Expert Witness Profiler

Category: Correctional Healthcare Expert Witness

  • Correctional Healthcare Expert Was Allowed to Opine on Drug Addiction

    Correctional Healthcare Expert Was Allowed to Opine on Drug Addiction

    Pro se Plaintiff Michael Scriven brought this action against Defendants VitalCore Health Strategies, LLC (incorrectly named as “Vital Core LLC”), Jennifer Ehrlich, Tracy Staley, Dr. Harold Stopp, Ryan Fickle, and Dr. John Tomarchio (incorrectly named as “Demarco”) for alleged violations of his constitutional rights while in custody at the Sedgwick County Jail (“SCJ”). Specifically, Plaintiff asserted that Defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights when they denied him narcotic pain medication for his chronic health conditions.

    During discovery, Defendants retained Dr. Thomas D. Fowlkes to provide an opinion regarding the medical necessity of the care and treatment requested by Plaintiff. Plaintiff sought to declare Defendants’ expert report inadmissible.

    Correctional Healthcare Expert Witness

    Thomas DeBow Fowlkes, M.D. is a correctional medicine physician with approximately 25 years of experience in delivering primary care in a correctional setting. He is board certified in both Emergency Medicine and Addiction Medicine. He is also a Certified Correctional Healthcare Professional-Physician (“CCHP-P”).

    Discover more cases with Thomas Fowlkes as an expert witness by ordering his comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Plaintiff asserted eight arguments as to why the Court should declare Fowlkes’ expert report inadmissible.

    Qualification

    First, Plaintiff argued that Fowlkes is not qualified because he is not an “orthopedic,” “nerve specialist,” or “pain management specialist.” However, Fowlkes is not opining on the type of pain medication suitable for Plaintiff’s chronic pain. Instead, he is opining on the appropriate standard of care for managing chronic pain in a correctional setting. Because Fowlkes’ expertise is directly relevant to the issue at hand, the Court found that Fowlkes is qualified to render an opinion in this case.

    Methodology

    Second, Plaintiff argued that Fowlkes’ method is not a sound medical opinion because the x-ray images he looked at are covered in gray and white static. Although these images may be low quality, Fowlkes reviewed the entire medical record, including the official radiology reports associated with the x-ray images. Thus, contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, Fowlkes’ methodology is not flawed, and the Court will not declare it inadmissible on this basis.

    Third-Party Hearsay Statements

    Third, Plaintiff argued that Fowlkes improperly relied upon third-party hearsay statements in Plaintiff’s medical records when crafting his expert report. However, an expert’s reliance on hearsay does not necessarily render the expert’s opinion unreliable.

    Substance Abuse Disorder

    Fourth, Plaintiff claimed that Fowlkes improperly diagnosed Plaintiff with a substance abuse disorder. This argument misrepresents Fowlkes’ report. Fowlkes did not make a new diagnosis regarding substance abuse. Instead, he relied on Plaintiff’s own reported history and prior medical records to document that Plaintiff had a substance abuse disorder in the past. Fowlkes merely opined on Plaintiff’s prior drug addiction.

    VitalCore Policy

    In his fifth argument, Plaintiff asserted that Fowlkes falsely denied the existence of a VitalCore policy in his report. Plaintiff asserted that the medical records showed that Defendant Staley used a VitalCore policy to deny Plaintiff’s medication.

    In response, Defendants argued that Fowlkes did not deny the existence of a VitalCore policy, instead he opined that he saw no VitalCore policy or procedure that precluded the use of opioid medication. This is a factual dispute between the parties. Plaintiff’s disagreement with Fowlkes’ conclusion in his expert report goes to the weight of Fowlkes’ testimony. It is not grounds for exclusion.

    Factual Statements

    In his sixth and seventh arguments, Plaintiff disagreed with two different factual statements in Fowlkes’ report. In his sixth argument, Plaintiff took issue with Fowlkes’ statement that Plaintiff fractured his hand after hitting a door. And in his seventh argument, Plaintiff argued that Fowlkes should have provided the name of the physicians who previously terminated Plaintiff as patient due to his behavior and demeanor. These are both tangential factual issues that are irrelevant to the issues before the Court. Plaintiff’s disagreement with Fowlkes’ statements did not render Fowlkes’ opinion on the central issues of the case unreliable.

    Falsified Medical Records

    In Plaintiff’s final argument, he claimed that Fowlkes relied on medical records that were falsified by Defendant Staley.

    In any event, criticisms regarding the medical providers or the databases on which the expert relies go to the weight, and not the admissibility of the expert’s opinion. Accordingly, this argument is not an adequate basis under which the Court may declare Fowlkes’ report inadmissible.

    Held

    The Court denied Plaintiff’s motion to declare Thomas Fowlkes’ expert report inadmissible.

    Key Takeaway

    Overall, the Plaintiff failed to present a credible challenge to Fowlkes’ qualifications or methodology. His arguments mostly amount to a disagreement with underlying evidence. This disagreement goes to the weight of the testimony, not its admissibility, and is the proper subject of cross-examination.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Scriven V. VitalCore Health Strategies, LLC named as “Vital Core, LLC”
    Docket Number: 5:22cv3282
    Court Name: United States District Court for the District of Kansas
    Order Date: May 20, 2026
  • Correctional Healthcare Expert Not Allowed to Opine on Physical Symptoms

    Correctional Healthcare Expert Not Allowed to Opine on Physical Symptoms

    This action arises from the death of Gregory Neil Davis while he was incarcerated as a pretrial detainee at the Oklahoma County Detention Center. Plaintiff, as special administrator of the estate of Davis, alleged that numerous Jail and Medical Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to Davis’ serious medical needs in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and were negligent under state law.

    Plaintiff filed three motions to exclude or limit the testimony of Dr. Paul M. Adler, Kathryn J. Wild, RN and Lori E. Roscoe, PhD.

    Correctional Healthcare Expert Witness

    Paul Morris Adler is a licensed medical doctor with a board certification in emergency medicine and a background in providing medical care in correctional settings.

    Discover more cases with Paul Adler as an expert witness by ordering his comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

    Nursing Expert Witnesses

    Kathryn Jean Wild, RN is a registered nurse and a Certified Corrections Healthcare Professional. She has decades of experience as a nurse in correctional settings. 

    Get the full story on challenges to Kathryn Wild’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Lori Elisabeth Roscoe, Ph.D., APRN is a nurse practitioner and Certified Correctional Health Professional with decades of experience in correctional healthcare, including with policy development, staff supervision, and administration.

    Want to know more about the challenges Lori Roscoe has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    A. Motion to Exclude Testimony of Adler

    Adler’s report largely consisted of factual narrative followed by his observation as to what the underlying facts show, including conclusions that there is “no evidence” or no “information or testimony” suggesting that Davis communicated his physical symptoms to anyone at the jail. These statements did not involve the application of scientific, technical, or specialized knowledge but instead expressed opinions that are “essentially factual matters as to which expert testimony is inappropriate and/or unnecessary.”

    When Adler comes closer to expressing an opinion that might be the proper subject of expert testimony, he fails to identify facts, data, standards, practices, or any other reliable principles that support his conclusions. For example, Adler opined that it is probable that symptoms began after August 9th and that an earlier medical exam would not have changed the outcome, but he did not adequately explain the basis of these opinions. Adler also speculates about what Davis knew and inappropriately weighs in on the credibility of a witness.

    Given the deficiencies in Adler’s report, the Court granted the Plaintiff’s motion to exclude the testimony.

    B. Motion to Exclude Testimony of Nurse Wild

    Plaintiff argued that Kathryn Wild offered several opinions that are outside the scope of her expertise and challenged the reliability and relevance of the other opinions.

    The Court found that Wild is qualified to offer opinions as to whether the medical staff responded appropriately and complied with applicable standards based on Davis’ clinical presentation. Additionally, although Wild is not an expert as to jail operations in general, her experience renders her qualified to offer opinions on how medical and nursing services operate in a correctional setting.

    Wild reached her opinions by reviewing medical records, deposition testimony, facility documentation and other evidence and then applying her experience in correctional health care. Further, and importantly, she identified the correctional health care standards that govern and the facts that supported her opinions.

    However, Wild’s report suffered from two deficiencies that render certain opinions unreliable or unhelpful to the jury. First, her opinion that the medical and mental health staff were not deliberately indifferent is an impermissible legal conclusion. Second, Wild’s report included factual narrative followed by conclusions that there is “no evidence” or “no documentation” that Davis verbalized or demonstrated pain or distress. These opinions did not involve the application of any specialized medical or nursing knowledge and were simply based on testimony from staff stating that Davis did not request help and the absence of any reports of pain in the medical charting.

    C. Motion to Exclude Testimony of Nurse Roscoe

    Plaintiffs have identified Lori Roscoe, Ph.D., APRN as an expert witness that will opine on standards of care and the care provided to Davis while he was detained.

    The Medical Defendants argued that she was unqualified to offer opinions as to whether the actions of a licensed professional counselor that saw Davis during his incarceration were appropriate. They also contended that her opinions regarding the scope of practice of a licensed practical nurse are unreliable.

    Although Roscoe is not a licensed professional counselor, she has experience in correctional healthcare operations and staff supervision. Her opinions are grounded in that expertise as they speak to when correctional healthcare staff should escalate care to another provider as opposed to the quality of the counseling provided by the LPC or the adequacy of the psychiatric treatment provided to Davis. The Court held that Roscoe’s experience and training are sufficient to render her qualified to opine on standards and practices for referring patients in correctional settings for additional evaluation and treatment.

    The Medical Defendants contended that Roscoe’s opinion that the LPN acted outside the scope of her practice by making diagnostic decisions, and specifically by attributing Davis’ change in condition to a mental health problem without referring him for a medical evaluation, is unreliable because she did not cite any authority to support her opinion. The Court agreed that Roscoe’s opinion that the LPN “exceeded the scope of her practice” or acted “far outside the scope of LPN practice” is not supported by sufficient facts or reliable methods and principles.

    Additionally, Roscoe’s deposition testimony indicated that the basis of her criticism of the LPN’s actions is not necessarily that she referred him to mental health, but that she did not also refer him for a medical evaluation given his symptoms.

    Although Roscoe’s explanation of the applicable standards could have been more detailed, the Court found that her opinion that the LPN’s actions deviated from accepted standards is sufficient to satisfy Rule 702‘s reliability requirements.

    Held

    • The Court granted the Plaintiff’s motion to exclude or limit the testimony of Dr. Paul Adler.
    • The Court granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiff’s motion to exclude or limit the testimony of Kathryn J. Wild, RN.
    • The Court granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiff’s motion to exclude or limit the testimony of Lori Roscoe, PhD.

    Key Takeaway

    An expert opinion “must be based on facts which enable her to express a reasonably accurate conclusion as opposed to conjecture or speculation.” The credibility of witnesses is generally not an appropriate subject for expert testimony.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Simms V. Board Of County Commissioners For Oklahoma County
    Docket Number: 5:23cv780
    Court Name: United States District Court, Oklahoma Western
    Order Date: February 03, 2026
  • Emergency Medicine Was Expert Allowed to Opine on Correctional Oversight

    Emergency Medicine Was Expert Allowed to Opine on Correctional Oversight

    Approximately 30 hours after Mark Beckner was booked into the Santa Cruz County Jail, he was found dead in his cell. Beckner’s son, Brandon Beckner, and his estate (“Plaintiffs”) filed suit asserting that the County of Santa Clara, correctional officers, and jail personnel were deliberately indifferent to Beckner’s serious medical needs in violation of federal and state law.

    Plaintiffs filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Patrick Ennis, M.D., who is one of California Forensic Medical Group (“CFMG”) Defendants’ expert witnesses. CFMG Defendants filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Jeffrey E. Keller, M.D., one of Plaintiffs’ expert witnesses.

    Correctional Healthcare Expert Witness

    Patrick K. Ennis, M.D. is a general physician and withdrawal specialist working in the field of corrections in Chicago, Illinois.

    Get the full story on challenges to Patrick Ennis’ expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Emergency Medicine Expert Witness

    Jeffrey Ernest Keller, M.D. is an emergency medicine physician licensed to practice in Idaho. He has experience providing direct clinical care to incarcerated patients and supervising medical programs in both jails and prisons.

    Want to know more about the challenges Jeffrey Keller has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    1. Testimony of CFMG Defendants’ Expert Patrick Ennis, M.D.

    CFMG Defendants designated Ennis “to provide expert testimony on the standard of care and actions and inactions of CFMG staff during Beckner’s medical care at the Santa Cruz County Jail.”

    However, Plaintiffs argued that (1) Ennis lacked the requisite qualifications to testify to specific standards of care, likely course of treatment in an emergency room, and the likely outcome of those treatments, and (2) Ennis’ opinions are not sufficiently reliable. The Court disagreed. First, Ennis is sufficiently qualified to testify to the proffered topics given his experience working “as an attending physician for the Department of Correctional Health Services/Cermak Health Services of Cook County in Chicago, Illinois since 2017” and as “the Medical Director of the Cermak Health Services of Cook County Opioid Treatment Program since March of 2022,” where he “works with correctional nurses everyday.”

    CFMG Defendants pointed out that Ennis’ testimony concerning the likely course of treatment in an emergency room and the outcome of those treatments is offered only in rebuttal to Plaintiffs’ expert Keller’s testimony. The Court found that Ennis’ education, training, credentials, and experience as a medical doctor in a correctional setting qualifies him as an expert to discuss standards of care and to rebut Keller’s testimony. Second, Ennis’ opinions are based upon sufficient facts and data given that Ennis conducted a blind review of the records in forming his opinion. Accordingly, the Court found that his opinions are sufficiently reliable.

    2. Testimony of Plaintiffs’ Expert Jeffrey Keller, M.D.

    Plaintiffs designated Keller to testify to correctional medical systems and oversight, clinical correctional care, emergency department care services and procedures, and emergency transport.

    CFMG Defendants did not challenge Keller’s qualifications as a medical professional in a correctional setting. CFMG Defendants instead argued that: (1) Keller’s opinions that Beckner’s death was preventable and that he suffered unnecessarily are speculative, contradict well-established scientific fact, and, as such, are unreliable and more prejudicial than probative; and (2) Keller’s opinions that any actions or omissions by Defendant CFMG caused any harm to Beckner are speculative and are unsupported by sufficient facts. The Court disagreed with both arguments.

    Keller based his opinions on his personal experience as an emergency room physician and his personal experience treating ruptured arteries (though not splanchnic artery ruptures). This is a sufficiently reliable basis for his opinions. Further, Keller’s opinions about Defendant CFMG’s actions are based on the operative complaint, grand jury testimony submitted with the complaint, Beckner’s medical chart, CFMG’s “policies and nursing protocols,” and the testimony of nurse Defendant Sarah Hewett, among other sources. Again, this is a sufficient factual basis for Keller’s opinions in this case. The Court found that Keller’s opinions are sufficiently reliable when coupled with his experience and credentials.

    Held

    The Court denied both Plaintiffs’ motion to exclude the testimony of Patrick Ennis and Defendants’ motion to exclude the testimony of Jeffrey Keller.

    Key Takeaway

    Expert opinion testimony is relevant if the knowledge underlying it has a valid connection to the pertinent inquiry. And it is reliable if the knowledge underlying it has a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of the relevant discipline.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Beckner V. County Of Santa Cruz
    Docket Number: 5:23cv5032
    Court Name: United States District Court, California Northern
    Order Date: March 26, 2026
  • Correctional Healthcare Expert’s Testimony About the Risk of Overdose Admitted

    Correctional Healthcare Expert’s Testimony About the Risk of Overdose Admitted

    S.F., a former detainee in the Denton County Jail, asserted claims for alleged violations of her constitutional rights on account of the jail’s treatment of her withdrawal from opioids during two separate incarcerations and the alleged denial by the jail of medication for Opioid Use Disorder (“OUD”).

    Plaintiff filed a motion to strike or limit the expert testimony of Dr.
    Nicholas Longnecker, contending that he is not qualified to opine on addiction medicine, the ADA (Americans with Disabilities Act), Denton County policies, and Department of Justice (“DOJ”) policies.

    Correctional Healthcare Expert Witness

    Nicholas Longnecker obtained a Bachelor of Science in Microbiology and Immunology from the University of Miami with minors in Chemistry and Religious Studies and his Doctor of Medicine from the University of Miami Miller School of Medicine. He completed his residency at The Washington Hospital Family Medicine Residency Program in Washington, Pennsylvania, and is licensed to practice medicine in the states of Texas, New Mexico, Colorado, and Wyoming.

    Longnecker is also a certified correctional health professional (CCHP), and he obtained his DEAX licensure, which allowed him to prescribe buprenorphine before this required waiver was eventually removed.

    Get the full story on challenges to Nicholas Longnecker’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study. 

    Discussion by the Court

    A. Longnecker’s Qualification to Opine on Addiction Medicine

    To begin with, S.F. argued that Longnecker is not qualified to offer an expert medical opinion on addiction medicine.

    She asserted that Longnecker might be qualified to talk about the administration of some medications in a correctional setting for general ailments but lacks certification or advanced training in addiction medicine and lacks training in psychiatry and addiction psychiatry.

    However, Longnecker gained experience in addiction medicine through his work at several facilities over the course of many years.

    Longnecker worked at Greenbriar Treatment Center and the Washington County Jail for two years. He evaluated and treated patients suffering from addiction there. And at the Washington County Jail, he managed patients with addiction disorders. For the next six-and-a-half years, he worked at the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, where he regularly treated patients suffering from addiction and managed their addiction medications.

    For a year-and-a-half after that, he worked at WellPath, where he oversaw the MAT program for Albion Prison. And since 2022, he has worked at CorrHealth, where he is responsible for directing inmate medical care. He also developed and manages its MAT program for sites across four States.

    The Court found Longnecker qualified to opine on addiction medicine.

    B. Improper Topics of Expert Testimony

    I. The ADA

    S.F. argued that Longnecker is not qualified to testify as to his legal conclusions about whether illicit substance abuse removes ADA protection.

    The Court held that Longnecker is qualified to draw that conclusion because he cited DOJ guidance and because he is experienced both in determining whether to offer Medication-Assisted Treatment (“MAT”) for OUD in a correctional setting and in drafting policies and procedures addressing that issue.

    II. County Policies

    S.F. argued that Longnecker is not qualified to testify that the Denton County Jail does not have a blanket policy prohibiting MAT. She said that the record did not show that Longnecker has worked at the jail, that his employer has performed services there, or that he has reviewed the jail’s or Public Health’s policies.

    The entirety of Longnecker’s opinion about the jail’s policies reads as follows: “No evidence exists that the Denton County Jail had a blanket policy prohibiting MAT. Conversely, there is evidence of MAT administration at the jail when the appropriate conditions were met (i.e. pregnancy).” 

    Since the jury did not need expert testimony to determine what evidence is in the record, the Court held that Longnecker’s opinion about the jail’s policies constituted improper expert testimony.

    III. DOJ Policies

    S.F. argued that, in the absence of any evidence or training showing otherwise, Longnecker is not qualified to opine as an expert that the jail provided treatment consistent with DOJ policies.

    Longnecker stated that the jail’s treatment of S.F. was “consistent with . . . DOJ expectations.” He did not, however, specify what expectations he had in mind. And his report mentioned only one DOJ report: a document that “provides informal guidance” to the public, the contents of which “do not have the force and effect of law and are not meant to bind the public in any way.”

    The Court held that the jury did not need an expert to opine on a document that was drafted for the public. Longnecker was expressing a prohibited legal conclusion if he meant to convey his opinion that, based on his understanding of the ADA’s requirements described in that document, the jail complied with the ADA.

    C. Relevance

    S.F. argued that Longnecker’s testimony about whether the jail treated her withdrawals is irrelevant. In her view, the issue is whether the jail treated her alleged disability—that is, her OUD—as opposed to her withdrawal symptoms.

    The Court held that Longnecker’s opinion about whether it was medically reasonable for S.F. to be treated for her withdrawals rather than being given MAT is relevant to showing deliberate indifference as to her constitutional right to medical care.

    D. Reliability

    I. County policies

    S.F. argued that Longnecker’s opinion about the county’s policies is unreliable because it is not based on any instances of the jail actually providing MAT. As already noted, the county refutes that assertion based on Longnecker’s review of county records.

    But even if Longnecker reached his conclusions about the county’s policies after reviewing relevant records, the Court held that he did not identify which facts in the record he relied on or what method he used to reach his conclusion.

    II. Standard of Care

    S.F. argued that the scientific and medical community regards methadone, buprenorphine, or naltrexone as the standard of care for treating OUD.

    In her view, Longnecker’s opinion that forced withdrawal, followed by treatment of withdrawal symptoms, constitutes effective treatment for Opioid Use Disorder “is so far outside the established medical community as to be unreliable, unsupportable, and viewed with extreme skepticism.”

    Longnecker did not opine, as S.F. argued, that forced withdrawal would be within the acceptable medical standard of care in all circumstances. And even if he did, S.F.’s argument that Longnecker’s opinion is “far outside the established medical community,” would still fail. The “general acceptance” factor from Daubert questions whether a theory or technique is reliable. It does not matter, at this stage, whether Longnecker is correct in finding forced
    withdraw reasonable. What matters is how he reached that conclusion, and his report makes that sufficiently clear.

    The Court held that Longnecker supported his opinion that MAT was not appropriate during S.F.’s first incarceration with sufficient facts and data. He opined that it was medically appropriate to provide “medically-assisted detox” because S.F. would not have been able to continue MAT after her transfer to Christian Farms, a facility that does not provide MAT.

    Further, Longnecker cited the “grave risk of severe overdose when using both fentanyl and methadone” as another reason the jail should not have administered methadone.

    Held

    The Court granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiff S.F’s motion to strike defense expert Dr. Nicholas Longnecker.

    Key Takeaway:

    Longnecker was allowed opine on whether the jail’s treatment of S.F. during both incarcerations, including its treatment of her withdrawals, was within the acceptable standard of care; and the severity of S.F.’s withdrawal.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: S.F. V. Denton County, Et Al.
    Docket Number: 4:23cv864
    Court Name: United States District Court, Texas Eastern
    Order Date: May 27, 2025

  • Correctional Healthcare Expert Witness’ Testimony on the Risks of MOUD in Correctional Settings Excluded

    Correctional Healthcare Expert Witness’ Testimony on the Risks of MOUD in Correctional Settings Excluded

    A district judge in West Virginia barred the Correctional Healthcare Expert from opining that there was no evidence of medical malpractice, deliberate indifference, discrimination, or negligence.

    Joseph Taylor has struggled with opioid addiction for nearly half his life. He is diagnosed with Opioid Use Disorder (“OUD”) and is treating this chronic brain disease with Medications for Opioid Use Disorder (“MOUD”).

    Wexford and the West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“WVDCR”) denied Taylor access to MOUD while he was detained from January through March at Central Regional Jail. Plaintiff alleged that Defendants had a policy of forced withdrawal from MOUD, which was discriminatory and evinced deliberate indifference to his clear and acute need for MOUD while detained at CRJ.

    Wexford provided an expert report from Dr. Grady Bazzel who testified that the Defendants met the standard of care in their treatment of Taylor. Taylor filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Bazzel as an expert in addiction medicine.

    Correctional Healthcare Expert Witness

    Dr. Grady Judson Bazzel is currently the Patient Safety Officer and Medical Director of Care Management for Wellpath, a company that provides correctional healthcare throughout the United States. He has worked in corrections since 2005 and is licensed to practice medicine in multiple states. In his current role, he investigates patient deaths and other care errors and helps improve quality of care across Wellpath-managed sites. He has familiarity with the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) Clinical Guidelines for the Diagnosis, Evaluation, and Treatment of Opioid Use Disorder (OUD), although he did not review them specifically while compiling his report. 

    Fortify your strategy by reviewing a Challenge Study detailing grounds for excluding Grady Bazzel’s expert testimony. 

    Discussion by the Court

    Bazzel explained that there are risks to the use of MOUD in correctional settings that are not present in the outside world, including the risk that other inmates will target a patient to obtain the medication.

    Bazzel stated that “proper patient selection is the key to a successful Medication Assisted Treatment (MAT) program.” He stated that the “psychological triggers for relapse are less present and the access to substances of abuse is greatly diminished,” during incarceration, reducing the need for treatment. Bazzel suggested that gaps in Taylor’s treatment record, both before and after his period of incarceration, showed a “pattern of spotty follow-up for this medication that he claims to need so badly.”

    He offered the opinion that Taylor was not a good candidate for MAT while incarcerated because of his lack of compliance with Clinical Opiate Withdrawal Scale (COWS) assessments, his urine drug screen results, and his gaps in treatment before and after his incarceration.  He further opined that “the medical staff at CRJ were under no obligation to continue [buprenorphine] until such time that it became clear that it was needed. This need never presented itself,” as demonstrated by “the fact that his first drug screen post-incarceration was negative for illicit drugs.”

    Bazzel lacks experience and specialized training related to OUD, MOUD, and opioid withdrawal

    Taylor conteded that Bazzel lacked the necessary qualifications as per Rule 702. He noted that Bazzel has “never conducted an OUD screening or a Rapid Opioid Dependence Screen and is not sure if he has ever reviewed such a test.”

    Plaintiff added that Bazzel’s opinions were contradicted in key areas by the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) Guidelines, a resource that he stated he was familiar with and considered authoritative.

    Absent full exclusion, the Plaintiff argued that several specific opinions offered by Bazzel are improper. He argued that Bazzel should not be permitted to offer opinions on the legal issues of medical malpractice, deliberate indifference, discrimination, and negligence. In addition, he contended that Bazzel’s opinion on the reduction in psychological triggers in jails and prisons should be excluded because it lacks any scientific support, and he is not a psychiatrist or psychologist with any qualification to offer such testimony.

    Since Bazzel’s report did not contain citations or references to medical or scientific sources, the Court looked to his deposition to gain an understanding of how he formed his conclusions.

    When asked what relevant medical literature he relied on in formulating his opinions, he replied, “None.” He stated that he did not review any scientific literature or journal articles related to COWS scores. As to his opinion that some patients who would be appropriate candidates for treatment with MOUD in the community are not good candidates in a correctional setting, he stated that he did not know if any literature or reports existed to support that viewpoint. He did not review any medical or scientific literature to formulate his opinion that there are fewer triggers for opioid cravings or relapse in jail, stating, “I’m sure I could find some. But it’s just commonsensical.”

    Bazzel’s testimony related to incidents of alleged diversion and urine screen results should be excluded 

    The Plaintiff next argued that Bazzel’s testimony and conclusions related to incidents of alleged diversion and urine screen results, all occurring after the Plaintiff’s January — March 2023 detention, should be excluded because medical staff could not have considered future events when determining Taylor’s medical treatment at the time. He further argued that Bazzel’s opinions regarding security concerns in a correctional setting related to MOUD are “pure conjecture.” Bazzel admitted in his deposition that he ‘has no experience in correctional security,’” and cited no scientific or medical sources. Finally, he argued that Bazzel’s testimony opining about Taylor’s credibility should be excluded.

    The Court held that Bazzel’s opinion that the Defendants met the standard of care in their treatment of Taylor was formed based on the analysis of Taylor’s treatment as discussed above, none of which was based on facts, data, or reliable principles or methods. 

    Held

    The Court granted the Plaintiff’s motion to exclude certain opinions of Grady Bazzel.

    Key Takeaway:

    Bazzel’s report lacked citations or references to medical or scientific sources. When asked what relevant medical literature he relied on in formulating his opinions, he replied, “None.”

    The Court held that Bazzel’s opinion that the Defendants met the standard of care in their treatment of Taylor was formed based on the analysis of Taylor’s treatment, none of which was based on facts, data, or reliable principles or methods. 

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Taylor V. Wexford Health Sources, Incorporated, Et Al
    Docket Number: 2:23cv475
    Court: United States District Court, West Virginia Southern
    Order Date: June 17, 2024