Expert Witness Profiler

Category: Psychiatry Expert Witness

  • Psychiatry Expert Was Not Allowed to Opine on Life Expectancy

    Psychiatry Expert Was Not Allowed to Opine on Life Expectancy

    Plaintiff Brigid “Bridie” Farrell alleged that Defendant Gabel groomed and sexually abused her from June 1997 to January 1998, when she was 15 and Gabel was 33. Plaintiff was a competitive short-track speedskater in the 1990s and 2000s.

    Defendant United States Olympic and Paralympic Committee (“USOPC”) filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff’s expert, Dr. Paul Ballas, pursuant to Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.

    Psychiatry Expert Witness

    Dr. Paul A. Ballas is a trained psychiatrist with board certifications in child, adolescent, and adult psychiatry.

    Ballas completed an internship, psychiatry residency and child and adolescent psychiatry fellowship at Thomas Jefferson University Hospital in Philadelphia. Ballas has treated over 1,000 children and adults with
    psychiatric and mental illness related to sexual abuse.

    Want to know more about the challenges Paul Ballas has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Specifically, USOPC requested that the Court exclude Ballas from testifying about the following:

    (1) his causation opinions, namely, that “Farrell experienced the onset of severe psychiatric symptoms following the sexual abuse that occurred from 1997-1998” and that “Farrell developed a depressive disorder in addition to PTSD as a consequence of the serious trauma inflicted upon her by Andy Gable [sic] from 1997-1998.”

    (2) his vocational functioning opinions, namely, that “the sexual and emotional abuse that occurred from 1997-1998 had an impact on Plaintiff’s future ability to function in her employment capacity.”

    (3) his opinions regarding Plaintiff’s past and future medical costs attributable to the alleged abuse.

    A. Defendant USOPC’s motion to exclude parts of Paul Ballas’ expert testimony

    (a) Causation opinion

    Ballas opined that Plaintiff developed psychiatric symptoms because of Defendant Gabel’s alleged abuse. USOPC took issue with this causation opinion, arguing that, “given the lack of any evidence or data suggesting that Plaintiff’s psychiatric symptoms developed immediately after her alleged abuse by Defendant Gabel, Ballas’ opinion that there was a clear demarcation of symptoms before and after the alleged abuse — and thus that the alleged abuse caused Farrell’s psychiatric symptoms and conditions — is speculative and should be excluded.”

    However, the Court found that, even if this was a flaw in Ballas’ reasoning or methodology, this flaw is not “‘large enough that Ballas lacks good grounds for his conclusions.’”

    Moreover, the Court concluded that Ballas’ opinion that, because of a traumatic experience as a child, Plaintiff later in life developed psychiatric conditions that did not exist prior to the traumatic experience is not the type of testimony which “is speculative or conjectural.”

    USOPC also criticized the reliability of Ballas’ report by arguing that his “failure to consider and rule out other likely causes of Plaintiff’s alleged injuries constitutes an independent and additional reason to exclude his causation opinions.”

    However, Ballas did acknowledge other traumas in his report. Ballas explained that, although other traumatic incidents have occurred, the abuse by Defendant Gabel was the first, making it the “index event” in causing Plaintiff’s trauma.

    Ballas also reviewed Farrell’s medical records and medical history, along with the medical records of her treating psychiatrist, Dr. Eleni Maloutas. USOPC took issue with the Ballas’ report to the extent that Ballas relied on Maloutas’ conclusions.  However, an expert’s reliance on a Plaintiff’s treatment record will not bar this expert’s testimony from being admitted. 

    The Court concluded that the methodology that Ballas used to reach his conclusions about the cause of Plaintiff’s psychological injuries is reasonable.

    (b) Ballas’ opinion regarding Plaintiff’s vocational capacity

    Ballas opined that Plaintiff’s “ongoing symptoms are clearly affecting her relationships and vocational functioning.”

    Ballas opined that, “in his opinion, the sexual and emotional abuse that occurred from 1997-1998 had an impact on Plaintiff’s future ability to function in her employment capacity, since her PTSD, anxiety, and depressive symptoms were directly related to this abuse.”

    Ballas, a trained psychiatrist, opined that the severe psychological symptoms Plaintiff is experiencing impacted her ability to function in her career. This application of Ballas’ training and experience does not contain a “flaw in his reasoning or methodology that is large enough that he lacks good ground for his conclusions.”

    Accordingly, the Court found that Ballas’ opinion regarding Plaintiff’s vocational capacity is reliable.

    (c) Ballas’ medical cost opinions

    USOPC contended that, although Ballas purportedly calculated Plaintiff’s medical costs stemming from the alleged abuse, his methods for calculating those costs are unreliable and should not be considered.

    With regard to the issue of past medical costs, Ballas estimates that “the financial cost of Plaintiff’s therapy and psychiatric visits since 2014 was approximately $40,000.”

    In this case, Ballas’ estimate of past medical expenses is not reliable. Plaintiff’s past expenses stemming from the alleged abuse can be calculated with specificity based on her actual treatment records. There is no need for an expert to estimate what those costs were. Furthermore, Ballas’ estimate of past treatment costs is unreliable because it includes costs that Plaintiff never incurred because, during certain periods, she received no treatment and, thus did not incur any costs. Therefore, the Court found that Ballas may not testify about Plaintiff’s past medical costs because any such testimony would be neither reliable nor necessary.

    With regard to future medical expenses, Ballas opined that Plaintiff will require mental health treatment “for at least an additional 40 years.” In this case, Ballas has not provided any information that suggests that he is qualified to testify about an individual’s life expectancy or that he has any actuarial experience. Therefore, the Court found that Ballas lacked the base level qualifications that Rule 702 requires to opine on Plaintiff’s life expectancy.

    Furthermore, the Court found that Ballas is qualified to testify regarding his opinion on Plaintiff’s yearly medical costs. The Court also found that Ballas’ opinion regarding Plaintiff’s future medical costs is relevant because it will assist the trier of fact in calculating any damages to which it concludes Plaintiff is entitled.

    B. Defendant USOPC’s motion to strike Ballas’ May 30, 2024 Declaration

    USOPC contended that the declaration of Ballas that Plaintiff filed in support of her opposition to its motion to exclude Ballas’ testimony contains new opinions asserted after the close of discovery and contains improper legal arguments.

    The Court has reviewed the information contained in Ballas’ May 30, 2024 declaration and finds that it is related to the initial Ballas report. For example, in this declaration, Ballas reaffirms much of what he has already stated or is responding to USOPC’s criticisms of his report. 

    Furthermore, the Court found that USOPC’s argument that Ballas is making improper legal arguments in his May 30, 2024 declaration is without merit. In all the paragraphs that USOPC cited as alleging impermissible legal arguments, no such arguments are made. Rather, Ballas is permissibly responding to the criticisms of his expert report that USOPC made in its motion to exclude those reports.

    Held

    The Court granted in part and denied in part Defendant USOPC’s motion to exclude the expert testimony of Dr. Paul Ballas.

    Key Takeaway

    When determining whether to admit expert testimony, a court must consider the qualifications of an expert to testify as to a particular matter. Ballas has not provided any information that suggests that he is qualified to testify about an individual’s life expectancy.

    Please refer to the blog previously published about this case:

    Psychiatry Expert Allowed to Opine on Psychological Injuries

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Farrell V. The United States Olympic & Paralympic Committee
    Docket Number: 1:20cv1178
    Court Name: United States District Court, New York Northern
    Order Date: June 22, 2026
  • Psychiatry Expert Allowed to Opine on Psychological Injuries

    Psychiatry Expert Allowed to Opine on Psychological Injuries

    Plaintiff Brigid “Bridie” Farrell alleged that Defendant Gabel groomed and sexually abused her from June 1997 to January 1998.

    Plaintiff filed a motion to exclude the expert testimony of Defendants’ expert, Dr. Charles Saldanha, pursuant to Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.

    Psychiatry Expert Witness

    Charles Edwin Saldanha graduated from Emory University with a Bachelor of Arts in Economics and completed his Doctor of Medicine degree at the Duke University School of Medicine. After internship at the Brigham and Women’s Hospital, he completed residency in Psychiatry at the University of California, San Francisco (UCSF) and a fellowship in Forensic Psychiatry at Yale University. He is certified in Psychiatry with Added Qualifications in Forensic Psychiatry by the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology.

    Saldanha has practiced in the areas of emergency psychiatry, inpatient psychiatry, and community psychiatry with a focus on persons with serious mental illness.

    Saldanha has performed over 60 forensic psychiatric evaluations and has testified over 25 times in court proceedings and depositions.

    Want to know more about the challenges Charles Saldanha has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    1. Qualifications

    Plaintiff is an adult who alleged that she suffered from psychiatric conditions due to sexual abuse she suffered as a teenager. She argued that Saldanha is not qualified as an expert “due to his lack of experience in child psychiatry.”

    Saldanha, however, has “superior knowledge, education, experience, or skill” in general and forensic psychiatry. Saldanha describes his work experience to “include clinical work with diverse behavioral health populations spanning a range of ages, primary diagnoses, comorbidities, and psychosocial backgrounds, including persons who have suffered sexual assault and abuse.”

    Accordingly, the Court concluded that, based on Saldanha’s education, experience and skill, he qualifies as an expert to give his opinion on Plaintiff’s emotional injuries as a result of the sexual and mental abuse.

    2. Reliability

    Saldanha opined that, “though Plaintiff’s records indicate that some treaters have also diagnosed PTSD or listed it as a rule out diagnosis, the information available does not support this diagnosis.” To arrive at this conclusion, Saldanha reasoned that, “since the abuse, Plaintiff has not shown a consistent presence of avoidance of stimuli associated with the abuse or marked alterations in arousal and reactivity, domains of symptoms which are present in PTSD.” Saldanha noted that, “since this episode of abuse, Plaintiff has not shown persistent avoidance of or efforts to avoid memories, thoughts, or feelings related to the events or people, places, activities, or situations related to the abuse.” Saldanha further asserted that, although “psychological testing performed as part of the evaluation showed significant emotional distress, it did not support the diagnosis of PTSD.”

    The Court concluded that, by outlining the symptoms that he looks for when identifying cases of PTSD and explaining why, in his opinion, Plaintiff is not experiencing these symptoms, Saldanha adequately explained the methodology he used to reach his conclusion.

    Saldanha explained that, in his opinion, the symptoms Plaintiff described were more consistent with major depressive disorder than with PTSD. Saldanha clearly articulated that, because Plaintiff was not exhibiting avoidance of stimuli or changes in reactivity, he did not believe that a PTSD diagnosis was appropriate.

    Furthermore, the Court concluded that Plaintiff’s contention that Saldanha is merely acting as an “advocate for a cause” and that, therefore, the Court should exclude his testimony as unreliable, is unavailing. To the contrary, in his report, Saldanha acknowledged that Plaintiff is experiencing psychological issues such as major depressive disorder.

    3. Relevance

    In this case, whether Plaintiff suffered psychological injury as a result of Defendant Gabel’s alleged abuse is a critical issue in this case. Saldanha’s expert opinion is directly relevant to both the psychological issues from which Plaintiff suffers and the cause of those problems.

    Accordingly, the Court found that Saldanha’s expert testimony is relevant to the issues in this case.

    Held

    The Court denied Plaintiff’s motion to exclude the testimony of Dr. Charles Saldanha.

    Key Takeaway

    The Court noted that, in assessing reliability, the principles and methodology employed should be assessed, not the outcome of those methods. Moreover, it is not unusual for reasonable minds to differ even when both apply reliable methodology in reaching such differing conclusions. For all these reasons, the Court concluded that Plaintiff’s displeasure with Saldanha’s conclusion is not a ground for excluding him from testifying.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Farrell V. The United States Olympic & Paralympic Committee
    Docket Number: 1:20cv1178
    Court Name: United States District Court for the Northern District of New York
    Order Date: June 17, 2026
  • Law Enforcement Expert Allowed to Opine on Massage Business Inspections

    Law Enforcement Expert Allowed to Opine on Massage Business Inspections

    Plaintiff Dai Trang Thi Nguyen brought this action against Defendant City of San Jose and Individual Supervisor Defendants Joseph Hatfield and Rachel Roberts alleging that a former City Code Inspector William Gerry sexually assaulted and extorted Plaintiff during his code enforcement inspections of her massage business, and Defendants allowed Gerry’s conduct to occur in deliberate indifference to her rights to due process and equal protection.

    It is undisputed that former City Code Inspector Gerry repeatedly raped and extorted Plaintiff while inspecting her massage business in 2019.

    Defendants filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Officer Antonio Flores and Leonard Powell pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 while Plaintiff filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Dr. John M. Greene under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26.

    Law Enforcement Expert Witnesses

    Antonio “Tony” Flores has been a police officer with the San Francisco Police Department (“SFPD”) since 1982. During his career, Flores has conducted and supervised “several hundred” massage business inspections, often as many as fifty to sixty per year.

    Discover more cases with Antonio Flores as an expert witness by ordering his comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

    Leonard Powell served as the Code Enforcement Manager, Zoning Administrator, and Deputy Building Official for Dangerous Building Enforcement for the City of Fremont from 2001 to 2020, where he supervised officers enforcing zoning, housing, sanitation, and building codes.

    As part of this role, he developed processes and managed investigations in massage business regulation and enforcement, trained and supervised officers, and implemented ethics and accountability systems.

    Get the full story on challenges to Leonard Powell’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Psychiatry Expert Witness

    Dr. John M. Greene is board certified in both General and Forensic Psychiatry. He began practicing in the San Francisco Bay Area in 1997. He became a member of Stanford University’s Adjunct Clinical Faculty in 2005, and currently teaches topics on psychiatry and the law to the residents in the Department of Psychiatry at Stanford.

    With extensive training and expertise, Greene is regularly relied upon to provide expert testimony in civil and criminal cases regarding mental illness.

    Want to know more about the challenges John Greene has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Leonard Powell

    a. Helping the Jury Decide the Case

    Defendants argued that Powell’s testimony will not help the jury decide whether the City was deliberately indifferent. Powell’s report identified several “best practices” in the code enforcement industry that San Jose was not implementing at the time of Plaintiff’s injury, including: using partner systems for inspections; random supervisory audits; rotation of inspectors across industries; direct supervisory contact with regulated businesses; and formal post-action debriefs. However, during his deposition, Powell testified that he does not believe code inspectors are “likely” to extort or sexually assault people absent those “best practices.”

    The Court found that this did not disqualify Powell from testifying as an expert in this case. Although Powell declined to use the word “likely” in his deposition, he also testified there is “a high probability” that lone male enforcement officers would commit sexual assault and corruption, and that lone code enforcement officers going into massage businesses is an outdated practice because “there is a high probability” that something may go wrong.

    b. Reliability

    Defendants argued that Powell’s opinions are narrowly based on his experience in the City of Fremont and the City of San Rafael, which is insufficient to opine on industry-wide practices.

    The Court found Defendants’ arguments unpersuasive. Defendants’ assertion that Powell’s experience is limited only to Fremont and San Rafael is taken out of context and contradicted by his documented experience. As author of the California Code Enforcement Officer Standards Act and CACEO guidelines, Powell drafted California legislation and regulations that established statewide training and ethical standards for code enforcement officers, and he implemented these standards in Fremont. When asked about which other jurisdictions have implemented these standards, he listed San Rafael as one of the “other Bay Area cities” with similar practices.

    As for his reliance on external written documents, this is not necessary for Rule 702 purposes.

    Powell served as a code inspector supervisor for nearly two decades and authored the California legislation and regulation that established statewide training and ethical standards. In his report and his deposition, he has sufficiently explained how this experience formed his opinions on best practices in this industry, and he relied on that experience to opine on the facts of this case.

    c. Common Sense

    Finally, Defendants argued that Powell’s opinions on code inspector supervision amount only to “common sense,” not the opinion of an expert.

    Defendants also highlighted Powell’s testimony that his reassignment protocols are not specific to code enforcement, but rather are “kind of everywhere in life,” such as in consumer transactions: “If one person has a conflict with somebody else in a commercial setting, the general approach is, ‘Can I talk to somebody else?’”

    But, as Plaintiff highlights, Defendants’ excerpts of Powell’s deposition are taken out of context. For example, the phrase “common sense supervisory assessment” was counsel’s, not Powell’s.

    And before discussing his general observations of re-assignments in commercial settings, Powell testified that his knowledge of re-assignment practices for code enforcement inspectors was based on his experience in the code enforcement field.

    Upon reviewing the whole record, the Court found that Powell sufficiently used his expertise in the code enforcement industry, rather than common sense available to any lay person, to provide his opinions.

    Antonio Flores

    a. Expertise

    Defendants first argued that Flores lacked the code enforcement expertise necessary to offer opinions about the industry because he is a police officer, not a code enforcement inspector.

    The Court found that, despite his role as a police officer, Flores possessed the expertise required under Rule 702 to testify on code enforcement practices in massage businesses. Though Flores has never been a code inspector, Flores has worked extensively with code enforcement inspectors in his “several hundred” massage business inspections. Flores also testified that he has seen code inspectors operate with enforcement powers akin to those of police officers, particularly in the eyes of certain vulnerable communities including illicit massage business employees, such that the distinction between police officer and code enforcement investigator may be immaterial in this context.

    b. Reliability

    Next, Defendants argued that Flores lacked reliable support for his opinion that sexual assault or extortion is the likely outcome of a solo male code inspector working in massage businesses.

    Defendants contended that Flores testified he was not aware of any other instance in his experience in which a code enforcement inspector assaulted or extorted a massage business worker; he is not aware of any standards applicable to supervising code inspectors; he is not aware of any jurisdiction that actually supervises code enforcement inspectors the way he opines they should be supervised; and he could not point to any written standards that suggest re-assigning an employee about whom a complaint has been made.

    Analysis

    First, whether similar conduct has occurred in the past is not necessarily relevant to the theory of Plaintiff’s case—that the risks of exploitation were so obvious and well-known in the industry that the City did not need a pattern of similar instances to be on constructive notice.

    Second, Flores’s lack of experience in code enforcement supervision could foreseeably render some opinions on code enforcement inadmissible, but it does not render his entire testimony unreliable. Flores still sufficiently explained how he formed his opinions on code enforcement best practices based on his observations, trainings, and teachings conducted over forty-three years in the SFPD overseeing code enforcement inspections in massage businesses—including observations of employees vulnerable to exploitation, power dynamics, intimate spaces, and code enforcement investigators’ use of police powers.

    Third, as the Court noted above, written standards on re-assigning code inspectors after receiving complaints is unnecessary to forming a reliable opinion. The Court found that Flores may rely “solely or primarily on experience” because he has sufficiently explained how his experiences have led to his conclusions on code enforcement best practices in massage businesses, why that experience is a sufficient basis for his opinions, and how his experience is reliably applied to the facts of this case.

    c. Common Sense

    Finally, Defendants also argued that Flores’ opinions are no more than “common sense.” But upon review of the cited potions of Flores’ testimony, it appeared that Flores’ use of “common sense” referred to “common sense” among industry professionals.

    Upon reviewing Flores’s report and testimony in its entirety, the Court is satisfied that his opinions are based on his relevant experience, including experience conducting massage business inspections, rather than on the common sense available to any lay person.

    Accordingly, the Court also found that Flores is qualified as an expert by his knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education in the field of massage business inspections.

    John Greene

    Unlike Powell and Flores, Plaintiff did not challenge the admissibility of Greene’s opinions under Rule 702.

    Defendants first disclosed Greene during fact discovery on August 19, 2025, as the person who would conduct a psychiatric independent medical examination (“IME”) on Plaintiff. Plaintiff argued that Greene’s opinion must be excluded because Greene is not a “rebuttal” expert, but rather an initial expert, and he should have been disclosed as such prior to the deadline for initial expert disclosure on September 22, 2025.

    The Court agreed with Plaintiff that the timing of the IME and Greene’s report was unusual. However, Plaintiff has not provided any authority prohibiting the use of prior findings to rebut the opinion of an initial expert during trial. So long as Greene’s testimony only uses his IME findings to narrowly contradict or rebut the initial expert’s opinions on the same subject matter, the Court sees no reason for exclusion.

    Held

    • The Court denied the Defendants’ motion to exclude the testimony of Antonio Flores and Leonard Powell.
    • The Court also denied the Plaintiff’s motion to exclude the testimony of John Greene.

    Key Takeaway

    So long as the witness “explains how that experience leads to the conclusion reached, why that experience is a sufficient basis for the opinion, and how that experience is reliably applied to the facts,” than the witness may rely “solely or primarily on experience.”

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Dai Trang Thi Nguyen V. City of San Jose
    Docket Number: 5:21cv92
    Court Name: United States District Court, California Northern
    Order Date: January 22, 2026
  • Psychiatry Expert Was Barred From Testifying About the Abuse Allegations 

    Psychiatry Expert Was Barred From Testifying About the Abuse Allegations 

    From 2020 to 2022, Plaintiff Jane Doe was dating Defendant Aaron Tanner, who at the time was a member of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (“LASD”) and the alleged leader of a law enforcement gang called the “Rattlesnakes.”

    According to Plaintiff, during the course of her relationship with Tanner, Tanner physically abused her. Tanner also warned Plaintiff that, “if she told anyone” about his abuse, the Rattlesnakes would “take care of her.”

    Plaintiff alleged that, after she broke up with Tanner in 2022, he and other members of the Rattlesnakes began to stalk and intimidate her. In 2023, the LASD’s Internal Affairs Bureau interviewed Plaintiff in connection with an “investigation into Tanner and a deputy who was stopped for a DUI by Tanner.” Later that year, the LASD’s Internal Criminal Investigations Bureau formally opened an investigation on Tanner. Soon after, law enforcement officers began to surveil Plaintiff’s home and, in one instance, “the gas tank of her car was tampered with, in an apparent effort to cause her to crash her car.” The LASD has since terminated Tanner’s employment, but Plaintiff alleges Tanner continues to stalk her, and she fears further retaliation from the Rattlesnakes.

    The County filed motions to exclude the testimony of Dr. George Elias and Mr. Roger Clark, who Plaintiff has named as a psychiatric expert and as a police practices expert, respectively.

    Psychiatry Expert Witness

    Dr. George R. Elias is certified by the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology in both Adult and Forensic Psychiatry. He is licensed to practice medicine in the states of California and Missouri.

    He is also licensed as an Out-of-State Telehealth Provider in Florida. Elias has provided expert opinion on various criminal and civil matters through written reports, testimony, and deposition. Elias is currently the President of Elias Diagnostix, a private forensic and outpatient psychiatric practice.

    Want to know more about the challenges George Elias has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Law Enforcement Expert Witness

    Roger Clark has worked as a Deputy Sheriff, Sergeant, and Lieutenant in the LASD over the span of a 27-year career.

    Clark frequently spoke out about law enforcement gangs, drafted an internal memorandum addressing the topic, and spoke with various LASD executives to voice his concerns. 

    Since retiring from the LASD in 1994, Clark has worked as a police practices consultant and has been retained in over 2,600 cases.

    Get the full story on challenges to Roger Clark’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.  

    Discussion by the Court

    A. Discovery Sanctions

    The County argued that Elias and Clark should not be permitted to testify because the Plaintiff failed to disclose either expert by the July 30, 2025, deadline set out in the Court’s December 26, 2024, Scheduling Order.

    Instead, Plaintiff disclosed Elias as an expert on August 4, 2025, and served his expert report on August 13, 2025—the deadline for either party to designate rebuttal experts. Plaintiff also identified Clark as an expert on August 4, 2025, serving Clark’s initial report the same day and a revised copy of his report on August 8, 2025.

    Here, Plaintiff disclosed both Elias and Clark as experts five days after the deadline set out in the Court’s Scheduling Order, served Clark’s report the same day, and served Elias’ report approximately nine days later, all before the close of expert discovery and more than a month before the deadline to file a motion for summary judgment.

    True, Plaintiff’s delay prevented the County from naming a rebuttal witness to Elias by the deadline set out in the Court’s Scheduling Order. However, even though expert discovery is now closed, Plaintiff has offered to enter into a stipulation that would allow the County to designate a rebuttal expert. Moreover, notwithstanding Plaintiff’s delay, Defendant designated a rebuttal expert to respond to Clark’s opinions and deposed both Elias and Clark.

    Given the minimal harm from Plaintiff’s untimely disclosure, Defendant’s opportunity to cure that harm through measures short of exclusion, the lack of any substantial impact on the trial schedule, and the absence of any indication Plaintiff acted willfully or in bad faith, the Court found Plaintiff’s untimely disclosure harmless and declined to exclude either Elias or Clark on that basis.

    B. George Elias

    Plaintiff offered Elias as an expert on “Plaintiff’s psychological condition, stress, and emotional and mental damages.”

    Elias offered proposed testimony that (1) Plaintiff “meets DSM-5 Diagnostic Criteria for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder [(“PSTD”)], with dissociative symptoms”; (2) Plaintiff “suffered from severe emotional distress that was a result of [Tanner’s] conduct”; and (3) Plaintiff’s “Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder is attributable to the severe emotional distress she endured.”

    Analysis

    The Court disagreed that Elias’ opinions are unsupported by a reliable methodology. Elias conducted a four-hour interview of Plaintiff, during which he “obtained a longitudinal history of Plaintiff, which included the onset, course, and severity of [her] symptoms, along with any associated clinically significant dysfunction.”

    Before diagnosing Plaintiff with PTSD, Elias “considered her medical history,” “reviewed her psychotherapy records,” and “performed a differential diagnosis.” Before reaching his diagnosis, Elias screened out “bipolar spectrum disorder, a prior history of depression, and substance use issues” as possible causes of Plaintiff’s symptoms. Finally, Elias reached a diagnosis based on the diagnostic criteria set out in the DSM-5. 

    The County argued that this is not enough, because Elias “did not obtain collateral information from family members, co-workers, or treating providers” and “did not administer any standardized tests commonly used in psychiatric evaluations, such as the CAPS-5, PCL-5, or MMPI-2.”

    However, these criticisms go to the weight of Elias’ testimony, not its admissibility.

    Nevertheless, the Court agreed that Elias may not testify that Tanner’s conduct “caused” Plaintiff’s PTSD. As an expert witness, Elias has no personal knowledge of Tanner’s conduct and cannot testify as to the credibility of Plaintiff’s specific allegations of abuse.

    C. Roger Clark

    Clark offered seven opinions: (1) Tanner used “excessive force” by “choking out” Plaintiff; (2) the “Rattlesnakes are a subgroup in LASD operating out of the Lancaster Station”; (3) the “Rattlesnakes meet the definition of a deputy gang,” as determined by Clark; (4) “Tanner’s references to the [R]attlesnakes in conversation with [Plaintiff] would intimidate a witness”; (5) Clark has not seen any evidence that would justify Tanner’s use of force under Peace Officer Standards and Training (“POST”) or LASD policies; (6) the LASD tolerates deputies’ use of excessive force, fails to properly investigate excessive force complaints, and fails to properly investigate and discipline membership in law enforcement gangs; and (7) the “collective approvals by the LASD puts the general public at unnecessary future risk of death and/or injury from the Defendant Deputies” and others in the LASD.

    Analysis

    The County argued that Clark is not qualified to testify on law enforcement gangs, six of his seven opinions amount to improper legal conclusions, his fourth opinion is not supported by a reliable methodology, and his seventh opinion is subject to exclusion under Rule 403.

    As a preliminary matter, Clark is adequately qualified to testify as to law enforcement gangs within the LASD.

    However, the Court agreed that four of Clark’s seven proposed opinions are improper. To start, Clark may not testify that “Deputy Tanner’s references to the Rattlesnakes in conversations with Plaintiff would intimidate a witness.” Nothing in Clark’s experience qualifies him to testify as to what “would intimidate a witness” and, to the extent Clark proposed to testify as to whether Tanner in fact intimidated Plaintiff, his proposed testimony improperly speculated as to Plaintiff’s state of mind.

    Likewise, Clark may not testify that the “collective approvals by the LASD put the general public at unnecessary future risk of death and/or injury from the Defendant Deputies and others in the department,” because this proposed testimony would not be helpful to the jury and added nothing beyond the sixth opinion set out in his report.

    Next, Clark’s opinions addressing the use of “excessive” and “unreasonable” force amounted to legal conclusions. To the extent such testimony is relevant, Clark may only testify as to whether Tanner’s use of force conformed to POST standards and LASD policies.

    The Court rejected the County’s argument that Clark’s remaining opinions are legal conclusions. Indeed, the County has not sufficiently explained how any of the terms Clark used in those opinions “have a specialized meaning in law” or how Clark has “attempted to instruct the jury on the law” or to “apply the law to the facts of the case.”

    Held

    The Court granted in part and denied in part the Defendant County of Los Angeles’s motions To exclude Dr. George Elias and Roger Clark.

    Key Takeaway:

    While Elias did not obtain collateral information from family members, co-workers, or treating providers, Elias is an experienced medical professional, the DSM is a recognized source of authority within the psychiatric community, and the County did not argue that Elias has misapplied the DSM.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Jane Doe V. County Of Los Angeles
    Docket Number: 2:24cv8649
    Court Name: United States District Court, California Central
    Order Date: October 28, 2025
  • Psychiatric Expert Was Allowed to Opine on Occupational Experiences

    Psychiatric Expert Was Allowed to Opine on Occupational Experiences

    Mamnoon Khan (“Khan” or “Plaintiff”) brought this action against Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc. (“Sedgwick”), Kim Hottel (“Hottel”), and Colleen Van Tuyl (“Van Tuyl”) (together, “Defendants”), alleging workplace maltreatment and racial discrimination.

    Dr. Joshua Kriegel is a board-certified psychiatrist that has been treating Plaintiff since August of 2023.

    Defendants Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc. (“Sedgwick”), Colleen Van Tuyl and Kimberly Hottel filed a motion to disqualify Kriegel from testifying at trial as Plaintiff’s designated expert witness.

    Psychiatry Expert Witness

    Joshua Kriegel, M.D. is a board certified psychiatrist licensed in Massachusetts and faculty member at UMass Chan Medical School.

    He completed his medical degree at Boston University School of Medicine and his adult psychiatry residency at the UMass Chan Medical School.

    Want to know more about the challenges Joshua Kriegel has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.  

    Discussion by the Court

    On the record before the Court, Kriegel appears only to have drawn the conclusion that Plaintiff suffers from PTSD related to cumulative experiences over ten years in the workplace, including, at least in part, an incident with a coworker that involved a knife.

    Kriegel’s specialized training and knowledge, his role as Plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist, and the evidence he received through his treatment of Plaintiff together appear adequate to support his expert opinion. Even if those experiences predated Plaintiff’s employment at Sedgwick, they are relevant for purposes of damages.

    On the other hand, the fact that he is Plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist did not free him of the requirements of Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which will govern his testimony assuming that he is admitted as an expert.

    Held

    The Court denied the Defendants’ motion to disqualify Dr. Joshua Kriegel as Plaintiff’s expert.

    Key Takeaway:

    Kriegel’s testimony is relevant and helpful to the jury. As Plaintiff’s treating physician, he is uniquely situated to provide testimony regarding Plaintiff’s symptoms and their causes.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Khan V. Sedgwick Claims Management, Inc.
    Docket Number: 1:22cv11893
    Court Name: United States District Court, Massachusetts
    Order Date: November 17, 2025
  • The Psychiatry Expert Was Allowed to Opine on the Absence of Sexual Trauma

    The Psychiatry Expert Was Allowed to Opine on the Absence of Sexual Trauma

    Defendant Wendy’s International, LLC operates a multinational fast food restaurant chain specializing in hamburgers and French fries. M.B. was a minor female employee of a Wendy’s restaurant in Lutz, Florida. M.B. alleged that from September until December 2023, she was subjected to sexual harassment at Wendy’s by Jamaya Clemmons, a 25-year-old male Wendy’s employee. She testified in deposition to several non-consensual sexual encounters with Clemmons at work.

    Plaintiff filed this lawsuit asserting claims for sexual harassment and hostile work environment. According to defense expert Eric M. Kaplan, M.D., a psychiatrist, Plaintiff did not suffer from PTSD arising from her experience with Clemmons at Wendy’s.

    Plaintiff filed a motion to exclude Kaplan’s opinions, arguing that he is unqualified to offer them and that his testimony failed the requirements for expert testimony imposed by Rule 702. Kaplan opined that she suffered from other conditions caused by factors that largely pre-date her employment at Wendy’s. 

    Psychiatry Expert Witness

    Eric Michael Kaplan, M.D.  is a board-certified psychiatrist with 35 years of experience treating adults and adolescents with a variety of conditions.

    Kaplan has worked as a forensic psychiatrist for over 25 years, and has been board certified by the American College of Forensic Examiners and American Board of Forensic Medicine for almost 30 years.

    Want to know more about the challenges Eric Kaplan has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Plaintiff argued that Kaplan is a general and forensic psychiatrist who is not “subspecialty trained” in adolescent or child psychiatry and has only limited experience in his clinical practice with adolescents who have suffered sexual trauma. Plaintiff further argued that Kaplan is unqualified to administer a psychological test he used as part of his evaluation of Plaintiff, and that his testing methods were unreliable.

    However, the Court found that Kaplan is sufficiently qualified and that his approach was sufficiently reliable to be admitted under Rule 702.

    Kaplan based his opinions on an examination of Plaintiff, including but not limited to an interview and psychological testing, and on his medical and psychiatric training and 35 of years of experience. In addition, he reviewed medical and other records, including records relating to previous treatment for emotional problems, and he reviewed depositions of Plaintiff, Clemmons, and Plaintiff’s parents. Moreover, he compared Plaintiff’s information to the diagnostic criteria in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders or DSM, a standard reference work published by the American Psychiatric Association.

    Plaintiff’s motion did not argue that Kaplan’s overall methodology was inappropriate. Instead, Plaintiff offered specific criticisms of how Kaplan performed various aspects of the evaluation and the conclusions he reached. These criticisms go to the weight to be accorded to Kaplan’s testimony, not its admissibility.

    The Court also found that, contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, Kaplan was sufficiently qualified to administer the MMPI-2-RF psychological test he gave Plaintiff. Scoring such tests is a matter typically within the expertise of psychologists rather than psychiatrists, but Kaplan has had training in using such tests and he did not score the results himself but sent them to the test’s creator for scoring and interpretation.

    Held

    The Court denied the Plaintiff’s motion to exclude the testimony of defense expert Eric Kaplan.

    Key Takeaway:

    While expert qualifications in a general area do not necessarily qualify an expert to offer any specific opinion within the area, by the same token, specific training or certification in a particular subspecialty area (such as, here, adolescent psychiatry) is not necessarily required to offer opinions in that area.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: M.B. Et Al V. The Wendy’s Company Et Al
    Docket Number: 8:24cv1116
    Court Name: United States District Court, Florida Middle
    Order Date: October 17, 2025
  • Adolescent Health Expert’s Testimony on Brain-Scan Studies Excluded

    Adolescent Health Expert’s Testimony on Brain-Scan Studies Excluded

    A.C. is a transgender boy who attends Martinsville High School. Prior to attending Martinsville High School, he attended John R. Wooden Middle School (“Wooden Middle”). While attending Wooden Middle, A.C. sought to use the boys’ restroom, the restroom he felt most comfortable using, but was denied access by the School District. The School District offered him the use of the school’s single-sex restroom instead.

    A.C. filed the instant lawsuit against the School District, citing Title IX and Equal Protection violations.

    The School District designated Dr. Kristopher E. Kaliebe as an expert witness to offer opinions concerning the care of youth with gender dysphoria. Plaintiff A.C. filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Kaliebe while Defendant Metropolitan School District of Martinsville filed a motion to exclude the testimony of James D. Fortenberry, M.D., M.S., who has been disclosed as an expert by Plaintiff.

    Psychiatry Expert Witness

    Kristopher Edward Kaliebe, MD is a Professor of Psychiatry at University of South Florida, in Tampa Florida. He is Board Certified in Psychiatry, Child and Adolescent Psychiatry and Forensic Psychiatry. He is a Distinguished Fellow at the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry (AACAP). His clinical work has been primarily in University clinics, Federally Qualified Health Centers and juvenile corrections.

    Want to know more about the challenges Kristopher Kaliebe has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Adolescent Health Expert Witness

    Dr. James Dennis Fortenberry is Professor of Pediatrics at Indiana University School of Medicine. He served as Division Chief from 2015 – 2020. He also holds an adjunct appointment in epidemiology in the Fairbanks School of Public Health and is a member of the Center for Sexual Promotion at Indiana University.

    Fortenberry is a member of the World Professional Association for Transgender Health, the Society for Adolescent Health & Medicine, the International Academy for Sex Research, the American STD Association, and the Society for Scientific Study of Sex. He is past president of the International Academy for Sex Research, and past-president of the American STD Association, a fellow of the Society for Scientific Study of Sex, and past chair of the Board of Directors of the American Sexual Health association.

    Fortify your strategy by reviewing a Challenge Study detailing grounds for excluding James D. Fortenberry’s expert testimony. 

    Discussion by the Court

    A.C.’s Motion to Exclude Testimony of Kaliebe

    A.C. argued that Kaliebe is not qualified to render opinions concerning gender dysphoria and social transition, Kaliebe’s opinions generally are not reliable, and Kaliebe’s opinions are irrelevant in assessing the damages caused for the emotional distress and physical discomfort A.C. experienced.

    A.C. narrows in on the fact Kaliebe has no clinical experience on the issue at hand in this case – the denial of a form of social transition, restroom usage, to a gender dysphoric youth.

    The School District details how Kaliebe’s testimony is relevant (1) to dispute whether their position regarding bathroom access is the cause of any irreparable injury to A.C.; (2) to the balancing harms analysis set forth in the permanent injunction consideration; and (3) to demonstrate that the public’s interest would not be served by a permanent injunction. However, there is no argument as to how this testimony relates to damages.

    Given the Court’s granting of the permanent injunction, the merits of the permanent injunction request are no longer an issue for trial. Therefore, the Court decided that Kaliebe’s proposed testimony is no longer relevant.

    The School District’s Motion to Exclude Testimony of Fortenberry

    The School sought to exclude the testimony of James D. Fortenberry, who opined that A.C. would suffer adverse effects if he is denied continued use of the boys’ restroom. The School District also sought to exclude Fortenberry’s testimony as to the genetic or brain-scan studies suggesting that there is a biological component to gender identity because those are areas outside his alleged expertise.

    Fortenberry’s Testimony on Harm Caused to Transgender Youth

    A.C. convincingly argued that most of Fortenberry’s testimony is necessary and relevant to demonstrate the types of harm – both physical and emotional – that transgender youth suffer. Fortenberry’s opinion that “forced use of facilities that contravene [A.C.’s] gender experience and identity are reasonably expected to cause adverse effects on relationships with his school, his safety at school, and his mental health” speaks to the harm A.C. experienced when he was denied access to the boys’ restroom prior to this Court’s grant of a preliminary injunction. Similarly, testimony about how youth react to the denial of access to appropriate restrooms and suicidality rates in transgender youth provides relevant background to the harms affiliated with gender dysphoria. A.C. testified that he made comments to his mom about not wanting to live trapped in a female’s body. This testimony is directly related to suicidal ideations in transgender youth.

    Fortenberry’s Testimony on Studies Demonstrating there is a Biological Component to Gender Identity

    However, A.C. has not successfully demonstrated how Fortenberry’s testimony that “gender expression/identity is not a ‘choice’” or testimony about genetic or brain-scan studies is relevant information that can help a jury understand gender dysphoria as it relates to A.C. specifically. A.C. argued that testimony about brain scans is necessary to explain his opinion that being transgender is not a choice. But A.C. did not explain how transgender status being a choice, opposed to a biological making, makes the harm he faced by the School District’s actions more or less probable. For this reason, the Court barred Fortenberry from discussing whether or not gender identity is a choice and from discussing genetic or brain-scan studies.

    The School District also argued that reports of the experiences of other young people with gender dysphoria should be excluded because it is hearsay, confusing to the jury, and unduly prejudicial. Fortenberry may communicate what he observed and heard to establish the basis of his opinion.

    Therefore, the Court held that while Fortenberry may testify about the harm caused to transgender youth who are denied the ability to socially transition,
    and the suicide rates of transgender youth, he may not testify about whether
    transgender status is a choice or studies demonstrating there is a biological component to gender identity.

    Held

    • The Court granted A.C.’s motion to exclude the testimony of Kristopher Kaliebe.
    • The Court granted in part and denied in part the School District’s motion to exclude the testimony of James Fortenberry.

    Key Takeaway:

    Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and the fact is of consequence in determining the action. In this case, Fortenberry’s testimony is relevant to demonstrate the type of harms – both physical and emotional – that A.C. was caused by the School District restricting his access to the boys’ restroom. His testimony as to the danger of suicidality in transgender young persons is necessary to demonstrate how serious gender dysphoria is.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: A.C. V. Metropolitan School District Of Martinsville Et Al
    Docket Number: 1:21cv2965
    Court Name: United States District Court, Indiana Southern
    Order Date: August 27, 2025
  • Psychiatry Experts’ Opinions on Causation and Permanency Admitted

    Psychiatry Experts’ Opinions on Causation and Permanency Admitted

    This action arises from the pled sexual assault of Plaintiff Margaret Betts by a massage therapist during an in-room massage appointment at Sixty LES, a hotel owned and managed by Defendants Sixty Lower East Side, LLC, Sixty Hotels, LLC, and Sixty Hotel Manager, LLC.

    Plaintiff has proffered two expert witnesses, Dr. Steven A. Fayer and Dr. Joseph Otonichar, to testify at trial that the Plaintiff’s assault resulted in lasting psychological injuries, including symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”). Defendants, meanwhile, have proposed to offer one expert witness, Dr. Julie C. Medlin, to testify at trial that the Plaintiff’s assault did not significantly impact her pre-existing psychological symptoms.

    The parties have each filed motions in limine seeking to preclude the opposing party’s proposed expert witnesses from testifying at trial.

    Psychiatry Expert Witnesses

    Dr. Steven Alan Fayer is an associate professor of psychiatry at The Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai Hospital and an attending physician at The Mount Sinai Hospital. He received his M.D. from Georgetown School of Medicine and completed his residency in psychiatry at Mount Sinai Medical Center in New York City. He is certified by the National Board of Medical Examiners and the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology. 

    Get the full story on challenges to Steven A. Fayer’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study. 

    Dr. Joseph Otonichar is a clinical assistant professor in the department of psychiatry at New York University’s Grossman School of Medicine, the medical director of Mental Health at NYC-HHC Correctional Health Services, and a co-partner at Gotham Forensics. He received a master’s degree in biology from Cleveland State University, and he subsequently received his D.O. from Midwestern University — Arizona College of Osteopathic Medicine. He is certified by the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology in forensic psychiatry and is a diplomat of the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology in Psychiatry.

    Want to know more about the challenges Joseph Otonichar has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report. 

    Psychology Expert Witness

    Dr. Julie Christine Medlin is a licensed psychologist and the Director of the Medlin Treatment Center in Marietta, Georgia. She obtained her bachelor’s degree in psychology from Harvard University, and her master’s and doctoral degrees in clinical psychology from the University of Florida. Medlin specializes in assessments and conducts psychological, sexual trauma, psychosexual, and forensic evaluations. 

    Discover more cases with Julie C. Medlin as an expert witness by ordering her comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Plaintiff’s Motion to Exclude the Testimony of Medlin

    Plaintiff filed a motion to exclude Medlin’s testimony on the grounds that she: (i) lacked the qualifications to serve as an expert in this case; (ii) is not licensed to practice psychology in New York; and (iii) employed tests and techniques in her examination that were not subject to peer review and have not gained general acceptance in the relevant scientific community.

    Julie C. Medlin

    To begin with, Medlin’s curriculum vitae stated that she founded a private, outpatient counseling center more than twenty-five years ago to offer “specialized evaluation and treatment for sexual and physical trauma victims” and conduct “forensic and clinical evaluations of alleged or confirmed sexual abuse victims and perpetrators, including in criminal and civil cases.” The Court found that such work experience is directly relevant to the issues in this action.

    Moreover, Medlin’s curriculum vitae stated that she is licensed with PSYPACT, an interstate organization that allows licensed psychologists to practice telepsychology and conduct temporary, in-person sessions across state boundaries. Medlin conducted her evaluation of Plaintiff in New Jersey, which is a participant in PSYPACT.

    Medlin conducted the following psychological tests on Plaintiff: the Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI); Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-3 (MMPI-3); Trauma Symptom Inventory, 2nd Edition (TSI-2); and Inventory of Problems (IOP-29). 

    Although Plaintiff claimed that the validity of each test is disputed, Plaintiff’s motion failed to present sufficient evidence to support this assertion. Rather, a brief internet search suggested that, although some instability is inherent in any tests that involve self-reporting, the tests employed by Medlin were widely used and generally considered to be reliable, including for diagnosing PTSD.

    Finally, Plaintiff requested that Medlin be precluded from testifying about certain commentary concerning Plaintiff’s counsel that is contained in her report. While Medlin’s report certainly suggested that Plaintiff’s counsel exhibited unprofessional behavior during both of Medlin’s examinations of Plaintiff, at this stage the Court agreed that the admission of such information is not directly relevant to the issues to be presented at trial.

    Defendants’ Motion to Exclude the Opinions of Fayer and Otonichar

    Defendants filed a motion to bar the admission of testimony by Fayer and Otonichar under Daubert or, alternatively, requested that the Court order a Daubert hearing to determine the reliability of their testimony. 

    Joseph Otonichar

    First, the Defendants contended that Otonichar’s credentials “simply do not meet the standard” set forth in Rule 702(a). With Otonichar’s advanced education in psychiatry and his work experience, including as Medical Director of Mental Health at NYC-HHC Correctional Health Services and Clinical Assistant Professor in the Department of Psychiatry at New York University School of Medicine, the Court disagreed.

    The Defendants further asserted that Otonichar’s methodology was unsupportable, claiming that he conducted two Zoom interviews of the Plaintiff in January and February 2024 lasting a combined total of four hours and “has not spoken to or engaged in any conversation” with the Plaintiff since that time. However, in preparing his written report, Otonichar reviewed: (i) psychiatric treatment records of Dr. Robert A. Reff, M.D. between July 2016 and January 2024; (ii) psychiatric treatment records of Dr. Wilson between August 2016 and January 2024; (iii) the psychiatric examination report of Fayer dated November 9, 2021; (iv) testimony and exhibits from the deposition of plaintiff on January 8, 2021; and (v) the pleadings and procedural filings in this action.

    Finally, the Defendants asserted that Otonichar’s report contains “no opinion on the issues of causation or permanency,” and that he must be precluded from offering opinions to the jury on those issues. The Court disagreed because Otonichar clearly addressed both causation and permanency in his report. Specifically, he stated that Plaintiff experienced a “new type of anxiety” as a result of the assault, which took the form of a “fear of intimacy and romantic relationships.”

    Steven A. Fayer

    Next, Defendants contended that Fayer must also be precluded from testifying at trial, asserting that his proposed testimony did not meet the requirements of Rule 702(b-d).

    First, Defendants asserted that Fayer’s methodology was insufficient, contending that he: (i) interviewed Plaintiff for a total of four hours via Zoom on September 29, 2021 and October 20, 2021, and has had no further contact with Plaintiff or reviewed any additional medical records since that call; (ii) did not review medical records from Plaintiff’s primary treating psychologist after December 15, 2020 or records from Plaintiff’s primary treating psychiatrist covering the four treatment sessions immediately preceding the assault, and did not review the records of Plaintiff’s second treating psychiatrist, Dr. Wilson, or her other medical providers; and (iii) did not administer any tests in evaluating Plaintiff’s psychological condition. However, a review of Fayer’s report indicated that he based his diagnosis of Plaintiff’s mental health conditions on his own examinations of Plaintiff and a review of her psychiatric treatment records with Robert Reff.

    Defendants further argued that Fayer’s expert report contained “no opinion on the issues of causation or permanency,” and that he must be precluded from offering opinions to the jury on those issues. However, Fayer stated that, as a result of the assault, Plaintiff developed “trauma-induced anxiety with features of posttraumatic stress” including “flashbacks, dreams, negative thoughts, avoidance, and isolation.” As a result, the Court held that Fayer’s report adequately addressed both causation and permanency.

    Rule 403

    Finally, Defendants contended that the testimony of Fayer and Otonichar should be precluded or limited as duplicative under Rule 403, asserting that both witnesses “will present predominantly duplicative testimony.”

    Because the two experts examined Plaintiff three years and five years after the assault, respectively, and are expected to testify regarding their separate conclusions with respect to Plaintiff’s psychological condition at each point in time, the Court held that the proposed testimony is neither cumulative nor duplicative.

    Held

    The Court denied the Plaintiff’s motion to exclude the testimony of defense expert, Dr. Julie C. Medlin as well as the Defendants’ motion to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff’s experts, Dr. Steven A. Fayer and Dr. Joseph Otonichar.

    Key Takeaways:

    • Medlin offers specialized evaluation and treatment for sexual and physical trauma victims. Her work experience is directly relevant to the issues in this action. Moreover, even if it were not, an expert’s training need not narrowly match the point of dispute in the case.
    • Fayer’s opinion is grounded in a reliable methodology commonly accepted in the psychiatric community. Any concerns regarding the depth or form of his evaluation goes to the weight of his testimony, rather than its admissibility, and may be addressed on cross-examination.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Betts V. Sixty Lower East Side, LLC Et Al
    Docket Number: 1:20cv4772
    Court Name: United States District Court, New York Southern
    Order Date: June 30, 2025
  • Court Limits Psychiatry Expert’s Testimony, Citing Reliability Concerns 

    Court Limits Psychiatry Expert’s Testimony, Citing Reliability Concerns 

    Kevin Brent Buchanan had been charged with making threatening interstate communications. Specifically, the charges stemmed from five voicemails he allegedly left. The Government alleged that Buchanan recorded these voicemails from Utah. These voicemails, sent in late October 2023, targeted an organization that was headquartered in the District of Columbia.

    To defend himself, Buchanan designated Dr. Glen E. Johnson as an expert witness. Johnson is a board-certified psychiatrist. Evidently, he was expected to testify about Buchanan’s mental state. This testimony would relate to the time of the alleged offenses.

    Johnson was prepared to testify that Buchanan suffered from severe PTSD and recurring panic disorder. According to Johnson, Buchanan’s diagnoses means that Buchanan is prone to react reflexively and with poor impulse control. Johnson also stated that Buchanan “has never demonstrated any violence” or “following through with threats,” and he “poses no risk to anyone.” However, Buchanan has not submitted an expert report from Johnson, and neither his expert disclosure notice nor the accompanying attachments clearly set out the bases and reasons for Johnson’s opinions.

    Consequently, the Government filed a motion in limine requesting an order precluding Buchanan from offering evidence or argument at trial in support of a diminished capacity defense.

    Psychiatry Expert Witness 

    Dr. Glen E. Johnson graduated medical school 54 years ago and has spent the past 54 years in the field of psychiatry. Johnson has been an independently practicing psychiatrist for 47 years. Moreover, he became board-certified nearly 46 years ago. Johnson was a clinical instructor at the University of Utah Medical Center, Department of Psychiatry, for twelve years. Additionally, he was chairman of the Pioneer Valley Hospital Department of Psychiatry from 1986 through 1988, and has otherwise been affiliated with that hospital for 47 years.

    Want to know more about the challenges Glen Johnson has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court 

    Johnson’s proffered expert witness testimony about Buchanan’s reflexive and impulsive reactions could be relevant and helpful to the jury’s assessment of whether Buchanan had the requisite mens rea to commit the crimes with which he is charged in this case.

    i. Reliability 

    First of all, Johnson must not express an expert opinion to the jury about whether Buchanan was “unable to formulate the requisite specific intent to violate the statutes pursuant to which he is charged in the indictment.” 

    In other words, the Court held that a core part of the proffered expert opinion testimony described in Buchanan’s witness designation is plainly inadmissible.

    Second, Buchanan’s expert disclosure statement omitted necessary details about the scope of and basis for any other expert opinions that Johnson might be prepared to offer.

    Moreover, the Court observed that Buchanan’s opinion witness designation suggested that he may be planning to call Johnson both as a lay witness and as an expert witness, but Buchanan failed to delineate which topics Johnson will address as a lay witness and which he will address as an expert

    ii. Qualifications 

    The government argued that Johnson’s background lacked specific experience in forensic psychiatry, questioning the relevance of his testimony in assessing Buchanan’s mental state at the time of the alleged offenses.

    However, the Court noted that Johnson was qualified in general-practice psychiatry due to his decades of practice and board certification in that field.

    Therefore, the Court focused on whether Johnson’s experience and board certification in general-practice psychiatry were sufficient to provide expert testimony on Buchanan’s mental health, diagnoses, and related symptoms.
    According to the Court, if Johnson qualifies, his testimony will need to closely adhere to his expertise as a psychiatrist. In other words, he must testify based on expertise. However, the Court deferred final ruling on the reliability and admissibility of this testimony until after the forthcoming evidentiary hearing.

    Held 

    The Court granted in part, denied in part, and held in abeyance in part the government’s motion in limine .

    Specifically: 

    • The Court precluded Dr. Glen Johnson from opining on whether Buchanan did or did not have a mental state that constitutes an element of the crimes charged, including an opinion about whether he was capable of forming that mental state. 
    • Buchanan was ordered to produce a revised Rule 16(b)(1)(C) expert disclosure statement on or before April 25, 2025, containing “a complete statement” of all expert opinions that Buchanan intends to elicit from Johnson.
    • An pretrial evidentiary hearing was set to evaluate Johnson’s qualifications as an expert in general-practice psychiatry and the exact scope for any expert opinion testimony that Johnson intends to offer that would be admissible at trial.
    • Buchanan was allowed to introduce lay witness opinion testimony that is relevant to whether Buchanan was conscious of wrongdoing at the time of the alleged acts for which he is charged in this case.
    • The Court deferred final ruling on the admissibility under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 of the evidence at issue in the Government’s motion until the relevant issues arise at the forthcoming evidentiary hearing or at trial.

    Key Takeaway:

    Expert testimony regarding a Defendant’s mental state is strictly limited. Experts cannot offer opinions on whether the Defendant possessed the required mental state to commit the crime; their testimony must focus on diagnoses, the basis for those diagnoses, and the characteristics of relevant mental conditions.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: United States V. Buchanan
    Docket Number: 1:24cr256
    Court Name: United States District Court for the District of Columbia
    Order Date: April 14, 2025

     

  • Psychiatry Expert’s Testimony Rejected for Injecting Subjective Characterizations

    Psychiatry Expert’s Testimony Rejected for Injecting Subjective Characterizations

    On September 3, 2020, Plaintiffs Dalila Yeend and Bounnam Phimasone (together with Elvin Minaya Rodriguez, Lisa LaPointe, and Shantadewie Rhamee, “Plaintiffs”) commenced this action against Akima Global Services, LLC a/k/a AGS (“AGS” or “Defendant”) in New York State Supreme Court, asserting state law claims pertaining to their civil immigration detention at the Buffalo Federal Detention Facility (“BFDF”).

    On October 16, 2020, Defendant removed this action to federal court. Almost two years later, Plaintiffs Yeend and Phimasone filed an amended complaint with class action allegations and claims for unjust enrichment and violations of the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (“TVPRA”) and the New York Labor Law (“NYLL”).

    Defendant sought to preclude the testimony of Dr. Stuart Grassian and Dr. Michael Childers. 

    Psychiatry Expert Witness

    Dr. Stuart Grassian is a board-certified psychiatrist and former faculty member of Harvard Medical School with experience in “evaluating individuals who were in conditions of confinement in prisons, ICE detention facilities, and secure psychiatric hospitals[.]”

     He has authored articles on topics such as the psychiatric effects of solitary confinement and the effects of restricted and isolated conditions of confinement, and has previously provided expert testimony in cases regarding conditions of confinement.

    Get the full story on challenges to Stuart Grassian’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Industrial Engineering Expert Witness

    Dr. Michael Childers is a Professor in the Department of Labor Education at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, holds an M.S. and Ph.D. in workforce education and development and a B.S. in industrial engineering, and has worked on numerous “time studies” to assess “the time that should be allowed to perform work activities.”

    Want to know more about the challenges Michael Childers’ has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report. 

    Discussion by the Court

    Dr. Stuart Grassian

    Grassian opines “to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that for a reasonable person in the position that the Batavia detainees find themselves, and with the attitude, threats, and punishments inflicted on those who refused to work, the work program at ICE-Batavia is coercive in nature.” In addition, Grassian concluded that (i) “[t]he conditions of the detention center collectively amount to a deprivation scheme;” (ii) “AGS exploits detainees’ access to resources and safety in order to coerce workers into working for wages that few people would voluntarily accept;” and (iii) “to a reasonable degree of medical certainty the Voluntary Work Program (“VWP”) at Batavia was psychologically damaging and scarring for the detainees exposed to it.”

    Relevance

    Grassian’s report includes a lengthy recitation of selected record evidence, as well as references to the amended complaint. Indeed, of his less than fourteen-page report, approximately seven pages appear to be direct quotes from interview notes taken by Grassian’s assistant, witness declarations, depositions, and the amended complaint. Additionally, in multiple areas of his report, Grassian appears to inject his subjective characterizations of detainee testimony to bolster his conclusions regarding the VWP.

    The Court found that Grassian’s report largely recites testimony and characterizes it in a manner that is favorable to Plaintiffs and, thus, impermissibly “construct[s] a factual narrative based upon record evidence.”

    In addition, and most notably, the Court found that Grassian’s expected testimony would impermissibly “tell the jury what results to reach.”

    By opining that (i) “AGS exploits detainees’ access to resources and safety in order to coerce workers into working;” and that (ii) “the [VWP] at Batavia was psychologically damaging and scarring for the detainees exposed to it,” Grassian is essentially telling the jury that Defendant knowingly coerced participation in the VWP and that the detainees exposed to the VWP at the BFDF did, in fact, feel psychologically coerced.

    Dr. Michael Childers

    Childers was retained to (i) determine the work time necessary for the performance of certain VWP tasks; and (ii) calculate the amount BFDF detainees would have been compensated for performing those tasks had they been paid the minimum wage.

    Childers also used those work times to calculate what AGS would have had to pay its own non-detainee employees, making market wages, to do the same work performed by detainees in the VWP.

    i. Qualifications

    Defendant argued that Childers’ background in industrial engineering, education, and labor relations is not relevant to assessing required staffing levels and associated costs at a secure federal detention facility, and that Childers lacked the requisite specialized knowledge related to federal contracts, regulations, or detention facilities necessary to render opinions on those topics.

    Here, Defendant did not dispute that Childers held advanced degrees in workforce education and development. Childers’ curriculum vitae indicated that he is currently teaching courses on topics such as “contract costing, budget and financial analysis, . . . and stopwatch time study.” Defendant also did not dispute Childers’ attestation that he has “conducted hundreds of time studies in manufacturing, warehousing, service, and government organizations.”

    Additionally, Childers has previously provided expert deposition testimony in a number of cases, many involving labor law claims.

    Childers utilized resources that are common in the field in which he holds degrees and instructs, as well as schematics and internal documents from the BFDF, to calculate the average number of hours an individual would need to complete certain labor while in the VWP. He then used those work hour determinations to calculate the wages detainees would have earned if paid the minimum wage, and the wages AGS would have had to pay its own non-detainee employees for such labor if they were paid the market wage.

    Accordingly, the Court found that Childers is qualified to render the opinions set forth in his report.

    ii. Sufficient Facts or Data and Reliable Methodology

    In his report, Childers describes the materials on which he relies and the assumptions he makes in reaching his conclusions. Specifically, Childers relied on the Association of Physical Plant Administrators’ (“APPA”) methodologies, applicable Federal Service Contract Act (“SCA”) wage data, discovery documents, and deposition testimony in this matter to determine the rate at which AGS would substitute market labor for detainee labor “but for the work program.”

    Childers calculated: (1) the amount detainees would have made if they were making the minimum wage, and the savings AGS arguably retained from paying detainees only one dollar per day; and (2) the cost that would have been required to replace detainee labor with full-time, non-detainee AGS employees, and the savings AGS purportedly retained from not doing so and instead paying detainees one dollar per day.

    The Court found that this methodology is sufficiently reliable.

    Defendant nonetheless asserted that the data that Childers extrapolated from the APPA Guidelines is too generic, overly inclusive, and failed to consider certain data adjustments that Defendant contended should have been made. However, similar to disagreements as to an expert’s qualifications, disputes as to faults in an expert’s use of a particular methodology “are grist for cross-examination, and go towards weight, not admissibility.”

    Moreover, Childers was instructed to assume that “AGS operates the Batavia immigrant detention facility and must do so by standards issued by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).” As such, Childers’ assumption that AGS would be responsible for the damages calculated does not render his conclusions or methodologies unreliable.

    iii. Relevance

    Moreover, Childers’ damages analyses utilize various specialized resources to calculate work times and wage rates that the Court finds are not easily interpreted by a lay person. In addition, Childers performs technical calculations not readily undertaken by a lay person, including calculation of the cost that Defendant would have incurred to pay outside contractors to perform the work covered by the VWP during the relevant time periods. The Court determined that this precisely the type of assistance that Rule 702 and Daubert allow.

    Held

    The Court granted in part and denied in part the Defendant’s motion in limine to exclude the testimony of Stuart Grassian and Michael Childers.

    Key Takeaways:

    • Defendant failed to explain why Childers’ undisputed experience in other work settings, including with “government organizations,” would be inapplicable in the detention setting, nor is it apparent to the Court. Indeed, the Court found that Childers’ experience, particularly with respect to conducting time studies, is sufficiently applicable here. Moreover, disputes as to the strength of an expert’s credentials generally go to the weight, not the admissibility, of the expert’s testimony.
    • Expert testimony must be carefully circumscribed to assure that the expert does not usurp either the role of the trial judge in instructing the jury as to the applicable law or the role of the jury in applying that law to the facts before it. The Court fiound that Grassian’s report largely recites testimony and characterizes it in a manner that is favorable to Plaintiffs and, thus, impermissibly “constructs a factual narrative based upon record evidence.”

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Yeend Et Al V. Akima Global Services, LLC
    Docket Number: 1:20cv1281
    Court Name: United States District Court, New York Northern
    Order Date: March 31, 2025