Category: Mortgage Expert Witness

  • Mortgage Expert Allowed to Testify Despite Not Updating the Earnings Model

    Mortgage Expert Allowed to Testify Despite Not Updating the Earnings Model

    The lawsuit concerns whether “Freddie Mac concealed its overextension in the nontraditional mortgage market—generally composed of instruments known as subprime mortgages or low credit and high risk instruments—and its materially deficient underwriting, risk management and fraud detection practices through misstatements and omissions to investors.”

    Plaintiff Ohio Public Employees Retirement System (“OPERS”)  retained Howard Shapiro as a putative non-scientific expert in the mortgage finance industry during August 1, 2006 through and including November 20, 2007 (the “Relevant Period”).

    Freddie Mac alleged that Shapiro is unqualified to offer his opinions, his opinions are unreliable, and therefore, do not meet the threshold of admissibility for expert evidence established by Rules 403 and 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence

    OPERS also designated Shapiro as a fact witness pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 701.

    Mortgage Expert Witness

    Howard S. Shapiro was a chartered financial analyst who specialized in the mortgage finance industry for a significant part of his professional career.

    From early 2006 through December 2008, he was a Vice President and Analyst at Fox-Pitt Kelton, a sell-side firm that specializes in financial services.

    His area of expertise is in studying the operations of mortgage finance companies, studying the credit risk that they take, studying their underwriting and product practices, and studying their usage of capital.

    Get the full story on challenges to Howard Shapiro’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study. 

    Discussion by the Court

    Shapiro’s first step was to review all of Freddie Mac’s public disclosures from the Relevant Period. Next, he reviewed other publicly available documents about Freddie Mac’s activities during the Relevant Period. Shapiro then reviewed “other analyses of Freddie Mac;” only; in this case, he had access to Freddie Mac’s own internal analyses. He reviewed more than 100 internal assessments (totaling more than 4,000 pages) related to Freddie Mac’s credit risk and underwriting. 

    Shapiro utilized the above methodology to reach his opinion that Freddie Mac was “externally reporting exposure to ‘subprime’ (broadly defined in its own disclosures) at a paltry 0.2% of the portfolio and internally recognizing that roughly 12% of the portfolio was behaving like subprime..”  Had he been made aware of Freddie Mac’s internal credit risk and underwriting assessments during the Relevant Period, Shapiro opines that he “would have rated the stock as ‘Underperform’ and advised our clients to avoid purchasing it” during the Relevant Period. 

    Analysis

    Shapiro’s Opinions Are Not based on Sufficient Facts

    According to Freddie Mac, Shapiro’s opinions are not based on sufficient facts. However, the Court determined that Freddie Mac’s argument that Shapiro should have looked at more and/or different evidence is not a basis on which to exclude him.

    Shapiro’s Opinions are not the Product of Reliable Principles or Methods

    Freddie Mac claimed that Shapiro failed to analyze whether the internal assessments he cited would have changed the “total mix” of information available from Freddie Mac’s public disclosures.

    To the contrary, Shapiro documented in his Rebuttal Report with regard to Freddie Mac’s underwriting that he “found repeated internal discussions, statements and conclusions stretching across the entire Relevant Period pointing to a significant, and multi-faceted, problem within the Company related to underwriting.”

    According to Freddie Mac, Shapiro’s opinions rest on a “faulty legal premise,” namely that Freddie Mac was obligated to disclose “as much information as they could disclose without putting themselves at any competitive risk.”

    Shapiro, however, stated his view as a financial analyst that he would have preferred Freddie Mac to provide “as much information as they could disclose without putting themselves at any competitive risk.”

    Freddie Mac criticized Shapiro for not updating the earnings model he used during the Relevant Period in connection with his opinions in the present case because “another expert cannot replicate it.” However, there was no need for Shapiro to update his 20-year-old financial model that he no longer had access to.

    Freddie Mac argued that Shapiro’s opinions on falsity and materiality are not the product of reliable principles or methods. Shapiro explicitly testified that he was not offering opinions on either of these issues.

    Freddie Mac contended Shapiro’s opinion on loss causation is not the product of reliable principles or methods. However, Shapiro has not been called to opine on the subject of loss causation. Rather, he “will testify that capital insufficiency and unexpected future losses due to credit risk were, in his view, largely responsible for the stock decline on November 20, 2007.” 

    Shapiro Impermissibly Opined on Ultimate Liability Issues

    Freddie Mac asserted Shapiro’s testimony should be excluded because he impermissibly opined on ultimate liability issues by offering legal conclusions on falsity and materiality.

    However, Shapiro is not attempting to instruct the jury on a legal test for falsity or materiality and is not applying any such test to the facts of the case. 

    Held

    The Court granted in part and denied in part Freddie Mac’s motion to exclude the testimony of Howard S. Shapiro. Shapiro will not be allowed to opine as an expert on securities fraud, falsity, materiality or loss causation.

    Key Takeaway:

    The trial court’s gatekeeping analysis with respect to an expert’s methodology is very flexible and must be tied to the facts of a particular case, depending on the nature of the issue, the expert’s particular expertise, and the subject of his testimony.

    Particularly with respect to non-scientific experts, like Shapiro, the relevant reliability concerns may focus upon personal knowledge or experience.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Ohio Public Employees Retirement System V. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp., Et Al.
    Docket Number: 4:08cv160
    Court Name: United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division
    Order Date: March 28, 2025
  • Court Accepts the Mortgage Expert’s Opinion on the OPERS’ Primary Fraud Theory

    Court Accepts the Mortgage Expert’s Opinion on the OPERS’ Primary Fraud Theory

    Defendant Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”) offered Dr. Chudozie Okongwu, a mortgage market expert, to discuss the mortgage and subprime markets and the credit crisis between August 1, 2006, and November 20, 2007 (the “Relevant Period”). The lawsuit concerns whether “Freddie Mac concealed its overextension in the nontraditional mortgage market—generally composed of instruments known as subprime mortgages or low credit and high risk instruments—and its materially deficient underwriting, risk management and fraud detection practices through misstatements and omissions to investors.”

    According to Ohio Public Employees Retirement System  (“OPERS”), the central issue is not the definition of subprime or the performance of Freddie Mac’s loans relative to others, but rather if Freddie Mac’s public disclosures about its portfolio, underwriting, credit risk, and capital position were misleading and fraudulent. OPERS alleged Freddie Mac was undertaking more risk than it revealed. Freddie Mac retained Okongwu to conduct economic and financial analysis regarding some of OPERS’ claims. His analysis aimed to refute OPERS’ primary-fraud theory, asserting that Freddie Mac’s Caution Loans did not carry “subprime risk” because “[t]he Caution Loans have different characteristics to the CoreLogic Subprime Loans and perform differently than the CoreLogic Subprime Loans. In particular, the serious delinquency rates of the Caution Loans were substantially lower than those of the CoreLogic Subprime Loans at both Q3 2007 and Q3 2008.”

    OPERS contended that Okongwu’s report, testimony, and purported opinions are inadmissible as expert evidence due to being irrelevant, unreliable, unhelpful, confusing, unfairly prejudicial, and failing to meet the necessary threshold.

    Mortgage Expert Witness

    Dr. Chudozie Okongwu is a Ph.D. economist and consultant with extensive experience in finance, economics, and valuation. He possesses expertise in the mortgage market, the evolution of the credit crisis during the Relevant Period, residential-mortgage products, and mortgage-backed securities (including their sensitivity to housing price and interest rate changes). He also has significant experience using econometric models for analyzing residential-mortgage products.

    Get the full story on challenges to Chudozie Okongwu’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study. 

    Discussion by the Court

    Okongwu’s Proposed Testimony on the First Two Topics in his Amended Expert Report about Background Facts of the Mortgage and Subprime Markets is Irrelevant and Unreliable

    OPERS contended that all of Okongwu’s planned testimony concerning the background of the mortgage and subprime markets in the initial two sections of his revised expert report was irrelevant and unreliable. However, the Court disagreed with OPERS’ central argument that Okongwu’s opinions on these first two topics were not suitable for expert testimony.

    The Court reasoned that this proposed testimony covers specialized areas related to events in the mortgage market during the financial crisis and OPERS’ claim that Freddie Mac did not disclose its involvement with subprime loans—details that are beyond the common understanding of an average juror. Furthermore, the Court found Okongwu’s testimony on these first two topics in his amended expert report to be reliable. His methodology was thoroughly explained, and he clearly stated the foundation for all his provided definitions. The Court also noted Okongwu’s expertise in residential-mortgage products and mortgage-backed securities (including their sensitivity to changes in housing prices and interest rates), along with his substantial experience in using econometric models to analyze residential-mortgage products.

    Okongwu’s Prepared-Solely-for-Litigation Proposed Testimony about what Freddie Mac Disclosed Between 2005 and 2008 is Irrelevant and Unreliable

    Okongwu’s analysis focuses on critical parts of Freddie Mac’s extensive disclosures to investors, which cautioned about credit risks leading up to the financial crisis. OPERS argued that Okongwu’s proposed testimony about Freddie Mac’s disclosures between 2005 and 2008—prepared solely for this litigation—is irrelevant, unreliable, and that he lacks the necessary qualifications to testify on this subject. However, the Court recognized that what OPERS described as a simple factual account is actually an independent analysis of substantial materials covering specialized topics. The Court noted that Okongwu has extensively published on the subjects relevant to his proposed testimony in this case. Consequently, the Court found Okongwu’s testimony on Freddie Mac’s extensive disclosures to be reliable, as he reviewed and analyzed these disclosures regarding credit risks within the context of the prevailing market conditions, drawing upon his expertise.

    Okongwu’s Proposed Testimony about Freddie Mac’s Caution Loans being Different from the CoreLogic Subprime Loans is Irrelevant and Unreliable

    Okongwu performed an empirical study employing specific analytical methods to compare millions of these two loan categories, ultimately concluding that OPERS’ “primary fraud” theory is flawed. His analysis indicated that Caution Loans and subprime loans were not the same, with Freddie Mac’s Caution Loans demonstrating significantly better performance. The Court ruled that Okongwu’s analysis comparing caution loans and subprime loans is admissible, relevant, and will aid the fact-finder in comprehending and deciding on OPERS’ primary-fraud theory.

    The Court also found Okongwu’s testimony analyzing Freddie Mac Caution Loans and comparing them to the CoreLogic Subprime Loans to be reliable. However, OPERS argues that Okongwu’s comparison was incomplete, as he did not examine “the totality of Freddie Mac’s subprime-like loans” because the Caution Loans he analyzed originated from the “Loan Prospector automated underwriting system . . ., which applied higher underwriting standards than other channels from which Freddie Mac purchased loans. . . .” The Court determined that Okongwu’s proposed testimony regarding the difference between Freddie Mac’s Caution Loans and the CoreLogic Subprime Loans is a suitable topic for examination through direct and cross-examination, but does not warrant excluding the proposed testimony.

    Held

    The Court denied OPERS’ motion to strike and exclude the testimony of Dr. Chudozie Okongwu.

    Key Takeaway:

    The Court operates with wide latitude in deciding how to test an expert’s reliability, and thus has considerable leeway in deciding how to go about determining whether particular expert testimony is reliable.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Ohio Public Employees Retirement System V. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp., Et Al.
    Docket Number: 4:08cv160
    Court Name: United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division
    Order Date: March 21, 2025
  • Mortgage Expert Witness’ Statements regarding TILA Rescission Held to Amount to a Legal Conclusion

    Mortgage Expert Witness’ Statements regarding TILA Rescission Held to Amount to a Legal Conclusion

    This case involved claims under the federal Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) regarding alleged errors in a loan arranged between Plaintiff and Defendant, as well as claims of slander of title, quiet title, and wrongful foreclosure. Beginning in 2006, Plaintiff owned residential property in Sandy, Utah (the “Property”). Defendant Veritas Funding, LLC is a mortgage lending company based in Midvale, Utah. On June 11, 2018, Plaintiff obtained a Fannie Mae Homestyle Renovation Loan for $370,500.00 from Defendant to remodel the Property, funding the loan by executing a deed of trust.

    Plaintiff had stopped making loan payments to Veritas in February 2020, claiming that Defendant’s lending process “was fraught with continual material disclosure errors.” Plaintiff sent a Notice of Rescission to Defendant on May 13, 2020, recorded with the Salt Lake County Recorder’s Office on June 18, 2020. On April 16, 2021, Defendant entered a Notice of Default and Election to Sell the Property (“Default”) and served the notice to Plaintiff. Plaintiff had until July 16, 2021, to cure the Default.

    Plaintiff brought this action on May 31, 2021, in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah, subsequently removed to Utah District Court on July 13, 2021. Plaintiff recorded a Lis Pendens on the Property with the County Recorder on October 4, 2021, also filed with the Court.

    On September 22, 2023, Plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the grounds that her Notice of Rescission was valid and proper due to Defendant’s material disclosure errors in violation of the TILA, and Defendant’s subsequent foreclosure of Plaintiff’s home was therefore unlawful. The Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on the exact same date alleging that (1) Plaintiff’s TILA rescission claim failed as a matter of law because she did not and could not tender the loan principal; (2) Plaintiff’s damages claims related to TILA violations, including actual damages, statutory damages, attorney fees, and finance charges were time-barred; and (3) Plaintiff’s claim for wrongful foreclosure was not supported by evidence of fraud in the foreclosure proceedings.

    Plaintiff had served Defendant with the expert report of Nelson Locke, whose testimony the Defendant sought to exclude in its entirety.

    Mortgage Expert Witness

    Nelson A. Locke has been an active Mortgage Loan Originator and Mortgage Banker from 1991 to 2013. While an active Mortgage Loan Originator and Mortgage Banker, he originated, underwrote, or approved approximately $450,000,000 of residential forward and reverse mortgage loans. From 2003 to 2013, he was the Legal and Compliance Manager for Value Financial, a Florida based HUD approved Direct Endorsement Lender. From 1991 to 2003, he was the CEO and Chairman of Amstar Financial Services, a publicly traded national HUD FHA Mortgage Banker headquartered in Florida. Since 1996, he has been a member in good standing of the Florida Association of Mortgage Professionals (“FAMP”), the largest state Mortgage Originator Association in the country, and a former President of that Association. While he was President, he wrote, produced, and hosted a public television series entitled “Ask Mr. Mortgage.”

    Discussion by the Court

    Federal Rule of Evidence 702 allows an expert to testify if the proponent has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that:

    (a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;

    (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;

    (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and

    (d) the expert’s opinion reflects a reliable application of the principles and methods to the facts of the case.

    The Defendant’s motion against Locke did not challenge his qualifications per se but was concerned with part (a) of Rule 702. Defendants objected to Locke’s expert opinions by arguing that “they were the type of impermissible legal analysis that attempt to usurp the role of the judge and jury and also because they exceeded their scope by improperly attempting to instruct the Court that Plaintiff had suffered various damages.”

    Plaintiff responded by asserting that Locke had the requisite qualifications and that his testimony was relevant and reliable.

    The Court observed that Locke, one of America’s foremost mortgage compliance experts, reviewed the Plaintiff’s Complaint, Defendant’s Answer, documents produced by the parties, and the origination and processing of Plaintiff’s Homestyle residential mortgage loan by Defendants in preparation to give his testimony.

    Locke’s assignment scope involved assessing Defendant’s handling of Plaintiff’s Homestyle Loan, examining the impact of rescission on foreclosure, and considering potential violations of Truth in Lending Act (TILA), the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), and Unfair, Deceptive, or Abusive Acts or Practices (UDAAP). Locke also aimed to consider any other civil torts present in the case file.

    Defendant argued that Locke’s expert report contained numerous instances where he offered legal conclusions regarding the alleged facts of the case. For instance, Defendant pointed out that Locke’s statements regarding TILA rescission appeared to resemble legal opinions. Locke referenced relevant statutes and Supreme Court caselaw before concluding with his opinion that Plaintiff complied with both the timing and form of notice requirements, and that all of Plaintiff’s funds should have been immediately returned. Defendant asserted that admitting Locke’s “array of legal conclusions” concerning nearly every element of Plaintiff’s burden of proof could have undermined the Court’s duty to establish the law and the jury’s ability to apply it to the evidence.

    The Court granted in part Defendant’s motion to exclude Locke’s testimony. Testimony offering legal conclusions about the elements of the case Plaintiff was required to prove at trial was excluded. However, to the extent that Locke’s expert testimony provided helpful information to the jury regarding the process of obtaining a Homestyle Loan, or otherwise provided context for the mortgage process and other fact issues based on his expertise, it was not excluded.

    As for Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment, the Court observed that Plaintiff sent a notice of rescission outside the three-day period, and none of the other required steps in 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) were completed. The Court denied Plaintiff’s motion because Plaintiff’s Notice of Rescission was not enough alone to make the rescission complete.

    Coming to the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the Court held that Defendant cannot require Plaintiff to prove her ability to tender the loan proceeds without first petitioning the Court for an equitable reordering of the TILA rescission process. It was noted that Defendant had made no motion requesting that the Court alter the TILA rescission procedure. Therefore, summary judgment in favor of Defendant due to Plaintiff’s alleged inability to tender the loan proceeds was inappropriate and was denied.

    However, because the statute of limitations contained in 15 U.S.C. §1640(e) applied to Plaintiff’s damages claim and Plaintiff filed her damages claim three years after the alleged violations and consummation of the sale, the Court granted summary judgment for Defendant on Plaintiff’s damages claim.

    Defendant’s knowledge of the initiation of the timely rescission process and its failure to comply with the requirements of TILA after receiving notice of rescission indicated a genuine dispute of material fact as to the existence of unfair dealing in the foreclosure sale process. If the Plaintiff timely rescinded the loan from Defendant, the trust deed executed through the foreclosure sale became void. The Plaintiff had plausibly alleged that her interests were sacrificed based on Defendant’s improper foreclosure of the Property. Defendant was not entitled to summary judgment on the wrongful foreclosure claim based on the Court’s earlier order denying a continued stay of foreclosure. While the Court denied the Plaintiff’s request for continued injunctive relief, the merits of her claim remained to be determined. Therefore, the Court denied summary judgment for Defendant on the wrongful foreclosure claim.

    As of February 26, 2024, the Defendant filed a motion requesting the Court to reconsider the the Memorandum Decision denying Veritas’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s TILA Rescission Claim.

    Held

    Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment was denied by the Court while the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment was granted in part and denied in part. The Court also granted in part Defendant’s motion to exclude Plaintiff’s Proposed expert Nelson Locke.

    The Court has not arrived on an outcome for this case since the remaining issues involved in this case still await resolution.

    Key Takeaways:

    Locke, recognized as a leading mortgage compliance expert in the United States, was evaluated based on his qualifications and the relevance of his testimony within the scope of Rule 702. His analysis focused on assessing the Defendant’s handling of the Plaintiff’s mortgage loan and potential violations of various acts, demonstrating the importance of expert testimony directly addressing the case’s issues. However, the Court differentiated between permissible expert opinions providing helpful information to the jury regarding the mortgage process and impermissible legal conclusions, excluding the latter to avoid usurping the judge and jury’s role in interpreting the law. This decision highlights the necessity of expert testimony adhering to Rule 702’s criteria, including relevance, reliability, and staying within the expert’s scope of expertise.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Drummond V. Veritas Funding
    Docket Number: 2:21cv423
    Court: United States District Court, Utah
    Citation: 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22232
    Order Date: February 7, 2024