Plaintiff Ruben Wills, a former New York City Council member, brought claims for negligence and violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process against Microgenics Corporation and Sheila Woodberry, respectively.
Plaintiff was convicted on corruption charges, although his conviction was later reversed on direct appeal. While still incarcerated, and shortly before his scheduled parole, officials from the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”) selected him for random drug testing. The officials used a urinalysis test and testing protocol that was designed, manufactured, and sold by Microgenics. The test returned what Plaintiff claims was a false positive. State officials revoked Plaintiff’s eligibility for parole, and Plaintiff remained incarcerated for several additional months. He is now out of prison.
Microgenics filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff’s expert, Dr. Robert B. Swotinsky.
Occupational Medicine Expert Witness
Dr. Robert Brian Swotinsky is a board-certified physician in occupation medicine with thirty-eight years of experience. This includes five years working with buprenorphine-assisted treatment of opioid-dependent patients, which involved urine testing for buprenorphine. Swotinsky has thirty-five years of experience as a medical review officer reviewing workplace drug test results. He is also the co-author of a physician certification examination for workplace drug testing, and he consults with government agencies on workplace drug testing. He has written two textbooks on the subject.
To begin with, Swotinsky opined that “the standard of practice for forensic urine drug testing includes complete chain of custody procedures and positive results supported by specific confirmatory tests,” and that Plaintiff’s drug test “had neither.”
Basically, Swotinsky’s testimony explains what the relevant standard of care is, and his opinion that Microgenics deviated from it. This will be helpful to the trier of fact in determining whether Microgenics breached a duty of care owed to plaintiff, one of the elements plaintiff must prove to prevail on his negligence claim.
Microgenics asserted that the relevant standard of care was that “an assay-based drug test [be] at least 98 percent accurate,” and that it complied with this standard of care because its Assay was 98% accurate. The Court ruled that Swotinsky’s testimony, that conducting drug screening tests that are 98% accurate without any confirmatory testing does not satisfy the standard of care, is thus necessary to rebut Microgenics’ assertion that it followed the proper standard of care.
Moreover, Swotinsky’s opinion that “[t]he reliable identification of a drug following a preliminary positive result requires using a second analytical method for confirmation, one based on a different and, in most cases, more specific chemical principle,” is not an inadmissible legal conclusion.
Microgenics’ assertion that Swotinsky ignored reliable data showing that the Assay was 98% accurate misses the import of Swotinsky’s opinion. Swotinsky does not dispute that the Assay is 98% accurate. Rather, he opined that conducting drug testing with a 98% accurate Assay, without confirmatory testing, falls short of the relevant professional standards for drug testing. Swotinsky supports this opinion with literature on workplace drug testing, Microgenics’ own product insert accompanying the Assay, and Swotinsky’s own experience with drug testing.
Held
The Court denied the Microgenics’ motion to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff’s expert Robert B. Swotinsky.
Key Takeaway:
A witness may have sufficient experience to qualify him as an expert even if his experience is in a slightly different area than the one he will testify about. The fact that Swotinsky’s experience with drug testing is in the occupational setting does not mean that he lacks the qualifications to provide opinions about the forensic setting.
Similarly, Swotinsky’s methodology is not unreliable just because he applies workplace drug testing standards to forensic drug testing standards, as Microgenics argues. In New York, the standards of care applicable to proprietary functions of a prison, such as the provision of medical care, are the same as in the private setting.
This lawsuit involves an alleged slip and fall in the Petco Store. Plaintiff, Lisa Brune alleged multiple injuries caused by the slip and fall and sought damages for same.
Plaintiff complained that Petco failed to adhere to this Court’s Order. Then Plaintiff complained that the testimonies, opinions, and/or reports of David C. Randolph, M.D., Ph.D., and M.P.H. and Stacie Nunez did not meet the requirements under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert.
Plaintiff filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Defendant’s experts David C. Randolph, M.D., Ph.D., and M.P.H. and Stacie Nunez. Alternatively, Plaintiff moved to limit their testimony. Plaintiff complains that Defendant, Petco Health & Wellness, Inc. (“Petco”) failed to timely identify and provide expert reports for these witnesses.
Occupational Medicine Expert Witness
David C. Randolph M.D., Ph.D, M.P.H is an active occupational medicine physician in Cincinnati, Ohio, in practice for 25 years. He is the former president of the American Academy of Disability Evaluating Physicians.
His doctoral degree is in Epidemiology at the University Of Cincinnati College of Medicine.
Stacie Nunez is a licensed vocational rehabilitation counselor/ life care planner. She works at an established Louisiana rehabilitation counseling firm.
Plaintiff suggested that the Court clearly indicated that “Petco could provide a single report from an IME physician relating to Brune’s recommended neck surgery, not multiple reports from other unidentified experts.”
This Court expressly stated that “the Court will grant an extension as to Defendant’s expert report deadline until August 30, 2024.”
Plaintiff informed the Court that on August 30, 2024, at 7:55 p.m., Petco provided additional reports from David C. Randolph and Stacie Nunez but complained that these two experts were not previously identified, and their expert report opinions are outside the limited purpose of the expert opinions to address Plaintiff’s neck complaints.
Petco has hired Randolph as an expert in the field of occupational medicine, and Stacie Nunez as a vocational therapist. Randolph’s opinion and analysis rests on the totality of Plaintiff’s medical condition and Nunez’s report opines on a life care plan. It appeared logical to the Court, considering Plaintiff’s numerous complaints of injuries, that these two experts could not provide relevant reports until after Petco was able to address Wolf’s recommended surgical treatment. Also, Plaintiff has ample time to depose these witnesses and prepare for trial considering these experts’ reports were provided on August 30, 20124, and the trial of this matter is November 18, 2024.
Plaintiff also complained that Petco has provided no dates for her to depose Randolph and Nunez. However, the Court noted that Plaintiff has not filed a motion to compel the deposition of these witnesses. The Court found no basis to strike Petco’s experts based on Plaintiff’s complaints herein.
Qualifications
Plaintiff complained of Randolph’s qualifications in the field of occupational medicine. Specifically, Plaintiff argued that Randolph did not have the expertise to opine that Plaintiff’s fall did not cause her bilateral patellar fractures.
Plaintiff challenged Randolph’s expertise in Epidemiology and argued that Plaintiff’s trip and fall is not associated with the distribution and determinates of diseases or disorders within groups of people.
Randolph noted that he provided multiple, peer-reviewed medical references that apply specifically to Plaintiff’s clinical presentation. Randolph explained that he personally reviewed the totality of Plaintiff’s submitted medical records, and notes that a fractured patella is extremely painful that would preclude the ability to walk.
Randolph’s review of Plaintiff’s medical records reflects a history of multiple joint complaints as well as multilevel degenerative changed in her neck and low back that dated back several years.
The Court has reviewed Randolph’s curriculum vitae and notes that he has vast experiences in the medical field and finds that he is more than qualified to opine, provide testimony and issue a report as to the causation of the subject incident.
Plaintiff also moved to strike the opinion, testimony, and report of Stacie Nunez as to Plaintiff’s alleged knee injury. Nunez relied on the opinions of Randolph. Plaintiff argued that should the Court entertain Plaintiff’s request to strike Randolph’s report and opinions, then likewise, Nunez’s report, opinions, and testimony should be stricken. The Court found no basis to strike Nunez’s opinion, testimony, and report.
Limitations
Alternatively, Plaintiff moved to limit Randolph’s testimony, report and opinions to exclude any issues regarding safety engineering, fall prevention, pedestrian safety, workplace safety, premises safety, human factors, ergonomics, post-accident evaluations, and/or any opinion as to whether the condition at issue that caused Plaintiff’s fall presented a hazardous condition.
The Court notes that Randolph has experience in areas of acute injury, incident, safety guidelines as well as other related areas of medicine. However, it appeared that Randolph’s report did not include a majority of these areas. As such, the Court will deny and defer ruling until after traversal at the trial of this matter.
Held
The Court denied Plaintiff’s motion to exclude untimely identified and/or unqualified expert witnesses, David C. Randolph and Stacie Nunez, or alternatively, to limit their testimony.
Key Takeaway:
Plaintiff argued, without explanation, that Randolph is not qualified to opine as to safety engineering, fall prevention, pedestrian safety, workplace safety, premises safety, human factors, ergonomics, or post-accident evaluations, and as such moved to exclude Randolph’s opinions that are allegedly based on subjective interpretations and assumptions. The Court has reviewed Randolph’s curriculum vitae and noted that he has vast experiences in the medical field and found that he is more than qualified to opine, provide testimony and issue a report as to the causation of the subject incident.
This case concerns claims under the Family and Medical Leave Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act. Plaintiff, Jeremy West (“West”), was hired by Defendant BNSF in January 2014 as a conductor and later as an engineer after receiving his engineer certification.
In 2020, West was diagnosed with a rare medical condition, Susac Syndrome, which if untreated can cause severe headaches; confusion; problems with thinking, such as short-term memory loss, slow thought processing and reduced ability to solve problems; slurred speech; walking difficulties; and/or changes in personality. For the next year, he was treated with medication to manage his disorder. West applied and received intermittent FMLA leave in September 2020 to attend routine appointments related to his condition. West re-applied for FMLA leave in September 2021 to continue attending routine appointments. He was subsequently removed from his position at BNSF in September 21, 2021. West initiated the present action against BNSF alleging he was effectively terminated in violation of the ADA and FMLA.
On September 3, 2024, BNSF filed a motion to exclude the testimony of West’s expert witness, Dr. Kevin Trangle.
Occupational Medicine Expert Witness
Dr. Kevin Trangle has over 40 years of experience as a board-certified physician in internal medicine, occupational medicine, and preventive medicine. He obtained his medical degree from the University of Minnesota Medical School in 1978 and also holds an MBA in healthcare management from Case Western Reserve University. He has served as a medical director for numerous corporations and organizations. His experience encompasses all aspects of occupational medicine including diagnosis and treatment of work-related injuries, disability evaluations, return to work assessments, corporate wellness programs, and substance abuse programs.
Trangle has provided expert consultation services for attorneys, government agencies, and insurers. He has given dozens of presentations to professional organizations on occupational health topics and has published extensively in medical journals. Trangle has particular expertise regarding workplace chemical exposures, having worked extensively with the chemical industry and conducted research on industrial solvents and chemical sensitivity issues. He has also managed corporate drug testing and substance abuse programs.
At West’s behest, Trangle conducted a review of West’s medical records and produced an Independent Medical Evaluation (“IME”) report. In his report, Trangle opined that BNSF “erred in its determination that West could not safely return to his job as a Conductor. Specifically, Aquino’s characterization of West as having a condition which posed an unacceptable future risk of sudden incapacitation was unjustified and based on an improper FFD process . . . .”
BNSF argues Trangle’s report and proposed testimony should be excluded under Federal Rules of Evidence (“FRE”) 702 because his analysis is unreliable, irrelevant, and unduly prejudicial. Specifically, BNSF asserts that Trangle is not qualified to opine on risk assessments in the railroad industry and his conclusions do not rely on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge as required by FRE 702. BNSF argues Trangle’s proposed testimony is unreliable because it is based on subjective belief and unsupported speculation.
Analysis
West sought to use Trangle’s report and proposed testimony to challenge BNSF’s risk assessment and subsequent finding that West presented a significant risk and needed to be removed from service.
BNSF’s chief medical officer, Dr. Theodore Aquino, ultimately made the decision to pull West from service after a conversation with West’s neurologist, Dr. Jessica Craddock, and performing independent research on Susac Syndrome. Susac Syndrome is a very rare neurological condition that Aquino had admittedly not heard of prior to BNSF’s diagnosis. Aquino based his conclusion in large part on Craddock’s recommendation that BNSF should not be performing his job as a locomotive engineer. The Court held that Trangle has also examined BNSF’s medical records, Craddock’s findings and performed independent research on Susac Syndrome, thus his testimony is directly relevant to West’s challenge of Aquino’s findings.
Qualifications
BNSF argued Trangle is not qualified to opine on this matter because he has no relevant knowledge, skill, experience, training or education. The Court disagreed. Trangle specializes in occupational medicine and has relied on his specialized knowledge as an occupational medicine doctor in numerous cases related to risk tolerance under the ADA fitness for duty assessment framework. As for Trangle’s knowledge on Susac Syndrome itself, he appeared to have a similar level of background knowledge on the condition as Aquino given that neither were familiar with the condition before West’s diagnosis and this case.
Reliability
BNSF argued that Trangle’s testimony is unreliable because his opinion is based on his subjective belief and is wholly speculative. Aquino came to his conclusions after a discussion with Craddock and independent research. Somewhat similarly, Trangle came to his conclusions after reviewing West’s medical records, Aquino and West’s deposition transcripts, West’s job requirements, and research articles.
Trangle reviewed the underlying facts necessary to support his testimony challenging Aquino’s findings. For these reasons, the Court finds Trangle’s testimony to be both relevant to this case and reliable.
Held
The Court denied the Defendant’s motion to exclude the testimony of Dr. Kevin Trangle.
Key Takeaway:
Trangle was not familiar with Susac Syndrome before West’s diagnosis and this case but he has more than made up for the same by reviewing West’s medical records, Aquino and West’s deposition transcripts, West’s job requirements, and research articles.
Following an automobile accident in which driver Ronald Skinner struck Plaintiff’s vehicle, Plaintiff subsequently filed suit against Defendants. To offer opinion testimony as to Plaintiff’s damages, Plaintiff’s counsel identified Dr. Manijeh Berenji, an occupational and environmental medicine physician, as an expert life care planner and emailed Defendants a life care plan for Plaintiff that Berenji prepared.
Compiled after Berenji conducted a “detailed review” of Plaintiff’s medical records and interviewed Plaintiff, Berenji’s life care plan listed medical costs that Plaintiff was likely to incur—including surgeries such as a lumbar discectomy, lumbar hardware removal, and cervical microdiscectomy, various injections, and a Functional Restoration Program—totaling $446,350.
Manijeh Berenji is board-certified in occupational and environmental medicine as well as public health in general preventive medicine. She is the chief of Occupational Health at VA Long Beach Healthcare System.
She has over 10 years of experience in occupational and environmental medicine, preventive medicine, and population health.
Plaintiff failed to properly disclose Berenji as an expert witness
Defendants argued (1) that Plaintiff’s disclosure of Berenji failed to meet Rule 26(a)(2)(B)’s requirements for witnesses specifically retained to provide expert testimony and (2) Plaintiff cannot meet his burden in showing the noncompliance was justified or harmless.
Defendants first argued that Plaintiff failed to properly disclose Berenji as an expert witness because although Plaintiff’s counsel emailed the life care plan to Defendants, Plaintiff did not comply with Rule 26(a)(4)’s requirement that an expert disclosure be written, signed, and served on the other party.
Next, Defendants argued that Berenji’s written report failed to satisfy the requirements of Rule 26(a)(2)(B) for experts specifically retained to provide expert testimony. First, they argued, Plaintiff failed to meet the requirement to list all other cases in the past four years in which the witness has testified as an expert witness—despite that Berenji later testified that she is deposed at least a few times per month. The Court noted that Berenji’s life care plan did not include any such list.
Although Defendants ultimately obtained a copy of Berenji’s CV, they obtained it through a subpoena to Medical Life Care Planners, not Plaintiff’s expert disclosure. The Court held that Plaintiff failed to provide the basis for the expert’s qualifications.
While Defendants did ultimately depose Berenji, the Court held that Plaintiff’s failure to disclose the other cases in which she has provided expert testimony prejudiced Defendants by limiting their ability to compare her testimony in other cases and cross-examine her about any similarities or inconsistencies.
Defendants first argued that Berenji was not qualified to testify as an expert witness regarding life care planning because (1) she was not certified as a life care planner and (2) she lacked experience in the field. Although Defendants acknowledged that lack of certification was not dispositive, they argued that such a lack—paired with the fact that Berenji had only been preparing life care plans for about a year and only had any training by way of the introductory module of certification coursework and by following a listserv—demonstrated that she was not qualified to speak as an expert in that area.
2. Reliability
Defendants argued that Berenji “failed to take into account” that none of Plaintiff’s treating physicians recommended surgery when she formulated her life care plan. Berenji neither spoke with nor received any information from any of Plaintiff’s treating physicians.
In sum, Defendants argued that because Berenji’s life care plan was based on generalized medical guidelines, rather than Plaintiff’s specific circumstances with his treating physicians, Berenji’s expert opinion was not based on “sufficient facts or data.”
Because she did not discuss the need for more surgeries with qualified physicians, the Court held that Berenji cannot offer the requisite reliability for her opinions because she necessarily relied on her own lack of expertise or resorted to a generic set of guidelines to support her opinions.
The Court disagreed with the suggestion that Berenji’s testimony “did not relate to any issue in the case.” Although it may be disputable and unreliable, it certainly would be relevant if allowed. That said, given that the Court agreed that Berenji’s testimony failed Rule 702’s other requirements (namely, her lack of qualification to provide spinal and other surgery recommendations and her lack of consultation with the treating physicians), the Court found that her expert testimony must be excluded.
Held
The Court granted Defendant’s motion to strike Manijeh Berenji because her testimony failed to meet the substantive standard for expert witnesses under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert.
Key Takeaways:
The Court held that Berenji is unqualified to provide spinal and other surgery recommendations. She previously testified that she is not in a position to recommend spinal surgeries to patients and does not have training in the areas in which she recommended Plaintiff have treatment (spinal surgery, neurosurgery, orthopedics, physical therapy, pain management, optometry, or radiology).
The Court found that Berenji’s guideline recommendations are not based on any consultation with Plaintiff’s treating physician because she did not discuss the need for more surgeries with qualified physicians.
Railroad companies were obligated to ensure that locomotive conductors met federal standards of visual acuity, including color vision, before they were permitted to conduct trains, in accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 240.121(c). To comply with these regulations, conductors underwent testing approximately every three years to confirm adherence to the specified vision standards. The federal regulations provided a range of acceptable testing methods, outlined in 49 C.F.R. App. F(4), to assess a conductor’s ability to differentiate between the colors of railroad signals. In cases where a conductor did not pass the test chosen by their employer, they had the option to request further testing, often in the form of a field test, to ascertain their fitness for duty.
Union Pacific Railroad Company initiated its color vision test process by conducting an Ishihara fourteen-plate color vision test, known for its high sensitivity to color-vision deficiencies. If a conductor successfully passed this initial test, recertification to operate trains was granted without any complications. However, if a conductor failed the test, the usual course of action involved progressing to a field test. This field test aimed to assess whether the conductor could safely operate trains despite any color vision deficiency. If the conductor passed the field test, Union Pacific would similarly recertify them for train operation.
Monte Mills (“Mills”), the Plaintiff, served as a conductor for Union Pacific Railroad Company (“Union Pacific”), the Defendant, for a period exceeding twelve years. Throughout this duration, Union Pacific conducted vision tests on Mills on at least three occasions. In the first two tests, Mills did not pass the Ishihara due to a color-vision deficiency. Nevertheless, on both occasions, Mills successfully cleared Union Pacific’s subsequent field test and was recertified.
In 2016, Union Pacific conducted another round of color vision testing for Mills. Once again, Mills did not pass the Ishihara and underwent a subsequent field test. However, by 2016, Union Pacific had introduced a new field test called the Light Cannon. Mills did not pass the Light Cannon test, leading to Union Pacific denying him recertification. Consequently, this denial marked the conclusion of Mills’ employment as a conductor at Union Pacific, despite his history of incident-free work.
On March 21, 2022, Mills initiated a lawsuit against Union Pacific, alleging unlawful discrimination based on disability, contravening § 12112 of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The legal proceedings advanced through discovery and the presentation of proposed expert witnesses. Subsequently, Mills filed a Motion in Limine, urging the Court to exclude testimony from Union Pacific’s expert witness Steven Fender. Union Pacific, in response, sought summary judgment and submitted a Motion to Strike Testimony from Mills’ Experts Jay Neitz and Kevin Tranngle. Furthermore, on October 10, 2023, Mills filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority, to which Union Pacific objected, promptly requesting the Court to strike the Notice from the record.
Railroad Expert Witness
Steven J. Fender is a seasoned Railroad Transportation/Safety Consultant, bringing an extensive 45 years of experience in the railroad industry. His expertise led him to frequent participation in rule and regulation review and development teams, as well as diverse roles within multi-modal and multi-discipline public safety evaluation teams, task forces, and industry-related projects and programs. Presently, Fender holds the position of Principal at Fender Rail Transportation and Safety Consulting Services, LLC. Prior to this, he served as the Railroad Administrator at the Federal Railroad Administration, where his principal responsibility involved providing guidance and direction for the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) and the US Department of Transportation (the “DOT”) transportation safety policy and organizational operations. Fender’s educational background includes multiple learning institutions nationwide, attended at various locations, further solidifying his comprehensive knowledge and qualifications in the field.
Occupational Medicine Expert Witness
Dr. Kevin Trangle has over 40 years of experience as a board-certified physician in internal medicine, occupational medicine, and preventive medicine. He obtained his M.D. from the University of Minnesota Medical School and also holds an MBA in Healthcare Management from Case Western Reserve University. His experience encompasses all aspects of occupational medicine including diagnosis and treatment of work-related injuries, disability evaluations, return to work assessments, corporate wellness programs, and substance abuse programs. Trangle is currently a Senior Clinical Instructor at Case Western Reserve University and is the Associate Staff Member at Euclid General Hospital.
Ophthalmology Expert Witness
Dr. Jay Neitz is the E.K. Bishop Endowed Professor in Ophthalmology at the University of Washington in Seattle, boasting a career spanning over 30 years as a research scientist and educator. He obtained B.A. from San Jose State University and then earned his Ph.D. from the University of California, Santa Barbara. With comprehensive expertise in all facets of eye disorders and their impact on visual performance, Neitz has made significant contributions to the field. His extensive research encompasses a focus on color vision deficiencies, where he has not only developed but also refined various tests and methods for identifying such deficiencies.
Discussion by the Court
Mills moved to exclude the testimony of Union Pacific’s expert, Steven Fender, who served as a Railroad Transportation and Safety Consultant. Fender has a background of working in various positions for the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) over numerous years. The dispute between the parties revolved around Fender’s proposed testimony, specifically focusing on his evaluation of the Light Cannon as a field test.
Mills argued that Fender’s testimony was neither relevant nor based on a reliable foundation, advocating for its exclusion. Union Pacific countered, asserting that Fender’s testimony was both reliable and relevant. Additionally, Union Pacific contended that Fender’s testimony was crucial as it was seen as dispositive, emphasizing that employers should not face liability for adhering to federally imposed safety guidelines.
The federal regulations in question aimed to ensure train conductors could “recognize and distinguish between the colors of railroad signals.” While providing a list of acceptable color-vision tests, the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) acknowledged that individuals failing these tests might still be qualified for the role. Notably, the regulations did not mandate specific follow-up tests for those who failed the specified tests, granting railroad companies discretion in evaluating conductor fitness within a defined framework.
After establishing a prima facie case under the ADA, an employer could avoid liability for an alleged discriminatory qualification standard by invoking affirmative defenses such as business necessity or direct threat. Successfully asserting a business necessity defense required the employer to demonstrate that the challenged standard was both job-related, consistent with business necessity, and that reasonable accommodation would not enable performance.
The FRA stipulated that a railroad company’s field test must be “valid, reliable, and comparable” for assessing a person’s ability to safely perform as a locomotive engineer or conductor. Mills argued that determining the validity of the Light Cannon required a medical, scientific inquiry, asserting that Fender lacked the necessary medical background. Despite acknowledging that testimony based on medical or scientific assessment might be more persuasive, the Court did not find Fender’s expertise wholly inappropriate for evaluating the Light Cannon. Fender’s extensive professional history in railroad safety suggested he was well-suited to assess whether a field test mimicked the conditions faced by train operators and whether use of the Light Cannon is at least permissible under federal regulations. While Fender lacked a medical or scientific background, the Court deemed these limitations not severe enough to warrant his disqualification, allowing Mills to address them through cross-examination.
The central issue in this case was whether Union Pacific’s decision not to recertify Mills amounted to disability discrimination under the ADA. Another critical aspect was Union Pacific’s ability to establish an affirmative defense to disability discrimination, potentially involving the determination of business necessity. Fender’s testimony regarding the Light Cannon’s compliance with federal regulations could provide insight for the fact finder on this matter. Mills expressed concerns about potential confusion caused by Fender’s testimony. Despite acknowledging a remote possibility of confusion, the Court was confident that any such issues could be addressed through cross-examination, thus deeming the testimony admissible.
Union Pacific asserted that Fender’s testimony was not only relevant and reliable but also dispositive under Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 573-74 119 S. Ct. 2162, 144 L. Ed. 2d 518 (1999). The Court acknowledged the relevance and reliability of Fender’s testimony but disagreed with Union Pacific’s interpretation of Albertson’s, finding it a stretch. In Albertson’s, the Supreme Court allowed an employer to insist on a specific federal safety regulation, and Union Pacific argued for a similar discretion. However, the Court noted significant differences in the facts, emphasizing that Union Pacific couldn’t opt out of conducting follow-up tests as per governing regulations.
While recognizing railroad companies’ discretion in choosing follow-up tests, the Court clarified that it must align with federal laws, including the ADA. Consequently, Fender’s testimony on the Light Cannon’s compliance with federal regulations was deemed relevant but not dispositive. Mills’ Motion to Exclude Fender’s Testimony was denied. The Court clarified that although federal regulations do not mandate the use of the Light Cannon, Fender’s testimony on the matter is not considered dispositive.
Union Pacific moved for summary judgment, asserting four main contentions: (1) Mills’ claims were time-barred, (2) Mills did not qualify as a “qualified individual” under the ADA and relevant caselaw, (3) Union Pacific had legitimate, non-discriminatory, and non-pretextual reasons for denying Mills return to the conductor position, and (4) Mills could not establish a disparate impact claim.
Union Pacific argued that Mills received a notice of his right to sue in January 2021, citing Mills’ deposition testimony where he affirmed receiving it on or around January 21, 2021. Union Pacific also presented the notice letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the “EEOC”), dated January 21, 2021, as evidence. According to Union Pacific, since Mills filed his lawsuit on March 31, 2022, well beyond the ninety-day limit from the alleged notice date, the claim should be considered time-barred.
In contrast, Mills contested receiving the notice and claimed uncertainty during his deposition about what a notice of right to sue entailed. He believed he had received various documents from the EEOC and assumed the notice letter was among them. Mills and his counsel, upon closer examination, could not locate the letter in the EEOC’s file on Mills, raising doubts about its existence and delivery. Both Mills and his counsel submitted sworn declarations supporting their findings.
The Court noted the absence of evidence from Union Pacific demonstrating that the notice letter was indeed mailed to Mills, as required by the mailbox rule. Consequently, the Court concluded that there was insufficient evidence to deem Mills’ claim time-barred.
Union Pacific contended that Mills’ claims should be legally barred as he did not qualify as a “qualified individual” under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). A qualified individual, as per the ADA, is someone possessing the necessary skills, experience, education, and other job-related requirements for the disputed position and can perform its essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation.
Union Pacific argued that since the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) had approved its administration of the Light Cannon, anyone failing this test did not meet the job-related requirements of the position and, therefore, could not be considered qualified. The Court, however, determined that the issues of whether Mills possessed the required qualifications to be a conductor and if he could perform the essential functions of the role were factual questions.
The Court highlighted Mills’ extensive work history of successfully passing color-vision field tests and accurately identifying railroad signals. Based on these facts, the Court concluded that a jury could reasonably find Mills to be a qualified individual. Consequently, the Court deemed summary judgment on that basis inappropriate.
The Court recognized that being a train conductor is a high-stakes occupation, where some degree of color-vision discernment is deemed important. However, the question of whether Mills’ specific disability is pertinent to the job requirements of a train conductor remained a disputed material fact. Consequently, the Court concluded that summary judgment on that basis was inappropriate.
Union Pacific claimed that Mills could not establish a disparate impact claim for three reasons: (1) lack of statistical evidence supporting his claim, (2) Mills was only “regarded as” having a disability, not having an “actual disability,” and (3) Union Pacific’s use of the Light Cannon was justified by business necessity. The Court determined that the primary purpose of the Light Cannon was to screen out individuals with color vision deficiency, making it unnecessary and wasteful to demand statistical evidence confirming its intended function. Therefore, Mills was not obliged to provide statistical evidence for his disparate impact claim.
Regarding the argument about Mills being “regarded as” disabled, Union Pacific acknowledged this, and since Mills asserted his disability, the Court deemed Union Pacific’s contention insufficient to warrant summary judgment.
In the broader context, Union Pacific failed to conclusively demonstrate that the Light Cannon accurately measured Mills’ actual ability to perform essential job functions or that no reasonable accommodation existed to address any performance deficiency. Consequently, the Court deemed summary judgment on the basis of a business-necessity defense inappropriate.
In his response to Union Pacific’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Mills briefly mentions the Independent Medical Record Review (“the Report”) conducted by two expert witnesses, Jay Neitz and Kevin Trangle (the “Doctors”). Trangle, a Doctor of Occupational Medicine, and Neitz, a Professor of Ophthalmology specializing in color vision and vision disorders, were retained by Mills’ counsel to assess whether the Light Cannon screens out individuals with color vision deficiency who could still safely perform conductor duties.
Union Pacific moved to strike the Independent Medical Record Review Report from the record and any references to it in Mills’ Response. According to Union Pacific, the Report functions as a transmitter of testimonial hearsay, violating Fed. R. Evid. 703, and the opinions expressed by the Doctors lack a proper foundation, constituting baseless speculation in contravention of Fed. R. Evid. 702.
The opinion presented by the Doctors in the Report is partially based on a scientific study conducted by Dr. Jeff C. Rabin. The Doctors interpret Rabin’s study to suggest that the Light Cannon fails many individuals who could safely operate trains.
Union Pacific contends that the Doctors, rather than forming independent conclusions, have merely repackaged Rabin’s report and presented it as their own opinion. To support this assertion, Union Pacific highlights that neither Doctor had conducted personal research on the Light Cannon nor even witnessed the administration of a Light Cannon test.
The Court asserted that expert testimony is not required to be founded on personal knowledge but can rely on information that experts in a specific field would consider. Therefore, the Doctors were not obligated to personally study or observe the Light Cannon in operation. Additionally, since Union Pacific did not present any evidence or argument questioning the reliability of Rabin’s study, the Court tentatively concluded that experts in the field of color-vision testing could reasonably rely on the study.
Upon thorough consideration, the Court determined that the Doctors did apply their training and experience to the available sources, reaching an independent judgment. While the Doctors integrated Rabin’s study findings into their analysis, they also conducted an exhaustive review of Mills’ color vision tests history and Union Pacific work safety records. The Court noted that the Doctors’ application of their own expertise is evident in their broader discussion of color-vision testing and their interpretation of Mills’ test results. Consequently, the Court rejected Union Pacific’s first challenge, asserting that the Doctors’ opinions are not mere transmissions of testimonial hearsay.
Union Pacific contended that the Doctors’ conclusions lack a sufficient factual basis for admissibility under Rule 702. The Doctors, in their Report, assert that the Light Cannon, as administered to Mills, “fails anomalous trichromats (individuals with slight color vision defects) who can safely perform their railroad duties”. Additionally, they opined that Mills can “safely distinguish colors necessary” for railroad work. Union Pacific argued that these conclusions lack an appropriate factual foundation.
In addition to the standards outlined earlier, the Court underscored that, in addressing Daubert challenges, its role was not to determine the correctness of the expert’s opinions but to assess whether the testimony held substance and would be beneficial to a jury, as established in Alaska Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Avis Budget Grp., Inc., 738 F.3d 960, 960-70 (9th Cir. 2013). Moreover, the Ninth Circuit affirmed that the facts or data required under Rule 702 could encompass the specialized knowledge and experience of the testifying expert, as indicated in Elosu v. Middlefork Ranch Inc., 26 F.4th 1017, 1024 (9th Cir. 2022).
The Doctors’ opinion on the Light Cannon’s tendency to fail anomalous trichromats, despite their qualification for railroad duties, was grounded in their examination of Rabin’s study, their assessment of Mills’ medical and work history, and their specialized knowledge of anomalous trichromats. Although this factual foundation was subject to potential challenges through cross-examination and opposing evidence, it undeniably existed, contrary to Union Pacific’s assertions. The Court determined that such testimony possessed sufficient substance to be beneficial to a jury, even if it did not conclusively resolve the central issues in the case.
The validity of the Doctors’ opinions on Mills’ color vision remains consistent. Union Pacific contends that the evidence reviewed by the Doctors lacks relevance with regard to Mills’ color vision in 2016. However, the Report clarifies that the Doctors diligently examined Mills’ comprehensive history of color vision testing at Union Pacific. While acknowledging the potential for changes or deterioration in one’s vision over time, the Court determined that Mills’ test history remained pertinent. When coupled with an assessment of Mills’ accident-free work record and the Doctors’ individual expertise in ophthalmology and occupational medicine, the factual foundation for their testimony was evidently sufficient. Any perceived methodological flaws by Union Pacific could be addressed through cross-examination.
On October 10, 2023, Mills filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority with the Court, attempting to bring attention to a federal complaint filed by the EEOC against Union Pacific in Minnesota. The complaint, similar to Mills’ case, alleged that Union Pacific’s use of the Light Cannon violated the ADA. Union Pacific objected to this filing shortly thereafter. The Court, noted that the filing of a complaint did not provide guidance on how to handle Mills’ case, sustained Union Pacific’s objection. Consequently, Mills’ Notice was stricken from the record.
Held
The Court determined that Steven Fender’s testimony could provide relevant information to the fact finder, rendering it admissible. Consequently, Mills’ Motion in Limine was denied. Recognizing unresolved questions of material fact that precluded summary judgment, the Court also denied Union Pacific’s Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court further concluded that Mills’ experts had appropriately applied their expertise to the available materials, establishing a sufficient factual basis to withstand preclusion under Rules 702 and 703. Therefore, Union Pacific’s Motion to Strike was denied. Additionally, the Court sustained Union Pacific’s objection to Mills’ proffer of a recently filed suit against Union Pacific, considering it did not qualify as supplemental authority. As a result, the Notice was stricken from the record.
The Court has not arrived on an outcome for this case since the remaining issues involved in this case still await resolution.
Key Takeaways
In the legal dispute between Monte Mills and Union Pacific, the admissibility of expert testimony played a pivotal role, particularly regarding the compliance of Union Pacific’s Light Cannon color vision test with federal regulations. The Court addressed Mills’ motion to exclude testimony from Union Pacific’s expert, Steven Fender, and allowed its admissibility, deeming it relevant but not dispositive.
Union Pacific’s attempt to strike testimony from Mills’ expert witnesses, Jay Neitz and Kevin Trangle, was rejected by the Court. The Court asserted that expert testimony need not be based on personal knowledge and deemed the Doctors’ opinions sufficiently grounded in their review of studies, Mills’ test history, and their specialized knowledge.
Union Pacific sought summary judgment on multiple grounds, including the timeliness of Mills’ ADA claims, his qualification as a “qualified individual,” and the failure to establish a disparate impact claim. The Court dismissed Union Pacific’s arguments, allowing the case to proceed to trial. Lastly, Mills’ attempt to introduce a Notice of Supplemental Authority regarding a similar EEOC complaint in Minnesota was stricken from the record.
Plaintiff Autumn Brown, who was twenty-two years old at the time, sustained injuries on June 24, 2020 after a vehicle driven by an employee of Defendant BellSouth Telecommunications, LLC struck her vehicle at an intersection in Pascagoula, Mississippi. She was taken to the emergency department at Singing River Hospital where they found she had suffered a broken right wrist, broken bones in her pelvic area, a fractured lumbar vertebra, and a liver laceration. She was transferred to USA Medical Center in Mobile, Alabama for further treatment, where testing revealed she also had a ruptured bladder.
Brown reported having issues controlling her bowel and bladder, back and pelvic spasms, stiffness, decreased range of motion, incontinence, and mental health problems – all of which she attributed to the accident.
Defendant BellSouth filed a motion in limine to limit the testimony of Plaintiff’s retained expert, Dr. Gregory L. Smith, regarding Smith’s life care plan which projected $345,337 in future medical damages for Brown. BellSouth argued the life care plan lacked sufficient factual basis.
Occupational Medicine Expert Witness
Gregory L. Smith, M.D., M.P.H. graduated from Rush Medical College in Chicago and served in the U.S. Army Medical Corp for six years, achieving the rank of Major and completing his residency in Occupational and Preventive Medicine at Walter Reed Army Medical Center. Following his military service, he earned a Master’s of Public Health (MPH) from Harvard University and published numerous research articles in peer-reviewed medical journals.
In 1988, Smith entered private practice, specializing in Occupational Medicine in various states, including California, Georgia, Florida, and Texas. He was recognized as a Fellow of the American Board of Occupational and Preventive Medicine and appointed as an Agreed Medical Examiner (AME) by worker’s compensation judges in two California counties. Additionally, he obtained certification from FIG® in Medical Cost Analysis.
Smith’s extensive experience includes providing expert medical opinions and testimony on numerous cases related to causation, medical necessity, and future medical care. He has authored hundreds of Life Care Plans and Medical Cost Projections for personal injury cases, demonstrating a comprehensive understanding of medical assessments and cost analysis in the legal context.
Discussions by the Court
Smith reviewed Brown’s medical records and conducted an interview, leading to the following conclusions:
Brown had the following diagnoses and associated impairments linked to the injury:
She experienced pelvis pain resulting from bilateral superior pubic rami comminuted displaced fractures, a right inferior pubic ramus fracture, and a left sacral ala intra-articular fracture. She underwent open reduction internal fixation (ORIF) for bilateral superior ramus fractures and closed reduction percutaneous screw fixation for bilateral sacral fractures on June 25, 2020.
Brown faced bowel incontinence.
She reported right wrist pain attributed to a healed impacted fracture of the distal radius and an ulnar styloid process nondisplaced fracture.
A bladder repair was performed on June 25, 2020, resulting in residual bladder urgency and incontinence.
Brown struggled with anxiety and depression
Smith, in his future care projections, organized the anticipated needs into four categories: (1) medication; (2) future diagnostic studies and surgeries for the “late sequelae” of Brown’s broken bones and bladder rupture; (3) durable medical equipment (“DME”); and (4) a Functional Restoration Program for pain management.
Regarding medication, Smith opined that Brown had an “ongoing need for prescription medications,” including daily use of cyclobenzaprine, which proved effective for residual symptoms. He projected that Brown would require Cyclobenzaprine (Flexeril) at 10mg per day for 63.9 years, with a total cost of $7,668.
The most substantial projected future care costs were allocated to the “late sequelae” of Brown’s ongoing wrist and pelvic pain from broken bones, as well as for “neurogenic bowel and bladder” problems presumably related to her rupture. Smith predicted that these “late sequelae” would necessitate a comprehensive diagnostic evaluation, along with potential interventional pain injections and/or surgery. The projected future care costs also factored in pre- and post-operative diagnostic studies, perioperative medical and facility costs, and required post-operative therapy.
In terms of durable medical equipment (DME), Smith foresaw Brown’s need for six Neuromuscular Stimulator units throughout her life, each costing $600, along with two sets of supplies per year for these units. The total projected cost for DME amounted to $11,268.
The remaining costs in the life care plan covered a Functional Restoration Program, incorporating a three-day evaluation and 160 hours of programming, with a total cost of $27,000.
In summary, Smith projected Brown’s future medical damages at $345,337.
The Court found that Smith’s testimony failed the Daubert test because his report lacked specificity in linking Brown’s medical records to the projected future care needs and establishing a reasonable degree of medical probability in the causal relationship to the accident.
In the context of future diagnostic studies and procedures for the “late sequelae” of Brown’s injuries, Smith did not identify or describe these sequelae beyond residual pain. The report failed to connect specific instances of projected future medical care to recommendations by any of Brown’s treating physicians. Additionally, the Court noted that Plaintiff’s counsel acknowledged during the hearing on September 21, 2023, that none of the treating physicians would opine on the need for future treatment, leaving the court unconvinced by Smith’s projections.
Furthermore, the Court observed that some of the medical records cited by Smith contradicted his projections. Brown mentioned in her interview with Smith that her orthopedist and urologist had released her, and the report indicated that she was no longer seeing a physical therapist. Despite listing a home exercise program under current treatments, Smith did not mention physical therapy, and no surgeries were scheduled.
Smith projected twelve future neurologist visits, although he provided no records of Brown receiving neurology care after the accident. Moreover, Brown denied a head injury immediately after the accident, and her hospital CT scan revealed “no significant abnormality.”
In essence, the Court concluded that Smith’s assertions were insufficient, emphasizing the need for a more concrete connection between Brown’s medical records, the projected future care needs, and a demonstrated causal relationship to the accident. The Court could not rely solely on Smith’s assertions without a more substantial basis.
Smith’s projections of Brown’s future care needs were deemed insufficient by the Court. In the case of future drug costs, Smith’s assertion that Brown had an “ongoing need” for Flexeril was criticized. The Court noted that simply because she was currently taking the drug and it had been effective did not necessarily mean she would require it for the rest of her life. Smith did not provide detailed explanations for why she would need Flexeril continuously, relying on a broad statement about her “ongoing need.”
Similarly, Smith’s opinion about the Neuromuscular Stimulator unit lacked sufficient justification. While he asserted that Brown would benefit from prolonged use due to chronic pain, he did not explain why she would experience a lifetime of problems with pain and spasms or how the stimulator would address these symptoms adequately.
The last medical care projection, the Functional Restoration Program, was also challenged. Smith referenced “current treatment guidelines (ODG)” to support the prescription, stating that Brown was expected to have long-term issues with bowel and bladder incontinence, anxiety, depression, and significant functional losses. However, the Court noted that no treating physician had recommended this program for Brown, and Smith’s conclusory statements lacked a clear basis in the medical evidence.
The Court emphasized the difference between weak and insufficient bases for expert testimony, asserting that Smith’s life care plan did not demonstrate a sufficient reliance on medical evidence to predict Brown’s future care needs accurately. Despite Smith’s status as a medical doctor, the Court found that he provided projections without an adequate foundation in the available medical evidence, specifically regarding the medical necessity of the predicted future care.
While Brown was undoubtedly injured, the medical records discussed in Smith’s report did not demonstrate an ongoing, specific, permanent injury. These records also lacked any doctor’s recommendations for future care. Smith’s report acknowledged the possibility of future pain, including the “chronic pain syndrome” he attributed to Brown, but he noted that it had not been diagnostically evaluated or treated.
The Court determined that there was a significant analytical gap between the data presented and the opinions Smith proffered. The absence of conclusive evidence supporting ongoing, specific injuries and the lack of doctor-recommended future care contributed to this analytical gap.
Additionally, the Court concluded that the opinions expressed in Smith’s life care plan were inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. Based on the reasons discussed earlier, the Court found that the “probative value” of Smith’s life care plan was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, and potential to mislead the jury regarding the extent of Brown’s future medical needs and their associated costs.
Held
The Court granted Defendant BellSouth Telecommunications, LLC’s Motion in Limine to Limit Testimony of Plaintiff’s Retained Expert, Gregory L. Smith, M.D., M.P.H., as a result of which he was precluded from testifying at trial to the opinions in his life care plan.
The case was dismissed with prejudice on October 23, 2023 after the parties announced to the Court a settlement of this case.
Key Takeaways:
An expert’s testimony must be based on sufficient facts and data to be admissible under Rule 702. The Court found Smith’s life care plan lacked a sufficient basis in the medical records.
An expert cannot simply state conclusions without explaining the underlying facts and analysis. The Court found there was too great an analytical gap between the data and Smith’s opinions.
An expert should clearly connect their opinions to specific recommendations by treating physicians when possible. Smith did not link his projections to any treating doctor’s recommendations.
A life care plan should identify ongoing, specific, and permanent injuries as a basis for projections. The Court found Smith did not show Plaintiff had such identifiable permanent injuries.
Expert opinions can be excluded under both Rule 702 and 403 if unreliable or prejudicial. The Court found admission would be unfairly prejudicial and misleading here.
This case involved a lawsuit filed by David Meza against his former employer, Union Pacific Railroad Co., alleging discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Meza worked as a carman for Union Pacific until his employment was suspended after a fitness-for-duty exam.
Meza retained Kevin Trangle as an expert witness to support his ADA discrimination claim. Trangle intended to testify that the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) Medical Examiner Handbook relied on by Union Pacific in evaluating Meza’s fitness for duty contained outdated medical information and was removed from the FMCSA website for that reason.
Union Pacific filed a Daubert motion to exclude parts of the occupational medicine expert witness’ proposed expert testimony. Specifically, Union Pacific argued Trangle should not be permitted to:
Craft a factual narrative about the FMCSA’s decision to remove the 2014 Medical Examiner Handbook from its website.
Opine or infer why the FMCSA removed the Handbook, including claiming its removal signaled the guidelines were outdated or unreliable.
Union Pacific insisted on the scientific validity of the Handbook and contended that Trangle’s testimony to the contrary was unsupported and inadmissible. Union Pacific asserted that testimony from its own experts Brian Morris, M.D., J.D., M.B.A., M.P.H. and Joel T. Cotton established the reliability of the Handbook.
Occupational Medicine Expert Witness
Dr. Kevin Trangle has over 40 years of experience as a board-certified physician in internal medicine, occupational medicine, and preventive medicine. He obtained his medical degree from the University of Minnesota Medical School in 1978 and also holds an MBA in healthcare management from Case Western Reserve University. He has served as a medical director for numerous corporations and organizations. His experience encompasses all aspects of occupational medicine including diagnosis and treatment of work-related injuries, disability evaluations, return to work assessments, corporate wellness programs, and substance abuse programs. Trangle has provided expert consultation services for attorneys, government agencies, and insurers. He has given dozens of presentations to professional organizations on occupational health topics and has published extensively in medical journals. Trangle has particular expertise regarding workplace chemical exposures, having worked extensively with the chemical industry and conducted research on industrial solvents and chemical sensitivity issues. He has also managed corporate drug testing and substance abuse programs. In summary, Trangle has comprehensive credentials and experience at the highest level in occupational and environmental medicine.
Discussions by the Court
The Court began by explaining that the admissibility of expert testimony in federal court is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 702. Under this rule, expert opinion testimony is admissible if the expert’s knowledge will help the jury understand the evidence, the testimony is based on sufficient facts, it is the product of reliable methods, and the methods were reliably applied to the case facts. The Court acts as a gatekeeper, ensuring only relevant and reliable scientific evidence is admitted. However, the Court must not invade the role of the jury in weighing evidence and resolving credibility issues. Rule 702 favors admissibility, and expert testimony should only be excluded if it is so unsupported it cannot assist the factfinder.
Union Pacific sought to bar occupational medicine expert witness Trangle from opining that the Handbook was unreliable and was removed from the FMCSA website for containing outdated information. Union Pacific argued Trangle had no basis to testify the information was outdated and his opinions were unsupported. It asserted testimony from its own experts establishes the Handbook remains current and reliable.
Meza responded that the 2014 Handbook’s current validity was relevant evidence, Trangle was qualified to opine on the medical science being outdated, and his opinion was reliable. Meza pointed to indications the Handbook was no longer in use and was removed for containing obsolete information. Meza contended competing expert views on the Handbook should be resolved through advocacy and jury findings rather than exclusion.
In support of their argument, Meza cited two key pieces of evidence. Firstly, they pointed to a watermark prominently displayed on the front of the Handbook, which unequivocally stated that it was “No longer in use.” This watermark served as a clear indicator that the handbook had been rendered obsolete and was no longer considered a reliable or current source of information.
Secondly, Meza referenced a notice of proposed regulatory guidance published in the Federal Register. This notice provided crucial context by explaining that the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) withdrew the Handbook in 2015. The reason behind this withdrawal, as stated in the notice, was that certain information contained within the handbook had become outdated or was overly prescriptive in nature.
The Court found Trangle’s opinions on Union Pacific’s reliance on the Handbook were not so unsupported as to be completely unhelpful to the jury. While not indisputable, his testimony could assist the jury to some degree and should be tested by the adversary process rather than excluded outright.
The Court stated Union Pacific’s proposed exclusions were too restrictive. Trangle should be able to explain why he believes Union Pacific should not have relied on the Handbook, even if Union Pacific disagrees. His opinions were not speculative or unsupported enough to be inadmissible. Union Pacific was permitted to challenge Trangle through its own experts and cross-examination rather than exclusion.
Union Pacific argued the FMCSA never found the Handbook guidelines unreliable. But the Court found Trangle should be able to tell the jury why he believes Union Pacific should not have relied on the Handbook. The Court preferred to let the adversary process test Trangle’s opinion rather than the Court excluding it upfront.
The Court explained it was not proper for the Court to weigh competing expert opinions or determine their correctness. Issues with Trangle’s testimony were better addressed by the adversary process with competing expert testimony and cross-examination. Where an expert opinion had sufficient grounds to assist the jury, it should be tested by competing evidence rather than be excluded outright.
Held
The Court denied Union Pacific’s motion to limit Trangle’s testimony about the Handbook being outdated and unreliable. The Court ruled that he could generally opine that the Handbook was outdated and unreliable, though more specific objections may be raised at trial. The validity of the Handbook would be resolved through competing expert views rather than the Court prohibiting testimony at the outset. The adversarial process is the appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.
The Court has not arrived on an outcome for this case since the remaining issues involved in this case still await resolution.
Key Takeaways
This case demonstrates several important principles regarding expert witness testimony.
The Court emphasized its role as a gatekeeper in evaluating reliability under Daubert, but cautioned against invading the province of the jury to weigh competing expert opinions.
The standard for admissibility is fairly low – expert testimony should be admitted unless it is so unsupported it cannot help the factfinder at all.
Doubts about usefulness should be resolved in favor of admission rather than exclusion. Fourth, weaknesses in expert opinions are better addressed through cross-examination and contrary evidence rather than outright exclusion.
Disagreements between experts on key facts illustrate the need to let the adversarial process test competing views.
The Court should not determine which expert is correct on disputed factual issues.
While specific objections may arise, experts should generally be permitted to offer opinions within their expertise that have potential to assist the jury.
