Expert Witness Profiler

Category: Psychology Expert Witness

  • Law And Legal Expert’s Speculative Calculations of Future Earnings Excluded

    Law And Legal Expert’s Speculative Calculations of Future Earnings Excluded

    Drew Dixon alleged that the Defendant, Antonio Marquis “L.A.” Reid sexually harassed her and refused to allow her to succeed unless she acquiesced to his demand to be alone and in close proximity to her while she was employed as an A&R executive at Arista Records from 1996 to 2002.

    Dixon claimed that Antonio Reid sexually assaulted her twice in 2001.

    Dixon departed Arista in 2002, leaving the music industry to pursue a degree at the Harvard Business School.

    Defendant filed motions to preclude the testimony of Plaintiff’s expert witnesses, Michael Selverne, Mark Plotkin, and Dr. Chitra Raghavan, pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 403.

    Law And Legal Expert Witness

    Michael Selverne is an attorney who, for the past 39 years, has specialized in the field of executive compensation in the music industry. Over the course of his career, he has represented artists in their contract negotiations for recording and performance agreements, record executives in their negotiations of compensation packages with their employers, and music labels in their negotiations with executives.

    Get the full story on challenges to Michael Selverne’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Music Industry Expert Witness

    Mark Plotkin holds a Bachelor of Arts degree from a joint program between Case Western University and The Cleveland Institute of Music and has over two decades of diverse experience in the music industry. Plotkin is a member of the Recording Academy, co-founded Decision Desk and Wifi Music School, and is the founder and CEO of Beast Music A.I., a media platform utilized by record labels such as RCA Records and Atlantic Records. Plotkin further serves as a Professor and the Area Head of Business and Technology at New York University’s Clive Davis Institute of Record Music.

    Fortify your strategy by reviewing a Challenge Study detailing grounds for excluding Mark Plotkin’s expert testimony. 

    Psychology Expert Witness

    Dr. Chitra Raghavan is a licensed clinical psychologist with more than twenty years of experience. Raghavan received her doctorate in clinical and community psychology at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and post-doctoral training at Yale University. Currently, she serves as a Professor of Psychology, Director of the Forensic Mental Health Counseling Program, and Coordinator of Victimology Studies in Forensic Psychology at John Jay College of Criminal Justice.

    She has previously testified as a witness for the prosecution in other cases regarding the effects of traumatic abuse and coercive control and given over 150 conference presentations and published over forty articles in various publications on subjects related to domestic violence, sex trafficking, and trauma.

    Want to know more about the challenges Chitra Raghavan has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report. 

    Discussion by the Court

    Michael Selverne

    In connection with this litigation, Selverne submitted an expert report setting forth his opinions regarding Plaintiff’s lost future compensation. In rendering his opinion, Selverne reviewed Dixon’s compensation package during her time at Arista.

    While the Plaintiff was hired in 1996 as a Senior Director for a two-year term, she was promoted to the position of Vice President when one of her “designated artist” albums sold 500,000 records. Selverne opined that the improvement in her compensation package and title in such a short time span indicated that Arista viewed Plaintiff as a “budding superstar.”

    Reviewing the compensation packages of contemporaries of Plaintiff who rose to the ranks of CEOs for major music labels, Selverne concluded that, if Dixon had “continued along the trajectory she was on when she departed Arista, it is highly likely that Dixon’s earnings would have reached seven or eight figures annually. It is equally likely that Dixon would have created a joint venture with a major record company and see her fortunes rise into the nine figures.”

    Analysis

    Selverne did not purport to calculate Plaintiff’s lost earnings based on her actual compensation at the time she left Arista. Indeed, he did not purport to calculate her lost earnings at all. He did not, for example, specify how long Plaintiff would have expected to work in the industry, with reference to verifiable statistics regarding longevity in the industry or even actuarial tables reflecting life expectancy. He did not calculate the value of lost benefits.

    Selverne’s lack of methodology in reaching his opinion on future earnings loss is reflected in his failure to quantify such damages. Selverne vaguely asserted that Plaintiff suffered damages in the range of millions to hundreds of millions of dollars.

    Selverne conjectures that Plaintiff not only would have continued to have a successful career in the music industry, but that she would have reached the pinnacle of the profession to become the CEO of a major record label or otherwise enter into a lucrative joint venture agreement. The Court held that these hypothetical promotions, bonuses, and business deals lack sufficient evidentiary foundation, and thus cannot form the basis of an expert opinion.

    Mark Plotkin

    Plaintiff retained Marc Plotkin to provide an expert opinion regarding the hypothetical earnings Plaintiff would have received from her A&R commission structure had she successfully signed Kanye West and John Legend.

    Plotkin first looked to Plaintiff’s employment agreement for the relevant formula and then researched West and Legend’s first contracts with Def Jam and Columbia Records, respectively, as well as their sales data year by year to ultimately determine how many records and singles were sold across various mediums and the price per unit.

    Analysis

    Defendant objected to Plotkin’s reliance on historical data regarding record sales as the basis for his opinion. Defendant contended that it rests on the faulty assumption that West and Legend would have released the same albums while at Arista and thus earned the same revenues. 

    The Court held that these are the types of assumptions that go to the weight of the evidence, not admissibility. The use of historical data may not provide exactitude, but allows for calculations to a reasonable certainty, which is all the law requires.

    Defendant also argued that the entirety of Plotkin’s opinion is speculative, in that it is unknown whether these artists would have signed to Arista if offered the chance or that they would have been deemed Dixon’s designated artists if they had done so. Defendant misapprehended the nature of Plotkin’s inquiry. Plotkin is not purporting to offer an opinion as to whether West or Legend would have signed to Arista, or if they had whether Dixon would have been responsible for signing them. Rather, his opinions are limited to a calculation of what commissions Plaintiff would have been entitled to under the terms of employment contract in the hypothetical world where she was responsible for signing the artists while at Arista.

    Dr. Chitra Raghavan

    Raghavan opined that she “found Dixon’s reported history to be believable” because she reported a decrease in recent symptoms rather than an increase, a pattern that would be typical of malingerers; Plaintiff’s emotional and physical responses were consistent with the experiences she relayed; she was able to clearly explain the abuse fact pattern and her narratives over multiple interviews; and three objective tests indicated that she responded genuinely about her mental health.

    She further opined that Defendant “used numerous tactics of coercive control to maintain his abusive power” over Plaintiff, including physical violence, manipulation, sexual abuse, retaliation, and microregulation. Raghavan opined that the “sexual assaults and the atmosphere of coercion and hostility” that Plaintiff suffered triggered a severe episode of complex PTSD.

    Analysis

    The Court held that Raghavan’s anticipated testimony is replete with improper opinions regarding witness credibility and bolstering. Such bolstering testimony regarding the truth of the underlying factual allegations in the case is not the proper province of an expert witness.

    The Court held that Raghavan is precluded, pursuant to Rules 702 and 403, from offering testimony at trial regarding Plaintiff’s credibility, including an opinion that Plaintiff was the subject of a sexual assault by Defendant or that Defendant exercised coercive control over Plaintiff. She is also precluded from opining on the causation of Plaintiff’s conditions. Raghavan can testify, however, as to coercive control generally, as background; her diagnoses of Plaintiff’s mental health conditions and the bases for her diagnoses; and that Plaintiff’s condition is “consistent with” that of individuals who have been sexually assaulted.

    Held

    • The Court granted the Defendant’s motion to preclude the testimony of Michael Selverne.
    • The Court denied the Defendant’s motion to preclude the testimony of Mark Plotkin.
    • The Court granted in part and denied in part the Defendant’s motion to preclude the testimony of Dr. Chitra Raghavan.

    Key Takeaway:

    Where lost future earnings are at issue, an expert’s testimony should be excluded as speculative if it is based on unrealistic assumptions regarding the Plaintiff’s future employment prospects.

    Selverne’s opinion is not only of little assistance to a jury, but also rests on inherently speculative assumptions. 

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Dixon V. Reid
    Docket Number: 1:23cv9878
    Court Name: United States District Court, New York Southern
    Order Date: August 21, 2025
  • Psychology Expert’s Testimony on Loss of Consortium Excluded

    Psychology Expert’s Testimony on Loss of Consortium Excluded

    Heather Blanchard died after undergoing a surgery at Madigan Army Medical Center. Heather’s husband Roy Blanchard was present in the hospital when Heather first finished surgery. Roy asserts his struggle with grief following Heather’s death has impacted his career and earning capacity. At the time of Heather’s death, Roy worked at J.P. Morgan in a private client banker position. 

    He took a three month leave of absence for bereavement, but struggled to succeed upon returning. He ultimately left J.P. Morgan in November 2022. Roy then worked part time, a seasonal job at Crystal Mountain as a ticket checker and lift operator. He then enrolled in barber school and became a licensed barber at Buzzerd’s Barber Shop in Tacoma where he still works today. 

    Roy sued the United States and Jane and John Does 1-10 on behalf of himself, Heather’s estate, and their children, C.B. and Ian Blanchard. 

    It should be noted that the Court dismissed Roy’s negligent infliction of emotional distress claim because he cannot meet the threshold requirement to show that he unwittingly encountered his wife Heather’s body given his concession that he requested to view her in the ICU. 

    Defendant United States filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Blanchards’ experts, Anthony J. Choppa, M.Ed., and Marsha Hedrick, Ph.D.

    Psychology Expert Witness

    Marsha Hedrick, Ph.D. is a clinical psychologist in private practice in Seattle specializing in forensic evaluations of adults and children.

    Want to know more about the challenges Marsha Hedrick has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report. 

    Vocational Rehabilitation Expert Witness

    Anthony Jude Choppa earned his M.Ed. in Rehabilitation Counseling in 1979 from Kent State University; is a cofounder of OSC Vocational Systems, Inc., practicing since 1976. OSC has over 50 employees throughout the State of Washington specializing in ‘hands on’ case management (life care planning) and vocational rehabilitation services. He has published many Life Care Plan and Vocational Rehabilitation articles and is a frequent speaker on rehabilitation issues in Washington State and internationally (U.S. and Canada ).

    Choppa served on the Boards of the International Academy of Life Care Planners and the International Association of Rehabilitation Professionals. He is currently on the Board of the Spinal Cord Injury Association of Washington. He holds certifications including CRC, CDMS and CCM. His specialties include life care planning and vocational assessment.

    Get the full story on challenges to Anthony Choppa’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study. 

    Discussion by the Court

    Anthony Choppa

    To begin with, the Court has already concluded that Roy’s lost wages are not a “pertinent injury” that is recoverable. Therefore, Choppa’s opinions surrounding his earning capacity and what lost wages are attributable to the loss of Heather are not helpful to the jury. To the extent that Choppa offers opinion on “other losses” such as Roy’s “inconvenience” related to “restoring his emotional wellbeing,” the Court held that this information does not logically advance a material aspect of the Blanchards’ case and falls outside the expertise of a vocational expert. 

    Marsha Hedrick

    Hedrick evaluated Roy and his sons and formed opinions on how Heather’s death caused them psychological harm. 

    The Court held that Hedrick’s testimony aimed at damages for mental anguish and grief is not relevant to a “pertinent injury” under the wrongful death statute and is excluded under Rule 702. To the extent that she offers testimony on loss of consortium, that topic is within the common knowledge and experience of a lay person and thus her expertise is unnecessary.

    Held

    The Court granted the Defendants’ motion to exclude the testimony of both Mr. Choppa and Dr. Hedrick 

    Key Takeaway:

    Because the wrongful death statute does not allow the Blanchards to recover for Roy’s lost wages or for grief and mental anguish, the claim to recover Roy’s lost wages is dismissed and Choppa’s testimony aimed at calculating damages for Roy’s lost wages and Hedrick’s opinions on the Blanchards’ grief and mental anguish is barred.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Blanchard V. United States
    Docket Number: 3:23cv5460
    Court Name: United States District Court for the Western District of Washington
    Order Date: August 05, 2025
  • Marketing Expert’s Post-Sale Confusion Survey is Admissible 

    Marketing Expert’s Post-Sale Confusion Survey is Admissible 

    Think Green Limited (“Think Green”) has taken Medela AG and Medela LLC (“Medela”) to Court, accusing them of infringing on the trade dress rights it holds in its breast pump and misleading consumers through false advertising.

    Rhonda J. Harper, a Think Green expert witness in areas involving marketing, branding, and consumer research, used various analytical methods to conclude that (1) among the relevant universe of consumers, there is a likelihood of confusion that Medela’s pump is sponsored or approved by Think Green due to the allegedly infringing trade dress; and (2) the relevant universe of consumers would likely ascribe secondary meaning to Think Green’s trade dress. Medela filed a motion to exclude Harper’s expert opinions and underlying survey results pursuant to Rule 702 and the Daubert Standard. Medela also sought to strike Harper’s rebuttal declaration. 

    Cynthia Cohen, who Medela proffered as an expert in areas related to psychology and consumer research, reached the following conclusion based on her analytical work: “offering the Medela breast milk collector on the Amazon platform does NOT cause consumer confusion.” Think Green filed a motion to strike this conclusion and the entirety of Cohen’s expert report.

    Think Green also filed a motion to strike portions of the expert report prepared by Medela expert Carsten Faltum. 

    Marketing Expert Witness

    Rhonda Jane Harper has over 30 years of experience at the highest levels of marketing, research, and branding. She has been the top marketing executive for several Fortune 100 corporations, served as an adjunct marketing professor at two universities, held national and international board positions in leading brand and marketing associations, led a leading global agency division, and founded an organic growth strategic consultancy. Harper has also provided and rebutted hundreds of trademark and trade dress infringement surveys for litigation purposes.

    Want to know more about the challenges Rhonda Harper has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report. 

    Psychology Expert Witness

    Cynthia R. Cohen, Ph.D. is an expert in survey methods. She designed consumer studies for Lanham Act cases and change of venue surveys for trials. Cohen’s education includes psychology degrees at UCLA and USC. Her firm, Verdict Success LLC, specializes in in jury research, trial strategies, and settlement decision-making.

    Want to know more about the challenges Cynthia R. Cohen has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Life Science Expert Witness

    Carsten Faltum has extensive experience in the life sciences industry, particularly in R&D coupled with several years as an investment manager in venture capital and corporate venture. 

    Discover more cases with Carsten Faltum as an expert witness by ordering his comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Rhonda Harper

    Admissibility of Survey Evidence, Generally

    With regard to Harper’s surveys, Medela argued that the data was not analyzed in accordance with accepted statistical principles, nor was the objectivity of the entire process assured.

    Courts generally find consumer survey evidence admissible if a qualified expert testifies that the survey was conducted according to generally accepted principles of survey research. Moreover, survey evidence need not be perfect to be admissible. 

    The Court held that Harper’s surveys did not constitute one of those “rare” situations where fundamental flaws rendered them “completely unhelpful to the trier of fact and therefore inadmissible.”

    Admissibility of Harper’s Survey Evidence

    Control Stimuli in Secondary Meaning and Point-of-Sale Confusion Surveys

    Medela took issue with the control stimuli Harper used in her secondary meaning and point-of-sale confusion surveys. Medela also objected to the pump images that members of both control groups were shown—in other words, the control stimuli. 

    The survey ultimately asked respondents whether or not “the manufacturer or brand of the breast milk pump/collector [they] just reviewed … is sponsored or approved by another manufacturer or brand.” If a respondent answered yes to the “sponsored or approved” inquiry, the respondent was then asked what other manufacturer or brand had sponsored or approved the pump or collector the respondent had just viewed and why the respondent thought so. 

    Medela argued that the control stimuli are “so wildly different” than the test stimuli that Harper’s surveys are unreliable.

    But as Think Green pointed out, it is not imperative that secondary meaning surveys include a control group at all to be considered reliable.  As at least one district court has observed, secondary meaning surveys measure the extent to which consumers associate a particular trade dress with a particular source, and a control group would not necessarily aid in that analysis. Nor is it clear that including a weak control stimulus (even assuming that is a fair characterization of the control stimuli used here) renders a survey “so flawed as to be completely unhelpful to the trier of fact” and therefore inadmissible.

    According to the Court, Medela’s bones of contention provides no basis to strike Harper’s testimony altogether.

    Point-of-Sale Confusion Survey and Marketplace Reflection

    Medela separately complained that Harper’s point-of-sale confusion survey did not reflect how consumers encountered the depicted pumps in the real-world marketplace.

    It argued that the pictures Harper used did not “present[] the full scope of information available to a prospective online purchaser” and were “devoid of a host of further identifying information that consumers would typically encounter by viewing the actual product listing page for these products.”

    A survey need “not replicate the exact purchasing experience of every consumer confronting the pertinent product in the marketplace”; it requires only “reasonable choices based on the expert’s experience and training and on accepted survey techniques.”

    In this Court’s estimation, Medela’s criticisms did not bear on the survey’s admissibility, but on the “evidentiary weight of the survey results”—a question for the jury.

    Control Stimulus in Post-Sale Confusion Survey

    Through a different survey, Harper sought to “determine whether Medela’s breast milk pump/collector is likely to cause post-sale confusion.” Post-sale confusion occurs when a potential customer sees a product bearing the Plaintiff’s trade dress and mistakenly attributes the product to the Plaintiff, thereby influencing his or her buying decision, either positively or negatively.

    To assess the likelihood of post-sale confusion, Harper’s online survey first screened for respondents who purchased a pump in the last year or who would consider purchasing one in the next year. The test group was presented with four images of Medela’s pump, collected from Medela’s online retail product pages, less Medela’s name, design elements, and measurements.

    Medela objected to the images Harper presented to the test group of its pump as well as the control stimuli images.

    The Court held that a survey need not be excluded simply because it failed to use the best available control stimuli.

    Test Stimuli in Post-Sale Confusion Survey

    Medela next criticized the post-sale confusion survey’s test stimuli as failing to “reflect real-world conditions in which consumers are likely to encounter the products.”

    What images Harper should have presented to better depict the “obvious intimate and exposed” nature of using a breast pump, Medela did not say. In any event, whatever Medela’s argument, the Court held that it affected the weight of the evidence—not its admissibility.

    Test Stimulus in Secondary Meaning Survey

    Medela argued that the test stimulus Harper used in her secondary meaning survey was “fundamentally flawed” because it failed to isolate the trade dress.

    To support its assertion that “a secondary meaning test stimulus must isolate the trade dress at issue,” Medela cited Handelman’s Guide to TTAB Practice, Second Edition, § 18.15. However, the quoted portion of Handelman’s Guide specifically directs that “[i]f the image used in the stimulus differs from the mark shown in the application or registration drawing”—as Medela alleges here—”the difference will weigh against the probative value, if any, to be accorded to the survey.” In other words, the Court held that Medela’s own source instructed that the weight to be assigned to the secondary meaning survey is a question for the jury—not one of admissibility.

    Use of Functional Stimuli To Assess Non-Functional Trade Dress

    Medela next argued that Harper’s surveys did not test the asserted trade dress, because the “shield-bulb-base” arrangement featured in the stimuli is functional.

    Because this argument mirrors a central theory of Medela’s summary judgment motion: that Think Green’s asserted trade dress is functional and therefore cannot be protected, the Court will address this argument when it resolves Medela’s motion for summary judgment.

    Net Secondary Meaning Calculation

    Medela argued that Harper’s secondary meaning calculation is “fundamentally flawed” because, in calculating net secondary meaning, she failed to subtract a particular number from the results.

    Harper, however, has laid out her reasons for employing the methodology that she did and, in so doing, amply conveyed that her calculations were a considered choice, not the result of a fatal error or oversight.

    At the end of the day, the two experts analyzed the same data, but came to different conclusions about its meaning. That leaves the Court with a “battle of the experts” situation that is inappropriate for dispensation in a Daubert motion and must be left for the factfinder to resolve.

    Data Supporting Secondary Meaning Opinion

    Medela argued that Harper’s report “fails to substantiate the connection between these data points with its conclusions that these were purportedly successful in connecting Think Green as the source of the trade dress in the minds of relevant consumers.” By “these data points,” Medela appeared to be referencing the entire universe of “sales data, advertising expenditures, awards, social media followers etc. ” in Harper’s report. But Medela did not actually cite to “these data points” or describe them with any degree of specificity. The Court will not guess at them, nor will it develop Medela’s argument for it.

    Admissibility of Harper’s Rebuttal Declaration

    Think Green attached a rebuttal declaration from Harper to its response to Medela’s motion for summary judgment in which Harper responded to Medela’s criticism of her net secondary meaning calculation. Medela filed a motion under Rule 37 to strike this declaration.

    In her short rebuttal declaration, Harper responded to what she described as “mischaracterization” and criticism Medela offered in its summary judgment briefing. More specifically: Harper explained that there are multiple ways of calculating net secondary meaning and why she chose her particular method of calculation. At the conclusion of her rebuttal, Harper performed an alternate method of calculation that “[s]ome sources indicate [is] also appropriate,” which she claims—consistent with her previously expressed opinion—”shows that the trade dress is strong.”

    The Court denied Medela’s motion to strike Harper’s rebuttal declaration because it remained “firmly grounded” in the opinions she expressed in her original expert report. Basically, Harper’s rebuttal declaration is the type of responsive report that is permitted under Rules 26 and 37.

    Cynthia Cohen

    Qualifications

    Medela contended that Cohen’s experience conducting consumer surveys related to trademark disputes is relevant to trade dress disputes, as the methodology between the two topics is largely interchangeable. Medela also cited her publications, speeches, and court appearances as an expert witness concerning consumer surveys.

    According to Think Green, Cohen’s limited prior experience as an expert or witness rendered her unqualified.

    Despite criticizing Cohen for not having “essential” experience, education, or training in marketing, Think Green did not draw any link between “a professional marketing background” and trade dress likelihood of confusion surveys. The Court is not persuaded that an expert who lacks a marketing degree or marketing experience should be automatically precluded from opining on matters of trade dress.

    Methodology

    Think Green argued that Cohen’s likelihood of confusion survey relied on improper methodology. In Cohen’s survey, respondents were shown the stimulus image of Medela’s pump “as it had been displayed on the Amazon platform.”

    With the stimulus picture still available on the screen, respondents were asked open-ended questions meant to assess whether confusion was likely. For example, respondents were asked “if you have an opinion, what company or organization makes or puts out this breast milk collector” and if the respondent had an opinion, whether the respondent “believed that this breast milk collector is affiliated with or sponsored by any other company.”

    Think Green objected to Cohen’s methodology of showing respondents the stimulus picture while the respondents answered the survey questions. According to Think Green, this is “a major flaw” that “departs from typical marketplace conditions.”

    As the Court already explained when denying Medela’s motion to exclude Harper’s expert report, no survey is “foolproof,” and perfection is not required to clear the Daubert bar. Think Green has presented no argument that any flaws in Cohen’s survey create one of the “rare” situations where a survey is so fundamentally flawed “as to be completely unhelpful to the trier of fact and therefor inadmissible.”

    Relevance

    Like Harper’s testimony, the Court held that Cohen’s survey evidence concerning likelihood of confusion will assist the jury in evaluating Think Green’s claim of trade dress infringement.

    Carsten Faltum

    As for Think Green’s motion to strike portions of the expert report prepared by expert Faltum, the Court denied Think Green’s motion to partially strike without prejudice to renewal after Think Green hinted that it may file a more robust motion to strike Faltum’s report before trial.

    Held

    The Court denied Medela’s motion to exclude Rhonda Harper’s expert opinions and underlying survey results as well as Harper’s rebuttal declaration. Think Green’s motion to strike Cynthia Cohen’s report was also denied by the Court.

    Additionally, the Court denied Think Green’s motion to partially strike portions of Carsten Faltum’s report without prejudice to renewal.

    Key Takeaways:

    • A survey need “not replicate the exact purchasing experience of every consumer confronting the pertinent product in the marketplace”; it requires only “reasonable choices based on the expert’s experience and training and on accepted survey techniques.”
    • Courts generally find consumer survey evidence admissible if a qualified expert testifies that the survey was conducted according to generally accepted principles of survey research. Moreover, survey evidence need not be perfect to be admissible. 
    • The notion that Daubert requires particular credentials for an expert witness is radically unsound. Anyone with relevant expertise enabling them to offer responsible opinion testimony helpful to judge or jury may qualify as an expert witness.
    • In a case of dueling experts, it is left to the trier of fact—not the reviewing Court—to decide how to weigh the competing expert testimony.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Think Green Limited V. Medela AG Et Al
    Docket Number: 1:21cv5445
    Court Name: United States District Court, Illinois Northern
    Order Date: July 02, 2025
  • Psychology Expert’s Failure to Disclose Does Not Warrant Exclusion

    Psychology Expert’s Failure to Disclose Does Not Warrant Exclusion

    Kiel Green fell to the ground after hitting the back of his elbow on a pallet of metal shelving while returning from a wooden wagon display containing beef jerky. At the time Green entered Atwood’s, Defendant was in the process of conducting a “reset” and various departments and merchandise were in the process of being rearranged. As part of the reset, a pallet of metal shelving had temporarily been placed near the beef jerky.

    Kiel and Melissa Green filed this action against Atwood Distributing, L.P. seeking to recover for negligence and loss of consortium arising from this incident, and requesting both compensatory and punitive damages.

    Plaintiffs filed a motion to strike Defendant’s expert witnesses Elizabeth Speck-Kern, Ph.D. and Irmo Marini, Ph.D.

    Plaintiffs argued that the Court should strike Speck-Kern as an expert witness because: (a) Speck-Kern did not send the raw data from her Rule 35 examination of Green to Green’s neuropsychologist until the day Daubert motions were due, violating Rule 26(a)(2)(B)(ii); and (b) Defendant failed to disclose a deposition given by Speck-Kern in the last four years, violating Rule 26(a)(2)(B)(v) while Marini has failed to disclose a list of all other cases in which he has been deposed or testified in the last four years under Rule 26.

    Psychology Expert Witness

    Elizabeth Speck-Kern is the Founder and Partner of Arkansas Neuropsychology Associates, P.A. She performs neuropsychological, psychological, and forensic examinations on children and adults. She obtained her Ph.D. in School Psychology from the University of South Carolina.

    Get the full story on challenges to Elizabeth Speck-Kern’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study. 

    Vocational Evaluation & Rehabilitation Expert Witness

    Irmo D. Marini obtained his PhD in rehabilitation from Auburn University and a master’s degree in clinical psychology from Lakehead University in Thunder Bay, Ontario, Canada. He is a 2009 recipient of the National Council on Rehabilitation Education’s Distinguished Career Award in rehabilitation education, and 2010 recipient of the American Rehabilitation Counseling Association’s James F. Garrett Distinguished Career Award in rehabilitation research.

    Want to know more about the challenges Irmo Marini has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report. 

    Discussion by the Court

    Elizabeth Speck-Kern

    In response, Defendant filed an affidavit by Speck-Kern explaining these two lapses. The affidavit sets forth that Speck-Kern’s failure to timely transfer the raw data to Green’s neuropsychologist was the result of a series of increasingly unfortunate events.

    Specifically, Plaintiffs’ counsel requested the raw data from defense counsel on February 7, the day after the Rule 35 examination, and defense counsel forwarded that request to Speck-Kern three days later. At that point, the raw data had not yet been compiled, and, unfortunately, Speck-Kern overlooked the emailed attachment that contained Plaintiffs’ request. As a result, the request went unanswered.

    Subsequently, two months later—and approximately six weeks after the full disclosure deadline—on April 11, Plaintiffs’ counsel contacted defense counsel to explain that Green’s neuropsychologist never received the raw data and to renew his request. Defense counsel forwarded this second request to Speck-Kern on April 14. At that time, Speck-Kern and her assistant (the only other person in her practice) were dealing with multiple familial illnesses and deaths. Consequently, on May 5—the first day Speck-Kern and her assistant were both back in the office and the day Daubert motions were due—Speck-Kern forwarded the raw data to Green’s neuropsychologist.

    As for Speck-Kern’s failure to disclose a prior deposition, she explained in her affidavit that, at the time she was retained and disclosed in this case, she did not recall any testimony she had given in the last four years. It was only when she reviewed Plaintiffs’ motion to strike and saw the attached portions of the testimony that she recalled the deposition.

    Irmo Marini

    Plaintiffs filed a motion to strike Marini as an expert on the basis that Marini has failed to disclose a list of all other cases in which he has been deposed or testified in the last four years under Rule 26.

    However, Marini provided a list of all cases in which he has been retained—approximately seventeen pages long, mostly single spaced—in which he includes his client’s name, the type of opinion given, the attorney’s name, and the location.

    While Plaintiffs argued that it did not denote which cases he offered testimony in, Defendant pointed out that Marini includes a “d” or “t” at the end of the client information for each case in which he testified.

    Plaintiffs cited various out-of-circuit courts for the proposition that Rule 26(a)(2)(B)(v) requires the parties’ names, case number, court, and whether the testimony was by trial or deposition. There is no binding precedent on this matter, and “courts in this Circuit have not necessarily required such rigorous case data from experts, although this Court agreed that the sort of information required is largely ‘a matter of common sense.’”

    Held

    The Court denied Plaintiffs’ motions to strike the opinions of Elizabeth Speck-Kern and Irmo Marini. While Plaintiffs may seek leave to supplement their Daubert motion as to Speck-Kern—provided they file such motion within ten (10) days—the Court ordered Defendant to supplement Marini’s disclosures within fourteen (14) days.

    Key Takeaway:

    “When a party fails to provide information” under Rule 26(a), “the district court has wide discretion to fashion a remedy or sanction as appropriate for the particular circumstances of the case.” However, the exclusion of evidence is a harsh penalty and should be used sparingly.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Green Et Al V. Atwood Distributing, L.P.
    Docket Number: 5:24cv5040
    Court Name: United States District Court, Arkansas Western
    Order Date: July 03, 2025
  • Psychiatry Experts’ Opinions on Causation and Permanency Admitted

    Psychiatry Experts’ Opinions on Causation and Permanency Admitted

    This action arises from the pled sexual assault of Plaintiff Margaret Betts by a massage therapist during an in-room massage appointment at Sixty LES, a hotel owned and managed by Defendants Sixty Lower East Side, LLC, Sixty Hotels, LLC, and Sixty Hotel Manager, LLC.

    Plaintiff has proffered two expert witnesses, Dr. Steven A. Fayer and Dr. Joseph Otonichar, to testify at trial that the Plaintiff’s assault resulted in lasting psychological injuries, including symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”). Defendants, meanwhile, have proposed to offer one expert witness, Dr. Julie C. Medlin, to testify at trial that the Plaintiff’s assault did not significantly impact her pre-existing psychological symptoms.

    The parties have each filed motions in limine seeking to preclude the opposing party’s proposed expert witnesses from testifying at trial.

    Psychiatry Expert Witnesses

    Dr. Steven Alan Fayer is an associate professor of psychiatry at The Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai Hospital and an attending physician at The Mount Sinai Hospital. He received his M.D. from Georgetown School of Medicine and completed his residency in psychiatry at Mount Sinai Medical Center in New York City. He is certified by the National Board of Medical Examiners and the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology. 

    Get the full story on challenges to Steven A. Fayer’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study. 

    Dr. Joseph Otonichar is a clinical assistant professor in the department of psychiatry at New York University’s Grossman School of Medicine, the medical director of Mental Health at NYC-HHC Correctional Health Services, and a co-partner at Gotham Forensics. He received a master’s degree in biology from Cleveland State University, and he subsequently received his D.O. from Midwestern University — Arizona College of Osteopathic Medicine. He is certified by the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology in forensic psychiatry and is a diplomat of the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology in Psychiatry.

    Want to know more about the challenges Joseph Otonichar has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report. 

    Psychology Expert Witness

    Dr. Julie Christine Medlin is a licensed psychologist and the Director of the Medlin Treatment Center in Marietta, Georgia. She obtained her bachelor’s degree in psychology from Harvard University, and her master’s and doctoral degrees in clinical psychology from the University of Florida. Medlin specializes in assessments and conducts psychological, sexual trauma, psychosexual, and forensic evaluations. 

    Discover more cases with Julie C. Medlin as an expert witness by ordering her comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Plaintiff’s Motion to Exclude the Testimony of Medlin

    Plaintiff filed a motion to exclude Medlin’s testimony on the grounds that she: (i) lacked the qualifications to serve as an expert in this case; (ii) is not licensed to practice psychology in New York; and (iii) employed tests and techniques in her examination that were not subject to peer review and have not gained general acceptance in the relevant scientific community.

    Julie C. Medlin

    To begin with, Medlin’s curriculum vitae stated that she founded a private, outpatient counseling center more than twenty-five years ago to offer “specialized evaluation and treatment for sexual and physical trauma victims” and conduct “forensic and clinical evaluations of alleged or confirmed sexual abuse victims and perpetrators, including in criminal and civil cases.” The Court found that such work experience is directly relevant to the issues in this action.

    Moreover, Medlin’s curriculum vitae stated that she is licensed with PSYPACT, an interstate organization that allows licensed psychologists to practice telepsychology and conduct temporary, in-person sessions across state boundaries. Medlin conducted her evaluation of Plaintiff in New Jersey, which is a participant in PSYPACT.

    Medlin conducted the following psychological tests on Plaintiff: the Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI); Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-3 (MMPI-3); Trauma Symptom Inventory, 2nd Edition (TSI-2); and Inventory of Problems (IOP-29). 

    Although Plaintiff claimed that the validity of each test is disputed, Plaintiff’s motion failed to present sufficient evidence to support this assertion. Rather, a brief internet search suggested that, although some instability is inherent in any tests that involve self-reporting, the tests employed by Medlin were widely used and generally considered to be reliable, including for diagnosing PTSD.

    Finally, Plaintiff requested that Medlin be precluded from testifying about certain commentary concerning Plaintiff’s counsel that is contained in her report. While Medlin’s report certainly suggested that Plaintiff’s counsel exhibited unprofessional behavior during both of Medlin’s examinations of Plaintiff, at this stage the Court agreed that the admission of such information is not directly relevant to the issues to be presented at trial.

    Defendants’ Motion to Exclude the Opinions of Fayer and Otonichar

    Defendants filed a motion to bar the admission of testimony by Fayer and Otonichar under Daubert or, alternatively, requested that the Court order a Daubert hearing to determine the reliability of their testimony. 

    Joseph Otonichar

    First, the Defendants contended that Otonichar’s credentials “simply do not meet the standard” set forth in Rule 702(a). With Otonichar’s advanced education in psychiatry and his work experience, including as Medical Director of Mental Health at NYC-HHC Correctional Health Services and Clinical Assistant Professor in the Department of Psychiatry at New York University School of Medicine, the Court disagreed.

    The Defendants further asserted that Otonichar’s methodology was unsupportable, claiming that he conducted two Zoom interviews of the Plaintiff in January and February 2024 lasting a combined total of four hours and “has not spoken to or engaged in any conversation” with the Plaintiff since that time. However, in preparing his written report, Otonichar reviewed: (i) psychiatric treatment records of Dr. Robert A. Reff, M.D. between July 2016 and January 2024; (ii) psychiatric treatment records of Dr. Wilson between August 2016 and January 2024; (iii) the psychiatric examination report of Fayer dated November 9, 2021; (iv) testimony and exhibits from the deposition of plaintiff on January 8, 2021; and (v) the pleadings and procedural filings in this action.

    Finally, the Defendants asserted that Otonichar’s report contains “no opinion on the issues of causation or permanency,” and that he must be precluded from offering opinions to the jury on those issues. The Court disagreed because Otonichar clearly addressed both causation and permanency in his report. Specifically, he stated that Plaintiff experienced a “new type of anxiety” as a result of the assault, which took the form of a “fear of intimacy and romantic relationships.”

    Steven A. Fayer

    Next, Defendants contended that Fayer must also be precluded from testifying at trial, asserting that his proposed testimony did not meet the requirements of Rule 702(b-d).

    First, Defendants asserted that Fayer’s methodology was insufficient, contending that he: (i) interviewed Plaintiff for a total of four hours via Zoom on September 29, 2021 and October 20, 2021, and has had no further contact with Plaintiff or reviewed any additional medical records since that call; (ii) did not review medical records from Plaintiff’s primary treating psychologist after December 15, 2020 or records from Plaintiff’s primary treating psychiatrist covering the four treatment sessions immediately preceding the assault, and did not review the records of Plaintiff’s second treating psychiatrist, Dr. Wilson, or her other medical providers; and (iii) did not administer any tests in evaluating Plaintiff’s psychological condition. However, a review of Fayer’s report indicated that he based his diagnosis of Plaintiff’s mental health conditions on his own examinations of Plaintiff and a review of her psychiatric treatment records with Robert Reff.

    Defendants further argued that Fayer’s expert report contained “no opinion on the issues of causation or permanency,” and that he must be precluded from offering opinions to the jury on those issues. However, Fayer stated that, as a result of the assault, Plaintiff developed “trauma-induced anxiety with features of posttraumatic stress” including “flashbacks, dreams, negative thoughts, avoidance, and isolation.” As a result, the Court held that Fayer’s report adequately addressed both causation and permanency.

    Rule 403

    Finally, Defendants contended that the testimony of Fayer and Otonichar should be precluded or limited as duplicative under Rule 403, asserting that both witnesses “will present predominantly duplicative testimony.”

    Because the two experts examined Plaintiff three years and five years after the assault, respectively, and are expected to testify regarding their separate conclusions with respect to Plaintiff’s psychological condition at each point in time, the Court held that the proposed testimony is neither cumulative nor duplicative.

    Held

    The Court denied the Plaintiff’s motion to exclude the testimony of defense expert, Dr. Julie C. Medlin as well as the Defendants’ motion to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff’s experts, Dr. Steven A. Fayer and Dr. Joseph Otonichar.

    Key Takeaways:

    • Medlin offers specialized evaluation and treatment for sexual and physical trauma victims. Her work experience is directly relevant to the issues in this action. Moreover, even if it were not, an expert’s training need not narrowly match the point of dispute in the case.
    • Fayer’s opinion is grounded in a reliable methodology commonly accepted in the psychiatric community. Any concerns regarding the depth or form of his evaluation goes to the weight of his testimony, rather than its admissibility, and may be addressed on cross-examination.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Betts V. Sixty Lower East Side, LLC Et Al
    Docket Number: 1:20cv4772
    Court Name: United States District Court, New York Southern
    Order Date: June 30, 2025
  • Psychology Expert’s Testimony on the Process of Memory Formation Admitted

    Psychology Expert’s Testimony on the Process of Memory Formation Admitted

    In October 2019, Nan Morgan McCartney was severely burned while attempting to start a fire in her backyard firepit. She used a plastic gasoline container manufactured by Scepter.

    McCartney has given multiple different accounts of the incident over time, but the most recent account (in her deposition) is that she was trying to pour gas from the plastic container on the previously lit but not actively burning kindling in the firepit when gas vapor from the container came in contact with an unseen ember in the firepit and caused a “flashback explosion” of the gas in the container.

    Scepter disclosed Dr. Charles Weaver as an expert to testify about the science of forming memories and factors that can affect memory recollection.

    The Plaintiff filed a Daubert motion to exclude Weaver’s expert testimony. 

    Psychology Expert Witness

    Charles A. Weaver III is currently Professor & Chair of Psychology and Neuroscience at Baylor University. He has published in the areas of memory and language, the relationship between confidence and memory, flashbulb memory (“where were you on 9/11?”), and eyewitness identification.

    Weaver has served as a forensic expert in civil and criminal cases in more than 30 states and has testified in both federal and state courts, for both prosecution and defense. 

    Get the full story on challenges to Charles Weaver’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study. 

    Discussion by the Court

    Relevance

    McCartney argued that Weaver’s opinions are not helpful or reliable and that they should be excluded under Fed. R. Evid. 403. According to McCartney, issues of witness memory and veracity are not proper subjects of expert testimony since they are within the exclusive purview of the jury and the common experience of jurors.

    Since one witness (expert or not) may not directly testify about the credibility of another witness, the Court held that Weaver cannot testify that McCartney’s current account of the incident was unreliable. Therefore, because Weaver will not be permitted to testify as to the veracity of McCartney’s current description of the incident or comment on the reliability of her memory, there is little danger of the jury being confused about their role in assessing McCartney’s credibility. However, Weaver’s expert testimony about how memories are formed and how they can be influenced over time will be helpful to the jury because those issues are grounded in science and are not entirely within the common experience of jurors. 

    In other words, Weaver will be permitted in this case to “testify as to the process of [memory] encoding, particularly in a traumatic situation, memory reconstruction, suggestibility, and post-event information,” but he “will not be permitted to opine on the ultimate issue of whether [Plaintiff’s] testimony is credible or incredible.”

    Reliability

    The Court did not overlook McCartney’s argument that Weaver’s opinions are unreliable because they did not “fit the facts of the case” for a variety of reasons, including the fact that Weaver is a “quintessential expert for hire.” The fact that Weaver did not interview McCartney does not undermine the reliability of his opinions since he is only being allowed to testify about the scientific basis for memory formation and alteration generally, not the veracity of McCartney’s current account of the incident. Finally, the fact that Weaver is a “career witness” and that his testimony has been excluded in other cases might be fodder for cross-examination, but it did not warrant exclusion of his testimony altogether.

    Held

    The Court granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiff’s motion to exclude Dr. Charles Weaver’s opinion under Daubert. 

    Key Takeaway:

    Weaver’s testimony on the science of forming memories will “provide the jurors with the tools they need to evaluate Plaintiff’s claims of lost and recovered memories” and allow the jury to “decide for itself whether Plaintiff’s ‘newly found’ recollections are reliable and credible, or, alternatively, whether those she shared with emergency medical and police personnel contemporaneous with [the incident] are more credible and reliable.”

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: McCartney V. Myers Industries Inc Et Al
    Docket Number: 3:23cv7038
    Court Name: United States District Court, Florida Northern
    Order Date: May 29, 2025
  • Psychology Expert’s Opinions Regarding Suicide by Cop Excluded

    Psychology Expert’s Opinions Regarding Suicide by Cop Excluded

    This civil rights case arises out of the officer-involved detention and shooting of Hector Puga (“Decedent”) by California Highway Patrol officers Isaiah Kee, Michael Blackwood, and Bernardo Rubalcava (“State Defendants”) and County of San Bernardino deputies Jake Adams and Robert Vaccari (“County Defendants”) that resulted in Decedent’s death on February 17, 2021.

    At the Final Pretrial Conference, Plaintiffs raised concerns regarding State Defendants calling County Defendants’ expert Dr. Kris Mohandie as a witness because State Defendants had not designated Mohandie as an expert. Thus, the Court ordered Plaintiffs to file briefing regarding the admissibility of expert witness Mohandie’s testimony no later than Monday, May 19, 2025. The Court also ordered any opposition to be filed by Wednesday, May 21, 2025. 

    On May 19, 2025, Plaintiffs filed the instant motion in limine to exclude the testimony of Mohandie. State Defendants failed to file an opposition.

    Psychology Expert Witness

    Kris Mohandie is a board-certified specialist in police and public safety psychology through the American Board of Professional Psychology.

    Get the full story on challenges to Kris Mohandie’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study. 

    Discussion by the Court

    It was Mohandie’s opinion that the decedent committed suicide by cop. According to him, the Decedent had an Antisocial Personality Disorder, including psychopathy, with life-threatening addictions to alcohol and methamphetamine.

    In this case, State Defendants failed to designate Mohandie as an expert witness prior to the deadline to designate an expert witness.

    Moreover, State Defendants failed to oppose Plaintiffs’ motion. Thus, State Defendants’ failure to file an opposition is deemed consent to the granting of the motion. 

    Held

    The Court granted the Plaintiffs’ motion in limine to exclude the testimony of Dr. Kris Mohandie.

    Key Takeaway:

    Failure to file any required document, or to file it within the stipulated deadline, may constitute consent to the granting of the motion. Moreover, arguments for which no response is provided are considered to be conceded.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: L.C. Et Al V. State Of California Et Al
    Docket Number: 5:22cv949
    Court Name: United States District Court, California Central
    Order Date: May 22, 2025
  • Psychology Expert’s Testimony on the Impact of Decades of Incarceration Admitted

    Psychology Expert’s Testimony on the Impact of Decades of Incarceration Admitted

    The Plaintiff, Glynn Simmons, was wrongfully imprisoned for nearly 49 years after a 1974 murder conviction and was exonerated in 2023. He filed a civil rights lawsuit seeking damages for the constitutional violations that led to his wrongful conviction and decades of incarceration.

    As a result, Simmons sued the City of Edmond, the City of Oklahoma City, former Oklahoma City Police Detective Shobert, and the estate of former Edmond Police Detective Sergeant Anthony David Garrett (Garrett).

    In other words, Plaintiff alleged that they suppressed exculpatory evidence and fabricated evidence, violating his Fourteenth Amendment rights.

    To support his claims, he retained Dr. Shirley Saar-McPherson, Ph.D., a clinical psychologist, to conduct a comprehensive psychological evaluation to assess his potential mental health diagnoses and their causes.

    City contended that Saar’s opinion is unreliable because she only formed this opinion for the purposes of testifying and did not treat the evaluation as carefully as she would have in her practice outside of paid consulting.

    Psychology Expert Witness

    Shirley Saar-McPherson is a a clinical psychologist with over two decades of
    experience. Basically, she earned her Ph.D. in clinical psychology with a concentration in forensic psychology, and has numerous publications in her field.

    Get the full story on challenges to Shirley Saar-McPherson’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.  

    Discussion by the Court

    The City argued that Saar’s opinion was inherently unreliable because it was prepared solely for litigation and lacked the same level of care and rigor she would typically apply in her regular clinical practice. According to the City, the evaluation was not conducted under the same professional standards expected outside the context of paid expert testimony.

    The City further asserted that the limited basis for her opinion, consisting of just two Zoom interviews and remote testing, rendered her conclusions methodologically weak and scientifically unsound.

    After reviewing the submissions from both parties, the Court found that Saar’s testimony satisfied the requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which governs the admissibility of expert testimony. The Court concluded that her opinion was grounded in sufficient facts and data and was derived using reliable principles and methods appropriate to her field.

    Also, the Court acknowledged that the City’s criticisms about the limited interaction and remote testing methodology might raise valid concerns regarding the thoroughness of Saar’s evaluation. However, it held that such concerns relate to the weight of the testimony rather than its admissibility. These are matters best explored through cross-examination, not exclusion.

    Held

    The Court denied the City’s motion to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff’s expert witness Shirley Saar-McPherson.

    Key Takeaway:

    Despite being based upon two zoom meetings and remote testing, the Court found that Saar’s opinion was based on sufficient facts and data and is the product of reliable principles and methods. 

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Simmons v. City of Edmond
    Docket Number: 5:24cv97
    Court Name: United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma
    Order Date: April 4, 2025
  • Psychology Expert’s Testimony on the Grave Risk of Harm Admitted

    Psychology Expert’s Testimony on the Grave Risk of Harm Admitted

    Petitioner brought this action under the 1980 Hague Convention and the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, seeking the return of his minor child, S.A.M., to Switzerland. He alleged that Respondent wrongfully removed the child to Missouri in April 2025 without his consent and was unlawfully retaining custody.

    Asserting joint custody rights, Petitioner identified Switzerland as the child’s habitual residence and requested repatriation.

    Respondent raised affirmative defenses, claiming that the child’s return would pose a grave risk of physical or psychological harm or create an intolerable situation. She also invoked the Human Rights Exception of Article 20 of the Convention, arguing that the repatriation would violate the human rights and fundamental freedoms.

    Petitioner filed a motion to exclude the testimony of expert David Finn and to block a medical examination of the child.

    Psychology Expert Witness

    David Finn is a doctor of psychology and licensed clinical psychologist with a practice focused on forensic assessment in good standing in the State of Illinois of the United States of America

    Want to know more about the challenges David Finn has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.  

    Discussion by the Court

    Petitioner moved to exclude David Finn’s testimony under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. and Federal Rules of Evidence 702, 401, and 403, because his opinions were unreliable, cumulative, based on selectively provided documents and unsupported by sufficient testing.

    Respondent opposed the motion to exclude. It was clear that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate Respondent acted outside her authority as the custodial parent in obtaining the examination of the minor child by Finn. Finn also reviewed the reports from the Department of Children and Family Services.

    Finn evaluated S.A.M. and reviewed all documents regarding S.A.M. Finding that Finn’s opinions were based on a sufficient factual foundation and methodological approach, the Court ruled his testimony admissible. While Petitioner’s concerns could impact credibility, they did not warrant exclusion and would be properly addressed through cross-examination.

    Held

    The Court denied the Petitioner’s motion to exclude the testimony of David Finn.

    Key Takeaway:

    The Court found Finn’s testimony admissible, supported by interviews and a review of documents, including Department of Children and Family Services reports.

    It held that the objections against Finn’s testimony concerned credibility, not admissibility, and could be addressed on cross-examination. Expert testimony, it emphasized, should only be excluded if so unsupported that it offers no help to the factfinder.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Muehlbauer v. Muehlbauer
    Docket Number: 2:24cv47
    Court Name: United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, Northern Division
    Order Date: May 14, 2025
  • Psychology Expert Witness’ Testimony Regarding Alleged Coercion Admitted

    Psychology Expert Witness’ Testimony Regarding Alleged Coercion Admitted

    On September 28, 2016, Terence B. Tekoh (“Plaintiff”) brought a suit against the County of Los Angeles, the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department (“LASD”), LASD Sergeant Dennis Stangeland, LASD Deputy Carlos Vega, and Does 1-10, alleging violations of his civil rights.

    Dr. Iris Blandon Gitlin (“Dr. Gitlin”) is one of Plaintiff’s designated retained experts and is purported to be a “false confessions” expert.

    Blandón-Gitlin’s testimony was excluded from the first two trials. In spite of that, Defendant Vega brought the current motion to exclude Blandón-Gitlin’s “improper and inadmissible expert opinions.” 

    Psychology Expert Witness

    Dr. Iris Blandon Gitlin is a professor of Psychology at California State University, Fullerton. She has been on the faculty at California State University Fullerton since 2006. Gitlin received her B.A. degree in psychology from California State University Northridge in 1997; her M.A. degree in psychology from Claremont Graduate University in Claremont, California in 2001; and her Ph.D. degree in psychology from Claremont Graduate University in 2005.

    Her focus at each institution was cognitive psychology.

    Get the full story on challenges to Iris Blandon Gitlin’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study. 

    Discussion by the Court

    There are a few steps the Court will take in order to make certain that Blandón-Gitlin’s testimony will not mislead the jury or impermissibly bolster the Plaintiff’s credibility.

    After all, the real issue is not whether Plaintiff (or a reasonable person in Plaintiff’s situation) would have felt or been coerced by the conduct of Defendant Vega. The question is whether Defendant Vega’s conduct (as found by the jury) is so impermissible or improper as to constitute a violation of Tekoh’s constitutional rights for purposes of liability.

    For example, Plaintiff indicated that Blandón-Gitlin will testify regarding the supposed coercive effect of Defendant Vega’s purported use of an “evidence ploy” (i.e. his false representation to Plaintiff of the existence of an alleged video of his committing the crime, which did not exist).

    However, the Court held that the mere use of such a ploy — while not necessarily encouraged — has not been found to give rise to a finding of unlawful coercion. 

    Jury Instructions

    In its supplemental brief, Defendant raised the issue that certain allegedly coercive acts that Blandón-Gitlin plans to testify about are lawful evidence ploys that are not unconstitutional and would therefore mislead the jury in their determination of whether “[a] confession was improperly coerced or compelled.”

    The Court will not exclude this testimony, but it will be sure in its jury instructions to clearly define what is “improper” coercion and what is acceptable coercion under the law in order to prevent juror confusion.

    In order to accomplish that endeavor, prior to trial, the Court will require Plaintiff to specifically identify by page number those acts of Defendant Vega as delineated in Blandón-Gitlin’s report upon which she will base her testimony regarding alleged coercion. She will be precisely limited to only those items at trial.

    Held

    The Court denied the motion to exclude Dr. Iris Blandon-Gitlin’s improper and inadmissible expert opinions.

    Key Takeaway:

    Blandón-Gitlin’s testimony regarding the supposed coercive effect of Defendant Vega’s purported use of an “evidence ploy” has not been found to give rise to a finding of unlawful coercion.

    The Court will not exclude Blandón-Gitlin’s testimony, but it will be sure in its jury instructions to clearly define what is “improper” coercion and what is acceptable coercion under the law in order to prevent juror confusion.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Tekoh V. County of Los Angeles
    Docket Number: 2:16cv7297
    Court Name: United States District Court, California Central
    Order Date: April 25, 2025