Category: Safety Expert Witness

  • Safety Expert Allowed to Opine on Effectiveness of Warning Signs 

    Safety Expert Allowed to Opine on Effectiveness of Warning Signs 

    Plaintiff Anthony Rebmann sues Astec, Inc. d/b/a Astec of Tennessee and Astec Industries, Inc. (collectively, “Astec”) based on an incident on March 19, 2020, when, in the course of his employment at an asphalt plant, his left hand became entangled in an Astec baghouse screw conveyor. Astec has answered and has also filed a Third-Party Complaint against Rebmann’s employer at the time, Gernatt Asphalt Products, Inc. (“Gernatt”), claiming contribution and negligent training and supervision.

    Astec sought to strike the report of Plaintiff’s life-care expert, Nadeem I. Hussain, M.D. and has also filed motions in limine to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff’s products-warnings (or “human factors”) expert, Gerald M. Goldhaber, Ph.D. and Plaintiff’s products-liability expert Thomas A. Berry, P.E.

    Plaintiff has filed his own motion to exclude or limit the opinions of Astec’s expert, Dennis B. Brickman, P.E.

    Safety Expert Witness

    Dr. Gerald Martin Goldhaber has emerged as the nation’s leading safety warnings and communication expert. He is the publisher of the Goldhaber Warnings Report. His clients have included over 100 of the top 500 corporations in the U.S. Fifty of the top 100 law firms and government agencies, including the FDA (for whom he consulted on a new nutritional label). Goldhaber’s clients have also included the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) to establish guidelines for products ranging from All Terrain Vehicles (ATV’s) to soda bottles to in-line skates, the USDA for whom he has consulted about potential warnings for sugary products.

    Discover more cases with Gerald Goldhaber as an expert witness by ordering his comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

    Physical Medicine And Rehabilitation Expert Witness

    Dr. Nadeem Imran Hussain is a Physical Medicine & Rehabilitation specialist who has practiced medicine in New York since 2014.

    Hussain is a licensed physician in the state of New York, and he is certified by the American Board of Physical Medicine & Rehabilitation.

    Want to know more about the challenges Nadeem Hussain has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Mechanical Engineering Expert Witness

    Dennis Barry Brickman is an industry veteran with over 40 years of mechanical engineering and materials science experience.

    Brickman has developed specialized expertise in the safety of children’s products, outdoor power equipment, tree care machinery, elastic cord products, and automatic door sensor systems.

    Get the full story on challenges to Dennis Brickman’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Engineering Expert Witness

    Thomas Alan Berry holds a Master of Science in Mechanical Engineering from Wichita State University and a Bachelor of Science in Mechanical Engineering from the same institution.

    He has authored at least 15 peer-reviewed papers presented at ASAE/ASABE and ASME conferences between 1985 and 2013, covering topics such as PTO safety, agricultural equipment accidents, forklift tipover risks, pallet truck accidents, mower stability, and gasoline geysering hazards.

    Gain a comprehensive understanding of Thomas Berry’s qualifications and casework history with his Expert Witness Profile report.

    Discussion by the Court

    A. Thomas Berry, P.E.

    Plaintiff has retained Thomas Berry, P.E., as an engineering expert in this case. Berry has opined that Astec “knew or should have known of technically and economically feasible design alternatives that would have significantly reduced and/or eliminated the risk to operators without unnecessarily affecting the utility of the [baghouse] machine.”

    Astec sought to exclude Berry’s opinions regarding causation and alternative designs, arguing that he “failed to properly test and validate his opinions, basing them instead on unsupported assumptions.”

    1. Clearance Between Door and Nip/Shear Point

    The first alternative design is to add “clearance between the access door opening and the nip/shear point created by the extremely small distance between the auger flighting and the housing.” According to Berry, “this could be accomplished by raising the edge of the access door opening or providing a grate guard for the lower area of the opening, or by utilizing a left-hand flighted screw that would move the nip area to the back of the auger rather than directly below the access opening.”

    a. Testing

    The Court concluded that Berry did not need to perform testing as to his alternative of raising the edge of the access door opening. Astec’s expert has asserted that “[f]lighted screw augers typically have a close clearance with respect to their housing [because] otherwise, material builds up and does not adequately move near the housing interior structure.” That is sensible and understandable, but the housing in the area at issue appears to be rectangular, containing a cylindrical auger. With that geometry, the Court concluded that no testing would be required to support Berry’s opinion that raising the lower edge of the access door opening could put the pinch/nip point beyond the reach of fingers when the hand is grasping the lower edge of the housing.

    b. Cost

    Astec asserted that Berry has failed to conduct a “meaningful” comparison of the cost versus utility of his proposed alternative designs.

    Plaintiff did not dispute the importance of cost in the analysis. But Plaintiff maintained that the associated costs were zero, nominal, required by industry standards, or otherwise based on Berry’s training, education, and experience.

    As to cost, Berry asserted that raising the lip of the access opening could be provided “at no or little difference in cost.”

    Absent special considerations that are not immediately apparent and that could be the subject of cross-examination, the Court agreed that no further explanation or analysis is necessary for Berry’s opinion that designing or cutting the port in the auger housing to place the lip of the access door at a higher point would carry little or no cost difference.

    c. Efficacy

    Astec also argued that Berry’s report lacks evidence that the proposed alternative designs “could have prevented” Rebmann’s injuries. Plaintiff maintained that the standard is not whether the design would have “prevented” the injury, but whether the design would have resulted in greater safety.

    The Court agreed with Astec that designing the crossover screw with left flighting instead of right flighting would not have been materially safer. Berry asserted that the change “would move the nip area to the back of the auger.”

    Raising the lower edge of the inspection door opening, however, does not suffer from the same problem. Astec correctly observed that Berry’s supplemental report recommends raising the edge by “a few inches” which is not a particularly precise specification. And if “a few inches” means just two or three inches, then Astec may be correct that the modification would not eliminate the risk of entanglement for a hand grasping the bottom edge of the inspection door opening. But the Court is not persuaded that Berry needed to calculate precisely how many inches the edge would have to be raised. It is apparent from the layout and geometry of the inspection door opening that raising the bottom edge by some number of inches—more than two but less than half the height of the inspection door opening—would put the nip/shear point more than a finger’s length away.

    2. Bars on Lower Area of Access Opening, or Grate

    a. Testing

    Similar to the alternative of raising the bottom edge of the inspection door opening, the Court concluded that Berry did not need to test the alternative of adding bars across the lower area of the access opening. This solution is functionally identical to raising the edge of the door opening. The main difference is that that lower area of the access opening would be covered with parallel bars instead of solid metal.

    b. Cost

    Like the alternative of raising the bottom edge of the inspection door opening, Berry asserted that the cost of adding bars would be low; in his view, “less than $10-15.” Astec maintained that Berry’s cost estimate should be excluded for lack of any “meaningful explanation.”

    The Court is not persuaded that more explanation is required; the proposed alternative design appears to involve ordinary components that could be incorporated into the inspection door opening at modest cost.

    c. Efficacy

    Similar to raising the bottom edge of the inspection door opening, adding a sufficient number of bars at the lower area of the opening would put the nip/shear point more than a finger’s length away. Astec argued that dust accumulation in the area would prevent visibility through the bars.

    At his deposition, Berry conceded that dust accumulation between the bars would obstruct visibility if the bars were not cleaned off. Even if not cleaned off, the alternative design is for bars only on the lower area of the access opening; the upper area would still offer views into the enclosure. The Court concluded that Berry can testify to the bars as an alternative design.

    3. Interlock

    a. Testing

    Berry’s third proposed alternative design would be to provide an interlock system “such that the augers could not operate with the access doors open or [without] a grate guard in place” to prevent contact with the running auger that would “still allow the dust to escape during the clearing operation and would allow visual inspection of the augers and shafts.”

    There appears to be no dispute that interlock technology existed at the time the baghouse was designed and manufactured in the 1980s, But Astec asserted that Berry should have conducted testing to determine whether such a device “would work on the Baghouse.”

    The Court agreed that adding an interlock device would be a “more substantial modification” to the Baghouse, and that the practicality and specifics of installation of an interlock depends on the machine to which it would be applied.

    Although it appeared that it would at least be possible to conduct testing of an interlock system applied to the Baghouse, the Court concluded that the lack of any testing or modeling weighs somewhat against admission of Berry’s opinions on the interlock design.

    b. Cost

    In his report, Berry asserted that integrating “interlocked doors and grate guards” into the Baghouse would cost “approximately $200 per opening.”

    Astec maintained that Bery “gives no explanation, sources, or support” for that assertion.The Court agreed with Astec that further support is necessary for Berry’s price estimate because the cost estimate must consider more than purchase price.

    Astec noted that Conveyor Equipment Manufacturers Association (CEMA) industry manual is “an industry group not focused on regulation (or authorized to regulate) but on voluntary standardization of conveyor design.” Even assuming that the CEMA manual purported to require interlocks for applications like the Baghouse, the manual would not constitute regulatory or binding authority. Thus, the cost of an interlock system remains relevant to the reliability inquiry.

    c. Efficacy

    Perhaps the most important consideration as to the interlock design is whether it would improve safety without negatively impacting maintenance and inspection. Berry and Rebmann both testified that Rebmann needed the crossover screw to be running while he was looking into the inspection door because he needed to determine whether the repair to the screw was successful.

    The Court is unpersuaded on this point. If disabling the proposed interlock were the only way to accomplish the inspection, Plaintiff could argue that the time spent doing so could have called extra attention to the need for caution near the spinning auger. Moreover, disabling the interlock would not have necessarily been the only way for Rebmann to complete his task. One version of the interlock that Berry proposes is that it would prevent the augers from operating unless a grate guard was in place. In that scenario, Rebmann would likely have simply replaced the grate guard, rather than attempting to disable the interlock mechanism. The Court concluded that all of these questions about testing, cost, and efficacy of an interlock system are suitable for cross-examination but are not a basis to exclude Berry’s testimony on that alternative.

    4. Safety Signs

    There appears to be a dispute about whether Astec supplied safety signs on or near the inspection door when the product was delivered to Gernatt in 1984. No warning signs or labels are visible on or near the inspection door in the contemporaneous photographs. However, Astec Vice President George Francisco testified in 2024 that he worked for Astec for over 31 years, and that in his experience during that time, Astec would affix warning labels to areas like the inspection door on the baghouse at issue in this case.

    a. Testing

    Aster’s arguments about the proposed addition of safety signs or warning labels do not appear to include a lack-of-testing criticism. In the context of warning labels, the testing that is often most relevant involves “creating several warning labels that varied with respect only to a single characteristic and then gauging peoples’ reactions to the various labels.”

    Here, in contrast, the inquiry is only the presence or absence of any warning labels at all. Testing might be helpful to determine how long a safety sign would remain attached or visible in a dusty and vibrating environment, but the court does not conclude that such testing was necessary here.

    b. Cost

    Berry asserted that safety signs at each access door could have been provided “at a cost of less than $3 each.” Astec faults that assertion as unsupported by any explanation or sources.

    The Court concluded that no further support is required for the proposition that, at least compared to the total cost of a baghouse, industrial safety signs were relatively inexpensive in the 1980s. Whether special adhesion or paint might be required for equipment in a dusty and vibrating environment would be fair game for cross examination.

    c. Efficacy

    Astec contended that “there is a complete absence of factual support for Berry’s conclusion that the alleged failure to warn was a proximate cause of Plaintiff’s injuries.”

    Astec cited Berry’s testimony stating that he agreed that “it’s reasonable to expect that [warnings on equipment] [are] not going to be read.” Plaintiff countered that “the general concept that not all warnings are followed, does not negate Astec’s responsibility to adequately warn.”

    The Court agreed with Plaintiff on this point; safety signs and placards have long been established as “resulting in greater safety.” The Court’s reasoning below as to Astec’s motion to exclude Plaintiff’s products-warnings expert, Goldhaber, supports this conclusion.

    B. Gerald Goldhaber, Ph.D.

    1. “Unsupported Assumptions” on Effectiveness of Warnings

    Astec contended that Goldhaber’s opinions are “premised on the false narrative that Plaintiff was told to get close to the moving screw to check it.”

    At his deposition, Goldhaber asserted that Robert Rebmann, Anthony Rebmann’s uncle and immediate supervisor, directly ordered Anthony Rebmann to “first clean the dust out, and inspect those augers.”

    The fact that Robert Rebmann agreed that the “check” required the augers to be turning does not prove that he expressly instructed Anthony Rebmann to perform the check. Based on its review of Robert Rebmann and Anthony Rebmann’s testimony, the Court agreed with Astec that there is no support for the proposition that Robert Rebmann expressly instructed to carry out a “check” or “inspection” of the repaired crossover screw (or how to perform that check). The Court therefore agreed to limit Goldhaber’s testimony insofar as he might opine that Rebmann received instructions to put aside his training, background, or common sense.

    Astec has a further criticism about the factual basis for Goldhaber’s report: Astec contended that his opinions “disregard that Plaintiff habitually ignored safety protocols, safety training and safety procedures.” The original report, dated August 8, 2024, did not discuss Rebmann’s prior safety incidents. The Court concluded that, at best, it is debatable whether Rebmann’s prior workplace injuries and a verbal reprimand for failing to wear a hardhat show that he “habitually ignored” safety protocols, training, or procedures. In any case, Goldhaber has addressed Rebmann’s prior safety incidents in the supplemental report.

    2. Goldhaber’s Own Testimony and Writing on Effectiveness

    Astec further argued for exclusion of Goldhaber’s opinion about the effectiveness of warning signs or placards as being “in direct contradiction to his own testimony and work on the effectiveness of warnings.”

    However, the inquiry is not whether warning signage would have made the user aware of a danger of which they were previously unaware. The inquiry is whether a warning would have increased the user’s awareness of the danger. Rebmann testified that if warning signs or labels had been present “it would have made me think about becoming—it would have made me think about coming in close proximity a little bit more.” A jury can assess that testimony, and the Court will not exclude Goldhaber from offering similar testimony.

    3. Warnings Standards as of 1984

    Goldhaber’s report specifically faults Astec for failing to comply with ANSI Z535.4, which lie asserts “has been in effect since 1968.” Astec insisted that “in reality, the first version of the ANSI Z535.4 standard for product safety signs and labels was published in 1991, seven years after the Baghouse was manufactured and delivered to Gernatt.” Plaintiff maintained that ANSI Z35.1-1968 was approved in September 1968 and that the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) “adopted this standard in 1971, requiring workplaces to comply with it starting August 31, 1971.”

    Astec cited a post on the ANSI website indicating that ANSI Z535.4’s “initial publication” was in 1991—after the Baghouse was manufactured in 1984.

    The Court accepts that as true, but Astec’s argument on this point fails to account for the fact that ANSI Z535.4’s predecessor is USAS 235.1. And federal regulations incorporated the Z35.1-1968 standard in 1984.

    For all of the above reasons, the Court denied Astec’s motion to exclude Goldhaber’s testimony.

      C. Nadeem Hussain, M.D.

      Astec contended that Hussain’s report is “an entirely new report that fails to contradict, challenge, or rebut Defendant’s corresponding report,” and that it is “not based on any new or previously unavailable information that would trigger a duty for Plaintiff to supplement its report.”

      There is no dispute that Hussain’s report cannot qualify as an initial expert disclosure. Plaintiff’s deadline for initial expert disclosures was August 30, 2024, and Plaintiff submitted Hussain’s report well after that date.

      The Court concluded that Hussain’s report is partly a proper rebuttal and partly and improper new expert report. Insofar as the report violates the discovery rules, the Court considers the following factors below.

      a. Plaintiff’s Explanation

      Plaintiff’s explanation is that he offered Hussain’s report “to contradict or rebut evidence on the same subject matter.”

      The majority of Hussain’s life-care plan did not repel, counteract, or disprove the opposing expert’s diagnostic report. But there are exceptions: Hussain’s inclusion of massage therapy implicitly contradicts the opposing expert’s opinion that it is not medically necessary, and Hussain’s inclusion of costs for prosthetics and related supplies for Rebmaim’s lifetime implicitly challenges the opposing expert’s remark about prosthetic abandonment. This factor is therefore mixed.

      b. Importance of Hussain’s Testimony

      In general, a second life-care plan is not particularly important to Plaintiff’s case. But medical opinions on the necessity or utility of the highest dollar-value treatments are very important to Plaintiff’s damages case. This factor is also mixed.

      c. Prejudice to Astec

      Plaintiff argued that Hussain’s report does not prejudice Astec, particularly because Astec had “an opportunity to rebut his report in writing and did so.”

      Astec maintained that allowing Hussain would result in significant prejudice. The Court is not persuaded that any of the items that Astec lists weigh significantly in favor of striking Hussain’s report. Instructions to the jury can mitigate concerns about giving more weight based on the quantity of evidence. The discovery order can be amended without prejudicing either side. Preparing to oppose a second life-care expert will require some additional expense, but it is not excessive in proportion to all the other expenses in this litigation.

      d. Possibility of Continuance

      Finally, Plaintiff asserted that a continuance is possible because “there is time afforded by the current case management order to complete expert discovery and depositions; and there is no trial date.”

      In December 2024, when Plaintiff filed his opposition to Astec’s motion to strike Hussain’s report, the Court had ordered expert depositions completed by March 15, 2025. Now, in mid-2026, all of the deadlines in that prior order have passed. However, it remains true that there is no trial date set in this case.

      For the reasons discussed above, the Court declined to strike Hussain’s report. The Court instead elects to grant Astec an opportunity to serve a surrebuttal report.

      D. Dennis Brickman, P.E. 

      Plaintiff sought preclusion of Brickman’s March 2025 report, arguing that it is untimely insofar as it contains new information and references.

      The first issues are whether Brickman’s March 2025 report is a timely and proper supplementation. Plaintiff has identified no court order altering the deadline, and because no trial date has been set, Rule 26(a)(3)(B)‘s 30-day deadline has not yet expired.

      The Court therefore rejected Plaintiff’s assertion that Brickman’s March 2025 report is untimely supplementation. The more significant dispute is whether it is proper “supplementation” at all.

      Plaintiff argued that Brickman’s March 2025 report is not supplementation, asserting that Brickman “undertook new work and testing based on information and materials that were equally available to him at the time of his first report.”

      For the reasons above, the Court rejected Astec’s explanations for providing the “supplemental” report. In the Court’s view, Brickman’s March 2025 opinions regarding the AGSCO mesh guard are of limited importance because Berry cited that manufacturer’s product only as an example. The AGSCO product’s one-inch openings might allow a finger to pass through, but a different screen with openings smaller than one inch could be specified. Moreover, even a screen with one-inch openings would have been safer than no screen at all.

      At the same time, Brickman’s March 2025 opinions about reduced visibility from the proposed interlocked mesh guard are more detailed than his opinion on that topic in his October 2024 report. Plaintiff asserted that failure to exclude Brickman’s March 2025 report or related testimony would result in “extreme” prejudice. The Court concluded that any such prejudice can be mitigated by granting Plaintiff the opportunity for a surrebuttal.

        Held

        • The Court denied Astec’s motion in limine to exclude Gerald Goldhaber’s testimony.
        • The Court granted in part and denied in part Astec’s motion in limine to exclude Thomas Berry’s testimony.
        • The Court denied Astec’s motion to strike the expert report of Nadeem Hussain.
        • The Court denied Plaintiff’s motion to preclude the opinions of Dennis Brickman.

        Key Takeaway

        Turning to the question of the proper sanction for failure to conform to the discovery rules, the Court considers (1) the party’s explanation for the failure to comply with the discovery order; (2) the importance of the testimony of the precluded witness; (3) the prejudice suffered by the opposing party as a result of having to prepare to meet the new testimony; and (4) the possibility of a continuance.

        Case Details:

        Case Caption: Rebmann V. Astec, Inc.
        Docket Number: 1:21cv879
        Court Name: United States District Court, New York Western
        Order Date: July 13, 2026

      1. Human Factors Expert Was Allowed to Testify About Limits of Visual Perception

        Human Factors Expert Was Allowed to Testify About Limits of Visual Perception

        Plaintiff Judith Bean alleged that this action arose from a February 28, 2023, trip-and-fall incident at Walmart Supercenter Facility #5686, located at 1301 N. Victory Place, Burbank, California, and asserted causes of action for negligence and premises liability.

        Walmart filed a motion in limine to preclude Plaintiff’s expert witnesses, Alex J. Balian and Kuba Glazek, Ph.D., from testifying about certain topics. Plaintiff filed a motion in limine to exclude improper opinions by Walmart’s rebuttal safety expert, Michael V. Nichols.

        Retail Store Expert Witness

        Alex J. Balian has been in the retail industry as an owner, operator, and consultant for more than 65 years.

        He has testified as a safety and operations expert in all areas of retail
        store operations and public facilities involving supermarkets, commercial buildings, restaurants, warehouse facilities, home improvement stores and specialty stores for more than thirty years.

        He has qualified as a retail safety expert and given expert testimony in state and federal courts in matters pertaining to retail operations throughout the United States.

        Want to know more about the challenges Alex Balian has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

        Human Factors Expert Witness

        Kuba J. Glazek has a Ph.D. in Brain and Cognitive Sciences. He has researched, published, presented, and consulted on human factors since 2006 and has applied his background in human cognition and scientific methods to analyze a variety of legal cases, including but not limited to premises, transportation, construction, industrial, products, sports, dram shop, and warnings cases.

        Get the full story on challenges to Kuba Glazek’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

        Safety Expert Witness

        Michael V. Nichols has a Bachelor of Science in Occupational Health & Safety, along with ample experience in retail security and safety. He has been practicing as a Safety Consultant since 1992, conducting safety inspections and consulting on liability and workers’ compensation.

        Nichols also taught Accident Investigation, Cal-OSHA Law, and Workers’ Compensation at Cal State Dominguez Hills University for fifteen (15) years. As a safety expert witness, he has testified over 130 times and given more than 1300 depositions since 1992.

        Discover more cases with Michael Nichols as an expert witness by ordering his comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

        Discussion by the Court

        I. Walmart’s MIL No. 4

        First, Walmart argued that Balian, a “retail-safety” expert, cannot offer opinions regarding “human factors” because he has no expertise in that field.

        Second, Walmart argued that Balian cannot offer opinions regarding prior incidents because his deposition testimony shows that he did not study the prior incidents to verify whether they were substantially similar and therefore probative.

        Third, Walmart argued that Balian should be precluded from testifying that Walmart engaged in a “conscious and wanton disregard” for Plaintiff’s safety because he admitted at his deposition that he used the term in a non-legal way.

        Finally, Walmart’s notice of the motion in limine further sought to exclude Plaintiff’s human factors expert, Kuba Glazek, Ph.D., on the ground that his testimony is unnecessary.

        II. Plaintiff’s MIL No. 4

        Plaintiff sought to exclude certain testimony by Walmart’s rebuttal retail safety expert, Michael V. Nichols, on the grounds that his opinions are beyond his designation as a rebuttal expert and/or are inadmissible credibility, advocacy, legal conclusion, and factual determination conclusions that invade the province of the jury or attempt to contradict Walmart’s binding admissions.

        The Court’s Analysis

        The Court found that a considerable amount of the content in Balian’s report, Glazek’s report, and Nichols’ rebuttal report will be inadmissible testimony at trial as improper legal conclusions or determinations that invade the province of the jury.

        Accordingly, the Court will not permit any expert witness for either party to testify as to their conclusions regarding issues for the jury to decide, including: whether the stackbase at issue was “unsafe,” a “trip hazard,” a “dangerous condition,” or below industry safety standards; whether Walmart’s policies and/or training was adequate or met industry standards/a standard of care or whether Walmart employees could have prevented the incident.

        Given that the Court found much of what Walmart objected to in Balian’s report and what Plaintiff objected to in Nichols’ report improper for reasons other than the reasons underlying the motions in limine, the Court need not specifically rule on each of the grounds in the respective motions in limine.

        To the extent that Walmart sought to exclude Glazek from testifying as to human factors on the grounds that his testimony is unnecessary and cumulative, the Court denied Walmart’s motion. Glazek may provide testimony based on his specialized knowledge, such as to limits on visual perception, human behavior, etc., that would be helpful to the jury to interpret the evidence. But Glazek may not interpret the evidence for the jury. To the extent that Plaintiff sought to exclude Nichols’ testimony as outside of the scope of rebuttal, the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion at this time. Plaintiff may raise such an objection to specific testimony at trial.

        Held

        The Court denied Walmart’s fourth motion in limine to preclude certain testimony by Alex Balian and Kuba Glazek as well as Plaintiff’s fourth motion in limine to exclude certain testimony by Michael Nichols.

        Key Takeaway

        To avoid expert witnesses invading the province of the jury, the Court does not permit expert witnesses to interpret the factual evidence in this case. Instead, expert witnesses may testify about industry standards, customs, best practices, and norms, and specialized knowledge relating to relevant topics.

        Expert witnesses may be asked hypothetical questions to elicit expert opinions on the aforementioned topics but may not be asked to make conclusions about the facts or evidence of the instant case, as these are issues for the jury to decide.

        Case Details:

        Case Caption: Judith Bean V. Walmart Inc.
        Docket Number: 2:24cv8871
        Court Name: United States District Court for the Central District of California
        Order Date: May 18, 2026
      2. Safety Expert Was Not Allowed to Opine on the Display Shelf

        Safety Expert Was Not Allowed to Opine on the Display Shelf

        Linda Jackson sustained a fall injury while visiting an ALDI store in Kansas City after getting her foot caught in a display with an unprotected opening at floor level.

        Defendant filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff’s expert, Kristen Cooper VanWieren.

        Safety Expert Witness

        Kristen Cooper VanWieren is a certified safety professional and her specialty is safety programs and risk management with a focus on retail settings. She has expertise in developing and executing safety programs in a wide variety of business sizes and types, as well as several years of experience with injury and general liability insurance claims.

        Want to know more about the challenges Kristen Cooper VanWieren has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

        Discussion by the Court

        Defendant stated that VanWieren’s opinions should be excluded because: (1) the opinions were directed to matters for which expert testimony was unnecessary and inappropriate; and (2) VanWieren’s opinions were not relevant to the issues in the case.

        Defendant argued that VanWieren’s opinion regarding whether the display shelf constituted a dangerous condition would not assist the jury because the subject did not require specialized skill or expertise and was based solely on VanWieren’s review of video footage of the incident and photographs of the alleged hazardous condition, without the use of any specialized techniques or methodology.

        The Court found that the three opinions VanWieren sought to offer in this case—(1) the hazard was consistent with one that would cause Plaintiff’s fall; (2) ALDI failed to implement, execute, and enforce the type of fall-prevention procedures expected of it; and (3) ALDI failed to warn or protect patrons from the hazard—did not satisfy Rule 702’s helpfulness requirement.

        In this case, the jury could review the store’s video footage showing the endcap and documenting how Plaintiff tripped and fell, just as VanWieren did, and determine for itself whether the endcap constituted a hazard and whether it was consistent with or caused Plaintiff’s fall. The jury could also determine from the video footage whether ALDI failed to warn or protect its patrons from the shelving unit.

        Held

        The Court granted Defendant’s motion to exclude the opinions of Kristen Cooper VanWieren.

        Key Takeaway

        Because expert testimony must be helpful to the jury, courts must guard against invading the province of the jury on a question which the jury is entirely capable of answering without the benefit of expert opinion.

        Case Details:

        Case Caption: Jackson V. Aldi, Inc.
        Docket Number: 4:24cv473
        Court Name: United States District Court, Missouri Western
        Order Date: February 02, 2026
      3. Safety Expert’s Clarified Opinions Excluded

        Safety Expert’s Clarified Opinions Excluded

        This case arises out of a slip-and-fall incident that occurred at US Bank’s branch office in Kirkland, Washington, on December 7, 2020. Carol Hummel alleges that she fell in the parking lot and suffered injuries as a result of US Bank’s failure to maintain its premises in a reasonably safe condition.

        Defendants U.S. Bancorp and U.S. Bank National Association (together, “US Bank”) filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff Carol Hummel’s expert, Tom Baird.

        Safety Expert Witness

        Tom Baird is a Certified Forensic Consultant, Certified Walkway Safety Auditor, and Certified Floor Safety Technician. He serves on the National Floor Safety Institute’s Committee on the Identification and Elimination of Interior and Exterior Trip Hazards on Walking Surfaces, Stairs, Steps, and Ramps.

        Want to know more about the challenges Tom Baird has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

        Discussion by the Court

        US Bank asserted that Baird’s testimony should be excluded because (1) his methodology is not sufficiently reliable, as it does not rely on “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge,” and (2) his testimony is not relevant and therefore would not assist the trier of fact.

        1. Baird’s testimony is sufficiently reliable

          Baird submitted a preliminary opinion report, which constitutes his sole expert report. The report includes exhibits such as photographs of Hummel’s injuries, photographs and Google Maps images of the US Bank location where the incident occurred, and photographs and a slope measurement obtained during a site visit.

          US Bank contended that Baird’s methodology is unreliable because it is not grounded in science or technical data and is instead backward-looking and conclusory, failing to establish a causal basis or connection.

          The Court disagreed. Baird’s credentials and experience demonstrate that he is qualified to offer the nine challenged opinions. In forming his opinions, Baird relied on multiple sources, including an interview with Ms. Hummel, a review of photographs of her injuries and the incident location, and a site inspection conducted by one of his associates on September 8, 2023. The Court found that reliability in this matter depended heavily on Baird’s specialized knowledge and experience rather than strictly scientific or technical data.

          2. Baird’s testimony is relevant

          The parties also disputed whether Baird’s testimony would assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or determining a fact in issue.

          The Court concluded that the knowledge underlying Baird’s expert report bears a valid connection to the issues in the case and logically advances a material aspect of the dispute. It rejected US Bank’s argument that the testimony would “muddle the issues at trial” or “mislead the trier of fact.” Because the Court itself is the trier of fact, it determined that it could appropriately evaluate and weigh Baird’s opinions.

          3. Baird’s New Declaration violates Rule 26(a)(2)(B)

          US Bank argued that the Court should reject Baird’s new declaration, which Hummel included with her response to US Bank’s motion, because it violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2) by “introducing additional factual assertions, new methodologies, and additional training and experience not in Baird’s original report.”

          The deadline for expert disclosures was October 9, 2024. The Court held that Hummel may not supplement Baird’s report through a new declaration filed after the disclosure deadline.

          Accordingly, the Court strictly limited Baird’s testimony to the nine opinions set forth in his expert report and the previously disclosed supporting facts. He may not offer additional or clarified opinions beyond those properly disclosed.

          Held

          The Court denied US Bank’s motion to exclude the testimony of Tom Baird, but limited that testimony to the opinions and facts set forth in Baird’s preliminary opinion report.

          Key Takeaway

          An expert opinion is relevant “if the knowledge underlying it has a valid connection to the pertinent inquiry.” Here, Baird’s specialized knowledge and experience were sufficiently connected to the facts of the case to assist the trier of fact.

          Case Details:

          Case Caption: Hummel V. U.S. Bancorp
          Docket Number: 2:23cv1915
          Court Name: United States District Court, Washington Western
          Order Date: January 29, 2026
        1. Safety Expert’s Testimony on Loading Practices Admitted

          Safety Expert’s Testimony on Loading Practices Admitted

          Marco Antonio Rodriguez and his wife, Rosanna Rodriguez, sued Americold Logistics, LLC and Frez-N-Stor, Inc. seeking damages for injuries he suffered while working at Americold’s facility in La Porte, Texas. 

          In March 2023, Rodriguez was instructed to remove pallets of frozen chicken from a railcar. He alleged that when he entered the car, hundreds of pounds of frozen chicken tipped over onto him, severely injuring his spinal cord and resulting in paralysis. He sued Americold for negligence in failing to ensure that the frozen chicken pallets had not shifted during the rail transit before starting to unload them. He also sued Frez-N-Stor, the company responsible for moving the frozen chicken parts from Arkansas to Houston, alleging improper packaging and packing of the frozen chicken pallets.

          Frez-N-Stor filed a motion to exclude the Plaintiffs’ expert, Stephen Legge, who will opine that Frez-N-Stor failed to package the pallets in the railcar consistent with the industry standards of care and that Frez-N-Stor’s failure to do so caused Rodriguez’s injuries. 

          Safety Expert Witness

          Stephen W. Legge is the Managing Director at Safety Mitigation Specialist, Inc., a consulting firm that specializes in health-and-safety requirements, including railway load securement. He also serves as a Safety and Security Consultant at Gannett Fleming, an architecture, engineering, and construction firm.

          He provides consulting and training services on matters relating to railway transportation security and safety, including compliance with safety and security standards set by the Federal Transit Administration, the Federal Railroad Administration, and the Association of American Railroads.

          During his career, Legge has accumulated myriad certifications concerning rail-transportation safety, including from programs affiliated with the U.S. Department of Transportation. He also chaired the subcommittee at the Association of American Railroads that is responsible for promulgating and approving safety standards about the safe loading of goods in railcars. 

          Want to know more about the challenges Stephen Legge has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.  

          Discussion by the Court

          Qualifications

          Frez-N-Stor argued that Legge has no specialized education or training that would qualify him to discuss the physics-or engineering-related aspects of the load shift that he opined were present when the pallets tipped and fell. Frez-N-Stor added that Legge is not qualified to criticize its expert, Christopher Bonanti, because Bonanti bases his opinions on physics and engineering principles about which Legge has no relevant expertise. 

          Although Legge may or may not have the academic background to testify to the mathematical concepts behind load shifts in railcars, the Court held that he can certainly testify, based on his many years of experience and his expertise, about the reasons load shifts occur. He has certainly “seen a lot more [load shifts] than the jurors have.” Legge has worked in the railroad industry for 35 years, chaired the subcommittee of the Association of American Railroads that established standards about how to load safely goods onto railcars, trained individuals on how to comply with these standards, and investigated for railroads incidents of improper loading of goods onto railcars.

          Beyond this on-the-job experience, numerous agencies and organizations governing railroad safety have accredited or certified Legge. Therefore, Legge is qualified to testify to the relevant standards of care that apply to safely loading goods on railcars, as well as to the accidents that may occur as a result of failing to adhere to those standards.

          The Court held that Frez-N-Stor’s argument that Legge cannot rebut Bonanti’s opinions because Bonanti approached the issues from the perspective of physics and engineering is also unpersuasive. Legge may not be able to rebut directly Bonanti’s engineering-and physic-based opinions or calculations; he does not appear qualified to do so. But Legge may still rely on his own experience and expertise to highlight errors in how Bonanti approached the issues.

          Relevancy and Reliability

          Frez-N-Stor next attacked the relevance and reliability of Legge’s opinions. First, Frez-N-Stor argued that Legge’s opinions amount to conclusory, ipse dixit statements because they are not based on scientific studies or an accident reconstruction. Second, Frez-N-Stor argued that Legge’s opinions are unreliable because he failed to consider and rule out alternative causes of the accident. Third, Frez-N-Stor argued that Legge’s opinions are unreliable because they are based on the Association’s recommendations, which are not the industry standard and which do not cover the hazard at issue. 

          Ipse-Dixit Opinions

          Frez-N-Stor argued that Legge’s opinions are mere ipse dixits that lack an adequate foundation. Legge opined that Frez-N-Stor failed to comply with the Association’s guidelines, resulting in 25 to 26 inches of void space in a 64-foot railcar that enabled the pallets to shift and fall on Rodriguez. Frez-N-Stor contended that this opinion lacks proper support because Legge did not do an accident reconstruction to analyze the forces applied to the railcar, did not run mathematical calculations, and did not perform fault-tree or root-cause analyses.

          However, Legge reviewed the extensive record in the case. Legge then connected his experience, the Association’s warnings about the need to use proper fillings, airbags, or other dunnage when packing loads in railcars, and the testing that led the Association to adopt standards for the steps needed to safely pack loads in railcars for transit.

          Frez-N-Stor responded that Legge overstated his opinions, implying certain causation when the Association’s standards express only the possibility of a load shift occurring because of excess void space in a railcar. 

          The Court found this response unpersuasive for two reasons. First, although the Association’s standards address only the probability of a load shift occurring if the railcar is not packed consistent with the standards, Legge can rely on his experience to testify that a load shift had occurred in every similar case he investigated. Second, even if Frez-N-Stor is correct that Legge is overstating his conclusions, overstatement does not warrant the complete exclusion of Legge’s testimony. 

          Alternative Causes

          Frez-N-Stor next contended that Legge did not consider: (1) whether the railcar experienced turbulence that would have shifted the pallets of frozen chicken even if Frez-N-Stor loaded them in compliance with the Association’s standards; or (2) whether the accident occurred because of Americold’s negligence in unloading the pallets.

          Frez-N-Stor highlighted that Legge previously used fault-tree or root-cause analyses to investigate accidents but admitted he did not do so here. Because of these omissions, Frez-N-Stor argued that Legge offered an improper res ipsa loquitur opinion that cannot establish liability. 

          First of all, the Court held that Legge’s failure to rule out possible alternative causes does not make his opinions unreliable. Legge is “entitled to assume” the “underlying fact” that no overly excessive force occurred during the rail transit, or that Americold was not negligent in a way that contributed to cause the accident, and a jury may give Legge’s opinions less or no weight if it believes either fact to be false. Basically, Frez-N-Stor’s alleged alternative causes did not provide a basis for excluding Legge’s opinions. 

          Moreover, there is insufficient evidence in the record establishing Frez-N-Stor’s alleged alternative causes to warrant excluding Legge’s opinions. No evidence creates a sufficiently compelling link between some excessive-force event and the falling pallets to warrant excluding Legge’s opinions. Frez-N-Stor also has not proffered enough evidence of Americold’s negligence to warrant excluding Legge’s opinions.  

          Finally, the Court ruled that Legge’s failure to conduct a root-cause or fault-tree analysis is not fatal to the reliability of his opinions. 

          The Association of American Railroads Standards

          Frez-N-Stor argued that Legge cannot testify that the Association’s guidelines are the industry standards. However, the Court held that Legge can reliably opine that the Association’s guidelines reflect the industry’s standard of care. Additional evidence in the record supports Legge’s testimony. Mike Dickmeyer, Union Pacific’s corporate representative, testified that the Association sets the industry’s safety guidelines and that they are used as the industry standard.

          When Frez-N-Stor responded that Legge’s reliance on Union Pacific’s Terms and Conditions transforms his expert testimony into impermissible legal arguments about contract interpretation, the Court held that Legge is not offering inappropriate legal conclusions by identifying references in record evidence to the guidelines that he argues are the industry standard. The Terms and Conditions provide “affirmative evidentiary support” of industry “customs.” 

          Frez-N-Stor also argued that Union Pacific’s Terms and Conditions undermine Legge’s testimony because the contract refers to the Association’s “rules”—which require a high standard for approval and on which Legge does not rely—as opposed to the Association’s “guidelines”—which have a looser standard of approval and on which Legge relies. However, these arguments do not warrant excluding Legge’s opinions. Legge testified in his deposition that the difference between “rules,” as used in the Union Pacific contract, or “guidelines” or “industry-setting standards” is irrelevant: the point is that the Association promulgates—whether as “rules” or as “guidelines”—concrete safety recommendations based on field testing.

          Frez-N-Stor argued that the Association’s standards are irrelevant because they do not address unloading and because they are focused on avoiding freight damage, not worker safety. These arguments are, however, not a basis for excluding Legge’s opinions. First, Legge did not apply the Association’s standards to how workers unloaded the railcar. Second, the Association’s standards did address worker safety. 

          Failure To Timely Supplement

          Frez-N-Stor finally argued that Legge untimely disclosed his supplemental report because he released it six months past the expert designation deadline.

          Legge issued his initial report on November 15, 2024 and completed his supplemental report on March 27, 2025. It appeared that the Plaintiffs did not produce Legge’s supplemental report until June 10, 2025. This timeline suggested that the Plaintiffs failed to serve Legge’s supplemental report until the day of his deposition despite having it prepared well before then. 

          Under Rule 26, Rodriguez timely supplemented Legge’s opinions. In addition, the Court’s scheduling order set the relevant pretrial-disclosure deadline as September 23, 2025.  The deadline for filing the Joint Pretrial Order was initially July 25, 2025, but the Court extended it to September 23, 2025, on Frez-N-Stor’s motion for continuance. Under all relevant deadlines, Legge timely supplemented his disclosures.

          Finally, Frez-N-Stor did not show prejudice. If Frez-N-Stor felt it could not properly cross-examine Legge on the opinions in his supplemental report during his deposition, it could have sought to continue Legge’s deposition to another date or raise with the Court the need for an additional deposition on that supplemental report. Frez-N-Stor did not request either.

          Held

          The Court denied Frez-N-Stor’s motion to exclude Stephen W. Legge’s opinions and testimony.

          Key Takeaways:

          • Legge can reliably opine that the Association’s guidelines reflect the industry’s standard of care. An expert’s experience and qualifications can support his or her identification of industry standards.
          • Legge’s failure to conduct a root-cause or fault-tree analysis is not fatal to the reliability of his opinions. Daubert requires that experts use reliable, rather than optimal or flawless, methodology.

          Case Details:

          Case Caption: Rodriguez, Et Al. V. Frez-N-Stor, Inc. Et Al
          Docket Number: 4:23cv3944
          Court Name: United States District Court, Texas Southern
          Order Date: September 05, 2025
        2. Retail Safety Expert’s Testimony Regarding the Duty of Care and Breach Excluded

          Retail Safety Expert’s Testimony Regarding the Duty of Care and Breach Excluded

          Plaintiff William Ramsey was allegedly injured while visiting the Defendant’s store in Somerset. As a result, the Plaintiff filed a premises liability cause of action against Defendant, Lowe’s Home Centers, LLC.

          Plaintiff relied on the testimony and opinions of Keven Moore. According to Moore, “Defendant did not fulfill the requisite duty of care to safeguard Plaintiff on December 7th, 2022,” and such failure “to adhere to the standard professional care and practices mandated in the retail building materials and home improvement industry, which are critical for the safe operation of such establishments, . . . significantly contributed to the injury sustained by Plaintiff.” Defendant, however, sought to exclude all testimony and opinions by Moore.

          Retail Safety Expert Witness

          Keven G. Moore is a senior risk control consultant/manager/HSE safety manager/independent consultant of demonstrated experience in leading organizations to integrate progressive safety, health, environmental, risk management and claims initiatives within public and private sectors.” He has over 35 years of risk management & safety professional work experience.

          Want to know more about the challenges Keven Moore has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report

          Discussion by the Court

          Defendant articulated eight reasons why, it argued, Moore’s report and related testimony would fail to satisfy Daubert and Rule 702, namely that Moore:

          (1) Lacked experience in the field of retail lumber or home improvement

          (2) Did not document or describe any methodology

          (3) Attempted to usurp the function of the Court by opining on the duty allegedly owed by [Defendant] to its customers

          (4) Is not qualified to give causation opinions because he is not a medical doctor

          (5) Contradicted the burden of proof imposed upon Plaintiff and attempted to redirect it to Defendant

          (6) Engaged in flat-out speculation

          (7) Opined that Defendant should have had signage in the lumber aisle which is moot based on Plaintiff’s own testimony

          (8) Relied on questionable online sources for information which are not sources of scientific, technical, professional, or other specialized knowledge. From this, the Court understood that Defendant primarily challenged Moore’s qualifications and the reliability of his testimony, and it also raised concerns about Moore’s ability to make legal determinations, among other things.

          Analysis

          The Moore report opined that Defendant “did not uphold a reasonable standard of duty of care to safeguard Plaintiff”; “failed to adhere to the professional care and practices that are customary in the retail building materials and home improvement industry, which are essential for operating such an establishment safely”; “failed to exercise their duty of care in safely retrieving awkward, heavy, and oversized stock”; and, along with its employees, engaged in “several reckless and actions and inactions that helped create a very dangerous environment.”

          However, Moore failed to identify the alleged industry standard or professional care and practices that are “customary,” and fails to describe how Lowe’s allegedly breached them. Moreover, the Court held that many of these broad-brush statements are legal conclusions or generic recitations of the legal standard to which Moore cannot properly testify.

          Plaintiff has utterly failed to provide the Court with any basis to find that Moore’s method—which remains a mystery to the Court other than his listing of “evidence reviewed” and ostensibly his experience—has been “‘tested, accepted, or used by other experts in the field of retail safety.’” In this case, Moore did not even indicate that he read “publications” relevant to retail home improvement standards. Other than his own experience, Moore identified only litigation documents and websites as the basis for his opinions. Websites such as Wikipedia, Zippia, and Yelp are clearly insufficient to meet Plaintiff’s burden under Rule 702. 

          Moreover, Moore himself admitted that, because he “was retained as an expert witness nearly two years after the incident had occurred, he “determined that there would be no value in . . . visiting the site of the accident.”

          Held

          The Court granted the Defendant’s motion to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff’s expert witness, Keven Moore.

          Key Takeaway:

          Moore failed to rely on anything other than the record in this matter, coupled with his extensive experience. This is insufficient on this record to demonstrate reliability. At no point did Moore, who “relied ‘solely or primarily on experience, . . . explain how that experience leads to the conclusions he reached, why that experience is a sufficient basis for the opinion, and how that experience is reliably applied to the facts.’” The Court simply cannot find that any of Moore’s proffered opinions are sufficiently reliable under Rule 702.

          Case Details:

          Case Caption: Ramsey V. Lowe’s Home Centers, LLC
          Docket Number: 6:24cv1
          Court Name: United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, Southern Division
          Order Date: September 04, 2025
        3. Safety Expert’s Testimony on Reasonable Care Admitted

          Safety Expert’s Testimony on Reasonable Care Admitted

          Plaintiffs, Michael Graham (“Michael”) and Barbara Graham, sued Defendant Walmart Stores East LP (“Walmart”) after Michael allegedly slipped and fell on some ice in the parking lot of Walmart’s store on February 24, 2024.

          Plaintiffs hired an expert, William L. Wallace, to “review and evaluate whether [Walmart] exercised the necessary high standard of reasonable care to protect Michael Graham from the hazard of ice in the parking lot.” He took photographs months after the incident where water had accumulated in depressions in the parking lot, including the area where Michael fell.

          Wallace also obtained the weather data from February 24, 2024. Those records show that, on the date of Michael’s fall, there was one inch of snow with temperatures ranging from 21 to 34 degrees Fahrenheit. The temperature was above freezing until 3:00 a.m., but thereafter temperatures were consistently below freezing. Wallace thus opined that because “there was no plowing or de-icing treatment after 6:00 a.m. By 7:15 p.m. ice would have formed in the depressions” in the parking lot. He also stated that “a reasonable person would understand that a wet surface and/or standing water will freeze if the temperature is below 32 degrees.”

          Walmart filed a motion to strike Wallace’s affidavit for a variety of reasons.

          Safety Expert Witness

          William L. Wallace is a Certified Safety Professional, Certified Healthcare Safety Professional and Certified Emergency Planner. Wallace holds a Masters Degree from Ball State University and has over 30 years of experience in safety and engineering. He is currently a Safety Board Director for Vantage Point Consulting.

          Want to know more about the challenges William Wallace has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

          Discussion by the Court

          Largely based on Wallace’s Affidavit, Plaintiffs argued that it had constructive knowledge of the ice based on the weather conditions on February 24, 2024.

          Reliability

          Wallace obtained weather data and took photographs of the Maysville Store parking lot. Walmart called the opinions therein “speculation” because the weather data was acquired from the Fort Wayne Airport which is located about 20 miles from the Maysville Store. And Walmart pointed out that the photographs were taken months after the incident and under a different set of circumstances.

          The Court did not believe that Wallace purely speculated on the weather conditions at the Maysville Store because the weather data was from a mere 20 miles away. Nor did the Court believe he speculates on the way water pooled in the parking lot simply because they were taken months after the incident when the weather was warmer. Basically, the connections that Wallace drew, though not perfect line for line, are rational.

          It is rational to believe that there would be similar weather conditions just 20 miles away from where Michael’s fall occurred. And it is rational to believe that the temperatures in those areas would rise and fall in a similar fashion. It is thus reasonable to assume that the weather data from 20 miles away would reveal similar results to that of the Maysville Store on February 24. As for the pictures, Walmart did not argue that the parking lot has faced substantial changes from the date of Michael’s fall to the date on which they were taken. Although temperatures were not freezing and rain had just fallen, it is still reasonable to assume that water would have pooled in a similar manner.

          Legal Conclusion

          Admittedly, paragraphs 17-19 of Wallace’s Affidavit are riddled with premises liability legalese. The Court nonetheless believes that they are subject to admissible interpretations. As for paragraph 17, Walmart takes issue with this portion: “By 7:15pm, ice would have formed in the depressions, which created a hazardous condition to business invitees where Michael Graham fell.” But Wallace did not say that ice did form, only that it would have formed absent de-icing or plowing, and created a hazardous condition.

          The same held true for paragraph 18 and Plaintiff’s use of “reasonable person” and “reasonable care.” While these terms could be interpreted as defining the standard of care, they could also reflect Wallace’s use of them in offering his opinion as a safety expert. Similarly, paragraph 19’s use of “responsible cause,” though close to causation, could likewise represent his expert opinion.

          Held

          The Court denied the Walmart’s motion to strike the affidavit of William L. Wallace.

          Key Takeaway:

          The Court determined that the statement, though it contained legalese, could be interpreted in two ways: one admissible and one not. If the Court construed it as a legal conclusion, it would be inadmissible. But if the statement is understood as [the Plaintiff’s expert] simply trying to use English, rather than legal terms, to express his opinion on [the Defendant’s] conduct, it ceases to be an opinion on the law.

          Case Details:

          Case Caption: Graham Et Al V. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP
          Docket Number: 1:24cv323
          Court Name: United States District Court, Indiana Northern
          Order Date: July 25, 2025
        4. Safety Expert’s Testimony on Obscure Construction Safety Standards Admitted

          Safety Expert’s Testimony on Obscure Construction Safety Standards Admitted

          In this commercial property damage insurance case, Plaintiff Prairie Walk Condominium Association sought to recover millions of dollars in benefits to repair damage to approximately fifteen buildings at its condominium complex resulting from a July 16, 2018, hailstorm, as well as treble damages for alleged unreasonable delay/denial of insurance benefits.

          Plaintiff disclosed as a retained expert Greg Z. Gerganoff of Rocky Mountain Safety Consulting, Inc., to provide opinions about construction safety standards for the restoration project.

          Defendant filed a motion to strike certain opinions of Plaintiff’s expert Gerganoff. The Court previously denied the Defendant’s motion to strike as moot. However, the motion did not persuade the Court that any of Gerganoff’s opinions should be stricken under either Rule 702 or Rule 403.

          Safety Expert Witness

          Greg Zdravko Gerganoff is a board-certified safety professional and the owner of Rocky Mountain Safety Consulting, Inc. He provides safety consulting to various industry clients including mining, oil and gas, construction, manufacturing, residential property managers, and insurance companies.

          Want to know more about the challenges Greg Z. Gerganoff has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report. 

          Discussion by the Court

          Defendant asserted that Gerganoff’s incorporation of Occupational Safety and Health Administration guidance into his opinions is a “stunning admission” that his “opinions are nothing more than the very type of ipse dixit that the U.S. Supreme Court mandates be rejected under Rule 702.” However, the Court held that Gerganoff’s opinions are supported by a reliable methodology, will be helpful to a jury determining the necessary cost of repairs, and do not present an appreciable risk of confusion. Basically, forming an opinion about safety standards based on guidance from a federal administration is far from ipse dixit—to the contrary, such an opinion has clear grounding beyond the expert’s mere “say-so.” 

          Defendant also quibbled with Gerganoff’s interpretation of certain OSHA regulations. However, the fact that the technical language of these guidelines may not encompass his specific suggestions did not render them inherently unreliable or unhelpful in this case, particularly since Gerganoff did not opine that his recommendations carry the force of law.

          Defendant argued that Gerganoff’s opinions are irrelevant because the insurance policy only entitles Plaintiff to “the amount actually and necessarily needed to repair or replace covered property damage.” While there is potentially some merit to this argument, what exactly the insurance policy means by “necessary”—and whether that term connotes bare legal necessity as defined by OSHA or some higher level of necessity as defined by the prevailing industry standards—is ultimately a question on which the parties have the burden of convincing the jury.

          Finally, Defendant argued that Gerganoff’s opinions should be excluded because they are overly prejudicial and misleading. Given that obscure construction safety standards are not within the realm of common knowledge, the Court held that any such potential risk did not substantially outweigh the potential helpfulness of Gerganoff’s opinions.

          Held

          The Court denied the Defendant’s motion to strike certain opinions of Plaintiff’s expert Greg Z. Gerganoff.

          Key Takeaway:

          Forming an opinion about safety standards based on guidance from a federal administration is far from ipse dixit—to the contrary, such an opinion has clear grounding beyond the expert’s mere “say-so.” This does not run afoul of the oft-quoted axiom that an expert’s opinion must be “based on actual knowledge, not subjective belief or unsupported speculation.”

          Case Details:

          Case Caption: Prairie Walk Condominium Association V. American Insurance Company
          Docket Number: 1:22cv870
          Court Name: United States District Court, Colorado
          Order Date: June 13, 2025
        5. Safety Expert’s Testimony on Clothing Rack Lighting Admitted

          Safety Expert’s Testimony on Clothing Rack Lighting Admitted

          This dispute involves injuries sustained by Plaintiff Virginia English (“Plaintiff”) when she fell in a Hollister Co. store at the Greenwood Mall in Bowling Green, KY (the “Hollister Store”). English alleged that she was looking at some clothes while walking out of the right side of the store when she tripped over a clothes rack and fell. 

          Defendants Abercrombie and Fitch Stores, Inc. d/b/a Hollister Co. and Abercrombie & Fitch Management Co. (collectively, the “Abercrombie Entities” or “Defendants”) filed a motion to exclude the testimony of David Johnson (“Johnson”), English’s expert witness. Meanwhile, English filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Defendants’ expert, Randy Gray (“Gray”).

          Safety Expert Witnesses

          David Johnson is a board certified safety professional. He performs forensic engineering and safety expert witness work for attorneys and insurance adjusters for cases involving slips, trips, missteps and falls, falls from elevation, stairway falls and industrial accidents.

          Get the full story on challenges to David Johnson’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study. 

          Randy Gray has over 25 years of conducting OSHA inspections of workplaces based on federal and state regulations, while being employed at Kentucky Labor Cabinet, Division of Compliance, Occupational Safety & Health. He has also worked fifteen years in the private sector as the President of Grayhawk Advantage, Inc., where he provides expert witness investigation services and reports regarding hazardous workplace conditions that caused injuries to clients.

          He has a Bachelor of Science degree from Murray State University in Occupational Safety & Health, a Masters degree in Science from Murray State University in Occupational Safety & Health, and twenty-five years of specialized training courses at the Occupational Safety and Health Training Institute.

          Want to know more about the challenges Randy Gray has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report. 

          Discussion by the Court

          David Johnson

          English offered the opinion of David Johnson to show that the clothing rack “formed a low profile, low contrast, inconspicuous obstruction in a foreseeable passageway/walkway that was unsafe and unreasonably dangerous.” 

          Defendants asserted that Johnson’s report is not reliable because it is based on his own speculation and on incomplete information. Defendants also asserted that Johnson’s testimony is unreliable because “his own testimony contradicts his assumptions,” and that “Johnson cites no applicable codes or regulations with which the clothing rack failed to comply with.”

          Reliability

          However, the Court found nothing wrong with Johnson’s assumption that English fell when “her foot be[came] stuck and then unstuck under the clothing rack.” It did not constitute “subjective belief based on speculation and incomplete information” because Johnson did not fabricate that English’s foot became stuck under the rack. In fact, English’s medical records state that she “sustained a Type III RTC from falling when her foot caught on a rolling clothes hanger in the store.” Therefore, the argument that Johnson’s opinion is based on unsupported speculation is unpersuasive, as Johnson’s assumption that English fell when her foot became stuck under the clothing rack is supported by evidence in the record.

          Defendants challenged Johnson’s opinion that the clothing rack constitutes a platform or a display base because “the feet of clothing rack were below knee-level and/or under three feet in height.” Defendants also argued that because the feet of the rack cannot be separated from the clothing rack, Johnson’s opinion must be excluded as it is in direct contradiction of his own testimony and would also mislead the jury and confuse the issues. And Defendants challenged Johnson’s opinion because he opines that Hollister did not violate any applicable codes, and because he based his opinion on the existence and placement of the clothing rack, not whether the clothing rack was defective.

          The Court held that the objections raised by Defendants regarding Johnson’s reliability go to the weight that should be given to the expert’s opinions, and not to their exclusion.

          Relevance

          Defendants asserted that Johnson’s opinion regarding the lighting of the clothing rack was irrelevant because “he did not observe the rack with the additional holiday lighting that was placed.”

          However, the Court held that Johnson relied upon the testimony taken in the case, including of the store manager who testified that the store is dim, dimmer than most other stores in the mall, and that the lighting can create shadows on the floor. 

          Moreover, the fact that Johnson did not observe the rack with the additional holiday lighting is a potential limitation to his opinion, the weight of which can be decided by a jury.

          Defendants also argued that Johnson’s opinion that the rack was unexpected would confuse the jury because the Sixth Circuit has already taken judicial notice that clothing racks are expected in department stores during the holiday shopping season. The Court ruled that Johnson’s opinion about the rack being unexpected is specific to the facts of this case, not that all clothing racks in a store are unexpected. 

          Randy Gray

          Defendants retained Randy Gray “to render an opinion regarding the December 18, 2022, fall accident of English.”

          Qualification

          With twenty-five years of specialized training courses at the Occupational Safety and Health Training Institute, Gray was found qualified by the Court under Rule 702 and Daubert to offer expert opinions on whether an unsafe and dangerous condition existed at Hollister, and whether Hollister failed to inspect, maintain, remedy, or warn of that condition.

          Relevance and Unduly Prejudicial

          English also argued that Gray’s opinion that Defendants did not violate any Codes of Federal Regulation “will not assist the trier of fact and its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger or confusing the issues or misleading the jury.”

          In this case, the Court held that Gray’s testimony will assist the trier of fact in determining whether a dangerous condition existed at the time of English’s fall. First, although OSHA standards apply to employees, Gray’s opinion could still help jurors determine whether an unsafe condition existed at the time of English’s fall. Second, the objections raised by English go to the weight that should be given to the expert’s opinions, and not to their exclusion. 

          Since this opinion is not unfair or inappropriate, the jury would be within its discretion to credit Gray’s testimony to conclude that a dangerous hazard did not exist. 

          Held

          • The Court denied Hollister’s motion to exclude David Johnson’s testimony.
          • The Court denied English’s motion to exclude Randy Gray’s testimony.

          Key Takeaway:

          An expert may express an opinion that is based on facts that the expert assumes, but does not know, to be true. Stated another way “an opinion may be based on facts that are ‘assumed,’ or ‘hypothetical’ at the time of the report, provided that those facts are ultimately ‘established’ by other, independent evidence.”  Therefore, the argument that Johnson’s opinion is based on unsupported speculation is unpersuasive, as Johnson’s assumption that English fell when her foot became stuck under the clothing rack is supported by evidence in the record.

          Case Details:

          Case Caption: English V. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. Et Al
          Docket Number: 1:23cv128
          Court Name: United States District Court, Kentucky Western
          Order Date: June 06, 2025

        6. Safety Expert Witness’ Opinions on OSHA Protocols and Procedures Admitted

          Safety Expert Witness’ Opinions on OSHA Protocols and Procedures Admitted

          The present case involves an insurance coverage dispute between an East Texas church, Plaintiff Christian Heritage School c/o Youth With a Mission, and its insurance company, Central Mutual Insurance Company. Between  May 1, 2020, to May 1, 2022, Defendant insured Plaintiff’s property, which consisted of a twenty-one building campus in Tyler, Texas. The dispute arises from alleged storm-related damage with a date of loss on April 5, 2022.

          Plaintiff designated Kevin Dandridge of Line Safety as a retained expert to testify as to the proper Occupational Safety and Health Administration (‘OSHA’) protocol and procedures that must be implemented when repairing and/or replacing Plaintiff’s property.

          Defendant filed a motion to exclude Dandridge from offering testimony as to (1) the cost for OSHA compliance for repairs to claimed damage on the campus sustained on April 5, 2022; or (2) the cost for OSHA safety protocols and procedures for buildings that he did not inspect.

          Safety Expert Witness

          Kevin Dandridge completed 510 and 500 OSHA certifications. He is able to certify students in 10 and 30‐hour courses. He has a bachelor of science degree in business management from the University of Phoenix in 2008.

          Get the full story on challenges to Kevin Dandridge’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study. 

          Discussion by the Court

          Inclusion of a Line-Item Cost Sheet was Not Prejudicial to Defendant

          While the majority of Dandridge’s report mostly relates to OSHA safety concerns and protocols, the last ten pages of his report, however, outlines the line-item costs associated with OSHA compliance. 

          The Court has to decide whether this is outside the scope of testimony for which he has been designated. Dandridge was designated as an expert to testify as to the proper OSHA safety protocol and procedures that must be implemented when repairing and/or replacing Plaintiff’s property. 

          Because the designation includes implementations for repair/replacement, it logically follows that Dandridge would have included a line-item cost sheet for adhering to OSHA compliance protocols. Thus, the Court cannot say that the inclusion of such a sheet was inherently prejudicial to Defendant in this case or that Defendant was not fairly apprised of this. Indeed, the sheet was disclosed in Dandridge’s report and Defendant deposed Dandridge and specifically inquired about the generation of the cost sheet. 

          Dandridge’s Opinion is Not Unreliable Because He Conceded that his Cost Report includes a Sheet that is simply an “Example” and is not Final Pricing

          Defendant argued that Dandridge’s opinion is unreliable because he conceded that his cost report includes a sheet that is simply an “example” and is not final pricing. Defendant also pointed out that Dandridge admitted that OSHA compliance may have already been included in some construction estimates, but he did not examine any estimate to determine to what extent those costs were already accounted for. 

          The fact that Dandridge included a cost sheet in his report as exemplary does not make his opinions on OSHA safety protocols and procedures inherently unreliable. Indeed, the Court held that such a fact is precisely an issue that goes to the weight of his opinions, not the admissibility.

          Lastly, Defendant wanted to limit Dandridge’s testimony to the buildings he actually inspected because he only inspected 11 buildings, but the lawsuit included 20 buildings. Plaintiff responded by pointing out that Dandridge has limited his opinions to only the 11 buildings he inspected. Thus, the issue appears to be moot as Plaintiff agrees his testimony is limited to these 11 buildings, and Defendant does not address this response in its reply. Nonetheless, the Court held that the inspection of 11 buildings alone is not a basis to exclude Dandridge’s testimony. 

          Held

          The Court denied the Defendant’s motion to strike the testimony of Kevin Dandridge.

          Key Takeaways:

          • The line-item costs associated with OSHA compliance was disclosed in Dandridge’s report and Defendant deposed Dandridge and specifically inquired about the generation of the cost sheet. Thus, the Court cannot say that the inclusion of such a sheet was inherently prejudicial to Defendant in this case or that Defendant was not fairly apprised of this.
          • Defendant’s attack on Dandridge using a “not final” cost sheet in his report was misplaced because Dandridge was designated to provide expert testimony on OSHA safety protocols and their associated costs, not to provide final cost estimates.

          Please refer to the blog previously published about this case:

          Insurance Adjuster Expert Witness Properly Justified the Inclusion of OSHA Compliance Costs 

          Case Details:

          Case Caption: Christian Heritage School c/o Youth With A Mission V. Central Mutual Insurance Company
          Docket Number: 6:24cv45
          Court: United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, Tyler Division
          Order Date: February 6, 2025

          Please refer to the blog previously published about this case:

          Insurance Adjuster Expert Witness Properly Justified the Inclusion of OSHA Compliance Costs