that they seek a discovery sanction under Rule 37(c), the operative case management order required them to first “file a memorandum requesting a video conference with the Court.” But no such request was made, and Defendants also failed to comply with the Court’s good-faith certification requirement.

    Nor have Defendants even attempted to show good cause for making this request after the discovery-motion deadline.

    The Court held that these procedural deficiencies alone are a sufficient basis for denying relief. But the motion also fails on the merits. After Defendants designated the nurses as experts, I’Esha was free to buttress Blackburn’s opinions to address the expanded categories on which the nurses could testify, and the challenged opinions were limited to the subjects outlined in the nurses’ disclosures.

    Thus, these opinions were timely under Rule 26(a)(2)(D)(ii), and even if they were not, any delay was substantially justified.

    Held

    The Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ joint motion to exclude Dr. Joel Blackburn’s testimony and denied Defendants’ joint motion to strike improper portions of Plaintiff’s expert’s rebuttal report.

    Key Takeaway

    There is no requirement for perfect symmetry between an expert’s experience and the precise subject matter of their testimony so long as the expert’s background equips him to help the jury understand the facts or issues in dispute. Blackburn is a board-certified physician with extensive experience treating COVID.

    While Blackburn may lack expertise in some relevant specialties, a doctor’s opinion should not be excluded merely because it involves a field of medicine that he does not specialize in.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Short V. St. Charles County
    Docket Number: 4:22cv1117
    Court Name: United States District Court, Missouri Eastern
    Order Date: July 09, 2026
  • Emergency Medicine Expert Not Allowed to Opine on Loss of Vision

    Emergency Medicine Expert Not Allowed to Opine on Loss of Vision

    Plaintiff, Amaris I Ward, who was seventeen years old during the events of this case, sought medical treatment at Madigan Army Medical Center (“MAMC”) over several weeks in October 2022.

    Plaintiff alleged that emergency care providers at MAMC failed to properly evaluate and diagnose her with acute bacterial rhinosinusitis on October 16, 2022, which led to their failure to determine the extent of the sinusitis so it could be treated in a timely fashion. As a result, Plaintiff alleged that the bacterial infection progressed untreated for more than 30 hours, which caused permanent damage to the optic nerve in her left eye, resulting in permanent blindness in the left eye. Plaintiff alleged that these actions amounted to a breach of the standard of care of reasonably prudent emergency care providers when confronted with symptoms such as Plaintiff’s.

    Defendants filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff’s expert, Dr. Richard O. Cummins.

    Emergency Medicine Expert Witness

    Richard Oliver Cummins is board-certified in both internal medicine and emergency medicine.

    He joined the faculty of the Department of Medicine at the University of Washington in 1981, and was promoted to the rank of full Professor in 1993. As a member of the Department of Emergency Medicine he worked as an attending physician in the UWMC Emergency Department, providing clinical care, supervising medical students and emergency medicine residents in training, as well as providing direct patient care.

    Discover more cases with Richard Cummins as an expert witness by ordering his comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

    Discussion by the Court

    1. Cummins is qualified as an expert

    Defendants argued that Cummins did not have the clinical experience or educational basis to anchor his causation opinion about the cause of Plaintiff’s infection.

    The Court noted that Cummins is qualified to testify because he has been medical physician for several decades and is board-certified in both internal and emergency medicine.

    Although he is not an infectious disease specialist, he is a board-certified emergency medicine physician with over 39 years of experience. To the extent there is a challenge to Cummins’ qualifications, the Court is satisfied he has demonstrated at least a “minimal foundation of knowledge, skill, and expertise required” to give expert testimony on the issues in this case.

    2. Cummins’ methodology is not reliable

    Defendants argued that Cummins opined that the failure to start Plaintiff on either levofloxacin or moxifloxacin on October 16, 2026 caused her permanent loss of vision—and argued that this opinion is unreliable.

    According to Cummins, a “causal chain” of failures to comply with the standards of reasonable emergency department care led to Plaintiff’s vision loss. Within the “causal chain” was the failure to timely initiate “appropriate treatment,” otherwise identified as “appropriate intravenous antibiotics.”

    Cummins determined from review of available records that Plaintiff’s left eye blindness was caused by “damage to her optic nerve (optic neuropathy) from her infectious sphenoid sinusitis,” which contained fusobacterium necrophorium. But nowhere in Cummins’ expert report or deposition testimony did he explain why or how the failure to diagnose Plaintiff with severe bacterial pan-sinusitis caused damage to her optic nerve.

    Simply put, the Court cannot identify the generally accepted methodology Cummins used in arriving at his medical conclusions on causation. When asked how he reached the opinion that if physicians had given Plaintiff antibiotics on October, the antibiotics would have been effective to prevent Plaintiff’s vision loss, Cummins stated, “A general experience that antibiotics often work.” To the extent Cummins’ opinions are based on his general experience, he did not explain “how that experience leads to the conclusion reached, why that experience is a sufficient basis for the opinion, and how that experience is reliably applied to the facts.”

    Held

    The Court granted Defendants’ motion to exclude the testimony of Dr. Richard Cummins.

    Key Takeaway

    A medical expert may rely heavily on their experience, but they must still explain their methods. Put differently, the opinion must describe a “methodology that can be challenged in some objective sense” because “a subjective, conclusory approach cannot reasonably be assessed for reliability.”

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Ward V. United States Of America
    Docket Number: 3:24cv5836
    Court Name: United States District Court, Washington Western
    Order Date: June 12, 2026
  • Cardiology Expert Allowed to Opine on the Need for Additional Treatment

    Cardiology Expert Allowed to Opine on the Need for Additional Treatment

    This medical-negligence/wrongful-death case resulting from the tragic death of Formeka Ball. Ms. Ball was admitted to the River Oaks Hospital Emergency Room complaining of chest pain and shortness of breath that started earlier that morning. After she died, Plaintiff Patricia Ball, Ms. Ball’s mother and the administratrix of her estate, sued River Oaks.

    Defendants challenged Plaintiff’s experts, Dr. Todd A. Parker and Dr. Ronald H. Wharton.

    Emergency Medicine Expert Witness

    Todd Allen Parker is a board-certified emergency-medicine physician and an attending physician. He is an editor and chapter author of a major Emergency Medicine board review textbook published by the American Academy of Emergency Medicine.

    Get the full story on challenges to Todd Parker’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Cardiology Expert Witness

    Ronald Howard Wharton is board certified in cardiovascular disease, completed a residency in internal medicine and a fellowship in cardiovascular disease, and is an associate professor of cardiology at the Zucker School of Medicine of Hofstra University in New York.

    He is also an attending cardiologist at a hospital in Manhasset, New
    York.

    Want to know more about the challenges Ronald Wharton has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Defendants mostly accepted their qualifications but said that their testimony is unreliable and thus inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 702.

    Parker and Wharton offered similar core opinions. Though Ball was given a troponin test in the ER to determine whether she was having a heart attack, they believe she should have received a second troponin test after more observation. Had that test been done, they believe it would have detected the need for additional treatment and that she would not have died from cardiac arrest later that night.

    1. Speculative and Conclusory Opinions

    Both Parker and Wharton offered opinions on the standard of care, breach, and causation. According to Defendants, Parker and Wharton failed “to take into account facts established by the family members’ depositions” regarding the onset of symptoms and have “no autopsy, no abnormal EKG, and no abnormal laboratory testing which factually supports the experts’ opinions.”

    Parker’s initial report indicated that Ball “presented to the ED with a history & physical that is a ‘textbook’ case of how cardiac ischemia presents.” He then described that history and those symptoms, including Ball’s score on a clinical guideline (the HEART score and Heart pathway).

    Parker also conducted a differential diagnosis, ruling in cardiac arrest and ruling out other causes of her symptoms. The Court found the methodology sufficiently reliable to meet Plaintiff’s burden under Rule 702.

    According to Defendants, Parker and Wharton missed evidence and had no autopsy to consider. Neither is dispositive. Because Plaintiff met Rule 702’s burden, Defendants’ other factual arguments go to weight.

    2. Wharton’s Qualifications

    According to Wharton, Ball would have survived if given treatment, including “medications and reperfusion therapy (either percutaneous coronary intervention or bypass surgery).”

    Defendants said that Wharton is unqualified to give this opinion because he is neither an interventional cardiologist nor a cardiovascular surgeon.

    Even assuming he did not currently perform the procedures he noted, Defendants have not explained why a cardiologist with his knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education would lack the expertise to explain how heart attacks are treated.

    Defendants next complained that Wharton lacked the qualifications to agree with the coroner’s finding that cardiac arrest caused the death.

    This was a new argument. While Wharton addressed the issue again in his new affidavit, his original report noted the coroner’s finding and stated that “more likely than not, Ball died from complications of an acute myocardial infarction.” Thus, Defendants could have initially argued that Wharton needed to be a pathologist to testify regarding the cause of death. That argument would have allowed Plaintiff an opportunity to respond.

    This qualifications argument is untimely, and the Court will not strike Wharton based on qualifications.

    3. Failure to Identify Specific Life-Saving Treatment

    After arguing that Wharton is unqualified to address the specific procedures he believes would have saved Ball, Defendants fault Plaintiff’s experts for failing to “establish that timely diagnosis would have led to an identified course of treatment and that treatment would more likely than not, have prevented death within the relevant time window.”

    But the experts’ initial reports did not mention specific treatment, so Defendants could have faulted the experts for this omission in their opening brief. The argument is therefore untimely.

    Held

    The Court denied the Defendants’ motion to strike the testimony of Todd Parker and Ronald Wharton.

    Key Takeaway

    The Court should make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Ball V. River Oaks Hospital, LLC
    Docket Number: 3:24cv632
    Court Name: United States District Court, Mississippi Southern
    Order Date: June 11, 2026
  • Law Enforcement Expert Was Not Allowed to Opine on the Officers’ Intent

    Law Enforcement Expert Was Not Allowed to Opine on the Officers’ Intent

    This case arises from officers’ alleged excessive use of force during an investigation of a 911 call regarding Plaintiff Henry Barnhill (“Barnhill”).

    Defendants City of Hemet, Brett Maynard, Joshua Bishop, Pedro Aguila, Douglas Klinzing, Jamie Gonzalez, and Catherine Tipton (collectively, “Defendants”) filed two motions (1) to exclude certain opinion and testimony of expert Dr. Ryan O’Connor and (2) to exclude certain opinion and testimony of expert Roger Clark.

    Emergency Medicine Expert Witness

    Ryan Scarritt O’Connor is a 20-year attending ER physician who is board-certified and has completed several clinical rotations in neurology, ophthalmology, biomechanics, general surgery, and traumatic medicine, among others, and holds a Master of Science in criminalistics with education in crime scene reconstruction.

    Discover more cases with Ryan O’Connor as an expert witness by ordering his comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

    Law Enforcement Expert Witness

    Roger Alma Clark is a retired law enforcement professional with 27 years of experience in the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (LASD). He was hired on December 1, 1965, and served until his retirement on March 31, 1993. Throughout his distinguished career, he held several key positions, including six years as a Deputy Sheriff, six years as a Sergeant, and 15 years as a Lieutenant. Roger retired with a California Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) Advanced Certificate and is a graduate of the POST Command College, class #5, 1988.

    Get the full story on challenges to Roger Clark’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Discussion by the Court

    Ryan O’Connor

    Defendants sought to exclude the opinions of Barnhill’s medical expert, O’Connor, regarding his conclusions that the incident resulted in Barnhill sustaining certain injuries.

    Defendants based their arguments on the fact that (1) O’Connor is an ER doctor, rather than a specialist in ophthalmology; (2) O’Connor relied more heavily on the officers’ statements as opposed to the video evidence; and (3) O’Connor failed to take into consideration all of Barnhill’s medical history. However, given O’Connor’s education, credentials, and experience, the Court held that Defendants’ concerns speak to the weight, rather than admissibility under FRE 702 and Daubert.

    Roger Clark

    To begin with, Defendants sought to exclude opinions by Barnhill’s police-practices expert, Roger Clark, regarding his “legal conclusions concerning the officers’ use of force, standards within the City of Hemet and the Hemet Police Department, the officers’ mental and emotional states and intentions, interpretations of the videos taken from officers’ body cameras, and all other conclusions and opinions based on Clark’s flawed methodology, which omits important information contained in the footage and is admittedly impermissibly intertwined with Plaintiff’s counsel’s opinions.”

    To the extent that Clark offered legal conclusions, such as that the officers used unreasonable or excessive force during the incident, the Court granted the motion to exclude. Clark was also precluded from opining on the officers’ intent or emotional states and on the medical cause of Barnhill’s injuries.

    However, to the extent that Clark’s testimony was limited to whether the officers’ conduct was consistent with California Peace Officer Standards and Training (“POST”) standards governing the use of force, the Court denied the motion. This basically included determinations based on Clark’s review of the video evidence demonstrating how Barnhill was responding during the incident, which were relevant to whether the officers’ conduct comported with POST standards in light of Barnhill’s actions.

    Held

    • The Court denied Defendants’ motion to exclude the testimony of Ryan O’Connor.
    • The Court granted in part and denied in part the motion to exclude the testimony of Roger Clark.

    Key Takeaway

    In conclusion, a jury could rely on expert testimony as to whether police conduct comported with POST standards.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Henry Barnhill V. City Of Hemet
    Docket Number: 5:23cv589
    Court Name: United States District Court, California Central
    Order Date: June 03, 2026
  • Corrections Expert’s Standard of Care Testimony Admitted

    Corrections Expert’s Standard of Care Testimony Admitted

    Terri Beth Mays died on November 4, 2021, while she was an inmate at the Whitley County Detention Center. Her Estate (“Mays’ Estate”) alleged that Jail personnel, nurses, and medical providers were responsible for ensuring her health and safety while she was in their custody, yet they failed to address her obviously serious medical needs and acted with deliberate indifference to those needs.

    Mays’ Estate named as Defendants Whitley County; Jailer Brian Lawson; Sergeants Austin Caldwell and Joseph Cureton; Deputy Jailers Sula Bowman, Kaytee George, Zach Hughes, and Nick Huddleston; Southern Health Partners, Inc.

    Defendants filed three motions to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff’s expert witnesses: Anthony Callisto as well as Doctors Terren Trott, MD and Lori Roscoe.

    Corrections Expert Witness

    Anthony Callisto, Jr. has over 40 years of experience in the correctional system. His experience is vast, ranging from correctional officer, Chief Deputy, Chief Law Enforcement Officer, American Jail Association President, and criminal justice professor.

    Get the full story on challenges to Anthony Callisto’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Nursing Expert Witness

    Lori E. Roscoe is an Advanced Practice Registered Nurse, certified through the National Commission on Correctional Health Care as a Certified Correctional Health Professional Registered Nurse (CCHP-RN).

    She has a Doctor of Nursing Practice degree from the University of Alabama, and a PhD in Healthcare Administration. Roscoe has a Master of Science degree in Nursing and a Master’s degree in Public Administration with a Healthcare Concentration. Roscoe began working in Corrections in 1995 as the Health Service Administrator for a female prison in the Northeastern United States. She has worked as an Associate Program Director and as a Regional Administrator on the statewide level. She has correctional business expertise in healthcare operations, policy and procedure development, project management, Continuous Quality Improvement, human resources, staff orientation and development, finance and contract auditing. Roscoe has worked with staff to achieve successful facility accreditation from both the National Commission on Correctional Health Care and the American Correctional Association.

    Discover more cases with Lori Roscoe as an expert witness by ordering her comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

    Emergency Medicine Expert Witness

    Dr. Terren R. Trott is an academic emergency medicine and critical care physician at the University of Kentucky College of Medicine.

    Want to know more about the challenges Terren Trott has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    A. Motion to Exclude the Testimony of Corrections Expert Anthony Castillo

    The Defendants argued that Castillo is unqualified and that his methodologies are unreliable. Further, the Defendants argued that his opinions are too general to be prescribed to any one Defendant.

    However, Castillo’s past background provided extensive technical and specialized knowledge that will help the jury understand the evidence on this case.

    The Defendants took issue with the fact that Castillo has never worked in Kentucky nor had he been in a small rural jail prior to his visit to the Whitley County Jail. The issue with the Defendants’ contention here is that it calls into question Castillo’s credibility, not admissibility.

    The Defendants accused Castillo of basing his opinions on “broad correctional standards rather than specific Kentucky statutes.” His report explicitly disproved this. Exhibit A of his report lists the “Sources Reflecting and Informing the Standard of Care.” Named among these standards are the Whitley County Detention Center Policies and Procedures, as well as multiple statutes and regulations. Likewise, Castillo’s report indicated that he reviewed all relevant pleadings, reports, depositions, and policies.

    Castillo’s ninety-nine page report is a comprehensive analysis of the Defendants’ roles and how their actions relate to the applicable standard of care. To the extent that the Defendants contested his opinion for being too generalized, they are disputing his conclusions, not his methodology.

    B. Motion to Exclude the Testimony of Dr. Terren Trott, MD and Dr. Lori Roscoe

    The Defendants’ motion as to Terren Trott and Lori Roscoe was simple. They argued that “neither witness is qualified to render opinions regarding Whitley County jail policies or practices.” Because of this, they objected to any testimony by either of these witnesses that non-medical personnel actions were negligent or reckless. The Plaintiff did not contest this motion.

    The Plaintiff agreed that neither of these experts will give opinions on Kentucky Jail standards, Whitley County Jail policies or procedures or that any non-medical Defendants’ actions violated the law. Finding no disagreement here, the Court concluded that Doctors Trott and Roscoe are barred from giving opinions regarding the non-medical Defendants’ culpability.

    Held

    • The Court denied Defendants’ motions to exclude the testimony of Anthony Castillo.
    • The Court granted Defendants’ motion to exclude the testimony of Doctors Terren Trott and Lori Roscoe.

    Key Takeaway

    Castillo’s lack of experience in an identical facility goes to the weight of his testimony, which is a matter properly left to the jury. Rule 702 does not require an expert to have identical background experience.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Webb V. Whitley County, Kentucky
    Docket Number: 6:23cv188
    Court Name: United States District Court, Kentucky Eastern
    Order Date: April 21, 2026
  • Emergency Medicine Was Expert Allowed to Opine on Correctional Oversight

    Emergency Medicine Was Expert Allowed to Opine on Correctional Oversight

    Approximately 30 hours after Mark Beckner was booked into the Santa Cruz County Jail, he was found dead in his cell. Beckner’s son, Brandon Beckner, and his estate (“Plaintiffs”) filed suit asserting that the County of Santa Clara, correctional officers, and jail personnel were deliberately indifferent to Beckner’s serious medical needs in violation of federal and state law.

    Plaintiffs filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Patrick Ennis, M.D., who is one of California Forensic Medical Group (“CFMG”) Defendants’ expert witnesses. CFMG Defendants filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Jeffrey E. Keller, M.D., one of Plaintiffs’ expert witnesses.

    Correctional Healthcare Expert Witness

    Patrick K. Ennis, M.D. is a general physician and withdrawal specialist working in the field of corrections in Chicago, Illinois.

    Get the full story on challenges to Patrick Ennis’ expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Emergency Medicine Expert Witness

    Jeffrey Ernest Keller, M.D. is an emergency medicine physician licensed to practice in Idaho. He has experience providing direct clinical care to incarcerated patients and supervising medical programs in both jails and prisons.

    Want to know more about the challenges Jeffrey Keller has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    1. Testimony of CFMG Defendants’ Expert Patrick Ennis, M.D.

    CFMG Defendants designated Ennis “to provide expert testimony on the standard of care and actions and inactions of CFMG staff during Beckner’s medical care at the Santa Cruz County Jail.”

    However, Plaintiffs argued that (1) Ennis lacked the requisite qualifications to testify to specific standards of care, likely course of treatment in an emergency room, and the likely outcome of those treatments, and (2) Ennis’ opinions are not sufficiently reliable. The Court disagreed. First, Ennis is sufficiently qualified to testify to the proffered topics given his experience working “as an attending physician for the Department of Correctional Health Services/Cermak Health Services of Cook County in Chicago, Illinois since 2017” and as “the Medical Director of the Cermak Health Services of Cook County Opioid Treatment Program since March of 2022,” where he “works with correctional nurses everyday.”

    CFMG Defendants pointed out that Ennis’ testimony concerning the likely course of treatment in an emergency room and the outcome of those treatments is offered only in rebuttal to Plaintiffs’ expert Keller’s testimony. The Court found that Ennis’ education, training, credentials, and experience as a medical doctor in a correctional setting qualifies him as an expert to discuss standards of care and to rebut Keller’s testimony. Second, Ennis’ opinions are based upon sufficient facts and data given that Ennis conducted a blind review of the records in forming his opinion. Accordingly, the Court found that his opinions are sufficiently reliable.

    2. Testimony of Plaintiffs’ Expert Jeffrey Keller, M.D.

    Plaintiffs designated Keller to testify to correctional medical systems and oversight, clinical correctional care, emergency department care services and procedures, and emergency transport.

    CFMG Defendants did not challenge Keller’s qualifications as a medical professional in a correctional setting. CFMG Defendants instead argued that: (1) Keller’s opinions that Beckner’s death was preventable and that he suffered unnecessarily are speculative, contradict well-established scientific fact, and, as such, are unreliable and more prejudicial than probative; and (2) Keller’s opinions that any actions or omissions by Defendant CFMG caused any harm to Beckner are speculative and are unsupported by sufficient facts. The Court disagreed with both arguments.

    Keller based his opinions on his personal experience as an emergency room physician and his personal experience treating ruptured arteries (though not splanchnic artery ruptures). This is a sufficiently reliable basis for his opinions. Further, Keller’s opinions about Defendant CFMG’s actions are based on the operative complaint, grand jury testimony submitted with the complaint, Beckner’s medical chart, CFMG’s “policies and nursing protocols,” and the testimony of nurse Defendant Sarah Hewett, among other sources. Again, this is a sufficient factual basis for Keller’s opinions in this case. The Court found that Keller’s opinions are sufficiently reliable when coupled with his experience and credentials.

    Held

    The Court denied both Plaintiffs’ motion to exclude the testimony of Patrick Ennis and Defendants’ motion to exclude the testimony of Jeffrey Keller.

    Key Takeaway

    Expert opinion testimony is relevant if the knowledge underlying it has a valid connection to the pertinent inquiry. And it is reliable if the knowledge underlying it has a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of the relevant discipline.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Beckner V. County Of Santa Cruz
    Docket Number: 5:23cv5032
    Court Name: United States District Court, California Northern
    Order Date: March 26, 2026
  • Emergency Medicine Expert Was Not Allowed to Opine on Sedation

    Emergency Medicine Expert Was Not Allowed to Opine on Sedation

    This litigation stems from the death of Charles Lamar Vanlandingham in September of 2019. Plaintiff alleged that Vanlandingham suffered a medical episode with seizure activity in the early morning hours of September 15, 2019, and Vanlandingham’s girlfriend called 911. According to Plaintiff, Vanlandingham started to improve in the time it took EMS to arrive. Following the seizure activity, Vanlandingham had apparently transitioned to a “postictal state” that can cause confusion.

    Although Vanlandingham was initially compliant with EMS upon their arrival, Plaintiff alleged that “EMS providers tried to force Vanlandingham onto their medical cot,” and when Vanlandingham did not comply, “[EMT] Tuttle ultimately tackled Vanlandingham onto the medical cot.”

    Once members of the Oklahoma City Fire Department arrived, Plaintiff alleged that the Firefighters used their body weight to pin Vanlandingham in the prone position for approximately three minutes before Oklahoma City Police Officer Brandon Lee arrived. Officer Lee then put handcuffs on Vanlandingham—still in the prone position—and placed his knee across Vanlandingham’s back.

    Plaintiff alleged that Vanlandingham was in this position, handcuffed, for approximately four minutes, during which time “no one checked Vanlandingham’s vitals or advocated for a position change despite Vanlandingham’s clear signs of respiratory distress.” “Without knowing Mr. Vanlandingham’s vitals and without performing any kind of medical assessment,” EMT Tuttle then administered midazolam (a sedative), and Vanlandingham went limp. CPR efforts were unsuccessful, and Vanlandingham died at the scene.

    Plaintiff’s claims are against Defendants City of Oklahoma City, Officer Brandon Lee, and American Medical Response Ambulance Service, Inc. (AMRAS). During discovery, AMRAS disclosed an expert report prepared by Molly A. Furin, M.D., M.S., who is board certified in both Emergency Medicine and Emergency Medical Services.

    In the present motion, Plaintiff contended that Furin’s offered opinions should be excluded under Fed. R. Evid. 702.

    Emergency Medicine Expert Witness

    Molly Ann Furin is board-certified in both Emergency Medicine and Emergency Medical Services (EMS) and has obtained a Master of Science in Disaster Medicine and Management.

    She has worked at a level 1 trauma center for the past 17 years as well as community Emergency Departments.

    Want to know more about the challenges Molly Furin has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    I. Timeliness of Furin’s Supplement

    Furin supplemented her expert report on May 20, 2025. In it, Furin did not expand the opinions listed in her initial report, but she did provide supplemental explanation of her education and experience in the emergency medicine field. Plaintiff contended that Furin’s supplement is untimely under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(2).

    Furin issued her supplemental report. However, Rule 26(a)(3) also refers to the deadline to file deposition designations, which has yet to expire. Accordingly, the Court found that Furin’s supplement of May 20, 2025, is timely under Rule 26(e)(2).

    II. Daubert Motion

    • Paramedic Tuttle and EMT Barnes performed an appropriate rapid assessment of Vanlandingham upon arrival, including checking blood glucose, and could not proceed with further evaluation and treatment because it became unsafe to do so. Evaluating for scene safety is one of the first skills taught in Emergency Medical Services, and the crew appropriately called for additional resources in a timely manner. Physical restraint of Vanlandingham was necessary at the time in order to prevent harm or injury to himself or crew members.
    • Upon the arrival of OCFD personnel, including Paramedic Morton, care was correctly transitioned to Paramedic Morton.
    • Paramedic Tuttle assisted the OCFD by drawing up and administering midazolam IM as requested. Sedation was paramount in order to further evaluate and treat Vanlandingham. Midazolam is a benzodiazepine, utilized for both sedation and treatment of seizures, and when administered intramuscularly takes a minimum of several minutes to take effect. Given the very brief time interval after administration, the midazolam had no causative role in Vanlandingham’s subsequent cardiac arrest.
    • When Vanlandingham sustained cardiac arrest, he was efficiently treated with high quality [Advanced Cardiovascular Life Support] care.

    Analysis

    First, the Court found that Furin’s initial report failed to clearly identify the basis for her opinions or explain how certain standards or her experience lead to the conclusions reached. Furin did not identify how her experience in the emergency medicine field led to her specific opinions.

    Next, Furin’s supplemental expert report did little to expand on the basis for her four opinions. Rather, Furin focuses on her qualifications to issue opinions regarding emergency medicine.

    Furin has largely failed—even after supplementing her report—to provide a basis for her opinions. Furin’s experience in emergency medicine, standing alone, is not sufficient to support her opinion that EMS “could not proceed with further evaluation because it became unsafe to do so.” Apart from explaining her experience in emergency medicine and providing examples of transitions of care, Furin’s supplemental report does not sufficiently explain how her experience (or knowledge of the industry standard) led her to opine that the transition of care in this case was “correct.”

    Next, Furin’s supplement did not provide a basis for her opinion that “sedation was paramount in order to further evaluate and treat Vanlandingham.”

    Although Furin stated that she “reviewed the patient care reports and documents provided to me, and is qualified to opine as to the quality of care provided when Vanlandingham sustained cardiac arrest,” Furin failed to provide any basis or reasoning for her opinion that the care provided to Vanlandingham was efficient and high quality.

    A portion of Furin’s third opinion was admissible under Rule 702 and Daubert because Furin has provided a sufficient basis for it. Furin can opine that—given her firsthand knowledge and experience with the administration and onset of midazolam—the midazolam could not have taken effect before Vanlandingham’s cardiac arrest.

    Held

    The Court granted in part and denied in part Plaintiff’s motion to exclude the opinions of Dr. Molly Furin.

    Key Takeaway

    It is fundamental that, if the basis for an expert’s opinions is to be tested for reliability, that basis must be identified in some fashion. Absent some identification of the basis for the expert opinion, there is little or no way to test it against any of the guidelines or factors involved in a Daubert analysis or to otherwise determine its reliability.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Vanlandingham V. City of Oklahoma City
    Docket Number: 5:22cv209
    Court Name: United States District Court, Oklahoma Western
    Order Date: March 18, 2026
  • Emergency Medicine Expert Was Allowed to Opine on Medical Management

    Emergency Medicine Expert Was Allowed to Opine on Medical Management

    On September 27, 2022, Plaintiffs Aislyn Batista Acevedo, Ina Ruth Kessler Krugman, and minor A.D.S.B. (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed the instant suit on behalf of the late David Suárez (“Suárez”) against Ashford Presbyterian Hospital (“Presby”) and various other Defendants (collectively, “Defendants”).

    From September 29, 2021, until his death on October 23, 2021, Suárez was hospitalized at Presby and Doctors’ Center Hospital Bayamón (“Doctors’”). Plaintiffs alleged that, during the time that Suárez was hospitalized, Defendants failed to properly screen and treat Suárez in violation of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (“EMTALA”).

    Plaintiffs also alleged that all Defendants are liable under Puerto Rico law for negligence and medical malpractice. To prove their claims, Plaintiffs intended to introduce at trial the expert testimony of Dr. Dainius A. Drukteinis regarding medical management. Defendants moved the Court to rule the proffered testimony of Drukteinis inadmissible.

    Emergency Medicine Expert Witness

    Dr. Dainius Albertas Drukteinis has been practicing emergency medicine for over twenty years.

    He graduated from Cornell Medical School in 2004. Drukteinis completed his emergency medicine training at NYU/Bellevue Hospital in New York City, finishing a four-year residency in 2008. He has served as an attending emergency medicine physician since 2008. He has previously served as an Assistant Professor of Emergency Medicine with the University of South Florida.

    Want to know more about the challenges Dainius Drukteinis has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Drukteinis provides a detailed account of his medical opinion that the physicians and staff at both Presby and Doctors’ breached the prevailing standard of care by failing to perform an MRCP or ERCP procedure, conducting poor transitions of care between medical providers during the time that Suárez was hospitalized, and transferring Suárez to another hospital facility when there was no valid reason to do so.

    A. The expert report of Drukteinis reliably identifies a standard of care applicable to Defendants

    Defendants argued that the expert witness opinion of Drukteinis is lacking in relevance and reliability because it assigned the same standards of care as to all seventeen medical practitioners sued by Plaintiffs: “notwithstanding the gamut of specialties involved in this case,” Defendants argued, “Drukteinis’ report did not identify the specific standard of care applicable to each physician, specialist, nurse practitioner, professional service corporation, or hospital.”

    Defendants’ argument is belied by the content of the report, which expressly sets forth three standards of care broadly applicable to all physicians who were responsible for the care of Suárez.

    It is therefore unclear why Defendants would argue that the expert report is deficient; indeed, the report specifically identified each Defendant physician in an account of the “chain of responsibility,” and identified three specific standards of care applicable to all of them.

    Moreover, Defendants identified no legal authority holding that, in multi-defendant medical malpractice cases, an expert report must set forth its conclusions regarding the standard of care with particularity as to each respective Defendant. Nor did Defendants explain why the fact that the conclusions adopted by Drukteinis are broadly applicable to various Defendants would render those opinions any less reliable or relevant under Rule 702.

    B. Defendants failed to identify any additional legal grounds for the exclusion of the proffered testimony of Drukteinis

    Next, Defendants moved the Court to exclude Drukteinis as a witness for “failing to provide opinions regarding causation vis-à-vis each Physician Defendant.”

    Defendants were incorrect when they claimed that an expert witness in a medical malpractice case “must” articulate an opinion regarding causation in order to testify.

    Drukteinis is not a party to this case and did not bear the burden to prove anything; instead, in civil litigation it is the Plaintiff who bears the burden to prove all three elements of a negligence claim. Accordingly, the Court declined to exclude the testimony of Drukteinis from evidence.

    Held

    The Court denied Defendants’ motion in limine seeking a ruling that the proffered testimony of Dr. Dainius Drukteinis was inadmissible.

    Key Takeaway

    Defendants fundamentally misapprehended the purpose of Rule 702 and the role of expert witnesses in federal court.

    Even assuming for the sake of argument that Defendants are correct that Drukteinis provided no opinion regarding causation in his expert witness report — a conclusion that the Court did not adopt — Defendants failed to explain why that would render his proffered testimony relating to the duty and breach elements of Plaintiffs’ negligence claim unreliable. The Court found that it would not.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Batista-Acevedo V. Presbyterian Community Hospital, Inc.
    Docket Number: 3:22cv1468
    Court Name: United States District Court, Puerto Rico
    Order Date: February 10, 2026
  • Emergency Medicine Expert’s Standard of Care Testimony Excluded

    Emergency Medicine Expert’s Standard of Care Testimony Excluded

    Plaintiff Chanada Robinson (“Plaintiff Robinson”) is the mother of Anthony J. Thompson, Jr., who was involved in an incident at East Austin Magnet High School (“Austin East”) that ended his life on April 12, 2021.

    Plaintiff Robinson alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment, deliberate indifference to Thompson’s medical needs, assault and battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

    Plaintiff filed the expert witness report of James A. Wilson, M.D. According to Wilson, “the purpose of [his] report is to assess the physical and psychological impact upon Thompson when he was denied medical care following being shot in the chest at close range by [Defendant] Clabough.”

    Defendants filed a joint Daubert motion to exclude Wilson’s opinions pursuant to Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.

    Emergency Medicine Expert Witness

    James Andrew Wilson, M.D. is a recent member of US Acute Care Solutions. From 2018-2023 he worked for Envision Physician Services, where he was an Assistant Medical Director of an Emergency Department and an EMS Medical Director for several local agencies.

    Wilson received an MD and MBA in one of the first joint degree programs in the country. He completed a residency in emergency medicine at Christ Hospital and Medical Center (also in the Chicago area).

    Want to know more about the challenges James Wilson has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Defendants contended that Wilson cannot offer an opinion about any breach of standard of care because (1) it is a legal conclusion, (2) he is not qualified to offer an opinion about the conduct of law enforcement officers, and (3) his opinion is not reliable.

    A. Qualifications

    Defendants argued that Wilson cannot offer any opinion about the breach of standard of care because he is not qualified to provide an opinion about the conduct of law enforcement officers.

    Wilson opined that the individual Defendants “failed to meet the standard of care for first responders interacting with a gunshot victim.”

    Plaintiff outlined Wilson’s educational and experience, which includes experience with first responder triage and teaching about the standard of care for first responders. But Plaintiff has not provided any evidence that Wilson is qualified to testify about the standard of care as it relates to a law enforcement officer.

    B. Legal Conclusion

    Defendants asserted that Wilson cannot offer an opinion that they breached the standard of care because that is a legal conclusion.

    Plaintiff did not respond to this argument. Given that, the Court found it unopposed and the proposition conceded.

    C. Reliability

    Defendants argued that Wilson’s opinion that they “breached the standard of care by not providing pain medication or by not ensuring that the paramedics (allegedly at the scene) gave pain medications to Thomspon” is unreliable.

    Plaintiff, once again, did not respond to Defendants’ argument. Therefore, it too is unopposed and the proposition conceded.

    But the Court would also exclude the opinion because it is unreliable. Wilson stated that a person must be conscious to feel pain and that Thompson was conscious between 3:15:28 and 3:19:22.

    Defendants have submitted evidence showing that EMS personnel were not at the scene until about 3:20:30, after Thompson became unconscious, and that Officer Willson left with the assistance of KPD officers at 3:18:20.

    Held

    The Court granted Defendants’ joint Daubert motion as to Plaintiff’s expert Dr. James Wilson, M.D.

    Key Takeaway

    An expert’s opinion must be supported by ‘more than subjective belief and unsupported speculation’ and should be supported by ‘good grounds,’ based on what is known.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Robinson V. Baldwin
    Docket Number: 3:22cv125
    Court Name: United States District Court, Tennessee Eastern
    Order Date: December 29, 2025
  • Emergency Medicine Expert’s Testimony on Jail Policies Admitted

    Emergency Medicine Expert’s Testimony on Jail Policies Admitted

    Jeff Trevillion, as Special Administrator for the Estate of Louis Perales,
    deceased (“the Estate”), filed a claim for cruel and unusual punishment against the arresting officer and the jail staff in their individual capacities, and Sheriff Scott Owen (“Owen”) in his official capacity as Sheriff of Washington County, Oklahoma.

    The Estate alleged that the Defendants’ policy of placing intoxicated inmates into holding cells until they “sobered up” constituted a deliberate indifference to Louis Perales’ serious medical needs.

    Owen filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Michael Jobin, M.D., an expert witness called by by the Estate.

    Emergency Medicine Expert Witness

    Michael J. Jobin, M.D., has been employed as a board-certified emergency room physician throughout his career, during which he has evaluated intoxicated patients and provided medical clearance examinations for patients in law enforcement custody. In that role, Jobin regularly decided whether arrestees who were intoxicated with alcohol or other drugs were fit for incarceration. 

    Want to know more about the challenges Michael Jobin has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.  

    Discussion by the Court

    Jobin is qualified to testify as an expert

    Owen argued that Jobin is not qualified to testify as an expert about either Perales’ medical needs or the jail staff’s actions and policies regarding intoxicated inmates because Jobin lacked specialized training in cardiovascular diseases or drug intoxication and has never worked in a jail or provided medical care in a jail setting. 

    However, Jobin is a board-certified emergency room physician who has provided medical clearances for patients in law enforcement custody throughout his career. 

    Jobin served on the Colorado Board of Medical Examiners, where he reviewed complaints made by prisoners about the medical care they received while in prison. 

    Jobin has previously served as an expert witness in cases in which he testified about inmates and medical care. In those instances, he was asked to review the basic emergency care policies of jail facilities, which he evaluated relative to the jail’s medical capabilities. In this case, he intended to offer his opinion that adequate medical evaluation procedures and emergency medical treatment for acute intoxication would have prevented Perales’ death by ensuring he was treated and monitored in a hospital.

    Further, while Jobin has not worked in a jail and is not trained regarding jail policies, his proposed testimony covers only whether the jail’s policies followed “normal medical practice” for an emergency setting, one which he compares to a “low-level emergency department.”

    The Court held that Jobin’s testimony on the jail’s policies is limited to his opinions about proper emergency medical policies and practices, and is therefore within the reasonable confines of his forty-five years of expertise in emergency medicine, including working as an emergency medicine professor and physician in multiple hospitals’ emergency departments and evaluating the medical needs of arrestees.

    Jobin’s opinions are reliable

    Owen argued that the expert opinions Jobin offered are unreliable because they are not based on sufficient facts or data and because some of the materials that he considered were unreliable.

    Jobin reviewed the following facts to reach his opinion: Perales’ medical records, which included the Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation report, ambulance records, and autopsy report; Perales’ jail records; the jail’s general policies; the jail’s policies relating to Perales; the police body camera footage from Perales’ arrest showing the EMTs attempting to take Perales’ blood pressure; the officers’ deposition testimony that Perales was cleared in the field for transport to the jail but without formal paperwork; and the jail video showing Perales flailing his arms in the holding cell. From these materials, Jobin concluded that adequate emergency medical care and procedures likely would have prevented Perales’ death. 

    The Court is persuaded that the facts that Jobin examined to develop his expert opinion are sufficient, even if not exhaustive. Jobin relied on his decades of experience in emergency medicine in assessing whether the facts showed that adequate procedures were in place to care for Perales.

    Jobin may not render legal opinions

    Owen argued that Jobin’s statement in his deposition that Perales’ death was caused by “deliberate indifference” is a legal opinion that Jobin is not qualified to offer.

    During his deposition, Jobin testified that he thought there was “deliberate indifference” in the jail’s actions in this case because the jail staff did not show proper regard to Perales’ well-being. Jobin admitted that he did not know an exact legal definition of “deliberate indifference,” and that he learned this phrase from another case in which he served as an expert.

    “Deliberate indifference” is an ultimate issue of law in this case, and its use by a witness would likely confuse the jury as to its role.

    As a result, the Court precluded Jobin from using the phrase “deliberate indifference” in his testimony.

    Held

    The Court granted in part and denied in part the Defendant Scott Owen’s motion to exclude the testimony of witness Dr. Michael Jobin.

    Key Takeaway:

    Jobin’s opinions are within the “reasonable confines of his subject area” of emergency medicine. His experience as an emergency room physician means that he is familiar with standard emergency medicine procedures and how to treat common conditions. Even if Jobin is not an expert in cardiology or drug intoxication specifically, he has made assessments about whether arrestees are fit for incarceration or need medical treatment outside of the place of incarceration. This necessarily involves assessing whether an arrestee’s medical condition will become dangerous if not treated in an acute care setting.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Trevillion V. Owen Et Al
    Docket Number: 4:22cv473
    Court Name: United States District Court, Oklahoma Northern
    Order Date: October 10, 2025