Expert Witness Profiler

Category: Internal Medicine Expert Witness

  • Internal Medicine Expert’s Testimony on a Syncopal Episode Admitted

    Internal Medicine Expert’s Testimony on a Syncopal Episode Admitted

    On June 3, 2020, Matthew Vomero was driving a tractor trailer when his vehicle crashed into a building insured by Travelers Home and Marine Insurance Company (“Travelers”). At the time of the accident, Vomero was acting in the course and scope of his employment with U.S. Xpress.

    The parties dispute whether Defendants have presented admissible evidence supporting their assertion that Vomero had such a medical incident, and Travelers asserts that Vomero merely fell asleep while driving. 

    Defendants’ expert, Dr. Adam C. Sobel, a physician, offered an expert opinion that prior to crashing his tractor trailer, Vomero suffered a “syncopal episode” as a result of laughing, causing him to lose consciousness and the ability to steer his vehicle. Travelers filed a motion to exclude Sobel’s testimony under Rule 702.

    Travelers did not challenge Sobel’s qualifications but sought to have Sobel’s testimony excluded as unreliable and unhelpful to the jury because 1) his testimony was not supported by evidence in the record, 2) Sobel did not review enough of the record to come to a reliable conclusion, 3) Sobel did not cite to any scholarly materials supporting his diagnosis, and 4) Sobel failed to testify that he came to his conclusions with a reasonable degree of medical certainty.

    Internal Medicine Expert Witness

    Adam C. Sobel, M.D. is a board-certified internist with more than three decades of clinical, academic, and forensic medical experience. He earned his B.S. through Pennsylvania State University’s six-year pre-medicine/medical program and his M.D. from Jefferson Medical College, followed by an internal medicine internship, residency, and service as Chief Medical Resident at Thomas Jefferson University Hospital. Dr. Sobel is certified by the American Board of Internal Medicine and is licensed to practice medicine in Pennsylvania and New Jersey. He has served as a Clinical Assistant Professor of Medicine and as an attending physician at multiple major hospital systems, including Penn Medicine and Main Line HealthCare.

    Want to know more about the challenges Adam Sobel has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    His testimony was not supported by evidence in the record

    The Court found Travelers’ argument that Sobel’s testimony is unreliable to be contradicted by evidence in the record. According to Travelers, because Vomero was not laughing prior to the crash, Sobel’s conclusion that Vomero suffered a laughter-induced syncopal episode is frivolous. However, Defendants presented the testimony of Nicholas Rice (“Rice”), a fellow truck driver, who stated that he was speaking with Vomero on the phone prior to and during the crash. Rice testified that during his phone call with Vomero, he heard Vomero laughing, heard Vomero go silent for fifteen to twenty seconds, and then heard a crash. 

    Sobel did not review enough of the record to come to a reliable conclusion

    The Court further rejected Travelers’ assertion that Sobel did not review sufficient evidence to come to a reliable medical conclusion. According to Sobel’s report, Sobel reviewed Vomero’s medical records, lab tests, and various other parts of the record such as a police report and Vomero’s deposition transcript.

    Sobel did not cite to any scholarly materials supporting his diagnosis

    The Court similarly rejected Travelers’ contention that Sobel’s conclusions regarding a laughter-induced syncopal episode are unreliable because Sobel did not cite to any scholarly articles regarding such a condition.

    Sobel failed to testify that he came to his conclusions with a reasonable degree of medical certainty

    Finally, the Court did not accept Travelers’ conclusion that Sobel’s testimony is neither reliable nor helpful to the jury because he did not testify that he reached his conclusions to a reasonable degree of medical certainty. The Court acknowledged that Sobel’s report contains statements such as “it is more probable than not that a person laughing does not simply fall asleep and it is more likely than not that Vomero had a syncopal episode.”

    While such language would indicate that Sobel did not reach his conclusions to the degree of medical certainty required by Pennsylvania law, during his deposition, Sobel testified that there was close to a one hundred percent chance that Vomero did not fall asleep prior to the accident and confirmed that he reached his opinions to a reasonable degree of medical certainty.

    While a reasonable jury could choose to discredit Sobel’s testimony due to perceived inconsistencies, Sobel’s testimony is sufficient for purposes of the instant motion and such inconsistencies are proper topics for cross examination.

    Held

    The Court denied Traveler’s motion to exclude the testimony of Adam Sobel.

    Key Takeaway

    A medical expert is not required to cite to scholarly or peer reviewed articles in order to provide a reliable opinion.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: The Travelers Home And Marine Insurance Company V. U.S. Xpress, Inc.
    Docket Number: 3:22cv700
    Court Name: United States District Court, Pennsylvania Middle
    Order Date: February 25, 2026
  • Internal Medicine Expert Was Allowed to Opine on Medical Effects

    Internal Medicine Expert Was Allowed to Opine on Medical Effects

    Plaintiff, Robert Rone (“Rone”) asserted claims against Kiesha Pettway, RN, and Felicia Crawford, CRNP, for alleged violations of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 relating to Rone’s incarceration at the Mobile County Metro Jail on May 7, 2021.

    Crawford and Pettway filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Robert’s purported expert, Ramzy Rimawi, M.D., pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 702.

    Internal Medicine Expert Witness

    Ramzy Husam Rimawi, M.D. received his M.D. from Ross University School of Medicine, after which he completed his Internal Medicine internship and residency training at NYU Lutheran Medical Center, followed by two clinical fellowships in Critical Care Medicine and Infectious Diseases.

    He is triple American Board certified in Internal Medicine, Infectious Diseases and Critical Care Medicine.

    Want to know more about the challenges Ramzy Rimawi has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Crawford and Pettway argued that Rimawi’s opinions did not assist the Court with the decision as to whether Crawford and Pettway were deliberately indifferent to Robert’s serious medical need. Crawford and Pettway argued that Rimawi did not know the actions or inactions that were taken by either of them and he did not analyze the medical care and treatment they provided to Rone.

    Indeed, in Robert’s response to the motion to exclude, he acknowledged that Rimawi “does not know what the nurse Defendants did, what the jail or NaphCare policies are, or even what deliberate indifference is” and he is solely a causation expert in this matter, who opined the stress that Robert experienced from his arrest and surrounding events caused him to develop shingles and chronic postherpetic neuralgia, as well as suffer symptoms consistent with post-traumatic stress disorder. These may be effects, but this opinion is not relevant to the claims.

    Since Rimawi’s expert opinions are limited to medical effects and do not address whether Crawford and Pettway were deliberately indifferent to Robert’s serious medical need, they are not relevant to the claims. Rather, they would only be relevant as to any damages. Since the Court determined summary judgment is granted on the claims for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, the motion to exclude was denied.

    Held

    The Court denied Kiesha Pettway and Felicia Crawford’s rule 702 motion to exclude the testimony from Plaintiff’s purported expert Ramzy Rimawi, M.D.

    Key Takeaway

    The district court’s objective is to make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Rone V. Lott
    Docket Number: 1:22cv509
    Court Name: United States District Court, Alabama Southern
    Order Date: February 10, 2026
  • Internal Medicine Expert’s Testimony About a Reasonable Accommodation Excluded

    Internal Medicine Expert’s Testimony About a Reasonable Accommodation Excluded

    Plaintiff Taplice Stapleton filed suit against her former employer, Prince
    Carpentry, Inc., and individual Defendants Thomas Voss and John Punis. Plaintiff brought claims for unequal pay and disability discrimination. Defendant Prince Carpentry, Inc., is a drywall and carpentry subcontracting company owned by Defendant Thomas Voss. At the time of Plaintiff’s termination she was earning an annual salary of $62,000.

    Defendants filed a motion to strike the expert report of Dr. Balvindar S. Sareen. Defendants argued that Sareen’s report consisted of legal conclusions that are impermissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence, and those portions of his report that did not contain legal conclusions otherwise constituted a narration of irrelevant facts.

    Internal Medicine Expert Witness

    Dr. Balvindar S. Sareen graduated from the University of Delhi, Maulana Azad Medical College, in 1977, and completed an internship and residency in Internal Medicine at North Shore University Hospital in 1989. Sareen is board certified in Internal Medicine and Geriatrics, is a Diplomate of the American Board of Quality Assurance and Utilization Review Physicians, and holds a Master of Business Administration.

    He is licensed to practice medicine in the state of New York. He has actively practiced medicine clinically for over 30 years and has also served in various executive positions. Sareen is currently the Senior Medical Director/Vice President for Healthcare Partners in Garden City, New York, and continues to practice clinically.

    Get the full story on challenges to Balvindar Singh Sareen’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.  

    Discussion by the Court

    Sareen’s report concluded that Plaintiff was “within her rights” to insist on returning to work full-time, notwithstanding her doctor’s medical advice to work only 20 hours per week, and that her request to do so was reasonable.

    This determination, as to whether the Plaintiff’s request to work more than 20 hours per week would be a reasonable accommodation, is a conclusion to be reached by the jury in determining Defendants’ liability on Plaintiff’s
    failure to accommodate claims.

    Sareen’s report also stated: “to conclude, the common decision to override physician’s instructions, and make one’s own health-related decision, was here one to be made entirely by Plaintiff.”

    However, whether Defendants were reasonable in refusing to grant Plaintiff an accommodation that conflicted with medical guidance is also a determination to be made by the jury. Therefore, the Court agreed that Sareen’s report consisted of legal conclusions unfit for expert evidence, and these conclusions must be stricken from his report.

    However, the Court found that Sareen’s testimony regarding the issue of patients failing to comply with their doctor’s orders, and how commonplace that occurrence is, may be admitted to provide helpful background information to the jury. Additionally, the factual narration provided by Sareen in the report is limited and did not impermissibly “invade the province of the jury by finding facts that are in contention in this case.”

    Held

    The Defendants’ motion in limine to strike the testimony of Balvindar Sareen is granted in part and denied in part.

    Key Takeaway:

    In sum, it is common for expert reports to contain some background information situating their expert opinion, and the Court declined to strike Sareen’s report in its entirety on that basis.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Stapleton V. Prince Carpentry, Inc. Et Al
    Docket Number: 2:22cv4044
    Court Name: United States District Court, New York Eastern
    Order Date: September 08, 2025
  • Expert Reliably Applied Vocational Counseling Experience to the Facts

    Expert Reliably Applied Vocational Counseling Experience to the Facts

    In July 2021, the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis required its employees to be vaccinated against COVID-19. The policy allowed religious exemptions. Plaintiff Rodney Maki—one of the Bank’s law enforcement officers—requested one, citing his opposition to vaccines linked to fetal stem cells. The Bank granted Maki a temporary accommodation but revoked it a few months later. In January 2022, Maki remained unvaccinated, and the Bank terminated him. Maki sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (or “RFRA”) for religious discrimination.

    Maki filed a motion to exclude two of Bank’s experts, Dr. Frank Rhame and Jennifer Bey. The Bank, in response, filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Maki’s expert rebuttal witness Dr. Peter A. McCullough.

    Infectious Diseases Expert Witness

    Dr. Frank S. Rhame is a medical doctor with board certifications in internal medicine and infectious diseases. He studied at Stanford University and directed the Hospital Infection Control Program at the University of Minnesota. Rhame is an Adjunct Professor of Medicine at the University of Minnesota and is a fellow of the Infectious Diseases Society of America. He has presented over twenty lectures on COVID-19 and testified as an expert in two trials.

    Fortify your strategy by reviewing a Challenge Study detailing grounds for excluding Frank Rhame’s expert testimony.

    Vocational Rehabilitation Expert Witness

    Jennifer Bey is a vocational expert and owner of Bey & Dyer. She has a B.S. in Psychology from the University of Wisconsin-River Falls and a Master’s in Rehabilitation Counseling from Illinois Institute of Technology.

    Bey has over twenty years of experience in the field, and has testified or been deposed as an expert in thirty-four cases from 2017 to 2024, not counting this matter.

    Want to know more about the challenges Jennifer Bey has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Internal Medicine Expert Witness

    Dr. Peter Andrew McCullough has a medical degree from the University of Texas Southwestern Medical School in Dallas. He completed a master’s degree in public health in the field of epidemiology at the University of Michigan. McCullough has published frequently in medical journals and provided testimony on government panels on the response to the COVID-19 pandemic. 

    He is board certified in the United States in internal medicine and cardiovascular disease, and holds an additional certification in clinical lipidology, as well as a previous certification in echocardiography.

    Get the full story on challenges to Peter McCullough’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Discussion by the Court

    Frank Rhame

    Maki argued that Rhame’s testimony regarding the effectiveness of vaccines on COVID-19 infection and transmission is irrelevant to the Bank’s undue hardship defense and described scientific opinions the Bank never consulted while it developed its vaccination policy.

    There are two basic aspects to Maki’s argument that Rhame’s opinions should be excluded. The first is that Rhame addresses many scientific aspects of COVID-19, but “COVID-19 is not on trial in this case.” This argument is not persuasive. In developing its vaccination policy and in determining not to grant Maki’s requested accommodation, the Bank accounted for a variety of scientific information regarding COVID-19, the disease’s impact on its employees and operations, and the efficacy of vaccines or other measures in addressing these impacts. The Court held that Rhame’s proffered testimony will assist the jury in understanding this information.

    The second aspect to Maki’s argument is that Rhame’s proffered testimony would concern information the Bank never considered in developing its policy or refusing the requested accommodation.

    The Court explained that the issue with Maki’s motion is that he did not point out the specific parts of Rhame’s testimony that were based on information the Bank did not have in January 2022 or before.

    Jennifer Bey

    First, Maki argued that Bey is not offering specialized knowledge, but rather a cursory and superficial analysis within the jury’s capabilities. However, Bey did not merely repeat written job descriptions or compare them as a layperson might. She analyzed Maki’s deposition testimony in relation to his work for both employers.

    As for Bey’s salary-comparison analysis, Maki contended that Bey “did not address Maki’s testimony, nor did she identify what most of the security jobs’ benefits packages might entail, and how they would compare with Maki’s benefits at the Bank.” The Court clarified that the problems Maki pointed out are matters that can be challenged during cross-examination, but they are not serious enough to justify excluding the testimony.

    Maki contended that Bey’s methodology is inadequate to determine the reasonableness of a job search. However, the Court held that Bey’s proffered testimony drew on her vocational counseling experience, described tangible steps an applicant could take to pursue employment, and offered an expected timeframe to gain a licensed position.

    Maki asserted that Bey would inappropriately opine on legal matters if she testified as proffered that Maki’s job search was not a reasonable and diligent effort. As Maki’s cited authorities confirm, the reasonableness of a job search for purposes of mitigating damages is a fact question for the jury. Bey’s opinion embraces an ultimate issue with respect to damages, but this is consistent with the rules.

    Peter McCullough

    The Bank sought to exclude only “the narrow portion of McCullough’s opinion related to vaccine requirements and exemptions or accommodations to such requirements.”

    McCullough would testify, for example, that “a position supporting or mandating COVID-19 vaccination goes against good medical practice and cannot be backed by ethical and prudent physicians, public health agencies, schools, or employers.” And again, “the COVID-19 vaccines have never been sufficiently protective against contracting COVID-19 to support their use beyond voluntary participation.” The Bank argued that these statements exceeded the boundaries of acceptable expert testimony in three ways: they are outside McCullough’s expertise; they constitute legal opinions; and they are irrelevant.

    The parties disagreed about whether McCullough is qualified to testify regarding the appropriateness of employer responses to the COVID-19 pandemic.

    McCullough may testify on the medical value of vaccines, and although the Bank disputes this testimony, it does not seek to exclude it. The Court admitted this testimony. However, when McCullough opined on how “prudent” employers should have responded, the Court held that he spoke beyond his expertise. This included his references to “ethical and prudent employers” and his statements that “[e]xemptions from vaccination saved lives and should have been granted for all applications” and “[n]o one should have received any pressure, coercion, or reprisal for requesting exemption from or declining COVID-19 vaccination.”

    Held

    • The Court granted in part and denied in part Rodney Maki’s motion to exclude the testimony of Frank Rhame and Jennifer Bey.
    • The Court granted Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis’s motion to exclude the testimony of Peter McCullough.

    Key Takeaway:

    An expert must stay within his area of expertise when testifying. If the witness’ competence does not match the subject matter of the testimony, the Court must exclude the opinion.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Maki V. Federal Reserve Bank Of Minneapolis
    Docket Number: 0:22cv2887
    Court Name: United States District Court, Minnesota
    Order Date: May 21, 2025
  • Internal Medicine Expert’s Testimony Limited Despite His Physician Behavior Experience

    Internal Medicine Expert’s Testimony Limited Despite His Physician Behavior Experience

    Plaintiff State of Washington alleged that Novo Nordisk Inc. (“NNI”) caused physicians to prescribe its drug, NovoSeven®, to Washington hemophilia patients by: (1) promoting it “off-label” for prophylaxis and “high dose” use; (2) paying kickbacks to physicians; and (3) paying bribes to patients, all of which rendered claims to Medicare and Washington Medicaid false.

    The State of Washington has been investigating this case for almost fifteen years, hoping to find evidence of unlawful conduct that allowed its Medicaid program to recoup money it paid for a medically necessary, life-saving drug.

    Novo Nordisk’s expert, Dr. Anupam B. Jena, a medical doctor who also has a Ph.D. in economics opined that NNI’s “alleged publication strategy” did not cause the submission of false claims for NovoSeven.

    Washington did not challenge Jena’s credentials or expertise, but it did argue that his “causation” opinions were not admissible because (1) they were based on insufficient or mis-stated facts; (2) his methodology was unreliable because though he is not an expert on the independence of medical publications, he makes “assumptions” about the integrity of the publications at issue, while ignoring other evidence particular to the publications and strategies at issue; (3) he opined about areas of medicine and reimbursement that are outside his expertise; and (4) he opined about the law of causation, a matter better left for jury instructions.

    Internal Medicine Expert Witness

    Dr. Anupam B. Jena, MD, PhD, is the Joseph P. Newhouse Professor of Health Care Policy at Harvard Medical School and a physician in the Department of Medicine at Massachusetts General Hospital. He is also a faculty research associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research. As an economist and physician, Jena’s research involves several areas of health economics and policy including the use of natural experiments in health care, the economics of physician behavior and the physician workforce, medical malpractice, the economics of health care productivity, and the economics of medical innovation. 

    Jena graduated Phi Beta Kappa from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He received his MD and PhD in Economics from the University of Chicago and completed his residency in internal medicine at Massachusetts General Hospital. He is the host of the Freakonomics, MD podcast, which explores the “hidden side of health care.”

    Want to know more about the challenges Anupam Jena has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report. 

    Discussion by the Court

    The Court concluded that Jena is qualified to opine on the bulk of topics in his Report, including the reliability of peer-reviewed publications. He has sufficient expertise and experience in the field of physician behavior in connection with writing prescriptions to set out the many factors that can influence treating physicians in their selection of pharmaceuticals to prescribe for their patients.

    While Jena’s testimony was largely permitted because he is a qualified expert in the fields of medicine and economics and his report is based on sufficient facts or data, Jena was barred from opining on the ultimate legal conclusion that the physicians who prescribed NovoSeven did not do so because of the inducements and benefits NNI extended to them or their patients.

    Held

    The Court granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiffs Siegel and Washington’s motion to exclude the testimony of Defendant Novo Nordisk’s expert witness, Dr. Anupam Jena.

    Key Takeaway:

    As a general rule, an expert opinion is not objectionable simply because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact. However, an expert cannot opine as to a legal conclusion, or to the ultimate issue of law; instructing the jury on the applicable law is the Court’s distinct and exclusive province.

    Please refer to the blogs previously published about this case:

    Law & Legal Expert Helps Jury Understand Medicaid’s Complex Regulatory Framework

    Hematology Expert’s Opinion on NovoSeven’s Medical Appropriateness Admitted

    Pharmacology Expert’s Testimony About the Purpose and Effect of Illegal Marketing Tactics Excluded

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: United States ex rel. Siegel V. Novo Nordisk Inc.
    Docket Number: 3:23cv5459
    Court Name: United States District Court, Washington Western
    Order Date: July 2, 2025
  • Internal Medicine Expert’s Testimony Partly Excluded Because He Made Credibility Determinations

    Internal Medicine Expert’s Testimony Partly Excluded Because He Made Credibility Determinations

    This is a medical malpractice case arising primarily out of the treatment provided to Plaintiff’s father, Santos González Ponce (“Mr. González”) at co-Defendant Doctors’ Center Hospital and Caribbean Medical Center (“CMC”) by Defendants Dr. Glorimar Santos Llanos, Dr. Glorimar Santos-Rodríguez, and Dr. Iolani García-Rosario  (“Dr. García”) at those medical institutions.

    Plaintiff argued that Dr. Miguel A. Colón-Pérez‘s expert testimony should be excluded since his report, dated August 31, 2024, is not signed.  Second, Plaintiff posits that the expert report “is devoid of references to medical literature to support the opinions contained therein” and is only based on “the expert’s say so, without reference to medical authorities, textbooks or literature.” Third, Plaintiff contended that Pérez-Colón’s report improperly vouches for García’s credibility inasmuch his expert opinion relies on her own statement that she “never saw the blood cultures.”

    Internal Medicine Expert Witness

    Miguel A. Colón-Pérez is board certified in internal medicine since 1989 and in infectious diseases since 1994. He is admitted to practice medicine in Puerto Rico and the states of Florida and Colorado. Colón-Pérez is also a member of various well recognized societies in his fields of practice, such as the “Infectious Diseases Society of America” and the “Socieded Panamericana de Enfermedades Infecciosas.”

    Get the full story on challenges to Miguel Colón-Pérez’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study. 

    Discussion by the Court

    Qualifications

    Plaintiff did not contest Colón-Pérez’s qualifications. Based on the educational background and professional experience outlined in Pérez-Colón’s curriculum vitae, the Court found that they are sufficient to satisfy the requirement that a proposed expert witness be qualified by “knowledge skill, experience, training, or education.”

    Expert Report “Prepared and Signed by the Witness”

    Colón-Pérez’s expert report is not signed. Yet, Plaintiff does not assert how the lack of signature is prejudicial. The absence of an expert’s signature is curable and renders the defect harmless. Consequently, the Court held that the exclusion of Colón-Pérez’s report is not warranted on this basis alone.

    Colón-Pérez was directed to submit a subsequent affidavit adopting the statements in his previously submitted and unsigned expert report or to submit a signed expert report, on or before April 4, 2025.

    Colón-Pérez’s Expert Report

    A thorough reading of the report demonstrates that Colón-Pérez did not directly cite any medical literature. However, throughout the report, Colón-Pérez references data and medical terms that certainly derive from his field of medicine. For instance, he states: “In the USA, lower respiratory tract infections surpass all other infections in terms of morbidity and mortality.” Furthermore, he notes, “In all cases of severe bacterial pneumonia, immediate initiation of empirical therapy is crucial to prevent sepsis. If left untreated, pneumonia can result in an overall mortality of up to 30%.”

    Colón-Pérez concluded that “when the involvement of Iolani Garcia Rosario, in the care of Santos Gonzales Ponce, is evaluated in full detail, it is clear that the patient arrived at the hospital with clinical signs and symptoms of facial cellulitis.” 

    Ultimately, Colón-Pérez concludes that: “there is no deviation of the best practice of medicine by Iolani Garcia Rosario when her clinical analysis of the case, which was supported by the Infectious Diseases and Pneumology service, was that the most likely cause of the poor medical condition of the patient was due to the severe pneumonic process and this source of infection needed the most urgent care.”

    The Court notes that an expert “need not necessarily cite literature or a published standard in demonstrating that he has relevant expertise. . .instead, his personal experience alone may be sufficient.”

    Other than complaining about absence of reference to publications and medical literature, the Court found that Plaintiff did not specifically explain why the testimony in question was insufficient or unreliable as to show what was the national standard of care that applied in this case. Furthermore, the sufficiency of Colón-Pérez’s professional experience has not actually been challenged here.

    Expert Testimony Regarding Witness Credibility

    The Court addressed Plaintiff’s claim that Colón-Pérez opinion improperly vouches for García’s credibility. In his report Colón-Pérez concluded:

    “It is critical in this case that Garcia was never notified of a panic level of positive blood cultures w/ gram positive cocci on 11-24 and neither was notified on 11-27 when the final results of blood cultures showed methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus.”

    In this case, it is a contested issue of fact whether Defendant physicians evaluated certain blood cultures now included in González’s medical record at the CMC, and if those blood culture were available to the physicians, particularly García, at the time.

    Certainly, Colón-Pérez does not directly say that García is truthful. Yet, he is giving weight to her version of events and reaching a concluding based, at least partially, on that version. The Court held that these statements in the expert report are unsubstantiated and speculative at best and would not assist the trier of fact. In other words, García’s expert must assist the trier of fact in determining credibility, not determine credibility for the trier of fact.

    Rule 703 was never intended to allow a witness, “under the guise of giving expert testimony, to in effect become the mouthpiece of the witnesses on whose statements or opinions the expert purports to base his opinion.

    Held

    The Court granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiff Wanda I. González-Villegas’ motion in limine to exclude Defendant Dr. Iolani García-Rosario’s expert witness report prepared by Dr. Miguel A. Colón-Pérez.

    Key Takeaways:

    • Determining the credibility of a witness is a function reserved exclusively for the jury. Regardless of whether an expert possess “medical knowledge and skills that relate directly to credibility,” they are barred from opining as to whether a witness is being truthful. In this case, Colón-Pérez does not directly say that García is truthful. Yet, he is giving weight to her version of events and reaching a concluding based, at least partially, on that version.
    • Colón-Pérez need not necessarily cite literature or a published standard in demonstrating that he has relevant expertise here; instead, his personal experience alone may be sufficient. In sum, the medical records, combined with Colón-Pérez’s own clinical experience, provided a sufficiently reliable basis for his opinions. 
    • The absence of an expert’s signature in a report is curable and renders the defect harmless. 

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Wanda I. González Villegas V. Doctors’ Center Hospital
    Docket Number: 3:21cv1592
    Court: United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico
    Order Date: March 27, 2025
  • Court refuses to exclude expert testimony on the application of local zoning regulations

    Court refuses to exclude expert testimony on the application of local zoning regulations

    In 2014, Plaintiffs asked Defendant to rezone a parcel of land from Agricultural (“AG-2”) to Community Facilities Planned Development (“CFPD”). They needed the rezoning to build a 72-bed residential substance abuse treatment center and detoxification facility. Plaintiffs were initially successful. Defendant’s staff and hearing examiner recommended rezoning because the facility was compatible with the surrounding area’s mixed-use character. But the success was short-lived.

    The Lee County Board of Commissioners unanimously voted against the rezoning at a public hearing on August 5, 2015.

    Plaintiffs disputed why their application failed. According to them, the Board rejected the rezoning because of community opposition to the facility. 

    Plaintiffs pursued multiple avenues to get the zoning approval. On August 1, 2019, they filed this Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) suit seeking monetary damages, declaratory relief, and injunction relief. Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendant (1) intentionally discriminated against them and their proposed patients when it denied the rezoning application, and (2) did not provide a reasonable accommodation.

    Defendant, Lee County, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 (“Rule 702”), sought to exclude the improper expert opinions of Plaintiffs’ designated expert witnesses, Veronica Martin (“Martin”) and Mary Magno Mouracade, M.D. (“Mouracade”).

    Project Management Expert Witness

    Veronica Martin is a Senior Planner/Project Manager with 17 years’ experience at TDM Consulting, a civil engineering and planning firm. She has testified as an expert on planning matters more than 40 times.

    Want to know more about the challenges Veronica Martin has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report. 

    Internal Medicine Expert Witness

    Mary Magno Mouracade is a medical doctor and is board certified in internal medicine, nephrology, and integrated medicine, and is board-eligible for certification in addiction medicine.

    She is the Chief Medical Officer for Kimberly Regenesis in Ft. Myers, Florida.

    Get the full story on challenges to Mary Magno Mouracade’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study. 

    Discussion by the Court

    First, Defendant maintained that neither Martin nor Mouracade had any specialized knowledge to help the Court understand the evidence or determine a fact. Second, Defendant claimed that Martin will usurp the Court’s role by stating legal conclusions on reasonable accommodations and the application of local zoning regulations. Third, both expert opinions are based on flawed methods and are not based on facts or data.

    The Eleventh Circuit has recognized that the barriers to opinion testimony are more relaxed in a bench trial where the judge is serving as factfinder and the Court is not concerned about “dumping a barrage of questionable scientific evidence on a jury.” The Court held that Defendant’s concerns about Plaintiffs’ experts are more appropriately discussed at trial when all the facts can be considered.

    If any shortcomings about an expert’s qualifications arise, or part of any expert’s testimony seems unhelpful or unreliable, Defendant may present its arguments through “vigorous cross examination and the presentation of contrary evidence.”

    Held

    The Court denied Defendant’s motion in limine to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff’s designated expert witnesses, Veronica Martin and Mary Magno Mouracade.

    Key Takeaway:

    The Court, sitting as trier of fact, is in the best position to distinguish between persuasive and insufficient expert evidence at trial.

    In Gibbs V. Gibbs, 210 F.3d 491 (5th Cir. 2000), it was held that most of the safeguards provided for in Daubert are not as essential in a case such as this where a district judge sits as the trier of fact in place of a jury.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Kimberly Regenesis, Llc, Et Al V. Lee County, A Florida Political Subdivision
    Docket Number: 2:19cv538
    Court: United States District Court, Florida Middle
    Order Date: June 24, 2024
  • Nursing Expert Witness Fails to Establish Breach of Duty of Care

    Nursing Expert Witness Fails to Establish Breach of Duty of Care

    A district judge in Kansas barred an expert physician and nurse from testifying about the Defendants’ deviation from the requisite standard of care.

    Facts:

    On April 9, 2021, Smoky Hill admitted Arlen Dority, age 82, after a fall at his home on April 6, 2021 and a decline in his ability to care for himself. Dority resided in the COVID-19 isolation unit. On April 10, 2021, Smoky Hill completed a 48 Hour Care Plan Conference Summary and conducted a fall risk assessment for Dority, and concluded that Dority was at high risk for falls. Shortly thereafter, Dority began physical therapy and occupational therapy to improve his balance and decrease the risk for falls. Between April 9 and April 17, 2021, Dority did not have a documented fall at Smoky Hill.

    On April 18, 2021, licensed nurse Andrea Stika noted that Dority was found lying on the floor against the wall, mostly on his left side. He was complaining of right hip and knee pain from his fall, and had scraped his elbow & behind his right ear. When touching the right hip, [Dority] yelled out in pain. He stated that he could not move it. Neuros were done, and no obvious injury was noted, besides the scrape behind right ear.

    Smoky Hill notified Salina Emergency Medical Services (“EMS”), which arrived at Smoky Hill six minutes after the nurse found Dority, at 1:31 A.M. EMS transferred Dority to Salina Regional Medical Center, where radiographs indicated a fractured right hip. At the hospital, Dority relayed to staff, and personnel recorded, that the fall occurred while Dority was walking down the hallway at full speed. Surgeons conducted an open reduction internal fixation of the fracture.

    At 4:07 P.M. on April 19, 2021, one day after his fall, Dority died. His death certificate listed hip fracture due to a fall as the primary cause of death, with congestive heart failure as a contributing cause.

    Wrongful Death and Negligence

    On July 9, 2022, Keyna Leonard, Dority’s surviving daughter and the administrator of his estate, sued Defendants for wrongful death and negligence. 

    Plaintiff claimed that Defendants negligently failed to do one or more of the following: (1) include in Dority’s Interim Care Plan fall-related interventions of a bed in the lowest position and a fall mat; (2) create a Comprehensive Care Plan, containing fall-related interventions of a bed in the lowest position and a fall mat; (3) ensure Dority’s bed was in the lowest position and a fall mat in place on the morning of April 18, 2021; (4) adequately supervise and monitor Dority on April 18, 2021; (5) ensure Dority’s safe transfer from one position to the other on April 18, 2021; and (6) ensure Defendants employed sufficient competent staff.

    Defendants argued that Plaintiff has not demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact as to whether they breached any alleged duty of care and, if so, whether that breach caused Dority’s injury.

    The Plaintiff retained two experts: Dr. John Kirby and Nurse Eleanore Tache. Tache opined on (1) Defendants’ deviations from the standard of care and (2) how those deviations caused Dority’s fall. John Kirby testified about all aspects of negligence and causation.

    Nursing Expert Witness Fails to Establish Breach of Duty of Care

    Internal Medicine Expert Witness

    John Kirby is the Associate Professor of Medicine in the Department of Medicine, Cooper Medical School of Rowan University. John Kirby holds an M.D. from the University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine. Prior to that, he completed his undergraduate studies at Yale University, where he obtained a Bachelor of Science in Biology, graduating magna cum laude with distinction in biology. He previously served as a Consultant to the United States Department of Justice.

    Discover more cases with John Kirby as an expert witness by ordering his comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

    Nursing Expert Witness

    Eleanore Tache has been a registered nurse since 1979. She currently holds a certification as a Director of Nursing in Long Term Care from the National Association of Directors of Nursing Administration Long Term Care. Additionally, she holds an active Nursing Home Administrator licensure since 2007. She is a graduate of Molly College with a Bachelor’s Degree in Nursing.

    Get in-depth insights into Eleanore Tache ‘s expert witness experience by requesting her Expert Witness Profile today.

    Discussion by the Court

    Eleanore Tache

    To begin with, Tache’s expert report stated that she examined whether any deviations from the standard of care “were a probable cause of harm to [Dority].” She broadly concluded that “multiple deviations” occurred, and that they were a “probable cause” of harm to Dority. She criticized Defendants’ documentation practices, but she did not implicate them in Dority’s fall on April 18, 2021. Tache found fault with Defendants’ assessments because a registered nurse did not conduct them, but she likewise expressed no opinion that this shortcoming contributed to his fall.

    She opined that Defendants’ care plan was not sufficiently comprehensive or implemented early enough. But Dority took no falls before the one in question, and the record contains no evidence that any such deviation from the standard of care caused Dority’s fall. She stated that Defendants had inadequate staffing on the night in question, but did not suggest how additional staff would likely have prevented the fall. Ultimately, her opinion on causation is that Defendants “failed to prevent an avoidable fall.”

    The Court held that her opinion did not create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether any alleged breach of Defendants’ duty of care caused Dority’s injury.

    John Kirby

    John Kirby opined that (1) given Dority’s medical history, he was at a risk of falling while in Smoky Hill’s care; (2) Smoky Hill’s fall prevention interventions were “inadequate to prevent” Dority’s fall on April 18, 2021; and (3) the trauma of the fall caused a hip fracture, which together with congestive heart failure, caused his death.

    Kirby’s expert report established a causal link between Dority’s fall and his death. However, it did not create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether any alleged deviations in the standard of care were the proximate cause of Dority’s fall. Like Tache, Kirby advanced the conclusory opinion that “[f]all prevention interventions were inadequate to prevent Dority’s 4/18/21 fall.”

    Once again, Kirby’s opinion did not create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendants breached a duty of care which resulted in Dority’s fall. Breach of the standard of care cannot be inferred merely from lack of success or an adverse result in treatment.

    Held

    Under Rule 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993), the Court held that expert testimony from Tache and Kirby on the issue of causation would cause confusion and delay. In short, their opinions are based on the incorrect legal premise that failure to prevent an accident is sufficient to find liability, and are tethered to specific evidence about the circumstances of the fall.

    Key Takeaways:

    Opinions of Eleanore Tache and John Kirby did not create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendants breached a duty of care which resulted in Dority’s fall. Moreover, breach of the standard of care cannot be inferred merely from lack of success or an adverse result in treatment. If the Court were to equate breach with an adverse result, the test would become no different than strict liability; indeed, medical facilities are not responsible each time a resident or patient is injured. Consequently, with or without expert testimony on causation, mere failure to prevent a bad outcome is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to liability.

    Case Details:

    Case Details: Leonard V. Hmg Park Manor Of Salina, Llc Et Al
    Docket Number: 2:22cv2267
    Court Name: United States District Court, Kansas
    Order Date: December 06, 2023
  • Physician’s expert testimony must stay within the ‘reasonable confines’ of their practice area; Court limits the testimony of Internal Medicine Expert Witness regarding the spread of COVID-19

    Physician’s expert testimony must stay within the ‘reasonable confines’ of their practice area; Court limits the testimony of Internal Medicine Expert Witness regarding the spread of COVID-19

    In the case brought by Plaintiff Leonard Roberts against Defendants Philadelphia Express Trust, Hapag-Lloyd USA, LLC, and Marine Transport Management, Leonard Roberts had alleged that he contracted COVID-19 while working as a longshoreman on a vessel with an individual who had tested positive for COVID-19. His Amended Complaint included claims for fraudulent concealment under Georgia law and negligence under Section 905(b) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (“LHWCA”). 

    The Court partially granted Defendants’ motion, dismissing Plaintiff’s fraud allegations and the alternative claim for negligence. The Court also determined that the duty to intervene was not violated, nor was it triggered simply because the Defendant failed to remove the infected person from the vessel or isolate them. However, the Court did not dismiss Plaintiff’s Section 905(b) claim for breach of the turnover duty, which comprises the “duty of safe condition” and the “duty to warn.” Claims related to these duties are typically subject to an “open and obvious” defense, which means that hazards should be observable and physical, affecting a specific work area or component of a ship. The Court was unable to determine as a matter of law that the individual allegedly infected with COVID-19 on the vessel constituted an “open and obvious” hazard. Typically, open and obvious hazards are physical and observable risks that affect a specific work area or component of a ship, like an unprotected walkway. 

    During the discovery phase, Defendants identified Dr. Mitchell Adam Blass as a retained expert witness who would provide expert testimony at trial. Blass, an internal medicine and infectious disease doctor, expressed his expert opinion in a written report. He opined that, within a reasonable degree of medical probability, Plaintiff did not contract COVID-19 from his actions working on board the vessel PHILADELPHIA EXPRESS on July 11-12, 2020. Blass also suggested that Plaintiff could have contracted COVID-19 from various other sources, including contact with his girlfriend, who had COVID and worked as a waitress at the time. 

    In response, Plaintiff moved to exclude Blass’ opinions. The basis for this motion was twofold: first, it was argued that Blass’ report did not meet the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2), and alternatively, it was contended that his opinions should be excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc, and its progeny. 

    Internal Medicine Expert Witness 

    Mitchell Adam Blass, M.D., completed his Bachelor of Science in Biology from Emory University and then graduated with his medical degree from Emory University School of Medicine. He is board certified in both internal medicine and infectious disease. He completed an internal medicine residency at Emory University Affiliated Hospitals. He was employed as a Hospital Epidemiologist at Saint Joseph Hospital of Emory university for six years.

    Discussions by the Court 

    Before turning to the substance of Blass’ opinions, Plaintiff had initially challenged the completeness of Defendants’ expert disclosures under Rule 26. Plaintiff had argued that Blass’ report did not adequately explain the bases and reasons for his opinions and failed to disclose the facts and data he considered when forming them. Specifically, Plaintiff objected to the report for not including a reference to “data of COVID-19’s incubation time” and for lacking a reference to information from the Center for Disease Control (“CDC”) website, which Blass testified he relied on to formulate his opinions. Plaintiff contended that these deficiencies had hindered their ability to prepare for an effective cross-examination of Blass during his deposition, and therefore, some sanction under Rule 37 was warranted. 

    However, the Court had conceded that despite the shortcomings in Blass’ report regarding the identification of the basis and reasons for his opinions, as well as the facts and data considered, sanctions under Rule 37 were not warranted. 

    Even though Blass’ report was found to be deficient under Rule 26, Defendants had successfully demonstrated that the deficiency was harmless. They had pointed out that one of the factors the Court considered in determining whether a Rule 26 violation was substantially justified or harmless was “the surprise to the party against whom the evidence would be offered.” Defendants had argued that Plaintiff could not have been surprised by their expert’s reliance on CDC guidance, as they had referenced the same guidance in their communications with Plaintiff before Blass’ deposition. Additionally, the transcript of Blass’ deposition showed that Plaintiff’s counsel had conducted a thorough cross-examination. Therefore, Defendants had shown that, despite the report’s deficiencies, Plaintiff was not surprised by Blass’ reliance on CDC guidance and COVID-19 incubation time, and even if there had been surprise, no harm had resulted from it. 

    Furthermore, Plaintiff’s counsel had the ability to address any limited surprise by requesting more specific disclosures, seeking a discovery extension, or attempting to resolve the dispute in other ways, but they had not taken these steps. This lack of action weighed against any exclusionary measures under Rule 37. 

    Because Defendants had successfully demonstrated that any deficiency in Blass’ report was harmless under Rule 37, the Court had denied Plaintiff’s request to exclude his testimony based on a Rule 26 violation. 

    Plaintiff had challenged Blass’ testimony on three grounds. First, Plaintiff had argued that Blass was not qualified to testify about the spread of COVID-19. Blass had opined that, within a reasonable degree of medical probability, Plaintiff did not contract COVID from his actions working on the vessel and that Plaintiff could have contracted COVID from various other sources. Plaintiff had contended that Blass lacked the qualifications to provide these opinions because Blass had testified that contact tracing was “outside of the scope” of his practice. 

    Blass, however, was a licensed physician with over 20 years of experience and was board certified in both internal medicine and infectious disease. He had worked as a Hospital Epidemiologist at Saint Joseph Hospital of Emory University for six years and had started studying COVID in the first quarter of 2020. Blass had extensive experience, having cared for a substantial number of COVID patients on a daily basis for over two years. The Court had explained that having a medical degree alone does not automatically qualify a physician to testify about any medical issue; the physician’s expert testimony must stay within the reasonable confines of their practice area. In this case, the Court found that Blass’ opinions were within the reasonable confines of his experience as an epidemiologist and infectious disease physician, making him qualified to offer them. Any concerns about the difficulties of contact tracing were considered matters that affected the weight of his testimony rather than its admissibility. 

    Plaintiff had further challenged Blass’ methodology. Plaintiff objected to Blass relying on his experience in patient care to form his conclusions and criticized his opinions for being based on a limited subset of material that wouldn’t reliably support his expert opinions regarding where Plaintiff contracted COVID-19. Plaintiff pointed out that Blass lacked detailed knowledge of the ship’s layout and hadn’t taken any measurements. Additionally, Blass hadn’t reviewed the medical records of the crew member who had COVID or Plaintiff’s girlfriend, which left gaps in his understanding of the situation. Plaintiff also highlighted that Blass didn’t have information about his living arrangements with his girlfriend. 

    In response, Defendants argued that Blass had reviewed deposition transcripts that provided him with sufficient facts to support his opinions. They contended that Blass’ extensive experience as an infectious disease physician, when applied to the facts of the case, was sufficiently reliable for his opinion that Plaintiff did not contract COVID from his actions on the vessel. 

    However, Defendants had not met their burden in laying a sufficient foundation for Blass’ second opinion, which suggested that Plaintiff could have contracted COVID from various other sources. The Court excluded this second opinion as unreliable. 

    As for Blass’ remaining opinion, Plaintiff argued that Blass’ testimony about the ways in which a person can, or, more importantly, cannot contract COVID-19 wouldn’t be helpful to the jury but the Court begged to differ considering Blass’ testimony delved into areas beyond the understanding of the average layperson. The Court determined that this opinion was relevant to Defendants’ defense against Plaintiff’s remaining claim and was not subject to exclusion under the helpfulness requirement. 

    Held 

    Plaintiff’s motion to exclude the testimony of Dr. Mitchell Adam Blass was granted in part and denied in part by the Court. The Court has not arrived on an outcome for this case since the remaining issues involved in this case still await resolution. 

    Key takeaways:

    • This case demonstrates the importance of ensuring expert disclosures and reports comply fully with Rule 26. Deficiencies can still provide grounds to attack expert opinions unless proved to be justifiably harmless. Parties have the ability to cure any limited surprise by requesting more specific disclosures, seeking a discovery extension, or otherwise attempting to resolve this dispute 
    • The decision also illustrates how courts serve a gatekeeping role under Daubert in assessing the admissibility of expert opinions. Qualifications alone do not suffice. Parties must also establish the reliability of the expert’s principles and methods. When expertise is the primary basis, as with Blass, experts must explain precisely how their experience supports their conclusions. Opinions unsupported by sufficient methodology may be excluded. 
    • Additionally, the Court excluded one opinion as unreliable even while allowing another admissible opinion by the same expert. This shows the Daubert requirements apply on an opinion-by-opinion basis. Admissibility of one opinion does not guarantee admissibility of all opinions by the same expert. 
    • Lastly, the Court rejected a challenge that the expert testimony would not assist the jury. As the Court discussed, testimony need only address matters beyond ordinary lay knowledge to have relevance and be helpful.  
    • In summary, this case serves as a guide for properly admitting expert opinions under the Federal Rules of Evidence and Daubert standards. Compliance with Rule 26, establishing reliable methodology, and basic relevance are key to admissibility.