Expert Witness Profiler

Category: Forensic Accounting Expert Witness

  • Forensic Accounting Expert Not Allowed to Opine on Household Services

    Forensic Accounting Expert Not Allowed to Opine on Household Services

    This is a medical malpractice action which arises from care provided by Defendant Richard Bellon, M.D. (“Dr. Bellon”) to Plaintiff Lauren Bern a/k/a Lauren Britton (“Ms. Bern”) in February 2021 at Defendant HCA-HealthONE LLC d/b/a Swedish Medical Center (“SMC”) after Bern suffered a stroke following the procedure, resulting in injuries.

    In support of their alleged damages, Plaintiffs Bern and her husband, Joshua Britton disclosed several experts while Defendants, in turn, disclosed rebuttal experts, including a forensic accountant, Alison Wise, CPA and a physical medicine and rehabilitation doctor, Kara E. Flavin, M.D. Plaintiffs filed motions to strike certain opinions of Wise and Flavin.

    Forensic Accounting Expert Witness

    Alison Wise is a forensic accountant in the CPA firm of Matson, Driscoll & Damico, LLP (“MDD”). She has eleven years of experience in evaluating forensic accounting cases and measuring damages claims, including those relating to injuries, lost earnings or profits, and future medical care.

    Discover more cases with Alison Wise as an expert witness by ordering her comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

    Brain Injury Expert Witness

    Kara Eunice Flavin is a board-certified physiatrist who specializes in brain injuries, regularly works with stroke patients as part of her practice.

    Get the full story on challenges to Kara Flavin’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Discussion by the Court

    Alison Wise

    Plaintiffs filed a motion to strike and preclude three of Wise’s categories of opinions regarding Bern’s: (1) salary and benefits; (2) future wage loss; and (3) needed household services.

    A. Opinions on Bern’s Salary and Benefits

    Wise opined about Bern’s past and future lost earnings and benefits based on Bern’s employment at the time of the incident. As part of that opinion, Wise calculated Bern’s lost past and future benefits.

    Wise opined that because there has been “no evidence or testimony to support which benefits Bern was actually participating in,” the fringe benefit percentage should be 11.3% of her salary, “which approximates the amount of Bern’s salary allocable to legally required benefits.”

    Plaintiffs contended that this opinion should be stricken because “Wise did not consider Bern’s specific benefits provided through her employer” and the 11.3% rate “only included calculations for Social Security and Medicare.”

    Indeed, when asked at her deposition, Wise admitted that if Bern participated in other benefits, such as health insurance, a 401(k) plan with a match, and disability, the fringe benefits would increase by 13-15%.

    It appears that Wise knew of the appropriate methodology to use but inexplicably failed to ask for any of the underlying data that would allow her to employ such methodology.

    B. Opinions on Bern’s Future Wage Loss

    Wise also opined in her report regarding Bern’s future wage loss, and Plaintiffs raised three distinct challenges to that opinion: first, they argued that Wise’s admission that there is a calculation error in her report “provided adequate evidence that calls the totality of Wise’s opinions in question.” Second, they contended that Wise’s reliance on the “Markov Model” to calculate Bern’s work-life expectancy is unreliable, because “she has not researched the model to see any validation or verification of the data,” is “unaware of the data the Markov Model uses to generate their reports,” and cannot “explain the statistical analysis underlying the data.”

    Third, Plaintiffs argued that Wise’s reduction of Bern’s future wage loss based on Flavin’s life expectancy opinion has no grounding in any generally accepted forensic accounting methodology and additionally should be precluded because Flavin’s life expectancy opinion should be excluded.

    The Court was not persuaded by Plaintiffs’ first two arguments—for which Plaintiffs cited no authority in support. At threshold, a “simple math error” in an expert’s calculation is not grounds to strike an expert opinion that is otherwise based on sound methodology.

    Regarding the Markov Model, Plaintiffs did not argue that the model itself is unreliable. Indeed, Plaintiffs acknowledged that Wise testified that she has been using the Markov Model throughout her entire career as a forensic accountant, as has her supervisor.

    Rather than take issue with the economic model’s reliability, Plaintiffs attacked Wise’s usage of the model on the grounds that, essentially, she does not understand how it works and has not independently verified the data it uses. But these issues go to the weight of the evidence and can be addressed through cross-examination.

    C. Opinions on Bern’s Needed Household Services

    Plaintiffs urged the Court to strike Bern’s opinion on household services  because ” Wise did not complete any evaluation of Bern’s necessary household services and did not employ any analysis to review the household service loss for Bern.” Further, Plaintiffs argued that Wise admitted that she was speculating that these household replacement costs would be covered by the costs in the Life Care plans.

    Without the benefit of a response from Defendants, the Court respectfully agreed with Plaintiffs. Wise admitted in her deposition that she did not conduct any investigation into whether home healthcare agencies—i.e. what Bern’s life care plan accommodates for—provide household services such as mowing the lawn, housekeeping, and grocery shopping. Nor is there any evidence that Wise relied on her expertise to come to this conclusion, either in her report or her deposition. On the contrary, Wise admitted that she was “speculating that the home healthcare agencies would actually provide the essential/home services.”

    D. Testimony Regarding Bern’s Current Medical Condition or Medical Needs

    Plaintiffs requested that the Court “exclude any testimony from Wise on Bern’s current medical condition or medical needs, as Wise is admittedly not qualified to offer medical, mental health, or other healthcare opinions.”

    Plaintiffs did not provide any additional information and did not point the Court to any portions of Wise’s report or deposition where Wise opined on ” Bern’s current medical condition or medical needs.” To the extent that Plaintiffs are concerned about Wise testifying about matters not included in her report, this issue is not properly before the Court and can be addressed if it arises during trial.

    Kara Flavin

    Flavin was retained by Defendants to “conduct an independent medical examination of Bern and opine on her future needs.” In her report, Flavin offered a range of opinions regarding Bern’s medical care needs, including, that Bern has a life expectancy of 18 years from the date of the report.

    Plaintiffs argued that Flavin’s opinion regarding Bern’s life expectancy should be stricken for four reasons: (1) it is not grounded in the method of science, and is therefore unreliable; (2) Flavin is not a statistician and does not have the education, training, or experience to conduct the statistical extrapolation needed for her life expectancy opinion; (3) the method used by Flavin to extrapolate Bern’s life expectancy is not grounded in accepted scientific principles; and (4) the study that Flavin used for her calculations is not meant to estimate the life expectancy of a person who suffers a stroke.

    The Court respectfully found Flavin’s extrapolation methodology unreliable considering Flavin acknowledged during her deposition that she does not know whether her extrapolation method is generally accepted. She did not offer any supporting scientific literature or precedent, any accepted practice of extending survival data to younger cohorts, or any explanation for why extending a certain pattern observed across three age intervals would hold true for a patient a decade younger than anyone studied.

    It should be noted that the Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion to exclude Wise’s opinion regarding Bern’s future wage loss to the extent it relied on Flavin’s life expectancy calculation.

    Held

    • The Court granted in part and denied in part Plaintiffs’ motion to strike certain opinions of Alison Wise, CPA.
    • The Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion to strike certain opinions of Kara Flavin.

    Key Takeaway

    This Court does not require an expert to have an in-depth knowledge of all the algorithms underlying their technological tools to reliably testify about the outputs of those tools.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Bern V. HCA-Healthone, LLC
    Docket Number: 1:23cv304
    Court Name: United States District Court, Colorado
    Order Date: March 24, 2026
  • Forensic Accounting Expert Allowed to Testify Despite Lack of SQL Expertise

    Forensic Accounting Expert Allowed to Testify Despite Lack of SQL Expertise

    Plaintiff Pietoso, Inc. operates Café Napoli restaurant in Clayton, Missouri. It has a Service Agreement for waste removal from the restaurant with Defendant Allied Services, LLC—a subsidiary of Defendant Republic Services, Inc. The Service Agreement sets a basic-service rate of $323 per month, but it allows Allied to unilaterally increase this rate for certain enumerated reasons. All other rate increases require Pietoso’s consent.

    Pietoso’s service rate increased incrementally from $323 per month in 2011 to $870.25 per month in 2018. Discovery revealed that Defendants increase their prices every 10-12 months through a Yield Management Process (YMP) whereby parent company RSI generates budget guidance for its subsidiaries using an algorithm that incorporates local division budgets, costs, and historical average price increases as well as individual customer histories, including prior increases, responses thereto, and profitability.

    Plaintiff Pietoso centrally asserted that Defendants’ YMP price increase
    practice violated the Customer Service Agreement (CSA) Rate Adjustment clause. Pietoso engaged Patrick Kilbourne to calculate damages for the class.

    Defendants filed a motion to exclude Kilbourne’s expert testimony because his methodology is insufficiently precise to satisfy the legal standards for admissibility of expert testimony.

    Forensic Accounting Expert Witness

    Patrick J. Kilbourne is a Managing Director at Berkeley Research Group, a business consulting firm. He has an MBA from the University of Pennsylvania Wharton School of Business.

    Kilbourne is a Certified Public Accountant, Certified Management Accountant, and Certified Fraud Examiner. He is also Certified in Financial Forensics and Accredited in Business Valuation by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.

    Want to know more about the challenges Patrick Kilbourne has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Accounting for YMP increases in excess of actual operating cost increases, plus the average fuel recovery fee (FRF) as a percentage of the service price, plus the average environmental recovery fee (ERF) as a percentage of both, Kilbourne estimated total damages for the class at $75.1 million. While his report provided averages beyond the class period, it demonstrated the feasibility of extracting more specific data for each year and customer.

    Kilbourne indicated that he was able to calculate damages for each class member by site and service. His report shows several examples calculating damages for specific customers based on YMP price increases within a certain date range. Between 2017 and 2019, Pietoso paid $2,526 over the contractually permissible increases (i.e., operating costs plus CPI). Based on the service rate for each month during that period, Pietoso paid $2,546 in FRF and $3,240 in ERF.

    Application of Contract Terms

    Defendants challenged Kilbourne’s methodology in several respects. First, the CSA defined the “Company” as a specific local division, but Kilbourne didn’t analyze division-level costs, which vary widely between urban and rural areas. Instead, he combined statewide costs to yield an average.

    Further, Kilbourne didn’t isolate disposal or transportation cost increases or those attributable to changes in the law, as the Rate Adjustment clause contemplates. He also didn’t isolate the additional category related to recyclable waste contained in some contracts. Rather, he combined all operating costs, thus diluting the contractual categories such that the result is inaccurate.

    Defendants contended that they produced division-level financial data sufficiently specific to facilitate more accurate calculations.

    Given the data available in the format produced, the Court held that Kilbourne’s inability to isolate costs corresponding to contractual categories is understandable. This is not a defect in methodology warranting exclusion but rather a limitation due to Defendants’ accounting – one that actually
    favors Defendants by overstating cost increases and potentially understating damages.

    In related points, Defendants criticized Kilbourne’s calculations for failing to account for negotiated credits and rollbacks or customer consent. But whether customers consented to increases is a central fact issue beyond Kilbourne’s assignment here.

    CAGR for Average Increase in Operating Costs

    Because Defendants’ financial statements don’t separate costs categories as between commercial, industrial, and residential customers or between small and large containers, and also because multiple divisions were combined into one financial statement prior to 2018, Kilbourne examined Defendants’ total operating costs of $152.9 million in 2016 to $203.2 million in 2022 to arrive at an average annual cost increase rate, or compounded annual growth rate (CAGR), of 4.9%.

    He compared this with the average annual price increases for customers to estimate damages as the difference between cost increases and price increases.

    In their motion to exclude, Defendants argued that Kilbourne’s methodology is flawed in that the time period Kilbourne used (2016-2022) doesn’t match the class period, and the annual average of 4.9%, while perhaps useful to predict future growth, is imprecise and factually inaccurate to calculate damages from historical data.

    The Court found Kilbourne’s general approach of calculating damages as the difference between customers’ actual rate hikes and contractually “allowable” increases as a percentage increase in annual operating costs plus CPI logical. While CAGR for 2016-2022 may not be the applicable variable if or when damages are calculated in this case, Kilbourne offered a feasible model using the data available, and his report demonstrates that operating cost increases are ascertainable for any given year and also by local division after 2017, as may be required.

    YMP Recommendation

    Next, Defendants argued that Kilbourne’s methodology is defective because he erroneously relied on “reason code 64” to identify YMP increases, when in reality local divisions use the code differently, according to some witness testimony. But that same evidence and other testimony in the record confirms that code 64 is indeed the correct code for YMP increases, and any other use of code 64 is viewed as misuse or unintended use.

    The Court found Kilbourne’s reliance on Defendants’ own coding system entirely reasonable. Any margin of error in this respect is attributable to flaws in Defendants’ data, not in Kilbourne’s methodology.

    Defendants also argued here that Kilbourne’s method is unreliable because he ignored the fact that local divisions often depart from YMP recommendations. But Kilbourne expressly acknowledged this fact and noted that it would be possible to exclude YMP increases that were different from the algorithm amount if needed. The data captured every invoice and corresponding payment. Again, the Court is not persuaded that Kilbourne’s model couldn’t accommodate those adjustments, and error-free perfection is not the standard.

    SQL Qualifications

    As the Court understands it, Kilbourne and his staff used a computer code called structured query language (SQL, or “sequel”) to identify the characteristics of the Plaintiff class and extract their invoicing and payment records from the voluminous data produced by Defendants. Kilbourne relied on technical staff to perform the query to identify class members, then he verified it for accuracy using a quality control test process. Defendants asserted that Kilbourne’s methodology is unreliable because he isn’t qualified in SQL; rather he adopted a methodology of non-experts that he can’t independently opine on because he lacks the necessary expertise.

    Kilbourne is, however, an expert in accounting and financial analysis, not computer science. The Court finds it reasonable that his examination of voluminous financial data might require technical assistance to manipulate, sort, and extract the characteristics and figures relevant to this case.

    Staff with SQL expertise assisted Kilbourne, and he tested the accuracy of SQL queries through quality control processes. The Court is satisfied that his method is reliable.

    Moreover, even accepting Defendants’ tenuous premise here, expertise with SQL is collateral to Kilbourne’s essential qualifications as a CPA and financial analyst. The Court therefore finds that any arguable deficiency goes only to the weight of his testimony, not its admissibility.

    Fuel and Environmental Recovery Fees

    Defendants’ financial records showed that fuel and environmental costs are included in Defendants’ annual operating costs incorporated in their price increases under the Rate Adjustment clause. However, Defendants also charged additional fuel and environmental recovery fees (FRF and ERF, respectively) as a percentage of the amount invoiced for the underlying services. Kilbourne was asked to calculate the total amount of these surcharges for each class member during the class period. The data enabled him to isolate amounts specific to these fees and calculate average annual increases for each year.

    Defendants asserted that Pietoso has failed to plead a viable theory of damages with respect to these fees, leading Kilbourne to merely perform simple math without any meaningful analysis.

    The Court will not exclude Kilbourne’s testimony on these fees. Defendants offered no argument that Kilbourne’s methodology is unreliable; they only dispute the applicability of these fees to a damages calculation. Kilbourne has demonstrated his ability to isolate these fees in the data and calculate them in relation to underlying price increases. If the jury deems some portion of the fees recoverable, Kilbourne’s methodology is reliable, and his testimony is relevant and likely to assist the trier of fact

    Held

    The Court denied the Defendants’ motion to exclude the testimony of
    Plaintiff’s damages expert, Patrick Kilbourne.

    Key Takeaway:

    While individual credits and rollbacks may require further examination, the Court is not persuaded that Kilbourne’s model cannot accommodate such adjustments, as the data captures every customer transaction. In the Court’s view, this doesn’t render Kilbourne’s methodology preclusively unreliable. Nothing in Rule 702 “requires the court to nitpick an expert’s opinion in order to reach a perfect expression of what the basis and methodology can support.”

    Even viewing Kilbourne’s technical staff as independent experts, the Court found no basis to exclude his opinions, as experts frequently rely on the expertise of others outside their field.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Pietoso, Inc. V. Republic Services, Inc. Et Al
    Docket Number: 4:19cv397
    Court Name: United States District Court, Missouri Eastern
    Order Date: September 15, 2025
  • Psychology Expert’s Testimony on Consumer Perceptions of Online Posts Excluded

    Psychology Expert’s Testimony on Consumer Perceptions of Online Posts Excluded

    This case arises out of an ongoing dispute between Plaintiffs LoanStreet, Inc. (“LoanStreet”) and LoanStreet CEO Ian Lampl (“Lampl,” and together with LoanStreet, “Plaintiffs”) and a former employee, Defendant Wyatt Troia (“Troia”).

    LoanStreet, a online platform which provides services to help clients share, manage, and originate loans, hired Troia to work as a software engineer in February 2019.  In June 2020, LoanStreet terminated his employment. Troia subsequently posted disparaging statements about LoanStreet, Lampl, and other LoanStreet employees on various websites, including Glassdoor.com and Reddit.com.

    Troia also purchased advertisements on Google that would appear when users searched the following terms or phrases: “LoanStreet”; “Loan Street”; “LoanStreet Glassdoor”; “LoanStreet careers”; “LoanStreet engineering”; “LoanStreet software engineering”; “What it’s like to work at LoanStreet”; and “LoanStreet Jobs.” Each of Troia’s Google advertisements began with the heading: “LoanStreet horror story” and linked to a Reddit post he had made, titled: “Name and Shame: LoanStreet (NY) cheated me out of equity.”

    Plaintiffs brought suit against Troia, asserting claims for breach of contract, defamation and unfair competition.

    Troia filed a motion to exclude Plaintiffs’ proposed expert, Allen Adamson while Plaintiffs filed a motion to exclude Troia’s proposed experts, Deepak Sabiki and Lamarcus Bolton.

    Branding Expert Witness

    Allen P. Adamson is a co-founder and managing partner of Metaforce, a marketing and brand consultancy, and he is an Adjunct Professor and guest lecturer at New York University’s Stern School of Business. He received his B.S. from the S.I. Newhouse School of Public Communications at Syracuse University and his MBA from New York University’s Stern School of Business.

    Want to know more about the challenges Allen Adamson has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.  

    Forensic Accounting Expert Witness

    Deepak Sabiki is a principal at Sabiki Consulting LLC, and he serves as a consulting and testifying expert in “forensic accounting, compliance, and litigation matters.” Sabiki received his B.S. in Finance and Economic Theory Analysis from New York University’s Stern School of Business.

    Get the full story on challenges to Deepak Sabiki’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study

    Psychology Expert Witness

     Dr. Lamarcus R. Bolton is a Principal at Insightful Holdings, a research firm based in Los Angeles, California. He attended St. Louis University, where he received his B.A. in Psychology and his M.S. and PhD in Industrial/Organizational Psychology.

    Discover more cases with Lamarcus Bolton as an expert witness by ordering his comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

    Discussion by the Court

    a. Troia’s Daubert Motion

    Troia filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Plaintiffs’ proposed expert, Allen Adamson.

    In his thirty-six-page report, Adamson evaluated the damage sustained to LoanStreet’s brand as a result of Defendant’s defamatory statements, focusing on the impact of his advertisements and posts on the company’s brand, and specifically on its ability to recruit software engineers and other prospective employees, attract and retain investors, and appeal to customers. Adamson further assessed the reputational damage sustained by Lampl’s “personal brand” due to Defendant’s statements.

    He ultimately determined that LoanStreet would need to spend a total of $3,700,000 over at least two years to repair its reputation with software engineers, prospective customers, and investors, and that Lampl would be required to spend between $750,000 and $2,500,000 over the next three to five years in order to adequately restore his reputation and safeguard his future career prospects.

    Troia claimed that Adamson’s testimony should be excluded as “irrelevant, unreliable, and prejudicial” and raised a variety of concerns centering primarily upon the assertion that Adamson’s report did not adequately establish causation by isolating the harm caused by Defendant’s defamatory statements.

    He also asserted that Adamson’s damages calculation impermissibly accounts for the republication of Defendant’s defamatory statements by third parties, which Troia contended is speculative and resulted in an “artificially inflated” damages amount.

    As Plaintiffs noted, broad general damages are permitted in cases involving defamation per se, and Adamson’s testimony is thus squarely relevant to those claims.

    The Court held that Troia’s remaining concerns regarding Adamson’s report and proposed testimony primarily concerned the weight of his testimony, rather than its admissibility, and are best addressed on cross examination.

    b. Plaintiffs’ Daubert Motion

    i. Deepak Sabiki

    Sabiki reviewed Adamson’s expert report and, after reviewing additional documents in this case, issued a ten-page rebuttal report in which he concluded that Adamson’s report is “speculative and not reliable, because it fails to tie the wrongful acts of Troia to the economic harm that LoanStreet and Lampl allegedly suffered.” 

    Plaintiffs contended that Sabiki’s report should be precluded because: (i) he has no expertise in branding and reputational harm or repair; (ii) he did not perform his own analysis or proffer a contrary damages calculation; and (iii) his proposed testimony presents arguments that counsel could make equally well without a witness.

    As an experienced consulting and testifying expert in litigation and forensic accounting with a degree in finance and economic theory analysis, the Court held that Sabiki is qualified to testify as a rebuttal expert regarding Adamson’s analysis of the economic damages sustained by Plaintiffs as a result of Defendant’s defamatory posts. Moreover, Defendant clarified that Sabiki is testifying solely as a rebuttal expert.

    Although Plaintiffs contended that Sabiki’s analysis consisted of observations that “can be observed readily by jurors and/or brought out in cross examination without benefitting from any aid by an expert,” they have not raised sufficient concerns regarding Sabiki’s qualifications or the reliability and relevance of his testimony. On the contrary, Sabiki’s opinion raised questions regarding Adamson’s analysis and methodologies, centering primarily on his failure to perform an economic causation analysis and a comparative damages analysis, as well as the data and assumptions underlying Adamson’s report. Although Plaintiffs may disagree with Sabiki’s conclusions, the Court held that those disagreements are best addressed on cross-examination.

    ii. Dr. Lamarcus Bolton

    Bolton conducted two surveys intended to “analyze public perceptions of the Defendant’s online statements regarding” LoanStreet and “gauge how these perceptions influenced potential employees’ and potential customers’ decisions to work for or engage in business with LoanStreet.”

    In his 137-page report, Bolton concluded, inter alia, that the survey results suggested that “the vast majority of the readers” of Troia’s posts “did not think the posts accused LoanStreet of breaking the law when it withheld equity compensation from Troia.”

    The primary issue with Bolton’s survey and report, as Plaintiffs noted, is its focus on whether respondents believed that Defendant had accused Plaintiffs of “breaking the law.” The use of this phrase appeared to be designed to determine whether the survey respondents believed defendant’s posts conveyed defamatory meaning. However, “breaking the law” carries an indisputably criminal connotation, and its use is entirely inappropriate in a survey carried out to assist in the determination of damages owed in a civil litigation. 

    Further, the Court agreed with Plaintiffs that both surveys impermissibly attempted to relitigate the question of liability and Defendant’s intent in crafting his posts by asking whether it “is possible” that the author of the posts “did not intend to claim LoanStreet broke the law” or was “motivated . . . by a desire to protect fellow workers” and asking whether the author’s post was “useful to public debate about workers’ rights.” Moreover, the fact that Bolton’s survey examining Defendant’s Reddit post did not include all the defamatory statements contained in the original post rendered that survey unusable.

    Additionally, both surveys are less reliable because they failed to exclude survey respondents with prior knowledge of Defendant’s posts regarding Plaintiffs or who had pre-existing perceptions regarding LoanStreet.

    Held

    • The Court denied Troia’s motion to exclude the testimony of Plaintiffs’ expert Allen Adamson.
    • The Court denied Plaintiffs’ motion to exclude the testimony of Troia’s experts with respect to Deepak Sabiki but granted it with respect to Dr. Lamarcus Bolton.

    Key Takeaway:

    While each methodological flaw, standing alone, may not mandate exclusion, the cumulative effect of the methodological flaws so diminishes the reliability and probative value of the survey that its exclusion is warranted under Rules 403 and 702.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Loanstreet Inc. Et Al V. Troia
    Docket Number: 1:21cv6166
    Court Name: United States District Court, New York Southern
    Order Date; September 03, 2025
  • Forensic Accounting Expert’s Valuation Testimony Without Deductions Admitted

    Forensic Accounting Expert’s Valuation Testimony Without Deductions Admitted

    Platinum Services, Inc. filed a lawsuit against the United States, acting through the Department of Defense (DoD), alleging breach of contract. The dispute centered on the transportation of 45 shipments of household goods for military service members during the summers of 2016, 2017, and 2018.

    Platinum claimed it had entered into an agreement with the government to provide both line-haul freight services (long-distance transport) and accessorial services (additional moving-related services beyond standard long-distance transportation). According to Platinum, the government had accepted the rates listed on its freight tenders, totaling $17,651,695 million, and despite completing the work, the company asserted it had not been paid.

    The government, however, disputed this account. It acknowledged requesting long-distance shipping but denied ever ordering or authorizing any accessorial services. It also argued that it had never accepted Platinum’s tendered rates. Instead, the government maintained that Platinum was owed no more than $400,612, based on the reasonable value of the services actually provided—a legal theory known as quantum meruit.

    The government’s expert witness on damages, Mr. A. Mark Gmyr, prepared a report purporting to calculate the value of accessorial services rendered to the government. Plaintiff has filed a motion in limine to exclude Gmyr’s testimony from evidence.

    Forensic Accounting Expert Witness

    Andrew Mark Gmyr specializes in forensic accounting and assessing contract-based damages claims, including under quantum meruit. Gmyr holds a Bachelor of Science in finance from Virginia Polytechnic and State University (Virginia Tech), he is a Certified Fraud Examiner (CFE), and is a Certified Construction Auditor (CCA).

    Gmyr also has 25 years of experience consulting on dozens of construction and Government contracts matters, analyzing Government contracts, preparing contract claims, crafting expert reports, and presenting his analyses through testimony or during mediation and settlement proceedings.

    Want to know more about the challenges A. Mark Gmyr has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report. 

    Discussion by the Court

    Gmyr’s Expert Report and Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine

    Gmyr’s report relied on the “stepped approach” to calculate Platinum’s quantum meruit damages, which is a recommended approach in the litigation cost-accounting industry. That approach (1) determines the type of claim at issue; (2) determines potential financial impacts; (3) determines the approach to quantifying damages based on the facts at issue; (4) reviews, in detail, the relevant documentation; (5) quantifies the financial impacts based on the relevant documentation; and (6) quantifies damages and/or applies adjustments to damages.

    Using the stepped approach, Gmyr ultimately concluded that Platinum’s quantum meruit damages amounted to $400,612, including $176,889 for line-haul for all 45 shipments, $3,990 for origin loading for only two shipments, and $219,733 for destination unloading for 43 shipments.

    Plaintiff’s motion in limine argued that Gmyr is not qualified to calculate the value of Platinum’s accessorial services, because although Gmyr has experience in financial analysis and forensic accounting, he has no specialized experience in the transportation industry. However, the Court held that Gmyr is qualified to testify on the fair market value of accessorial services performed by Platinum.

    Moreover, Gmyr’s report analyzed rate data from other Transportation Service Providers registered in the relevant government system—GFM—during the relevant time periods—2016 through 2018—and for the relevant accessorial services at issue—expedited service, loading and unloading, and handling non-adjacent freight.

    The stepped approach is simply a commonsense approach to a mathematical inquiry frequently used in the damages accounting industry. In other words, the Court concluded that Gmyr’s methodology is not unreliable simply because it is straightforward.

    However, Gmyr’s damages deductions based on his application of the government’s contract formation and performance arguments was not admitted because he is in no position to instruct the Court on issues of law. 

    Held

    The Court granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiff’s motion in limine to exclude A. Mark Gmyr’s testimony from evidence

    Key Takeaway:

    An expert’s assessment of damages is not any less relevant or reliable just because it involves simple mathematical calculations. Gmyr’s valuation methodology is reliable as Gmyr based his calculations on the “stepped approach,” which is commonly used in the litigation cost-accounting industry.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Platinum Services, Inc. V. USA
    Docket Number: 1:20cv456
    Court Name: United States Court of Federal Claims
    Order Date: July 25, 2025
  • Oil and Gas Industry Expert is Qualified Despite Her Lack of Forensic Accounting Credentials

    Oil and Gas Industry Expert is Qualified Despite Her Lack of Forensic Accounting Credentials

    Louisiana Minerals, Ltd., as lessor, and Weyerhaeuser, as lessee, are the successors in interest to a 1986 Timber Sale and Lease Contract (“Contract”).

    LML asserted that Weyerhaeuser has entered into a significant number of unauthorized third-party agreements that impinge upon or adversely affect LML’s rights under the Contract. Damages were sought for harm caused by Weyerhaeuser’s alleged breach of contract and a declaration of the parties’ rights under the Contract to preclude Weyerhaeuser’s “unauthorized” activity going forward.

    LML retained Ms. Helga A. Zauner to calculate their alleged damages in this action. She produced two reports, the first on December 15, 2023, and a supplemental report on February 29, 2024. Weyerhaeuser filed a Daubert motion to exclude the opinions of Zauner on the basis that they are both irrelevant and unreliable.

    Weyerhaeuser, on the other hand, retained Ms. Lesa S. Adair who rendered a rebuttal to Zauner’s first expert report. LML filed a motion to exclude the opinions of Adair on the basis that she is unqualified, her methodologies are unreliable, and her opinions are not based on sufficient facts.

    Forensic Accounting Expert Witness

    Helga Abreu Zauner, CVA, CFE, MAFF, is a testifying expert witness with 27 years of experience in litigation consulting, financial analysis, banking, research and teaching. She focuses on financial modelling and statistical techniques, with extensive experience in quantitative data analysis.

    Zauner is recognized as a Certified Fraud Examiner (CFE) by the Association of Fraud Examiners and as a Certified Valuation Analyst (CVA) and Master Analyst in Financial Forensics (MAFF) by the National Association of Certified Valuators and Analysts. In addition, she has built a successful practice as an expert witness in personal injury, family law, and commercial litigation.

    Want to know more about the challenges Helga Zauner has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report. 

    Oil and Gas Industry Expert Witness

    Lesa Shuyler Adair has a Bachelor’s Degree in Chemical Engineering and an MBA in Finance. She is a founder and principal of Pearson Adair & Co., and has more than 35 years’ experience in the energy industry. Adair also has served as an expert or consultant in many court and arbitration proceedings, assessing and analyzing damages in a variety of industries and contexts, including the oil and gas industry. She  has written several energy related publications.

    Get the full story on challenges to Lesa Adair’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study. 

    Discussion by the Court

    Helga Zauner

    Relevance

    Weyerhaeuser asserted that Zauner’s testimony is irrelevant because her damage calculations were based upon third-party agreements selected by LML’s attorneys according to unknown and unverifiable criteria and because her calculations reflected a theory of disgorgement, which is not an available remedy for breach of contract under Louisiana law.

    Having reviewed Zauner’s reports and the parties’ submissions, the Court found that Zauner’s testimony is relevant as it relates to and will aid the Court’s determination of damages. Zauner’s reports were based on assumptions of how the disputed facts might be resolved by the Court.

    The third-party agreements that formed the basis of Zauner’s calculations were selected based on the assumption that they infringed on LML’s mineral rights. Her damage calculations were not based on a legal theory but were based on the assumption of what LML would have received from third parties in the absence of Weyerhaeuser’s third-party agreements.

    Reliability

    Weyerhaeuser contended that Zauner’s testimony is unreliable because she assumed breach of contract and causation of damages. Moreover, Weyerhaeuser argued that her extrapolation methods were faulty, she made unspecified corrections in her second report, she failed to consider Weyerhaeuser’s offsetting damages, and her analyses were based on LML’s counsel’s selection of agreements based on undisclosed criteria.

    The Court disagreed with Weyerhaeuser’s assertion that there is “an unbridgeable gap” between Zauner’s opinions and the evidence in this case. Whether there is a breach of the contract that caused any damage to LML are core facts in dispute in this action. Moreover, Zauner’s calculations were not based on facts contradictory to the evidence in the record, but instead relied on assumptions of facts in dispute. In other words, the Court declared that Weyerhaeuser’s objections to Zauner’s opinions on the grounds of unreliability were ultimately rooted in the bases and sources of her opinions.

    Adair Motion

    First, LML claimed that Adair is not qualified to rebut the conclusions of Zauner, who is a credentialed forensic accountant. LML alleged that Adair is not qualified because she is not a forensic accountant and holds no licenses, certifications, or formal training in accounting.

    Moreover, LML stated that no one on Adair’s analytical team holds any type of license or certification in accounting. LML also asserted that Adair lacked expertise in the subject matter of this case because she has never been retained by a timber company and there is no explanation of how her technical experience, as a chemical engineer, relates to her conclusions or how she applied her experience to the facts of this case.

    Weyerhaeuser contended that this case did not involve forensic accounting, but a calculation of what third parties paid Weyerhaeuser for use of the surface. She was assisted by a team including a mechanical engineer, a financial analyst with an accounting degree, and a market research data analyst with a finance degree.

    The Court found LML’s assertions that Adair is unqualified unconvincing. First, Adair herself has a master’s degree in finance and her team included others with a background in finance.

    Further, the Court was persuaded by Weyerhaeuser’s argument that the damage calculations in dispute did not involve forensic accounting principles. Additionally, even though Adair has not been retained by a timber company before, her expertise in the oil and gas industry will aid the Court in resolving the disputed facts which form the basis of Zauner’s damage calculations.

    Reliability

    First, LML claimed that Adair’s report is unreliable because she only criticized Zauner’s opinion and did not conduct an independent analysis. LML also averred that Adair’s opinions are not based on sufficient facts and have not been reliably applied to the facts of this case.

    The Court found that Adair’s critique of Zauner’s report was based on her independent analysis; further, any shortcomings of Adair’s analysis may be addressed on cross examination and will go to the weight of her testimony.

    Held

    The Court denied both Weyerhaeuser Company’s Daubert motion to exclude the testimony of Helga Zauner and Louisiana Minerals, LTD.’s Daubert motion—or, in the alternative, motion in limine—to exclude or limit the testimony of Lesa Adair.

    Key Takeaway:

    While expert testimony is rightly excluded where an expert’s opinions are based on such speculative assumptions or alterations of fact that the testimony is no longer relevant and would not materially assist the trier of fact, making factually supported and non-speculative assumptions does not constitute valid grounds for disqualification of an expert opinion.

    Just as with Zauner, Adair has relied on assumptions — which agreements to include, the value of certain agreements, whether administrative fees should be included, and whether LML would have received the same payments that Weyerhaeuser received from third parties — of facts in dispute in this case.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Louisiana Minerals Ltd V. Weyerhaeuser Company
    Docket Number: 5:22cv145
    Court Name: United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, Shreveport Division
    Order Date: June 18, 2025
  • Forensic Accounting Expert Witness’ Opinion About Defendant’s Potential Contribution of APFOs Admitted

    Forensic Accounting Expert Witness’ Opinion About Defendant’s Potential Contribution of APFOs Admitted

    The case involves allegations concerning the contamination of drinking water in Hoosick Falls, New York, by perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA), a chemical commonly referred to as PFOA. Plaintiffs claim that the primary source of this contamination was a fabric coating facility located on McCaffrey Street. According to their allegations, DuPont manufactured and sold aqueous fluoropolymer dispersions (AFD) containing ammonium perfluorooctanoate (APFO) to Saint-Gobain and Allied Signal, who used these products at the facility. APFO, when dissociated in water, forms perfluorooctanoate (PFO) and, under acidic conditions, transforms into PFOA, which contributed to the contamination. 

    Plaintiffs allege that DuPont supplied PFOA-containing AFD products to these companies from the 1950s through 2015, despite being aware of the health hazards associated with PFOA exposure by 1984. They further assert that DuPont was also aware of technologies that could have reduced or eliminated PFOA emissions but chose not to advise its customers or recommend testing for PFOA in groundwater near their facilities. Instead, DuPont allegedly prioritized profits over safety, continuing to sell these products without warning about the risks. 

    DuPont, in its defense, denied many of the allegations and disputed its role as a direct and proximate cause of the contamination. It argued that it was not a significant contributor to the contamination of the Hoosick Falls water supply. To support this, DuPont submitted expert reports from Adam Love and David Duffus, suggesting that the company contributed only around 15% of the total AFDs delivered to the McCaffrey Street facility between 1991 and 2003. Plaintiffs, however, sought to exclude their expert testimony, arguing that they were not relevant to the case. 

    Environment Engineering Expert Witness

    Dr. Adam Love earned a Bachelor of Arts in Geosciences from Franklin & Marshall College in 1996, followed by a Master of Science in Material Science and Mineral Engineering in 1998, and a Doctor of Philosophy in Civil and Environmental Engineering in 2002, both from the University of California, Berkeley. He accumulated over 20 years of experience in environmental forensics, site characterization, remediation, exposure assessment, human health risk, and contamination transport analysis. 

    From 1996 to 2002, Love worked as a graduate student researcher at UC Berkeley, contributing to contaminant transport and environmental forensic evaluations. He developed new techniques for environmental pollution reconstruction and allocation. From 2002 to 2009, he served as a scientist at the Forensic Science Center at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. 

    Discover more cases with Adam Love as an expert witness by ordering his comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.   

    Forensic Accounting Expert Witness 

    David Duffus is a forensic accountant with over 25 years of experience across diverse industries. He earned a BA in Economics and Political Science, an MBA in Accounting and Finance, and held several professional designations, including CPA, ABV, CFE, and CFF. 

    Throughout his career, Duffus served as an expert on more than 100 occasions, testifying over 90 times in depositions, trials, and alternative dispute settings. He handled disputes involving values up to $275 million and project values exceeding $300 million. Additionally, he acted as an arbitrator and neutral accountant in post-acquisition and valuation-related disputes. 

    Since 1992, Duffus specialized in complex litigation services, forensic accounting, and valuation assignments for a wide range of businesses, from start-ups to Fortune 100 companies. He collaborated extensively with legal counsel through all phases of litigation, providing expert witness and deposition testimony in both state and federal courts, as well as in alternative dispute settings. Before joining HKA, Duffus dedicated nearly 17 years to Baker Tilly’s Global Forensics & Litigation Services practice, including 15 years as a partner. 

    Want to know more about the challenges David Duffus has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report. 

    Discussion by the Court 

    Adam Love 

    Plaintiffs sought to exclude Love’s testimony on the grounds of irrelevance, asserting that his opinions did not cover the full period during which DuPont supplied chemicals to the McCaffrey Street site. They argued that Love’s data only reflected roughly a third of the known supply period, making it insufficient to determine DuPont’s contribution to the contamination. Plaintiffs further contended that his opinions did not make it less probable that DuPont significantly contributed to the contamination in Hoosick Falls. 

    The Court, however, found Love’s testimony relevant under Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which allows evidence that has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable. The comparative data he presented could reasonably lead a jury to conclude that DuPont was not a significant contributor to the contamination. Additionally, the Court noted that Love’s report explicitly recognized the limitations in the available data, particularly regarding the APFO content in the AFDs supplied by DuPont. While Plaintiffs argued that this limited scope could confuse the jury, the Court emphasized that such concerns could be addressed through cross-examination rather than by excluding the testimony. Thus, Love’s testimony was found to be both relevant and based on a sufficient foundation. 

    David Duffus 

    Plaintiffs also sought to exclude Duffus’ expert testimony, arguing that his reliance on a limited data set—specifically, records from Saint-Gobain covering a narrow time frame—rendered his conclusions irrelevant. Duffus’ report addressed DuPont’s supply of AFDs between 1991 and 2003, but Plaintiffs argued that this narrow focus could not accurately assess DuPont’s contribution to the contamination. 

    In response, the Court found Duffus’ testimony relevant under Rule 702, which establishes a broad standard for the admissibility of expert opinions. Despite the limited data set, the Court concluded that Duffus had based his opinions on the best available information, which was accessible to both parties. The Court also rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that the source of the data—Saint-Gobain—undermined the testimony’s foundation. Instead, it held that any limitations in Duffus’ analysis could be explored during cross-examination, rather than serving as grounds for exclusion. Permitting Plaintiffs’ able counsel to cross examine Duffus about the perceived limitations of the data set and what, if any, information can be gleaned from his opinion about DuPont’s potential contribution of APFOs is considered a better remedy than total preclusion of this opinion.

    Held 

    The Court denied the Plaintiffs’ motions to exclude expert testimonies from Adam Love and David Duffus, ruling they met relevance and admissibility standards under Federal Rules 401(a) and 702. 

    Key Takeaways: 

    • Relevance of Expert Testimony: The Court affirmed that expert testimony can be relevant even if it doesn’t cover the entire time period of alleged contamination. Partial data can still be useful in assessing a party’s potential contribution to environmental damage. 
    • Cross-Examination vs. Exclusion: The Court favored allowing expert testimony and subjecting it to cross-examination rather than excluding it entirely, even when there were potential limitations in the data or analysis. 
    • Foundation for Expert Opinions: The Court found that expert opinions based on limited available data can still have sufficient foundation, especially in cases where complete historical records may not exist. 
    • Source of Data: The Court determined that the source of data (in this case, from one of the parties) does not automatically render expert testimony inadmissible or lacking foundation.

    Please refer to the blog previously published about this case:

    Chemical Engineering Expert Witness’ Testimony About the Harms Surrounding PFOA Limited

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Baker V. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp. 
    Docket Number: 1:16cv917 
    Court: United States District Court for the Northern District of New York 
    Order Date: September 13, 2024 
  • Expert’s opinion need not rely on admissible evidence to be admissible; Court deems a motion to bar forensic accounting expert witness premature

    Expert’s opinion need not rely on admissible evidence to be admissible; Court deems a motion to bar forensic accounting expert witness premature

    Justin Guy, a former employee of Absopure where he worked as a driver transporting products within the state of Michigan, had filed a collective action lawsuit on behalf of himself and 25 opt-in Plaintiffs, alleging that Absopure violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) by not paying overtime for hours worked in excess of 40 per week. Throughout the litigation, Absopure contended that its drivers, including some of the Plaintiffs, were exempt from FLSA’s overtime provisions under the Motor Carrier Act (MCA) exemption.

    One of the key points of contention in the case was whether the “small vehicle exception” to the MCA exemption applicable to the Plaintiffs. This exception would entitle them to overtime pay if they drove trucks weighing less than 10,001 pounds, regardless of the MCA exemption.

    The parties had ongoing disputes related to discovery, particularly concerning the weight of the vehicles driven by the Plaintiffs and the hours worked by them. Following a Court order, Absopure was required to furnish Plaintiff with information it possessed relevant to the topics of Absopure’s discovery requests to Plaintiff , while the Plaintiffs were instructed to respond with any agreements or disagreements they might have with the information furnished by Absopure.

    Absopure had submitted an interrogatory to the Plaintiffs requesting that they identify each day they drove a vehicle weighing 10,000 pounds or less and each day they drove a vehicle weighing 10,001 pounds or more during the relevant time period. As per the Court’s order, Absopure provided a statement and additional information about the weights of vehicles it claimed were driven by the Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs’ counsel reported that they were conferring with opt-in Plaintiffs regarding their vehicle usage. Subsequently, the Plaintiffs provided Absopure with a summary chart detailing the estimated number of times that 18 opt-in Plaintiffs had driven vehicles weighing 10,000 pounds or less. Notably, only five of those 18 Plaintiffs had submitted declarations stating the number of times they drove small vehicles and similar declarations for the remaining 13 Plaintiffs on the chart were missing.

    The parties also disputed the number of hours worked by the Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs initially provided Absopure with a chart estimating the daily start and end times for 22 Plaintiffs, although this chart was not sworn to by any of the Plaintiffs. Additionally, Plaintiffs’ expert, Martin K. Williams, calculated the Plaintiffs’ asserted damages based in part on his review of this estimated hours-worked chart.

    Absopure had submitted a motion in limine seeking several specific actions from the Court. These requests included, first, the request to prohibit the Plaintiffs from offering any testimony or evidence related to the small vehicle exception to the Motor Carrier Act (MCA) as a sanction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 due to the Plaintiffs’ failure to respond to Absopure’s interrogatories.

    Additionally, Absopure asked the Court to exclude from evidence the Plaintiffs’ estimated hours-worked chart, which had been attached as Exhibit A to the Plaintiffs’ third supplemental initial disclosures. Absopure had argued that this chart consisted of inadmissible hearsay and hence warranted exclusion.

    Finally, Absopure also requested the Court to exclude the testimony of the Plaintiffs’ proffered damages expert, Martin Williams.

    However, after Absopure filed its motion, the Plaintiffs subsequently provided Absopure with sworn declarations from 19 Plaintiffs, which contained estimates of the hours they had worked.

    Forensic Accounting Expert Witness

    Martin K. Williams, CPA/CFF, CFE is a twenty-two year Certified Public Accountant and sixteen-year seasoned forensic accountant/expert witness. He specializes in economic damages and lost profits in cases pertaining to breach of contract, shareholder disputes, personal injury and marital dissolution. He holds a Bachelor’s and Master’s degree in Business Administration from University of Miami Herbert Business School.

    Discussions by the Court

    The Court first addressed Absopure’s request to prohibit Plaintiffs from presenting any evidence or testimony related to the small vehicle exception to the MCA exemption as a sanction under Rule 37. The Court recognized that the small vehicle exception was highly relevant to the parties’ claims and defenses. The Court also acknowledged that Plaintiffs failed to adequately respond to Absopure’s interrogatory asking them to specify which vehicles under 10,000 pounds they drove. However, the Court determined that imposing sanctions at this stage would be premature if Plaintiffs promptly supplemented their discovery responses as required.  

    Instead of imposing sanctions immediately, the Court ordered Plaintiffs to produce for every Plaintiff for whom recovery is sought, a declaration, affidavit, or sworn testimony by October 31, 2023 specifying the number of times the Plaintiffs drove vehicles under 10,000 pounds. The Court stated that reasonable estimates could be used if Plaintiffs attested exact numbers were unknown. The Court warned that any Plaintiff who failed to timely provide the required sworn statement without showing good cause would be barred from presenting evidence or testimony regarding the small vehicle exception. This potential sanction would apply unless there was some other evidentiary basis for establishing a Plaintiff’s invocation of the exception. 

    Next, the Court addressed the admissibility of Plaintiffs’ estimated hours-worked chart attached to their supplemental disclosures. The Court agreed with Absopure that the chart constituted inadmissible hearsay under Rule 801, noting that Plaintiffs did not dispute this characterization or indicate an intent to admit the chart into evidence. Because the chart was hearsay and did not fall under any recognized hearsay exception, the Court ruled the chart inadmissible as evidence at trial. However, the Court stated Plaintiffs could potentially use the chart as a demonstrative exhibit to illustrate evidence properly admitted at trial. If Plaintiffs wished to use the chart for this limited purpose, the Court instructed them to file a motion setting forth the proposed use and supporting authority. 

    Absopure had argued that Plaintiffs’ expert, Martin Williams, should not be allowed to testify because his expert report summarizing his likely testimony regarding Plaintiffs’ damages relied on their inadmissible hours-worked chart and was based on what they considered “pure speculation.” The Court had agreed with Absopure to some extent, noting that Martin Williams’ intended testimony would lack a proper evidentiary basis at trial.

    Plaintiffs had correctly asserted that, according to Federal Rules of Evidence 703, an expert’s opinion did not necessarily need to rely on admissible evidence to be admissible. However, the Courts had discretion under the Federal Rules of Evidence to exclude expert opinion testimony if it was based entirely on speculation. In this case, the expert report of Martin Williams had generated calculations based on (i) the expert’s review of the estimated hours-worked chart and (ii) assumed workdays ranging from 9 to 12 hours. The report had calculated Plaintiffs’ “total unpaid overtime premiums and liquidated damages” based on this estimated hours-worked chart.

    The Court had emphasized that expert testimony must have an evidentiary basis to be considered sufficiently reliable and not speculative. Therefore, the Court had determined that it should wait to see what evidence would be presented at trial. If evidence establishing a factual basis was presented, the expert’s testimony might be deemed reliable. At that point, it was considered premature to bar him from testifying.

    Held

    The Court granted in part and denied in part Defendant Absopure Water Company, LLC’s motion to exclude Plaintiffs from presenting at trial 1) any testimony or evidence related to the Small Vehicle Exception to the Motor Carrier Act, 2) Exhibit A to their Third Supplemental Initial Disclosures consisting of Plaintiffs’ estimated hours-worked chart, and 3) the purported expert testimony of Martin Williams.

    The Court has not arrived on an outcome for this case since the remaining issues involved in this case still await resolution.

    Key Takeaways:

    • Expert opinions must have a reliable factual basis to be admissible. If the facts underlying the opinion are too speculative or unreliable, the testimony must be excluded.
    • According to Federal Rules of Evidence 703, an expert’s opinion need not rely on admissible evidence to be admissible. An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert has been made aware of or personally observed. If experts in the particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject, they need not be admissible for the opinion to be admitted.
    • Because the expert’s testimony must have an evidentiary basis to take it out of the realm of speculative testimony and render it sufficiently reliable, the Court must await what evidence is presented at trial. If evidence is presented that establishes a factual basis, the expert’s testimony may well be reliable.