Category: Vocational Rehabilitation Expert Witness

  • Transportation Engineering Expert Allowed to Opine on Traffic Safety

    Transportation Engineering Expert Allowed to Opine on Traffic Safety

    Plaintiffs Yafeng Zhu and Shuhui Zhang filed this action in March 2024 for damages stemming from a motor vehicle accident that occurred in April 2022.

    Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged that at approximately 12:21 a.m. on April 1, 2022, Plaintiff Zhu was traveling westbound on a two-lane section of Interstate 70 in Bond County, Illinois, as part of his employment. The right lane of the highway contained markings for ongoing construction, but no construction work was being performed at that time.

    At or near milepost 37.6 westbound, there was a manmade pothole (i.e., a cutout) that was only marked by cones in the right lane. According to Plaintiff, however, the pothole protruded into the left lane without any signs or cones signifying the full length of the protrusion. As a result, Plaintiff Zhu’s vehicle crashed into the manmade pothole, causing the vehicle to flip onto its side and Plaintiff Zhu to suffer severe injury and expense.

    Defendant Keeley filed three Daubert motions seeking to exclude the expert reports, testimony, and opinions of Michelle Albers, Dr. Richard G. Bowman, and Dr. Helena Breuer.

    Vocational Rehabilitation Expert Witness

    Michelle J. Albers has a Master of Science degree in rehabilitation psychology from the University of Wisconsin and has obtained numerous licenses and certifications related to rehabilitation counseling and life care planning. In addition, she has practiced vocational rehabilitation counseling for over 27 years, has worked as a vocational and life care planner for over 17 years, and has served as a social security vocational expert since 2004. Albers has also served as an expert witness in numerous cases across various state and federal courts.

    Want to know more about the challenges Michelle Albers has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation Expert Witness

    Dr. Richard Graham Bowman earned his M.D. from West Virginia University, and he specializes in physiatry (physical medicine and rehabilitation). In addition, Bowman has been certified by the World Institute of Pain as a Fellow of Interventional Pain Practice and he has been certified by Capital University School of Law as a Certified Life Care Planner. He has also served on the International Commission on Health Care Certification’s Certified Life Care Planner Board of Commissioners.

    Get the full story on challenges to Richard Bowman’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Transportation Engineering Expert Witness

    Dr. Helena K. Breuer obtained a master’s degree and a bachelor’s degree in civil engineering, both of which included a focus in transportation engineering. In addition, she obtained a Ph.D. in civil engineering with a specialization in transportation engineering.

    Breuer also completed 280 hours of accident reconstruction-related training approved by the Accreditation Commission for Traffic Accident Reconstruction.

    Discover more cases with Helena Breuer as an expert witness by ordering her comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

    Discussion by the Court

    I. Michelle Albers’ Expert Opinions

    Defendant Keeley challenged the sufficiency of the facts and data underlying Albers’ opinions, as well as the methodology and reliability of those opinions.

    However, Albers’ opinions about Plaintiff Zhu’s inability to work and lost earning potential were based on sufficient facts and data. Her expert report considered hundreds of documents including dozens of medical and billing records, depositions, tax returns, photographs and videos, and numerous other discovery documents from this case.

    Defendant Keeley next contended that Albers failed to rely on personal observations of Plaintiff to reach her opinions. Albers conducted a clinical interview of Plaintiff Zhu, relied on the depositions of Plaintiff Zhu and his family, and also relied on the medical records and findings of Plaintiff Zhu’s doctors.

    Next, Defendant Keeley argued that Albers’ testimony should be excluded because she did not follow a reliable methodology, and thus “the opinions included in her report are unreliable because they amount to mere speculation or conjecture.”

    While Defendant Keeley contended that Albers merely explained what those methods entail, without also explaining how they were applied in this case, the Court does not believe that to be true. Rather, Albers’ report demonstrates how she applied those accepted methodologies to the facts of Plaintiff Zhu’s case.

    Finally, Defendant Keeley argued that Albers’ testimony and report should be excluded because her opinions would not assist the trier of fact due to the lack of data underlying her opinions and errors or inconsistencies in her methodology. The Court has already rejected Defendant Keeley’s data and methodology arguments above.

    Thus, all that is left is to determine whether Albers’ opinions may be helpful to the jury. Suffice to say, the Court believes Albers’ expert opinion as to lost earning capacity would be relevant and helpful to the trier of fact in determining damages, if applicable.

    II. Dr. Richard Bowman’s Expert Opinions

    Defendant Keeley first argued that Bowman’s evaluation is not supported by sufficient facts or data. In this regard, Defendant Keeley emphasizes that Bowman “did not perform any physical tests or any kind of investigation” into Plaintiff Zhu’s capabilities and instead relied on Plaintiff Zhu’s subjective self-reporting. However, as shown in Bowman’s report, he relied on extensive medical records from Plaintiff Zhu’s providers and also evaluated Plaintiff Zhu over Zoom.

    Defendant Keeley argued that Bowman relied exclusively on the conclusions of other medical providers, rather than the underlying data generated by them.

    The Court rejected Keeley’s argument that Bowman’s opinion could only rely on the “data generated” by Plaintiff Zhu’s medical providers and not their overall conclusions. To the contrary, had Bowman relied solely on the data Plaintiff Zhu’s doctors generated, that would have raised much greater concerns as to Bowman’s qualifications and methodology, absent a showing that he was qualified to interpret underlying data from every type of medical field at issue in this case.

    Defendant Keeley’s challenge related to whether Plaintiff Zhu has and will continue to avail himself of the treatment Bowman accounted for in his reports is also a question of weight, not admissibility. Admittedly, evidence that Plaintiff Zhu has not, or will not, avail himself of treatment that Bowman anticipated in his life care plan is something that goes to the weight of Bowman’s plan and cost estimates.

    However, Plaintiff Zhu’s alleged treatment noncompliance does not impact the reliability of Bowman’s methodology. And, in regard to methodology, Bowman reasonably relied upon medical opinions as to the care Plaintiff Zhu will need and then expanded upon that information by using his expertise to estimate future costs. That is an appropriate methodology for determining Plaintiff’s care costs.

    III. Helena Breuer’s Expert Opinions

    a. Breuer’s Qualifications as an Expert

    As Plaintiffs admit, this is Breuer’s “first case as an expert.” Obviously, however, the Court’s inquiry focuses on Breuer’s qualifications and not her experience or lack thereof as an expert witness.

    Breuer did not dispute the fact that she is not a licensed engineer, has not designed a traffic control plan, has not assisted or evaluated the setup of an active traffic control plan, and has no prior work experience related to commercial truck drivers in construction zones.

    Here the purpose of Breuer’s investigation and report was “to determine if the temporary traffic controls (TTC) at the time of the incident (1) met the requirements outlined in the approved TTC plans, (2) adequately warned road users of hazards created by work activities, and (3) provided adequate positive guidance for drivers to safely navigate the work zone.” Accordingly, given Breuer’s extensive education in civil engineering with a focus in transportation engineering along with her accident reconstruction training, the Court found that she is qualified and has an adequate foundation to answer the above questions.

    Defendant Keeley has also argued that, even if Breuer is qualified to provide expert opinions on certain transportation related topics, such as passenger vehicles and commercial vehicles at rest, she is not qualified to provide expert opinions for situations involving “extensive interstate construction and commercial vehicles traveling on a busy interstate.”

    Thus, to the extent Breuer has greater specialized experience in passenger vehicles or commercial vehicles at rest, as opposed to “commercial vehicles traveling on a busy interstate,” that distinction goes to the weight of her expert opinions, not their admissibility.

    b. Sufficient Facts and Data

    Defendant contended that Breuer’s report is lacking facts and data because: (1) she never visited the crash site or performed any sort of scene examination; (2) she has no knowledge of how traffic control measures were placed at the end of the construction day; (3) she lacks knowledge as to the reasons for the cutout extension; and (4) her opinions rely on unsupported assumptions. Again, the Court is not persuaded.

    Analysis

    For one, even if the Court assumes that there was value in Breuer visiting the crash site several years after the incident in question, Defendant Keeley’s argument improperly presumes that the failure to personally visit the site renders an expert’s opinions unreliable. This is an argument that has already been rejected in this circuit on multiple occasions.

    Turning to Defendant Keeley’s next contention—that Breuer has no knowledge of how traffic controls were placed at the end of the workday—the Court again found that this challenge would, at most, go to the weight of Breuer’s opinions. For one, Breuer’s report demonstrates that several individuals associated with Defendant Keeley have claimed that their placement of safety barrels was permissible at the time of the accident. Put simply, Breuer’s expert opinion on the placement of safety barrels at the time of the accident is not impacted by the separate question of whether those safety barrels were initially placed in different, suitable locations.

    Defendant Keeley also argued that Breuer’s opinions should be excluded because she lacks knowledge as to the underlying cause for the cutout extension (i.e., the manmade pothole referenced in the Complaint). The Court questions how Breuer’s alleged lack of knowledge as to the underlying reasoning for the extension of the cutout impacts her opinions and testimony related to traffic safety.

    For similar reasons, the Court rejected Defendant Keeley’s argument that Breuer lacked knowledge to provide expert opinion as to the failure to inform the Illinois Department of Transportation about the cutout extension. Undoubtedly, if Defendant Keeley possesses evidence tending to demonstrate that the engineer in question was informed of the extension, they are free to use that evidence to challenge Breuer’s opinion that there is no evidence the engineer was informed.

    c. Methodology

    Defendant Keeley challenged: (1) Breuer’s use of photogrammetry to form her opinion as to the extension of the cutout; and (2) her failure to look at other factors that may have contributed to the incident.

    Breuer’s report first describes the site and the accident. It then lays out the purpose and utility of temporary traffic control measures before discussing the hazard created by the extension of the cutout. Breuer references numerous resources and evidence discussing/specifying what temporary traffic control occurred in this case and what was required under the applicable plans and standards. Her report then outlines the responsibilities the Defendants failed to follow for proper temporary traffic control. Finally, her report lists seven findings related to the traffic hazard at issue and the failure to take appropriate actions to protect drivers from it.

    To the extent Defendant Keeley has even challenged Breuer’s overall methodology, the Court is not persuaded. Breuer’s report provides sufficient context, explains and relies on applicable standards and plans, and analyzes Defendant Keeley’s alleged deviation from those requirements to reach her opinions. In other words, Breuer arrived at her opinions with appropriate soundness and care.

    Moreover, regarding the specific photogrammetry challenge Defendant Keeley has raised, the Court found that such an approach was permissible because it satisfies the reliability requirements specified in Daubert.

    Additionally, the Court is not persuaded by Defendant Keeley’s argument that Breuer’s methodology was inadequate because she failed to use the same methodology to “determine Plaintiff’s lane positioning” or “the width of other cutouts in the construction zone.” If Defendant Keeley wanted an expert to opine on Plaintiff’s lane positioning or the adequacy of temporary traffic controls for other cutouts in the area, it should have retained its own expert to conduct that analysis.

    d. Breuer’s Report is Relevant and Will Assist the Trier of Fact

    Defendant avers that Breuer’s report and opinions are unreliable, provide little to no independent investigation, and can readily be observed through evidence in the record (and underlying standards and specifications cited therein). The Court did not find any of these arguments convincing.

    The Court need not rehash its prior finding that Breuer’s methodology was reliable. It was. Likewise, that methodology demonstrates that Breuer provided ample independent investigation. In fact, the Court found it curious that Defendant Keeley challenged Breuer’s use of, among other things, photogrammetry, while also claiming that she provided no useful independent analysis. Regardless, the Court found that Breuer’s report relied upon useful, independent analysis of temporary traffic control standards and compliance. Moreover, contrary to Defendant Keeley’s argument, the Court did not believe that the pictures and other evidence in the record adequately establish whether traffic control measures were appropriately followed. In addition, contrary to Defendant’s assertions, such a topic is not within the purview of the average juror.

    Held

    The Court denied Defendant Keeley & Sons, Inc.’s Daubert motions seeking to exclude the testimony of Michelle Albers, Dr. Richard Bowman, and Dr. Helena Breuer.

    Key Takeaway

    Medical professionals have long been expected to rely on the opinions of other medical professionals in forming their opinions. This is particularly true in the area of life care planning because it would be virtually impossible to find an expert life care planner who was qualified to opine on every distinct type of underlying injury.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Zhu V. Keeley & Sons, Inc.
    Docket Number: 3:24cv908
    Court Name: United States District Court, Illinois Southern
    Order Date: July 02, 2026
  • Vocational Rehabilitation Expert Not Allowed to Opine on Business Income Loss

    Vocational Rehabilitation Expert Not Allowed to Opine on Business Income Loss

    Plaintiff John Thomas McReynolds, Jr. asserted claims for breach of contract and bad-faith delay arising from Defendant’s handling of a claim for underinsured motorist benefits under a Group Personal Excess Liability Policy issued by Vault.

    Defendant Vault E&S Insurance Company filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff’s vocational expert, Allison Shipp Berry.

    Vocational Rehabilitation Expert Witness

    Allison E. Shipp Berry has substantial education and experience in vocational assessment, work-capacity analysis, labor-market access, and earning-capacity evaluation. Her credentials include advanced degrees in rehabilitation counseling and an MBA, as well as certifications in rehabilitation counseling and life-care planning.

    Get the full story on challenges to Allison Shipp Berry ’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Discussion by the Court

    Berry plainly possessed specialized knowledge concerning vocational impairment and diminished earning capacity. The Court rejected Defendant’s broad contention that Berry is wholly unqualified to testify in this case.

    The more difficult question concerned the scope and reliability of the specific opinions she proposed to offer.

    Vocational Impairment and Diminished Earning Capacity

    The Court first addressed Berry’s opinions regarding Plaintiff’s vocational impairment and diminished earning capacity arising from an asserted occupational change following the accident.

    Berry reviewed Plaintiff’s medical records, interviewed Plaintiff regarding his post-accident functional limitations, reviewed certain financial materials, and utilized vocational resources and labor-market tools commonly employed in her field, including occupational classification and wage data.

    She further opined that Plaintiff could no longer perform the interventional pain-management work that allegedly constituted a significant component of his pre-accident practice and instead transitioned into a more sedentary supervisory or medical-director role. Plaintiff himself testified that he could no longer perform interventional pain-management procedures at the same level after the accident and that he pursued the Baptist Hospital arrangement after recognizing he could no longer continue his prior work in the same manner. Berry’s opinions concerning occupational change and diminished work capacity are therefore not untethered abstractions. The Court concluded that Plaintiff has carried his burden under Rule 702.

    Defendant correctly observed that Berry selected particular occupational codes and wage data that may be subject to challenge. The fact that Defendant believed that Berry selected imperfect comparators did not establish that she employed no identifiable methodology at all.

    Defendant also emphasized that Plaintiff continued receiving a $240,000 salary both before and after the accident. But Berry expressly testified that her earning-capacity analysis was not intended as a reconstruction of Plaintiff’s historical W-2 compensation; rather, it was intended to estimate the difference in vocational earning capacity between Plaintiff’s pre-injury work and his post-injury occupational role. Whether that distinction is persuasive is a matter for the jury. The Court cannot conclude that Berry’s testimony on this issue is so disconnected from accepted vocational analysis as to require exclusion.

    Lack of Specialized Training or Experience in Forensic Accounting

    Although Plaintiff attempted to characterize Berry exclusively as a vocational expert offering vocational opinions, the reports themselves demonstrate that Berry went further. In both her 2023 and 2025 reports, Berry analyzed the financial performance of McReynolds Anesthesia, P.A., compared pre- and post-accident income figures, and calculated alleged annual income losses for the practice.

    The Court concluded that Plaintiff has not demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that Berry is qualified or that her methodology is sufficiently reliable. Berry is not a CPA, economist, or business-valuation expert.

    Berry’s business-income calculations were based largely upon a comparison of profit-and-loss statements from selected periods before and after the accident. Yet she admittedly did not review tax returns for either Plaintiff or the medical practice, did not verify the underlying financial data, and did not meaningfully analyze alternative economic causes affecting the practice’s revenue.

    Berry’s methodology assumed that any reduction in the practice’s income was attributable to the accident while failing to account for an acknowledged and substantial change in the business model of the practice itself. Rule 702 requires more than a temporal comparison followed by an assumption of causation.

    The Court is likewise persuaded that these opinions present substantial risks of jury confusion under Rule 403.

    Held

    The Court granted in part and denied in part Defendant Vault E&S Insurance Company’s motion to exclude the opinions and testimony of Plaintiff’s vocational expert, Allison Shipp Berry. 

    Key Takeaway

    Berry was not permitted to testify regarding alleged net-income losses suffered by McReynolds Anesthesia, P.A., or to offer opinions calculating business-income damages based upon the practice’s profit-and-loss statements. Those opinions exceed the scope of her demonstrated vocational expertise and are not supported by a sufficiently reliable methodology under Rule 702. Moreover, because the opinions risk conflating Plaintiff’s individual earning-capacity claim with the financial performance of a separate business entity, any limited probative value they may possess is substantially outweighed by the danger of confusing or misleading the jury.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: McReynolds V. Vault E&S Insurance Company
    Docket Number: 1:24cv173
    Court Name: United States District Court, Mississippi Northern
    Order Date: May 12, 2026
  • Social Work Expert Was Not Allowed to Opine on Trauma and Mental Health

    Social Work Expert Was Not Allowed to Opine on Trauma and Mental Health

    This matter concerns Claudia Arias’ removal from the University of Washington Tacoma Bachelor of Arts in Social Work (“BASW”) Program.

    Defendants filed motions to exclude Plaintiff’s expert witnesses Allison Osborne and Merrill A. Cohen.

    Social Work Expert Witness

    Allison Osborne, MSW, LICSW, SUDP is a forensic social worker with almost a decade of experience working with clients that are justice involved. Since January 2022, Osborne has been employed as an owner, clinical social worker, and substance use disorder professional at Forensic Social Work Services in Mount Vernon, Washington.

    Get the full story on challenges to Allison Osborne’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Vocational Rehabilitation Expert Witness

    Merrill Ann Cohen, MC, CRC, CLCP has spent over thirty years of experience as a vocational consultant. She has spent nearly twenty of those years as a vocational consultant and life care planner with Strategic Consulting Services, Inc. In her role with Strategic Consulting Services, Inc., Cohen provided vocational rehabilitation assessments and conducted earning capacity analyses.

    Want to know more about the challenges Merrill Cohen has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    A. Osborne’s Opinions

    Defendants sought to exclude Osborne’s opinions because “(1) she impermissibly offers legal opinions; (2) her opinions are not based on reliable principles or methodology; (3) she failed to disclose the required materials in violation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1); and (4) her opinions are irrelevant and would be substantially more prejudicial than probative.” The Court held that each of Osborne’s three conclusions—on the First Amendment, on Social Work Ethics and Standards, and on Trauma and Mental Health—is excludable.

    Analysis

    To begin with, Osborne’s opinion that “the Defendants in this case ultimately infringed upon Plaintiff’s freedom of speech by denying her ability to speak freely while in the process of learning through muting information that demonstrated Plaintiff was not being discriminatory,” amounts to an impermissible legal opinion.

    Moreover, as to Osborne’s opinion that Defendants “did not adhere to social work ethical standards while interacting with” Plaintiff, such opinion is irrelevant as to Plaintiff’s remaining claims. Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim turns on whether Defendants ultimately removed Plaintiff from the BASW Program based on defined professional standards or based on personal disagreements.

    As for Osborne’s opinion that Plaintiff suffered from adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed mood, Plaintiff failed to properly disclose all evidence relied upon and all documents supporting these opinions. The failure to fully disclose expert opinions as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a) results in exclusion “unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless.”

    Osborne did not produce her handwritten notes from her interview of Plaintiff and did not produce the empirical screening tool forms she completed in evaluating Plaintiff. Osborne also did not produce the notes she took while reviewing the depositions of various witnesses.

    Notwithstanding, Plaintiff sought to excuse her failure to timely produce various documents by arguing she appropriately supplemented her expert disclosure under Rule 26(e)(2) on March 11, 2026. However, the supplemental disclosure did not obviate the harm caused by the delay as the disclosure occurred after Osborne’s deposition and after the discovery cutoff, which eliminated Defendants’ ability to engage in further discovery.

    Finally, Osborne’s opinions also are not based on sufficient data or facts. Osborne incorrectly asserted that Plaintiff was removed from a certain course when she was in fact allowed to continue and passed the course.

    B. Cohen’s Opinions

    Defendants asserted that Cohen’s opinions should be excluded because “(1) she relied upon insufficient or incomplete data, (2) her opinions are purely speculative, and (3) her opinions are not based on reliable principles or methodology.”

    Analysis

    Cohen conducted a “vocational assessment and/or prepared a Life Care Plan” for Plaintiff. In preparing an assessment, Cohen normally requests discovery materials, employment history, medical records, earning records, and educational records for every client, although she noted that not all clients will have all these types of materials and not all materials will be relevant in every matter. Of these, Cohen reviewed only Plaintiff’s educational records.

    The Court found that information about a person’s employment, earning history, and discovery materials are relevant to performing a vocational assessment. And although in certain instances such information may not be required, Cohen failed to identify why the information she requested, but did not receive or review, was unnecessary to formulate her opinions in this case.

    In addition, Cohen’s opinions are unduly speculative because Cohen assumed what Plaintiff’s career path could have been had Plaintiff graduated from the BASW program. Cohen identified that upon graduation Plaintiff would (1) apply for and be accepted into a masters of social work program, (2) attend and complete that program, (3) take and pass the social worker licensing examination, (4) complete 3,000 to 4,000 hours of supervised social work, and (5) then apply for and obtain a full-time employment earning approximately $80,000 annually. First, it is impossible to determine with any reasonable degree of certainty that Plaintiff would follow Cohen’s assumed educational and employment path. And second, Plaintiff repeatedly emphasized that her damages were based on the loss of her bachelor’s level degree, which contradicted the educational and employment future Cohen assumed.

    Finally, Cohen’s report is not based on a reliable application of principles or methods. While Cohen identified tests such as RAPEL and VADRE, she did not identify how those tests were applied in this case.

    Held

    The Court granted Defendants’ motions to exclude Allison Osborne and Merrill Cohen.

    Key Takeaway

    The Court will not permit supplemental expert disclosure when what is set forth in the supplemental disclosure is the information, reasoning, and opinions that Rule 26 requires be disclosed in the critical initial disclosure. The duty to supplement did not provide the opportunity to add information that should have been initially provided under Rule 26(a).

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Arias V. University Of Washington Tacoma
    Docket Number: 3:25cv5079
    Court Name: United States District Court, Washington Western
    Order Date: May 13, 2026
  • Economics Expert Allowed to Opine on Historic Losses

    Economics Expert Allowed to Opine on Historic Losses

    Plaintiff Sergio Romero was hired by Defendant Tribune Media Company (“Tribune”), a national media company that owns and operates various news outlets and television stations, as an Account Executive.

    On or around June 21, 2023, Plaintiff was diagnosed with gastric adenocarcinoma, also known as stomach cancer. To accommodate Plaintiff’s cancer diagnosis, Defendant authorized a medical leave of absence for Plaintiff on October 23, 2023. By February 28, 2024, Plaintiff’s approved FMLA/CFRA leave had been fully exhausted.

    After accommodating Plaintiff’s absence since October 2023, Defendant notified Plaintiff by letter on June 14, 2024 that his employment would be terminated on July 1, 2024 for failure to return from exhausted leave, resulting in Plaintiff filing a wrongful termination suit.

    Defendant filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff’s expert witness George A. Jouganatos, Ph.D. while Plaintiff filed a motion to strike or exclude the testimony of Defendant’s expert June Hagen, Ph.D. 

    Economics Expert Witness

    George A. Jouganatos, Ph.D. has been a college lecturer for more than 35 years. He has taught economics, finance, management, ethics, and quantitative analysis at University of California, Davis, University of California,
    Santa Cruz, California State University, Sacramento, and University of San Francisco.

    Discover more cases with George Jouganatos as an expert witness by ordering his comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

    Vocational Rehabilitation Expert Witness

    June Hagen is a vocational expert and Certified Disability Management Specialist with decades of experience in vocational assessments, labor market research, and disability evaluations. Hagen holds a Ph.D. in Clinical Psychology from the California Graduate Institute, an M.A. in Community/Clinical Psychology from Pepperdine University, and a B.A. in Psychology from Pepperdine University. She is certified by the American Board of Vocational Experts and has extensive experience in vocational rehabilitation and disability management.

    Want to know more about the challenges June Hagen has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    A. Defendant’s Motion to Exclude Plaintiff’s Expert

    Defendant argued that Jouganatos failed to submit a detailed and complete written expert report as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 as his report failed to contain the facts or data considered by Jouganatos in forming his opinions.

    To begin with, Jouganatos submitted a declaration in which he described his background and qualifications. In relevant part, he stated that his “assignment was to analyze the historic (‘back pay’) economic loss and the present value of future (‘front pay’) economic loss for Sergio Romero.” Moreover, he stated that he “employed a standard forensic economic methodology consisting of: (1) establishing a baseline earnings stream, (2) projecting earnings over worklife expectancy, (3) accounting for benefits, (4) applying wage growth, and (5) discounting to present value using a risk-free rate.”

    The following relevant documents were among those reviewed: Complaint, Romero’s employment record at Tribune, pay advices 2020-2024, resume, and responses to economist’s questionnaire and follow-up questions. Jouganatos calculated back pay as extending from July 1, 2024 to June 1, 2026, and front pay from June 1, 2026 going forward 3.58 years, the remainder of Plaintiff’s projected “worklife.”

    Having reviewed Jouganatos’s report, the Court found it sufficient for the purposes of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B)(ii). The report did not reproduce the questionnaire or responses and follow-up questions upon which the expert expressly relied. However, the scope of what Jouganatos testified to is limited and is adequately supported by documents in Defendants’ possession or that were obtainable by Defendant.

    B. Plaintiff’s Motion to Exclude Defendant’s Expert

    Plaintiff moved to exclude the statement of Defendant’s expert witness, vocational rehabilitation expert June Hagen, Ph.D., that Plaintiff could have found work within 23 weeks of his termination. Plaintiff asserted that this testimony should not be permitted because Hagen’s expert witness report failed to identify any substantially comparable positions that were available in December 2024; (2) Hagen’s reliance on Bureau of Labor Statistics to determine Plaintiff could have found comparable employment within 23 weeks from his termination is not based on any facts or evidence of substantially comparable positions in the Sacramento area; and (3) none of the open positions identified in Hagen’s expert witness report met the standard for “substantially similar employment.”

    Hagan’s report identified the documents she reviewed, which included deposition transcripts, court filings, and discovery responses. The report included a summary of Plaintiff’s personal, medical, educational, and work history, as well as his employment skills and history of compensation. The report included a timeline of Romero’s job search, which Hagen stated that she sourced from Plaintiff’s deposition.

    As a result, Plaintiff did not identify any procedural defect in the disclosure of Hagen under Rule 26.

    Held

    • The Court denied Plaintiff’s motion to exclude the testimony of Defendant’s expert, June Hagen, without prejudice to a motion in limine to be scheduled at the Final Pre-Trial Conference.
    • The Court denied Defendant’s motion to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff’s expert, George Jouganatos, without prejudice to a motion in limine to be scheduled at the Final Pre-Trial Conference.

    Key Takeaway

    The expert report must be complete such that opposing counsel is not forced to depose an expert in order to avoid ambush at trial; and moreover the report must be sufficiently complete so as to shorten or decrease the need for expert depositions and thus to conserve resources.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Romero V. Tribune Media Co.
    Docket Number: 2:24cv3143
    Court Name: United States District Court, California Eastern
    Order Date: April 23, 2026
  • Vocational Rehabilitation Expert Not Allowed to Opine on Post-Injury Limitations

    Vocational Rehabilitation Expert Not Allowed to Opine on Post-Injury Limitations

    Plaintiff Azzine Kali alleged that while driving for Lyft on February 17, 2023, he was seriously injured in an automobile accident caused by the negligence of Defendant Erasmo Lopez, who at the time was operating his vehicle on behalf of Defendant J Bermudez Trucking, Inc.

    Plaintiff produced the report of vocational rehabilitation expert John Dieckman, an assistant vocational services director at Proto-Worx, Inc. Defendants filed a motion to exclude Dieckman’s testimony.

    Vocational Rehabilitation Expert Witness

    John W. Dieckman, MS, CRC, CDMC has been a licensed vocationalist since 1983. He has been qualified as an expert vocationalist numerous times in both state and federal courts.

    Get the full story on challenges to John Dieckman’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Discussion by the Court

    A. Reliability

    Defendants asserted that Dieckman’s opinion on Plaintiff’s future lost earnings should be excluded because it is speculative, subjective and unsupported by any published or unpublished sources.

    Highlighting that Plaintiff cited no authority for his contention that vocational experts “routinely” employ BLS data, Defendants specify that in any event the issue here is that Dieckman did not apply a reliable methodology when he replaced Plaintiff’s actual job earnings as a rideshare driver with the government figure even though at his deposition he was unable to identify any literature or studies supporting this decision and admitted that “[t]here’s no particular way to confirm” that the selected Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) classification applies to Plaintiff.

    The Court agreed with Defendants that Dieckman’s methodology in reaching his opinion regarding Plaintiff’s future lost wages was unreliable. Although Plaintiff’s earnings for his years as a rideshare driver for which Dieckman had complete information at the time of his report (2020 to 2023) ranged within a reasonably narrow band of a few thousand dollars each year, Dieckman jettisoned this data based on actual income in favor of the much higher (approximately 73 percent more than Plaintiff’s best year) BLS figure, despite the fact that he admittedly lacked key information regarding the applicability of the relevant BLS occupational classification, including what constituted “full-time” under it, the average number of days and hours worked, and whether the classification even covered rideshare drivers like Plaintiff. 

    B. “Fit”

    Defendants asserted that Dieckman’s opinion that Plaintiff is limited to 50 percent of a normal workload (and thus 50 percent of his earning capacity) did not fit the facts of this case because his post-injury 2023 and 2024 tax records showed no diminution in his income.

    The Court again agreed with Defendants. Dieckman’s findings are predicated upon the notion that Plaintiff will permanently remain able to work only half of a full workload, with an attendant 50 percent cut in earnings. However, after being injured in February 2023, Plaintiff went on to earn more as a rideshare driver that year than he did the year before and only $1,284 less than his all-time high from the year before that. Indeed, in 2024 (the most recent year for which there appears to be earning information), Plaintiff earned approximately 69 percent more than in 2022, the last full year before his injury. Yet Plaintiff asked the Court to permit Dieckman to testify that Plaintiff will never again reach more than 50 percent of his former earning capacity.

    Held

    The Court granted Defendants’ motion to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff’s expert, John Dieckman.

    Key Takeaway

    It is doubtful that Dieckman’s hypothesized final calculation is “testable” as to accuracy given that his choice of the BLS figure reflects a lack of “the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique’s operation.”

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Kali V. Lopez Et Al
    Docket Number: 2:24cv4197
    Court Name: United States District Court, Pennsylvania Eastern
    Order Date: March 05, 2026
  • Vocational Rehabilitation Expert Was Allowed to Opine on Economic Horizons

    Vocational Rehabilitation Expert Was Allowed to Opine on Economic Horizons

    Natasha Shea was involved in a slip and fall accident at Kalahari Resort in the
    Pennsylvania Pocono Mountains on March 11, 2023. Defendants sought to preclude Plaintiff Natasha Walkowicz Shea from offering any testimony from her economic loss experts John W. Dieckman, MS, CRC, CDMC and Andrew C. Verzilli, MBA

    Vocational Rehabilitation Expert Witness

    John W. Dieckman, MS, CRC, CDMC has been a licensed vocationalist since 1983. He has been qualified as an expert vocationalist numerous times in both state and federal courts.

    Get the full story on challenges to John Dieckman’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Economics Expert Witness

    Andrew C. Verzilli, MBA is an economist who holds an MBA and has also been qualified as an economics expert in both state and federal courts.

    Want to know more about the challenges Andrew Verzilli has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    A. Reliability of Plaintiff’s Economic Loss Experts

    The Court found that the opinions of Dieckman, as limited herein, and Verzilli are reliable based on the preponderance of the evidence presented at the Daubert hearings. Both relied on generally accepted principles in their respective fields.

    For Dieckman, the Court found his methodology to be reliable and based upon “good grounds” because he used his standard and customary methods that he used in other cases. Dieckman reviewed several medical and related reports, including emergency room records and Shea’s CV and tax returns from 2022-23.

    Dieckman also testified that the opinions he intended to offer are generally accepted in his field and are based on a reasonable degree of professional certainty.

    For Verzilli, the Court found that his methodology is reliable and generally accepted within the economics community and his testimony is supported by “good grounds.” He applied reliable methods standardly used by economists in calculating future lost earnings potential.

    B. Whether the Proposed Expert’s Testimony Fits the Case

    Specific Opinions Offered by Dieckman

    Dieckman intended to testify regarding the future economic losses suffered by Plaintiff as a result of her fall. He relied on his interview with Plaintiff, who informed him that her contract was not renewed because of the fall.

    Defendants’ principal issue with Dieckman’s testimony is that he relied upon his interview of Plaintiff in order to opine that Plaintiff’s contract was not renewed because of the accident. Whether Plaintiff’s contract was or was not renewed, and whether that renewal (or lack thereof) was caused by Plaintiff’s injuries due to the slip and fall are disputed facts.

    In sum, the Court permitted Dieckman to offer his opinions regarding Plaintiff’s future lost earnings capacity (i.e., shortened “economic horizons”) because he is qualified to offer those opinions, those opinions are reliable, and they fit with this case.

    Dieckman, however, was precluded from testifying as to any statements made to him by the Plaintiff wherein she informed him that the non-renewal of her contract of employment with the Port Jervis City School District was caused by, or the result of, injuries sustained by Plaintiff as a result of a slip and fall on the premises of the Defendants. The introduction of any such statements through Dieckman presented inadmissible hearsay and their probative value did not substantially outweigh their prejudicial effect.

    Specific Opinions Offered by Verzilli

    The methodology used by Verzilli in calculating Plaintiff’s future lost earning capacity is a well-accepted methodology in the fields of economics, which Defendants did not dispute. Therefore, Verzilli will be permitted to testify at trial. Like Dieckman, many of Defendants’ issues with his testimony go to weight, not admissibility.

    Held

    The Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ motion in limine to preclude Shea from offering any testimony from her economic loss experts John Dieckman, MS, CRC, CDMC and Andrew Verzilli, MBA. 

    Key Takeaway

    An expert is, nonetheless, permitted to base his opinions on a particular version of disputed facts and the weight to be accorded to that opinion is for the jury. It is also a proper subject of cross-examination at trial.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Shea V. Resorts
    Docket Number: 3:23cv814
    Court Name: United States District Court, Pennsylvania Middle
    Order Date: February 27, 2026
  • Orthopedic Surgery Expert Allowed to Testify Despite a Temporary Lapse in Board Certification

    Orthopedic Surgery Expert Allowed to Testify Despite a Temporary Lapse in Board Certification

    This case concerns a personal injury. On July 5, 2021, Plaintiff Cline Cockburn was employed by AmSpec Services, LLC as a petrochemical inspector performing work for Marathon Petroleum Company, LP aboard in rem Defendant the M/V San Roberto, a vessel owned and operated by Defendant Buffalo Marine Service, Inc. (“Buffalo Marine”).

    At the time, the San Roberto was moored at a dock facility in Mt. Airy, Louisiana, that was owned by Apex Oil Company, Inc. Cockburn was injured while disembarking from the San Roberto when the gangway leading from the barge to the dock “gave way.” On July 5, 2022, Cockburn filed this suit against Apex, Buffalo Marine, and the San Roberto, in rem, and amended it on June 21, 2023, alleging negligence claims.

    In April 2022, nearly nine months after the accident, Cockburn began treatment with Dr. Alexis M. Waguespack, an orthopedic surgeon.

    Plaintiff Cline Cockburn filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence of prior alleged acts of malpractice and credentialing records related to Waguespack while Defendants Buffalo Marine Service, Inc. and Apex filed a motion in limine to exclude Waguespack’s testimony.

    Both Buffalo Marine and Apex filed a motion in limine to exclude the testimony of lifecare planner Jordan Frankel.

    Orthopedic Surgery Expert Witness

    Dr. Alexis Mayoral Waguespack has been performing orthopedic spinal surgery since 1998. She attended medical school at Louisiana State University School of Medicine, did her residency at LSU and completed a fellowship in spine surgery at the San Francisco Spine Institute in California.

    Discover more cases with Alexis Waguespack as an expert witness by ordering his comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

    Vocational Rehabilitation Expert Witness

    Jordan Frankel earned his Master of Health Sciences in Rehabilitation Counseling degree from Louisiana State University Health and Sciences Center. Frankel is a Licensed Rehabilitation Counselor in the State of Louisiana, and has national certifications as a Certified Rehabilitation Counselor and a Certified Life Care Planner.

    He is a member of the International Association of Rehabilitation Professionals. Frankel has testified in federal court in the fields of Vocational Rehabilitation and Life Care Planning.

    Want to know more about the challenges Jordan Frankel has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report

    Discussion by the Court

    Alexis Waguespack

    Buffalo Marine and Apex argued that Waguespack’s testimony should be excluded to the extent she may offer expert opinions on medical causation or necessity of treatment, or testify in any way as an expert, because, they say, she lacks the requisite expertise and her opinions are not reliable or based on sufficient facts or data.

    Buffalo Marine and Apex contended that Waguespack lacked expertise because she let her certification with the American Board of Orthopaedic Surgery lapse from January 1, 2021, to January 15, 2023, during part of Cockburn’s treatment, which began in April 2022.

    They also argued that Waguespack’s opinion—that Cockburn’s cervical symptoms and two cervical surgeries were more likely than not caused by the July 2021 incident—is unreliable, because it rests on Cockburn’s self-reported pain nine months after the incident.

    Analysis

    Having weighed Waguespack’s qualifications, history of treating Cockburn, and her deposition testimony against the arguments presented, the Court found that she is qualified by education and experience to render opinions as to medical necessity and causation. The opinions are reliable, considering her long career as an orthopedic surgeon and history of treating Cockburn. While the temporary lapse in Waguespack’s board certification does not make her unqualified to render the proffered opinions, it does raise questions as to her credibility and status at the time she began treating Cockburn. Therefore, the Court will not exclude such evidence.

    On the other hand, evidence about medical malpractice claims made against Waguespack are not relevant and would be more prejudicial than probative, and so will not be admitted into evidence. The questions raised by Buffalo Marine and Apex regarding the reliability of Waguespack’s testimony, such as the basis for her diagnosis, causation opinion, and the necessity of future treatment, can be addressed through vigorous cross-examination and the presentation of countervailing expert testimony.

    Jordan Frankel

    Buffalo Marine and Apex argued that Frankel’s testimony as to the cost of future medical treatment is predicated on Waguespack’s recommendation for a cervical fusion and that such evidence should be excluded to the extent that Waguespack’s testimony is excluded.

    Because the Court is not excluding Waguespack’s opinions on future treatment, it will not exclude Frankel’s opinions based on them.

    Held

    The Court denied Buffalo Marine and Apex’s motions in limine to exclude the testimony of Alexis Waguespack and Jordan Frankel.

    Key Takeaway:

    Waguespack’s temporary lapse in board certification does not mean that she lacked expertise, especially considering her long career as an orthopedic surgeon and history of treating Cockburn. However, it does raise questions as to her credibility and status at the time she began treating Cockburn. 

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Cockburn V. Apex Oil Company Inc Et Al
    Docket Number: 2:22cv2058
    Court Name: United States District Court, Louisiana Eastern
    Order Date: August 22, 2025
  • Expert Reliably Applied Vocational Counseling Experience to the Facts

    Expert Reliably Applied Vocational Counseling Experience to the Facts

    In July 2021, the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis required its employees to be vaccinated against COVID-19. The policy allowed religious exemptions. Plaintiff Rodney Maki—one of the Bank’s law enforcement officers—requested one, citing his opposition to vaccines linked to fetal stem cells. The Bank granted Maki a temporary accommodation but revoked it a few months later. In January 2022, Maki remained unvaccinated, and the Bank terminated him. Maki sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (or “RFRA”) for religious discrimination.

    Maki filed a motion to exclude two of Bank’s experts, Dr. Frank Rhame and Jennifer Bey. The Bank, in response, filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Maki’s expert rebuttal witness Dr. Peter A. McCullough.

    Infectious Diseases Expert Witness

    Dr. Frank S. Rhame is a medical doctor with board certifications in internal medicine and infectious diseases. He studied at Stanford University and directed the Hospital Infection Control Program at the University of Minnesota. Rhame is an Adjunct Professor of Medicine at the University of Minnesota and is a fellow of the Infectious Diseases Society of America. He has presented over twenty lectures on COVID-19 and testified as an expert in two trials.

    Fortify your strategy by reviewing a Challenge Study detailing grounds for excluding Frank Rhame’s expert testimony.

    Vocational Rehabilitation Expert Witness

    Jennifer Bey is a vocational expert and owner of Bey & Dyer. She has a B.S. in Psychology from the University of Wisconsin-River Falls and a Master’s in Rehabilitation Counseling from Illinois Institute of Technology.

    Bey has over twenty years of experience in the field, and has testified or been deposed as an expert in thirty-four cases from 2017 to 2024, not counting this matter.

    Want to know more about the challenges Jennifer Bey has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Internal Medicine Expert Witness

    Dr. Peter Andrew McCullough has a medical degree from the University of Texas Southwestern Medical School in Dallas. He completed a master’s degree in public health in the field of epidemiology at the University of Michigan. McCullough has published frequently in medical journals and provided testimony on government panels on the response to the COVID-19 pandemic. 

    He is board certified in the United States in internal medicine and cardiovascular disease, and holds an additional certification in clinical lipidology, as well as a previous certification in echocardiography.

    Get the full story on challenges to Peter McCullough’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Discussion by the Court

    Frank Rhame

    Maki argued that Rhame’s testimony regarding the effectiveness of vaccines on COVID-19 infection and transmission is irrelevant to the Bank’s undue hardship defense and described scientific opinions the Bank never consulted while it developed its vaccination policy.

    There are two basic aspects to Maki’s argument that Rhame’s opinions should be excluded. The first is that Rhame addresses many scientific aspects of COVID-19, but “COVID-19 is not on trial in this case.” This argument is not persuasive. In developing its vaccination policy and in determining not to grant Maki’s requested accommodation, the Bank accounted for a variety of scientific information regarding COVID-19, the disease’s impact on its employees and operations, and the efficacy of vaccines or other measures in addressing these impacts. The Court held that Rhame’s proffered testimony will assist the jury in understanding this information.

    The second aspect to Maki’s argument is that Rhame’s proffered testimony would concern information the Bank never considered in developing its policy or refusing the requested accommodation.

    The Court explained that the issue with Maki’s motion is that he did not point out the specific parts of Rhame’s testimony that were based on information the Bank did not have in January 2022 or before.

    Jennifer Bey

    First, Maki argued that Bey is not offering specialized knowledge, but rather a cursory and superficial analysis within the jury’s capabilities. However, Bey did not merely repeat written job descriptions or compare them as a layperson might. She analyzed Maki’s deposition testimony in relation to his work for both employers.

    As for Bey’s salary-comparison analysis, Maki contended that Bey “did not address Maki’s testimony, nor did she identify what most of the security jobs’ benefits packages might entail, and how they would compare with Maki’s benefits at the Bank.” The Court clarified that the problems Maki pointed out are matters that can be challenged during cross-examination, but they are not serious enough to justify excluding the testimony.

    Maki contended that Bey’s methodology is inadequate to determine the reasonableness of a job search. However, the Court held that Bey’s proffered testimony drew on her vocational counseling experience, described tangible steps an applicant could take to pursue employment, and offered an expected timeframe to gain a licensed position.

    Maki asserted that Bey would inappropriately opine on legal matters if she testified as proffered that Maki’s job search was not a reasonable and diligent effort. As Maki’s cited authorities confirm, the reasonableness of a job search for purposes of mitigating damages is a fact question for the jury. Bey’s opinion embraces an ultimate issue with respect to damages, but this is consistent with the rules.

    Peter McCullough

    The Bank sought to exclude only “the narrow portion of McCullough’s opinion related to vaccine requirements and exemptions or accommodations to such requirements.”

    McCullough would testify, for example, that “a position supporting or mandating COVID-19 vaccination goes against good medical practice and cannot be backed by ethical and prudent physicians, public health agencies, schools, or employers.” And again, “the COVID-19 vaccines have never been sufficiently protective against contracting COVID-19 to support their use beyond voluntary participation.” The Bank argued that these statements exceeded the boundaries of acceptable expert testimony in three ways: they are outside McCullough’s expertise; they constitute legal opinions; and they are irrelevant.

    The parties disagreed about whether McCullough is qualified to testify regarding the appropriateness of employer responses to the COVID-19 pandemic.

    McCullough may testify on the medical value of vaccines, and although the Bank disputes this testimony, it does not seek to exclude it. The Court admitted this testimony. However, when McCullough opined on how “prudent” employers should have responded, the Court held that he spoke beyond his expertise. This included his references to “ethical and prudent employers” and his statements that “[e]xemptions from vaccination saved lives and should have been granted for all applications” and “[n]o one should have received any pressure, coercion, or reprisal for requesting exemption from or declining COVID-19 vaccination.”

    Held

    • The Court granted in part and denied in part Rodney Maki’s motion to exclude the testimony of Frank Rhame and Jennifer Bey.
    • The Court granted Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis’s motion to exclude the testimony of Peter McCullough.

    Key Takeaway:

    An expert must stay within his area of expertise when testifying. If the witness’ competence does not match the subject matter of the testimony, the Court must exclude the opinion.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Maki V. Federal Reserve Bank Of Minneapolis
    Docket Number: 0:22cv2887
    Court Name: United States District Court, Minnesota
    Order Date: May 21, 2025
  • Psychology Expert’s Testimony on Loss of Consortium Excluded

    Psychology Expert’s Testimony on Loss of Consortium Excluded

    Heather Blanchard died after undergoing a surgery at Madigan Army Medical Center. Heather’s husband Roy Blanchard was present in the hospital when Heather first finished surgery. Roy asserts his struggle with grief following Heather’s death has impacted his career and earning capacity. At the time of Heather’s death, Roy worked at J.P. Morgan in a private client banker position. 

    He took a three month leave of absence for bereavement, but struggled to succeed upon returning. He ultimately left J.P. Morgan in November 2022. Roy then worked part time, a seasonal job at Crystal Mountain as a ticket checker and lift operator. He then enrolled in barber school and became a licensed barber at Buzzerd’s Barber Shop in Tacoma where he still works today. 

    Roy sued the United States and Jane and John Does 1-10 on behalf of himself, Heather’s estate, and their children, C.B. and Ian Blanchard. 

    It should be noted that the Court dismissed Roy’s negligent infliction of emotional distress claim because he cannot meet the threshold requirement to show that he unwittingly encountered his wife Heather’s body given his concession that he requested to view her in the ICU. 

    Defendant United States filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Blanchards’ experts, Anthony J. Choppa, M.Ed., and Marsha Hedrick, Ph.D.

    Psychology Expert Witness

    Marsha Hedrick, Ph.D. is a clinical psychologist in private practice in Seattle specializing in forensic evaluations of adults and children.

    Want to know more about the challenges Marsha Hedrick has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report

    Vocational Rehabilitation Expert Witness

    Anthony Jude Choppa earned his M.Ed. in Rehabilitation Counseling in 1979 from Kent State University; is a cofounder of OSC Vocational Systems, Inc., practicing since 1976. OSC has over 50 employees throughout the State of Washington specializing in ‘hands on’ case management (life care planning) and vocational rehabilitation services. He has published many Life Care Plan and Vocational Rehabilitation articles and is a frequent speaker on rehabilitation issues in Washington State and internationally (U.S. and Canada ).

    Choppa served on the Boards of the International Academy of Life Care Planners and the International Association of Rehabilitation Professionals. He is currently on the Board of the Spinal Cord Injury Association of Washington. He holds certifications including CRC, CDMS and CCM. His specialties include life care planning and vocational assessment.

    Get the full story on challenges to Anthony Choppa’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study

    Discussion by the Court

    Anthony Choppa

    To begin with, the Court has already concluded that Roy’s lost wages are not a “pertinent injury” that is recoverable. Therefore, Choppa’s opinions surrounding his earning capacity and what lost wages are attributable to the loss of Heather are not helpful to the jury. To the extent that Choppa offers opinion on “other losses” such as Roy’s “inconvenience” related to “restoring his emotional wellbeing,” the Court held that this information does not logically advance a material aspect of the Blanchards’ case and falls outside the expertise of a vocational expert. 

    Marsha Hedrick

    Hedrick evaluated Roy and his sons and formed opinions on how Heather’s death caused them psychological harm. 

    The Court held that Hedrick’s testimony aimed at damages for mental anguish and grief is not relevant to a “pertinent injury” under the wrongful death statute and is excluded under Rule 702. To the extent that she offers testimony on loss of consortium, that topic is within the common knowledge and experience of a lay person and thus her expertise is unnecessary.

    Held

    The Court granted the Defendants’ motion to exclude the testimony of both Mr. Choppa and Dr. Hedrick 

    Key Takeaway:

    Because the wrongful death statute does not allow the Blanchards to recover for Roy’s lost wages or for grief and mental anguish, the claim to recover Roy’s lost wages is dismissed and Choppa’s testimony aimed at calculating damages for Roy’s lost wages and Hedrick’s opinions on the Blanchards’ grief and mental anguish is barred.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Blanchard V. United States
    Docket Number: 3:23cv5460
    Court Name: United States District Court for the Western District of Washington
    Order Date: August 05, 2025
  • Vocational Rehabilitation Expert is Qualified to Serve as an Expert on the ADA and Loss of Earnings

    Vocational Rehabilitation Expert is Qualified to Serve as an Expert on the ADA and Loss of Earnings

    It all started when Plaintiff, Maurice Young (“Young”), was employed by Defendant, Jabil, Inc. (“Jabil”) in the role of Machine Operator I (“Operator”). It should be noted that Young suffers from osteoarthritis in his hips which limits his ability to stand, sit, and walk.

    Young asked for a new accommodation, applying for the Engineering Technician I position (“Engineering Technician”) on October 29, 2022. However, Young’s employment with Jabil was officially terminated on November 1, 2022. As a result, Young contended that Jabil failed to accommodate him for other positions under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).

    On October 22, 2024, Young submitted the expert report of Dr. John Dieckman. Dieckman provided an ultimate conclusion that Jabil had alternate employment opportunities that they could have offered to Young as a reasonable accommodation. Additionally, Dieckman opined that Young lost at least $36,563 in earnings and $6,033 in benefits.

    Defendants filed a motion to strike the testimony of Dieckman primarily because he is not a qualified expert as to ADA compliance and economic losses.

    Vocational Rehabilitation Expert Witness

    Dr. John Dieckman is a Certified Rehabilitation Counselor and Certified Disability Management Rehabilitation Specialist. He has held the position of Assistant Vocational Director at Proto-Worx since 2000.

    At Proto-Worx, Dieckman oversees the development, training, supervision, and direction of vocational staff. He has previously testified regarding wage loss, liability, and economic recovery in federal and state courts as well as in administrative hearings.

    Get the full story on challenges to John Dieckman’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study. 

    Discussion by the Court

    Defendants sought to preclude Dieckman’s report as it pertains to both his ADA and Loss of Earnings findings.

    Dieckman explained that his vocational assessment was based on a review of numerous documents, including Jabil performance reviews of Young, the Jabil physician questionnaire, emails between Young and Jabil employees regarding the accommodation process, and a review of Jabil job listings.

    Dieckman explained that his analysis of lost earnings was based on a review of Young’s W-2 forms and taxes between 2018 and 2023.

    ADA Arguments

    1. Dieckman is not a qualified expert as to ADA compliance because Dieckman does not have any medical training or licenses

    2. Dieckman’s methodology regarding ADA compliance is unreliable because his finding that Jabil did not provide Young a reasonable accommodation was based solely on public job descriptions and conversations with Young

    3. Dieckman cannot opine on whether Jabil provided Young a reasonable accommodation because Dieckman did not interview anyone at Jabil as to what positions Young could perform or review job postings from the relevant period.

    Economic Loss Arguments

    1. Dieckman is not a qualified expert as to economic losses because Dieckman does not have any economics or business certifications or training

    2. Dieckman’s methodology regarding economic losses is unreliable because his finding that Young was entitled to economic losses was based on open positions as of May 2024, whereas the economic loss assessment covers the period between July 2022 and March 2023, and was calculated based on full time employment when Young was on a part-time schedule prior to his termination.

    3. Dieckman cannot opine on whether Jabil violated the ADA because Dieckman cannot provide a conclusion as to whether Young’s requested accommodations were an undue burden or whether Jabil should have placed Young into a new position

    4. Dieckman’s conclusions regarding Young’s economic losses would not help the jury because they are purely speculative.

    Analysis

    Qualification

    With his formal training in vocational rehabilitation, the Court held that Dieckman is a qualified vocational expert. After all, Dieckman has over thirty years’ experience as an Assistant Vocational Director wherein he has performed vocational evaluations of injured and disabled individuals and produced reports regarding wage and earning loss.

    Reliability

    Defendants’ challenge to Dieckman’s vocational assessment pertains to Dieckman’s failure to interview any Jabil employees. The Court held that Defendants’ challenge to the report’s credibility can be “addressed through vigorous cross-examination [rather] than through threshold exclusion.”  

    Defendants’ challenge to Dieckman’s analysis of lost earnings pertains to Dieckman’s use of open positions as of May 2024 instead of July 2022 to March 2023 and calculation of lost earnings based on full-time employment.

    As to Dieckman’s use of positions available as of May 2024, Dieckman was aware, from his interview with Young and review of the records, that Young had applied for an open Engineering Technician position. While Dieckman reviewed additional job postings as of May 2024, and determined that Young would have been able to fulfill the requirements for most of the positions, this does not negate Dieckman’s knowledge of at least one open position from the relevant period that he determined Young was able to perform.

    Moreover, the Court held that Dieckman’s use of full-time employment to calculate Young’s lost earnings is premised on the assumption that had Jabil provided Young a reasonable accommodation, such as a transfer to the Engineering Technician position, Young would have been able to return to work full-time.

    Courts in this Circuit have held that the future earning capacity model, which would allow for greater damages than identified by Dieckman’s Report, “is an accepted and reliable method for calculating future lost earnings.”

    Fit

    Dieckman’s vocational assessment and wage loss analysis is connected to the questions presented in this case, namely whether (1) Jabil failed to reasonably accommodated Young, and (2) if Jabil violated the ADA, what damages Young is entitled to. Dieckman’s assessment will assist the trier of fact in answering whether Young was able to perform other positions at Jabil and what wages Young lost as a result of his termination.

    Thus, the Court held that there is a sufficient nexus between the facts of the case and Dieckman’s Report to satisfy the “fit” standard.

    Oral Argument

    The decision to hold a Daubert hearing is discretionary with the Court and is not necessary when “the facts upon which the Court must make its determination have been adequately presented to the Court in the parties’ papers and accompanying exhibits.”

    Based on the Court’s review of Dieckman’s Report and the parties’ submissions, which the Court finds are sufficient to render a determination, a Daubert hearing is not warranted in this case.

    Held

    The Court denied Defendants’ Daubert motion to strike the testimony of Dr. John Dieckman.

    Key Takeaways:

    • Dieckman’s report met the Daubert standard because he articulated his methodology and the sources on which he relied.
    • Dieckman is qualified because he has performed vocational evaluations of injured and disabled individuals and produced reports regarding wage and earning loss.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Young V. Jabil, Inc. Et Al
    Docket Number: 2:23cv4992
    Court Name: United States District Court, Pennsylvania Eastern
    Order Date: May 19, 2025