Category: Nutrition Expert Witness

  • Nutrition Expert Not Allowed to Opine on FTC Compliance

    Nutrition Expert Not Allowed to Opine on FTC Compliance

    This putative class action involves claims that a manufacturer falsely marketed its pediatric nutrition beverage as helping children grow taller. Joanne Noriega sued Abbott Laboratories (“Abbott”), claiming that the packaging and marketing of its beverage, PediaSure Grow & Gain (“PediaSure”), has thus misled consumers. Noriega claimed that she purchased PediaSure for her grandson based on Abbott’s representation that PediaSure is “Clinically Proven to Help Kids Grow (the “challenged statement”). That claim, she alleged, allowed Abbott to charge a price premium for the product.

    Abbott filed motions to exclude the testimony of Dr. Gita Johar (as to consumer perception of the challenged statement), Dr. Daniel Hoffman (as to scientific studies of PediaSure’s effects on growth), and Dr. William Ingersoll (as to the price premium attributable to the challenged statement). Noriega filed motions to exclude the testimony of Dr. Ran Kivetz (as to the materiality of the challenged statement) and Dr. Melvin Heyman (as to scientific studies).

    Marketing Expert Witnesses

    Dr. Gita V. Johar is a professor at Columbia Business School, where she has taught classes on marketing, branding, and research methods since 1992. She earned her PhD in marketing from the New York University School of Business. She has served as a fellow and president of the Society for Consumer Psychology, and as an editor of the Journal of Consumer Research, Journal of Marketing, and Journal of Consumer Psychology. Johar has published papers on topics including deceptive advertising, corrective advertising, refutation of false beliefs formed based on advertisements, effectiveness of disclosures in advertising, and inferences and false beliefs based on advertising claims.

    Get the full story on challenges to Gita Johar’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Dr. Ran Kivetz is a marketing professor at Columbia Business School, where he teaches courses related to marketing strategy, consumer acquisition and retention, and behavioral economics. He earned his PhD in business from Stanford Graduate School of Business and a master’s degree in psychology from Stanford University. His research focuses on buyers’ purchasing behavior, survey design, and the effect of product characteristics on purchase decisions. He has published numerous articles on topics related to consumer behavior and decision-making.

    Kivetz has achieved recognition for his contributions to consumer research, including from the Journal of Marketing Research and Society of Consumer Psychology. He serves on the editorial boards of three journals, evaluating marketing research surveys for publication.

    Want to know more about the challenges Ran Kivetz has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Nutrition Expert Witness

    Dr. Daniel J. Hoffman is a professor in the Department of Nutritional Sciences at Rutgers University, where he has taught for the last 25 years. He earned his PhD in human nutrition from Tufts University, a certificate in epidemiology from the World Health Organization, and a master’s degree in cell biology from The Catholic University of America. Between 2012 and 2022, in addition to teaching, he served as director of the Center for Childhood Nutrition Research at the New Jersey Institute for Food, Nutrition and Health.

    Discover more cases with Daniel Hoffman as an expert witness by ordering his comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

    Economics Expert Witness

    Dr. William Robert Ingersoll is an associate professor and chair of business and entrepreneurship at Azusa Pacific University, where he teaches courses in industrial organization, econometrics, and microeconomic theory. He earned a PhD and master’s degree in economics from the University of Arizona. He represents that he has testified as an economic damages expert in a variety of state and federal cases.

    Get the full story on challenges to William Ingersoll’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Pediatrics Expert Witness

    Dr. Melvin Bernard Heyman is a professor in the Department of Pediatrics at the University of California, San Francisco School of Medicine (“UCSF”). He earned his medical degree from the University of California, Los Angeles (“UCLA”); completed a residency in pediatrics at Los Angeles County-University of Southern California Medical Center; and completed a fellowship at UCLA in pediatric gastroenterology and nutrition. Since 1981, he has worked in pediatric health and medicine, conducting thousands of clinical visits during his career, many of which addressed children’s nutritional needs. Between 1990 and 2016, Heyman served as chief of UCSF’s pediatric gastroenterology division and organized nutritional support services for pediatric patients. He has held leadership roles on local and national committees, including the American Board of Pediatrics and the American Academy of Pediatrics Committee on Nutrition, and has served as editor-in-chief of the Journal of Pediatric Gastroenterology and Nutrition.

    Gain a comprehensive understanding of Melvin Heyman’s qualifications and casework history with his Expert Witness Profile report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Gita Johar

    Johar was retained by Noriega to opine on whether the PediaSure label and commercials would lead a reasonable consumer to believe that the product is clinically proven to help kids grow in height.

    Johar’s expert report assesses whether the PediaSure label and commercials would lead a reasonable consumer to believe that the product is clinically proven to help kids grow in height. Based on her assessment of the PediaSure label and commercials, Johar opined that Abbott has misled consumers to believe that PediaSure has been clinically proven to help kids grow in height. 

    a. Reliability of Johar’s Methodology

    Abbott argued that Johar’s methodology is unreliable because she did not undertake an empirical consumer survey, which it contended departed both from “accepted practice” in the field and from Johar’s own academic research practices.

    The Court held that Johar’s education and experience, taken together with the relevant academic literature on which she relied, supplied an adequate basis for the testimony she proposed to give.

    Abbott noted that Johar lacked specific expertise as to children’s nutrition drinks. Given her extensive experience in consumer product marketing, however, that fact, though fair game for cross-examination, did not support precluding her as unqualified to testify here.

    b. Relevance of Johar’s Consumer Perception Opinions

    Abbott argued that Johar’s testimony would not be helpful to the jury because “her opinions are purely subjective.”

    The Court found that Johar’s testimony would be helpful to the jury. Notwithstanding Abbott’s portrait of her testimony, she did not propose to set out her personal beliefs, as a consumer, about the meaning of the challenged statement on the label. Instead, she proposed to opine, as a marketing professor, based on her experience and research, about how a reasonable consumer would view and process the challenged statement in the context of PediaSure’s packaging.

    Daniel Hoffman

    Hoffman was retained by Noriega as a nutrition and growth expert to opine as to whether PediaSure has been—as the challenged statement represents—clinically proven to help kids grow.

    Hoffman addressed Abbott’s claims substantiation guidance (“CSG”)—an internal manual that addresses health benefit claims, the evidence necessary to substantiate such claims, and the claims development process. He opined that the CSG “sets mandates to be followed” by Abbott and is not “merely aspirational.”

    a. Opinions About the CSG

    Abbott sought to preclude Hoffman’s testimony about the CSG on the grounds that he is unqualified to opine on an internal Abbott document and cannot properly opine on Abbott’s state of mind.

    To begin with, the Court found that Hoffman is not an expert in marketing, claims substantiation, or Abbott’s internal practices. When asked at his deposition what qualified him to interpret the CSG, he answered his “research education.”

    Moreover, the CSG’s guidance, if relevant at trial, would not be “beyond the ken of the average juror” to grasp.

    Finally, Hoffman’s proposed opinion testimony that Abbott failed to comply with the CSG’s ostensibly mandatory guidance is not the province of an expert.

    b. Reliability of Hoffman’s Analysis of Abbott’s Studies

    Abbott argued that Hoffman employed an unreliable methodology in finding Abbott’s studies of PediaSure unsound.

    A fair-minded review of Hoffman’s report supported the reliability of his methodology in evaluating Abbott’s studies. He drew upon his experience (both as a researcher in the field of pediatric growth and nutrition, and as an editor of scientific journals) and academic articles about standards applicable to clinical studies, randomized trials, and medical research involving human subjects.

    c. Relevance of Hoffman’s Opinions on Abbott’s Studies

    Abbott next argued that Hoffman’s opinions as to the scientific rigor of Abbott’s studies are irrelevant because they are based on “academic publication standards.”

    However, the Court found that Hoffman’s report sets out standards that must be satisfied for a study to be considered “transparent,” “objective,”  “scientifically vetted,” “scientifically rigorous,” and “unbiased.”

    Few of the 36 journal articles on which Hoffman relied in support of those standards appear to relate to “academic publishing,” and even those appear to be generally applicable.

    That Hoffman’s analysis of Abbott’s studies tracks analyses he conducted in his editorial roles is no impediment to the admissibility his testimony.

    d. Opinions Not Stated in Expert Report

    Abbott sought to preclude Hoffman’s opinions related to (1) Abbott’s compliance with Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) health claims guidance and (2) how a reasonable consumer would interpret the challenged statement.

    It was in his deposition that Hoffman articulated for the first time his opinions about Abbott’s compliance with FTC guidance and consumers’ perceptions of the challenged statement.

    Noriega did not contend that these opinions were disclosed earlier or justify the failure to do so. The Court thus cannot find their non-disclosure substantially justified.

    Moreover, Hoffman’s education and experience is in “nutritional sciences and growth,” he is therefore unqualified to opine on FTC compliance or consumer perception.

    Because Noriega failed to timely disclose Hoffman’s opinions on FTC compliance and consumer perception, and because they are independently inadmissible, the Court excluded such testimony.

    William Ingersoll

    Noriega’s expert, Ingersoll, proposed to opine that: (1) products bearing the label “Clinically Proven to Help Kids Grow” are on average “more favorably viewed” than ones that state, “Helps Kids Grow”, or that make no statement about growth; and (2) consumers are willing to pay more—in the amounts above—for the product bearing the challenged statement than the growth-only statement or no statement.

    a. Relevance of Ingersoll’s Survey Results

    Abbott argued that Ingersoll’s survey failed to calculate a price premium keyed to Noriega’s theory of consumer deception.

    Because Noriega’s theory is that the challenged statement misled consumers to believe that PediaSure promotes height growth, Abbott argued, the survey, to be helpful, needed to “isolate a price premium traceable to Abbott’s purported misrepresentation about height.”

    Ingersoll’s survey tested the premiums attributable to the label statements, “Clinically Proven to Help Kids Grow,” and “Helps Kids Grow.” But on their faces, those statements do not exclusively concern height. Their references to growth can also—or alternatively—be read to encompass other forms of growth (e.g., weight, body composition, and/or muscular development).

    As a result, the Court held that Ingersoll’s survey aimed at quantifying price-premium damages did not “fit” Noriega’s theory of liability. 

    Ingersoll could have tested the price premium traceable to a hypothetical height-growth-specific statement. Or he could have tested the value that respondents place on various promised health benefits (e.g., height growth compared to weight gain). Either approach might have enabled him to isolate the price associated with the alleged misrepresentation about height. Ingersoll’s failure to do so resulted in a broad conclusion—that consumers are willing to pay more when PediaSure contains the challenged statement—that is not tailored to Noriega’s theory of the case nor helpful to a jury tasked with isolating the damages (via a price premium theory) attributable to a misrepresentation about height. This flaw is sufficiently fundamental to require exclusion of his proposed testimony.

    b. Reliability of Ingersoll’s Survey Methodology

    Abbott argued that Ingersoll’s conclusions are separately irrelevant because the survey he used showed a “truncated version of the challenged statement” which excluded the footnote disclaimer.

    The Court found that Ingersoll’s failure to test the disclaimer undermined the reliability of his conclusions as to the price premium attributable to the challenged statement. As Abbott noted, the disclaimer supplied context for the statement’s claim of clinical proof: a person who read and understood the disclaimer could be alerted to the fact that the evidence of PediaSure’s growth benefits “came not in studies of all children but rather those who were ‘at risk of malnutrition.’” 

    More broadly, Ingersoll’s election not to address the disclaimer in his report is strong evidence of motivated reasoning—that his analysis was not “reliable at every step,” but instead was result-driven.

    Ran Kivetz

    Kivetz was retained by Abbott to assess whether the challenged statement, as modified by the disclaimer, was a driver of consumers’ decisions to purchase and/or pay a price premium for PediaSure. 

    Kivetz conducted an empirical consumer materiality survey to test the effect of the challenged statement on consumers’ likelihood of purchasing and willingness to pay for PediaSure, and to ascertain the reasons and motivations driving consumers’ purchase of the products.

    He drew two conclusions based on the survey’s results. First, Kivetz concluded that the challenged statement did not drive consumers to purchase PediaSure. Second, Kivetz concluded that consumers are not willing to pay more for PediaSure when the challenged statement is present compared to when it is absent.

    a. Reliability of Kivetz’s Survey Design

    Noriega argued that, for three reasons, the design of Kivetz’s consumer survey was unreliable.

    First, Noriega argued that Kivetz erred in conducting a between-group, rather than within-group, study. Even if a within-group study would have been more effective for assessing materiality, the Court held that Kivetz’s decision to conduct a between-group study did not render his survey unreliable.

    Second, Noriega claimed that Kivetz’s study “suffers from . . . the ceiling effect.” Because approximately 90% of individuals in both the test and control groups stated that they were probably or definitely likely to purchase PediaSure, Noriega argues, there was “no room” to perceive the effect of the challenged statement.  That his survey might have been better designed, however, does not render it unreliable.

    Third, Noriega argued that Kivetz’s use of open-ended questions “produced incorrect and unreliable data.”

    The survey asked consumers why they were definitely/probably likely or unlikely to buy the product, and instructed respondents to “be specific and include details.” It then asked for “any other reason or reasons” for their purchase likelihood, and again instructed them to be specific. Respondents were thus prompted to provide a fulsome explanation for their purchase decision—not just the first reason that occurred to them. The survey also asked respondents closed-ended questions in addition to the two open-ended questions. Respondents were asked about their purchase likelihood (which required choosing between six answer choices) and willingness to pay (which required a numeric response). Accordingly, the questions here do not come close to requiring exclusion of the survey.

    b. Reliability of Survey Coding

    Noriega next argued that Kivetz’s methodology for coding the survey responses was unreliable, and that the responses did not support his conclusions. She argued that Kivetz failed to provide instructions to anonymous assistants, who made “highly subjective” coding decisions, and to keep data that would allow Noriega to determine how each response was coded. But Kivetz provided the coders with a “coding frame,” which contained a list of specific categories in which the responses could be classified. And Noriega did not dispute that Abbott produced the raw survey data, which was also attached to Kivetz’s report. Noriega accordingly could have, based on the raw data, coding frame, and results, reconstructed how responses were coded. The Court found her objections on this basis unavailing.

    c. Opinions Based on Caselaw

    Noriega argued that Kivetz’s testimony should be excluded insofar as it “offers legal conclusions.” Kivetz references caselaw once in his report.

    In support of his statement that the survey he conducted is “routinely used in academic, industry, and litigation settings,” he cited cases that accepted his consumer surveys and found that they “conclusively showed that the challenged claims were not material.” It should be noted that an expert’s testimony on issues of law is inadmissible.

    Melvin Heyman

    Abbott’s expert Heyman opined that there is ample clinical support for a claim that PediaSure helps kids grow, including in both height and weight.

    a. Qualifications to Opine on Height Growth

    Noriega argued that Heyman is unqualified to opine on pediatric height growth because he lacked specialized training or experience in the field.

    Although Heyman did not appear to have expertise in pediatric height growth specifically, that does not render his qualifications inadequate. Courts admit testimony of experts who have “educational and experiential qualifications in a general field closely related to the subject matter in question,” but lack expertise in “the specialized areas that are directly pertinent.”

    b. Reliability of Heyman’s Methodology

    Noriega argued that Heyman’s analysis is unreliable due to a lack of textual support for his assessment of Abbott’s studies. The Court held that Heyman’s testimony is reliable because he has shown how his experience led to his conclusion. Although Heyman’s failure to cite relevant authority might undermine the strength of his conclusions, it does not invalidate them.

    Second, Noriega argued that Heyman’s analysis is unreliable because he failed to rely on the CSG, which constitutes “considerable contradictory evidence.” As noted, however, the CSG is an internal Abbott document that supplies guidance for substantiating marketing claims. It was unnecessary for Heyman to consider it in analyzing the findings of Abbott’s studies, or whether the studies were scientifically rigorous.

    Heyman also addressed the AL-48 study, which he opined was a “scientifically rigorous clinical study that affirms . . . the height-related findings of prior PediaSure studies.” Noriega argued that Heyman’s analysis is unreliable because it is premised on the AL-48 study, which is “unfinished, unwritten, and unpublished.”

    The Court found the AL-48 study was not relevant, because it was completed after the time period on which Noriega’s claims are based (and after the proposed class period). Accordingly, the Court excluded Heyman’s testimony insofar as it references or relies on that study.

    c. Relevance of Opinions About Non-Height Growth

    Noriega argued that Heyman’s testimony would be unhelpful to jurors because he “avoids opining on height growth specifically,” instead addressing other forms of growth that are “wholly irrelevant” to Noriega’s claims.

    The Court found this argument unavailing because Heyman did opine on height growth. His conclusions as to the height findings of Abbott’s studies are central to his proposed testimony.

    d. Relevance of Opinions About L.V ‘s Medical Records

    Noriega argued that Heyman’s testimony related to L.V.’s medical records is irrelevant. The Court agreed.

    Even taking as true Heyman’s assessment that L.V. grew while he consumed PediaSure, such would not make it more likely that PediaSure helps kids grow. There are myriad reasons why L.V. might have grown during the relevant period, such as his genetics, age, diet, sleep, and physical activity. Heyman did not opine that PediaSure caused L.V.’s height growth, nor could he responsibly do so.

    If L.V. grew during the relevant period, that fact would be fair game to use to impeach that aspect of Noriega’s testimony. But a medical expert is not necessary to establish it. L.V.’s medical records, which reflect the weight and height recorded at his appointments in July 2021 and March 2023, are comprehensible to a layperson. Abbott has not contended that expert testimony is needed to decode them on this point. Accordingly, such testimony would be improper.

    Held

    • The Court denied in full Abbott’s motion to exclude Dr. Gita Johar’s testimony.
    • The Court granted in part and denied in part Abbott’s motion to exclude Dr. Daniel Hoffman’s testimony.
    • The Court granted in full Abbott’s motion to exclude Dr. William Ingersoll’s testimony.
    • The Court granted in part and denied in part Noriega’s motion to exclude Dr. Ran Kivetz’s testimony.
    • The Court granted in part and denied in part Noriega’s motion to exclude Dr. Melvin Heyman’s testimony. 

    Key Takeaway

    Trial courts serve as gatekeepers, responsible for ‘ensuring that an expert’s testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand.

    Whether a witness is qualified as an expert is a threshold question that precedes the Court’s relevance and reliability inquiries. It is critical that an expert’s analysis be reliable at every step. To ensure relevance, the Court must assess whether the expert’s testimony fits the facts of the case.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Noriega V. Abbott Laboratories
    Docket Number: 1:23cv4014
    Court Name: United States District Court, New York Southern
    Order Date: June 04, 2026
  • Nutrition Expert Was Allowed to Opine on the Use of Statutes and Regulations

    Nutrition Expert Was Allowed to Opine on the Use of Statutes and Regulations

    Plaintiffs are the estates of three decedents, Robert W. Petersen (“Mr. Petersen”), Mary Ann Simons, (“Ms. Simons”) and Charlotte Elaine Guilford (“Ms. Guilford”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”). Plaintiffs were residents of Canyon Creek, an assisted living facility in Billings, Montana specializing in memory care, during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. Plaintiffs alleged that Canyon Creek was negligent in the care of Mr. Petersen, Ms. Simons, and Ms. Guilford and that its negligent care caused their deaths.

    One of Plaintiffs’ allegations in this case is that Canyon Creek failed to ensure that Petersen and Simons maintained acceptable parameters of nutrition and hydration as required by state statute and federal regulation.

    Plaintiffs retained Janet McKee, a registered dietician, as their expert on the standard of care regarding how assisted living facilities monitor residents’ nutritional status and needs.

    However, Defendants filed a motion to exclude McKee’s testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, arguing that her opinions exceed the scope of her qualifications, are based on insufficient facts and data, and are not supported by a reliable assessment of the applicable standard of care. Defendants next filed a motion in the alternative to limit McKee’s testimony. They first argued that she lacked the qualifications to offer medical causation opinions or to use statutes or regulations to establish a duty and should therefore be prohibited from proffering such opinions. Second, they argued that any testimony about, reliance upon, or reference to opinions and information first disclosed during McKee’s deposition should be excluded from trial pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 and 37.

    Nutrition Expert Witness

    Janet Sutton McKee holds a Master of Science in Food, Nutrition, and Institutional Management and a Bachelor of Science in Home Economics Education. She is a registered dietician and nutritionist and holds licenses in nine states.

    Also, she is board certified as a specialist in gerontological nutrition and currently, she is the owner and manager of a nutrition and foodservice consulting company that services healthcare facilities, including acute care, skilled nursing and long-term care, residential psychiatric and behavioral treatment, and assisted living centers throughout the United States.

    Discover more cases with Janet McKee as an expert witness by ordering her comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

    Discussion by the Court

    A. Motion to Exclude Testimony of Plaintiffs’ Expert Janet McKee

    1. Qualifications

    McKee has delivered extensive educational programs and presentations nationwide for healthcare associations, industry conventions, and professional groups, covering topics including nutrition’s role in fall prevention, geriatric care, quality assurance, pandemic response, and liability reduction.

    Also, she has developed and taught nutrition courses at the university level and for healthcare professionals. Further, she has conducted and published clinical research and authored/co-authored numerous articles and chapters on clinical nutrition topics, liability risk management, and speciality dietetics.

    In other words, the Court held that McKee’s knowledge, skill, experience, and education are relevant to the opinions she offers regarding Canyon Creek’s dietary standard of care duties.

    2. Reliability

    The Court determined that McKee’s opinions satisfy the preponderance standard for admissibility, albeit marginally. First, McKee’s opinions are based on sufficient facts and data.

    Although McKee did not cite specific documents and conceded that she would have preferred to review additional material, the Court nonetheless acknowledges that her testimony appears grounded in record evidence, as shown by the “thousands of pages” she produced at her deposition.

    Moreover, McKee’s opinions reflected a reliable application of her experience, training, and education to the facts of the case. 

    For example, McKee opined that Canyon Creek failed to weigh Mr. Petersen on admission and that its negligence caused his weight loss, malnutrition, falls, dehydration, and pressure wounds, as well as a decreased quality and length of life. At deposition, however, she acknowledged not knowing when Petersen was admitted, not possessing his pre-admission records, and not being aware of his prior quality of life or whether he had preexisting pressure injuries. Absent this information, Defendants argued that her opinions are unreliable.

    However, McKee did offer opinions relevant to her experience and supported by the record regarding Petersen’s condition and treatment at Canyon Creek.

    Because McKee’s opinions rest on sufficient facts and data and reliably apply her expertise to the facts of this case, the Court denied Defendants’ motion to exclude.

    B. Alternative Motion to Limit Testimony

    1. Causation Opinions and Establishing a Duty

    In the alternative, Defendants next moved to limit, in limine, McKee’s testimony by prohibiting her from offering causation opinions or using statutes or regulations to establish a duty.

    a. Causation Opinions

    Defendants first argued that McKee should be prohibited from opining that Canyon Creek caused Plaintiffs’ medical diagnoses or that Canyon Creek “promoted” Plaintiffs’ medical outcomes.

    Plaintiffs did not intend to elicit a causation opinion from McKee. Therefore, the Court granted the alternative motion to limit testimony as to eliciting causation opinions.

    However, the Court agreed with Plaintiffs that McKee “is uniquely positioned to render an opinion on the risks attendant to poor nutrition.”

    b. Establishing a Duty

    Defendants next argued that McKee cannot use statutes or regulations to evidence a standard of dietary care because she only opined that Canyon Creek violated the cited statutes and regulations, not that the statutes and regulations embodied an applicable standard of care.

    Because McKee failed to identify laws embodying the standard of care, Defendants argued that she is not qualified to determine which statutes and regulations establish a duty applicable to Canyon Creek.

    Based on McKee’s testimony and qualifications discussed above, the Court allowed her to opine on how the regulations and statutes she identified inform the standard of care and create a duty in this case. Plaintiffs did not intend to elicit ultimate issue opinions from McKee.

    The Court denied the alternative motion to limit testimony as to McKee’s use of statutes and regulations to identify a standard of care and establish a duty.

    2. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 and 37

    a. Rule 26

    The Court found that McKee introduced new opinions in her Violations Report and throughout her deposition that were neither adequately disclosed nor supplemented by Plaintiffs.

    After reviewing McKee’s Initial Report alongside her Violations Report, the Court found that though the documents are fundamentally aligned, they differ in breadth and scope, in their regulatory and legal framing, and in their identification of infection control and systemic failures.

    Disclosures by experts are not living documents that can be added to on a continuing basis. If the Court were to treat McKee’s disclosures in this fashion, then “the full disclosure requirement implicit in Rule 26 … would interfere with the Court’s ability to set case management deadlines, because new reports and opinions would warrant further consultation with one’s own expert and virtually require new rounds of depositions.”

    In addition to improper disclosure, Plaintiffs failed to adequately supplement McKee’s Initial Report under Rule 26(e). It is obvious that the additional material McKee relied on and the new opinions she formed after her disclosure far exceed the scope of Rule 26(e), that is—”correcting inaccuracies or filling the interstices of an incomplete report.”

    Accordingly, Plaintiffs violated Rule 26 when they failed to adequately disclose or supplement McKee’s Initial Report with the numerous new opinions from her Violations Report and the detailed analysis she provided at her deposition.

    b. Rule 37

    The Court found that the late disclosure was neither substantially justified nor harmless. Initially, the late disclosure deprived Defendants of a meaningful opportunity to prepare for, examine, and respond to McKee’s new opinions at her deposition. True, Plaintiffs complied with Defendants’ subpoena. However, had Defendants not subpoenaed McKee, they may not have learned about the new materials she relied on or her new opinions until trial. Plaintiffs offer no reason why the additional materials or new opinions were not properly supplemented under Rule 26(e) before McKee’s deposition, and therefore, the late disclosure was not justified.

    The Court next rejected Plaintiffs’ contention that the late disclosure was harmless because Defendants violated the parties’ agreement not to produce expert notes.

    McKee’s “notes” advanced her opinions far beyond the scope of her summary analysis in her Initial Report. And even though Defendants have known the totality of McKee’s opinions for over a year, it was Plaintiffs’ duty to adequately disclose and supplement under Rule 26.

    Here, the Court ultimately concluded that the risk of any prejudice to Defendants at trial is mitigated by two factors. First, despite Plaintiffs’ procedural infraction, Defendants have had adequate time to prepare for trial since they learned of McKee’s late disclosure 15 months ago. Second, expert testimony is an essential component to litigating the parties’ case; as such, there are less drastic sanctions available than striking portions of McKee’s opinions that would promote a fair trial. The jury should be allowed to weigh the entirety of Plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions.

    Therefore, the Court elects to impose the lesser sanction of allowing Plaintiffs to file McKee’s supplemental expert report and allowing Defendants to reopen McKee’s deposition.

    Held

    (1) The Court denied the Defendants’ motion to exclude the testimony of Plaintiffs’ expert Janet McKee.

    (2) The Court granted in part and denied in part the Defendants’ alternative motion to limit testimony.

    Key Takeaway

    Although certain aspects of McKee’s testimony may lack foundation in pre-admission records or prior medical history, her analysis of Canyon Creek’s care practices are nonetheless grounded in her professional experience and supported by the record. Therefore, her opinions are reliable.

    Please refer to the blogs previously published about this case:

    Palliative Care Expert’s New and Expanded Opinions on Facility Neglect Admitted

    Economics Expert Was Allowed to Opine on Assisted Living Facility Administration Issues

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Estate Of Robert W. Petersen Et Al V. Koelsch Senior Communities LLC
    Docket Number: 1:22cv11
    Court Name: United States District Court, Montana
    Order Date: December 12, 2025