Expert Witness Profiler

Category: Police Practices Expert Witness

  • Police Practices Expert’s Testimony on Eyewitness Identifications Admitted

    Police Practices Expert’s Testimony on Eyewitness Identifications Admitted

    This litigation arises from Plaintiff Raymond Flanks’ (“Plaintiff”) wrongful conviction for first-degree murder in 1985. Plaintiff alleged that the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office (“OPDA”) secured his wrongful conviction in violation of his constitutional rights by withholding material exculpatory evidence.

    Plaintiff retained William Brooks as an expert in police policy and practices. Brooks makes three primary conclusions in his expert report:

    (1) In 1983, New Orleans Police Department (“NOPD”) did not have adequate written policies regarding photo arrays;

    (2) In 1983, NOPD had inadequate training and supervision, which created a risk of suggestive identification procedures that could lead to a mistaken identification and possibly a wrongful conviction; and

    (3) The identification procedure that Dillmann used in this case had two significant problems: Dillmann steered Mrs. Carnesi to identify Plaintiff and Dillmann used inappropriate “fillers” in the photo array he showed Mrs. Carnesi.

    The City Defendants contended that Brooks’ testimony should be excluded for four reasons: (1) Brooks’ opinions are outside the area of his expertise; (2) Brooks’ testimony will mislead the jury and confuse the issues; (3) Brooks’ opinions on NOPD’s policy on identification procedures are not based on any reliable methodology; and (4) expert testimony is not needed to establish that police should not tell witness who to pick in a lineup.

    Police Practices Expert Witness

    William G. Brooks III is a former Chief of Police of the Norwood Police Department in Norwood, Massachusetts. He began his career as a Patrolman from 1977 to 1985; served as a Detective Sergeant from 1985 to 2000; served as Deputy Chief of Police from 2000 to 2012; and served as Chief of Police from 2012 until he retired in 2024. He has a bachelor’s degree in criminal justice from Stonehill College and a master’s degree in criminal justice from Western New England College.

    Brooks is a state-certified instructor on eyewitness identification; he authored a model policy on eyewitness identification for the Massachusetts Chiefs of Police Association; he has been appointed to study and develop best practices for eyewitness identifications by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts and by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit; and he has lectured about eyewitness identification procedures to numerous law enforcement agencies, law schools, bar associations, and other professional groups.

    Get the full story on challenges to William Brooks’ expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Discussion by the Court

    A. Whether Brooks’ Opinions are Within the Area of His Expertise

    The Court found that Brooks is qualified to testify as an expert on eyewitness identifications.

    The City Defendants asserted that Brooks’ opinions were outside the area of his expertise because during the relevant time period, 1983, he was a patrolman with no training or experience in identification procedures, policy development, or running a police department. Brooks became a Detective Sergeant in 1985, where he “supervised a team of Detectives.” Therefore, he had some supervisory experience in the 1980s.

    Moreover, the fact that he was not overseeing a police department until the 2000s did not render him unqualified. The expert report cited two widely used reference books from 1956 and 1965 to support the assertion that “eyewitness identification issues became a prominent topic in the law enforcement community” by “the mid-twentieth century.” He also discussed two U.S. Supreme Court decisions from 1968 and 1977, which discussed the risks related to misidentifications. Brooks stated that certain witness identification “principles would have been known to police departments in the 1980s,” but he also acknowledges that some of the present-day best practices he cites were not all “widely used by police departments in 1983.” Therefore, Brooks opinions appear to be based both on his experience and his review of reference materials from the relevant time period.

    Additionally, the City Defendants suggested that Brooks’ expertise did not extend to the impact of suggestive identification procedures on a witness, as Brooks did not have a background in psychology or any other scientific discipline. However, he did not opine about specific psychological impacts for which scientific qualifications would be necessary. Therefore, the proposed testimony is within the area of Brooks’ expertise.

    B. Whether Brooks’ Testimony Will Mislead the Jury or Confuse the Issues

    The City Defendants argued that Brooks’ testimony will mislead the jury and confuse the issues because it references best-practices that were not all widely used by police departments in 1983.

    To the extent Brooks cited some best-practices that were not widely used in 1983, the City Defendants was free to cross-examine Brooks on this issue. It is not a basis for outright exclusion of his testimony.

    The City Defendants also contended that Brooks’ discussion regarding use of inappropriate “fillers” in photo arrays will not assist the jury in determining whether Dillmann told Mrs. Carnesi which photograph to pick and whether that statement caused her to falsely identify Plaintiff as the murderer. If the jury concluded that Dillmann did not explicitly tell Mrs. Carnesi whom to pick from the photo array, Brooks’ opinion that Dillmann used at least two inappropriate “fillers” in the photo array remains relevant to Plaintiff’s argument that the photo array was suggestive.

    C. Whether Brooks’ Opinions are Based on a Reliable Methodology

    Next, the City Defendants asserted that Brooks’ opinions on NOPD’s policy on identification procedures are not based on any reliable methodology.

    Brooks’ report cited an Eyewitness Identification Model Policy. Additionally, Brooks relied on his own experience running a police department and designing training curriculum. According to the City Defendants, Brooks’ opinion that formal training on identification procedures was needed was contradicted by Brooks’ own experience. The fact that Brooks did not receive formal training on identification procedures when he began his career can be raised on cross-examination, but it does not provide a basis for exclusion of the proposed testimony.

    The City Defendants also contended that Brooks’ analysis on NOPD’s policy is equally unreliable and based entirely on his own opinion about how officers might read into the absence of an express prohibition on suggestive techniques in photographic identification procedures.

    Brooks reviewed NOPD policy, which included a specific rule against suggestive behavior for lineups but did not include a specific rule for photo arrays. Brooks opined that “by including a specific rule against suggestive behavior for one type of identification procedure and omitting that rule for the other, an officer could easily infer that making the rule apply only to lineups was intentional.”

    He appeared to base this opinion both on his experience and on the Eyewitness Identification Model Policy. To the extent the City Defendants believe this opinion is unsubstantiated, that issue is better left to cross-examination.

    D. Whether Expert Testimony is Needed

    Fourth, the City Defendants contended that the jury does not need an expert to say that police should not tell witness who to pick in a lineup. The City Defendants pointed out that Dillmann readily acknowledged such action was improper. The City Defendants contended that a jury instruction on this topic is sufficient. This argument oversimplified the issues identified in Brooks’ expert report. Brooks explained why he believed the procedure used in this case was suggestive. These issues are not common knowledge, and Brooks’ testimony will assist the jury in this case.

    Held

    The Court denied City Defendants’ motion to exclude the testimony of William Brooks.

    Key Takeaway

    Brooks is qualified to discuss the effect of suggestive identification procedures on a witness because that effect is inherently a part of studying, lecturing about, and developing model practices for, eyewitness identifications. Brooks also discussed ways that officers can ensure identification procedures are not suggestive.

    Please refer to the blog previously published about this case:

    Vocational Evaluation Expert Allowed to Opine on Lost Earning Capacity

    Legal Expert Was Barred From Opining on Good Time Credits

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Flanks V. City Of New Orleans
    Docket Number: 2:23cv6897
    Court Name: United States District Court, Louisiana Eastern
    Order Date: December 01, 2025

  • Police Practices Expert’s Testimony About Baton Technique Admitted

    Police Practices Expert’s Testimony About Baton Technique Admitted

    Plaintiffs Lazendra Collins, Lawrence Teague, and Willie Teague alleged that various officers of the Chicago Police Department (“CPD”) violated the U.S. Constitution and Illinois state law during a confrontation in May 2020.

    The City identified Paul Amelio as a proposed expert witness on police practices. Amelio, an active-duty CPD officer, serves as “Team Leader” and “lead trainer” for the CPD SWAT Team. Plaintiffs filed a motion to exclude Amelio’s testimony. They contended that admitting Amelio’s opinions would improperly intrude on the fact-finding role of the jury.

    Plaintiffs have filed a motion to exclude Amelio’s testimony. They contended that admitting Amelio’s opinions would improperly intrude on the fact-finding role of the jury.

    Police Practices Expert Witness

    Paul Amelio as an active-duty CPD officer, serves as “Team Leader” and “lead trainer” for the CPD SWAT Team.  In this position, Officer Amelio “develops curricula and provides training for SWAT Team members” for multiple law enforcement agencies across several jurisdictions.

    Want to know more about the challenges Paul Amelio has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Officer Amelio is an expert on police practices who planned to testify about the proper use of force, particularly the use of a baton, by police officers.

    Plaintiffs argued that Amelio’s testimony is inadmissible because it (1) invades the province of the jury and (2) renders an improper legal conclusion.

    In their words, “Amelio’s testimony is not proffered to aid the jury in determining the facts, but to add the ‘gloss of an expert opinion’ to the Defendants’ disputed version of events.”  The Court largely agreed that Amelio’s testimony is not necessary and will not be of assistance to the jury in determining the reasonableness in general of actions by the CPD officers, relevant legal standards, or CPD policy governing the use of force.

    Analysis

    In this case, the core conclusion that Amelio offered is that the CPD officers’ use of force was “reasonable” and “in line with nationally recognized and generally accepted police practices.” In the Court’s view, this is a case involving straightforward facts: because blunt contact is the “most primitive form of force,” the reasonableness of using the baton, given the context, is likely within the everyday experience and understanding of lay jurors.

    To the extent Amelio proposed to offer an opinion on the policies or training practices of the Chicago Police Department, the Court has a further concern:  As courts in this circuit have repeatedly explained, excessive force is a question of constitutional law, not department policy.

    If the City contends that a police expert is required to explain how a “reasonable officer” would conduct himself, the Court disagrees. Expert testimony on complex police practice or other forms of “specialized knowledge” may be helpful to the jury in some contexts, but the legal standard in this case is governed not by a police officer‘s understanding of what a reasonable police officer would do, but instead by a juror‘s understanding of the actions of a reasonable police officer.

    The Court is thus inclined to grant Plaintiff’s motion to exclude this testimony, with one potential limited exception: Amelio’s testimony about baton technique might be helpful to the jury. In his report, he claimed that the video shows officers waving their batons in an “Xpattern,” noting that “officers are trained that swinging the baton in an ‘X’ motion in circumstances such as these helps them create a ‘zone of safety’ for everyone involved.” To the untrained eye, the officers’ use of the baton might come across as random, disorganized swings designed to strike a suspect.

    Held

    The Court granted in part the motion to exclude Paul Amelio’s testimony and strike his expert report.

    Key Takeaway:

     A lay witness (or, indeed, the officers themselves) would be in a position to competently testify to CPD policy and training practices, and there is no indication that these policies and practices are complex enough to necessitate an explanation or independent application by an expert witness.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Collins V. City Of Chicago
    Docket Number: 1:21cv2913
    Court Name: United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division
    Order Date: November 07, 2025