Tag: Assumptions

  • Safety Expert Allowed to Opine on Effectiveness of Warning Signs 

    Safety Expert Allowed to Opine on Effectiveness of Warning Signs 

    Plaintiff Anthony Rebmann sues Astec, Inc. d/b/a Astec of Tennessee and Astec Industries, Inc. (collectively, “Astec”) based on an incident on March 19, 2020, when, in the course of his employment at an asphalt plant, his left hand became entangled in an Astec baghouse screw conveyor. Astec has answered and has also filed a Third-Party Complaint against Rebmann’s employer at the time, Gernatt Asphalt Products, Inc. (“Gernatt”), claiming contribution and negligent training and supervision.

    Astec sought to strike the report of Plaintiff’s life-care expert, Nadeem I. Hussain, M.D. and has also filed motions in limine to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff’s products-warnings (or “human factors”) expert, Gerald M. Goldhaber, Ph.D. and Plaintiff’s products-liability expert Thomas A. Berry, P.E.

    Plaintiff has filed his own motion to exclude or limit the opinions of Astec’s expert, Dennis B. Brickman, P.E.

    Safety Expert Witness

    Dr. Gerald Martin Goldhaber has emerged as the nation’s leading safety warnings and communication expert. He is the publisher of the Goldhaber Warnings Report. His clients have included over 100 of the top 500 corporations in the U.S. Fifty of the top 100 law firms and government agencies, including the FDA (for whom he consulted on a new nutritional label). Goldhaber’s clients have also included the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) to establish guidelines for products ranging from All Terrain Vehicles (ATV’s) to soda bottles to in-line skates, the USDA for whom he has consulted about potential warnings for sugary products.

    Discover more cases with Gerald Goldhaber as an expert witness by ordering his comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

    Physical Medicine And Rehabilitation Expert Witness

    Dr. Nadeem Imran Hussain is a Physical Medicine & Rehabilitation specialist who has practiced medicine in New York since 2014.

    Hussain is a licensed physician in the state of New York, and he is certified by the American Board of Physical Medicine & Rehabilitation.

    Want to know more about the challenges Nadeem Hussain has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Mechanical Engineering Expert Witness

    Dennis Barry Brickman is an industry veteran with over 40 years of mechanical engineering and materials science experience.

    Brickman has developed specialized expertise in the safety of children’s products, outdoor power equipment, tree care machinery, elastic cord products, and automatic door sensor systems.

    Get the full story on challenges to Dennis Brickman’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Engineering Expert Witness

    Thomas Alan Berry holds a Master of Science in Mechanical Engineering from Wichita State University and a Bachelor of Science in Mechanical Engineering from the same institution.

    He has authored at least 15 peer-reviewed papers presented at ASAE/ASABE and ASME conferences between 1985 and 2013, covering topics such as PTO safety, agricultural equipment accidents, forklift tipover risks, pallet truck accidents, mower stability, and gasoline geysering hazards.

    Gain a comprehensive understanding of Thomas Berry’s qualifications and casework history with his Expert Witness Profile report.

    Discussion by the Court

    A. Thomas Berry, P.E.

    Plaintiff has retained Thomas Berry, P.E., as an engineering expert in this case. Berry has opined that Astec “knew or should have known of technically and economically feasible design alternatives that would have significantly reduced and/or eliminated the risk to operators without unnecessarily affecting the utility of the [baghouse] machine.”

    Astec sought to exclude Berry’s opinions regarding causation and alternative designs, arguing that he “failed to properly test and validate his opinions, basing them instead on unsupported assumptions.”

    1. Clearance Between Door and Nip/Shear Point

    The first alternative design is to add “clearance between the access door opening and the nip/shear point created by the extremely small distance between the auger flighting and the housing.” According to Berry, “this could be accomplished by raising the edge of the access door opening or providing a grate guard for the lower area of the opening, or by utilizing a left-hand flighted screw that would move the nip area to the back of the auger rather than directly below the access opening.”

    a. Testing

    The Court concluded that Berry did not need to perform testing as to his alternative of raising the edge of the access door opening. Astec’s expert has asserted that “[f]lighted screw augers typically have a close clearance with respect to their housing [because] otherwise, material builds up and does not adequately move near the housing interior structure.” That is sensible and understandable, but the housing in the area at issue appears to be rectangular, containing a cylindrical auger. With that geometry, the Court concluded that no testing would be required to support Berry’s opinion that raising the lower edge of the access door opening could put the pinch/nip point beyond the reach of fingers when the hand is grasping the lower edge of the housing.

    b. Cost

    Astec asserted that Berry has failed to conduct a “meaningful” comparison of the cost versus utility of his proposed alternative designs.

    Plaintiff did not dispute the importance of cost in the analysis. But Plaintiff maintained that the associated costs were zero, nominal, required by industry standards, or otherwise based on Berry’s training, education, and experience.

    As to cost, Berry asserted that raising the lip of the access opening could be provided “at no or little difference in cost.”

    Absent special considerations that are not immediately apparent and that could be the subject of cross-examination, the Court agreed that no further explanation or analysis is necessary for Berry’s opinion that designing or cutting the port in the auger housing to place the lip of the access door at a higher point would carry little or no cost difference.

    c. Efficacy

    Astec also argued that Berry’s report lacks evidence that the proposed alternative designs “could have prevented” Rebmann’s injuries. Plaintiff maintained that the standard is not whether the design would have “prevented” the injury, but whether the design would have resulted in greater safety.

    The Court agreed with Astec that designing the crossover screw with left flighting instead of right flighting would not have been materially safer. Berry asserted that the change “would move the nip area to the back of the auger.”

    Raising the lower edge of the inspection door opening, however, does not suffer from the same problem. Astec correctly observed that Berry’s supplemental report recommends raising the edge by “a few inches” which is not a particularly precise specification. And if “a few inches” means just two or three inches, then Astec may be correct that the modification would not eliminate the risk of entanglement for a hand grasping the bottom edge of the inspection door opening. But the Court is not persuaded that Berry needed to calculate precisely how many inches the edge would have to be raised. It is apparent from the layout and geometry of the inspection door opening that raising the bottom edge by some number of inches—more than two but less than half the height of the inspection door opening—would put the nip/shear point more than a finger’s length away.

    2. Bars on Lower Area of Access Opening, or Grate

    a. Testing

    Similar to the alternative of raising the bottom edge of the inspection door opening, the Court concluded that Berry did not need to test the alternative of adding bars across the lower area of the access opening. This solution is functionally identical to raising the edge of the door opening. The main difference is that that lower area of the access opening would be covered with parallel bars instead of solid metal.

    b. Cost

    Like the alternative of raising the bottom edge of the inspection door opening, Berry asserted that the cost of adding bars would be low; in his view, “less than $10-15.” Astec maintained that Berry’s cost estimate should be excluded for lack of any “meaningful explanation.”

    The Court is not persuaded that more explanation is required; the proposed alternative design appears to involve ordinary components that could be incorporated into the inspection door opening at modest cost.

    c. Efficacy

    Similar to raising the bottom edge of the inspection door opening, adding a sufficient number of bars at the lower area of the opening would put the nip/shear point more than a finger’s length away. Astec argued that dust accumulation in the area would prevent visibility through the bars.

    At his deposition, Berry conceded that dust accumulation between the bars would obstruct visibility if the bars were not cleaned off. Even if not cleaned off, the alternative design is for bars only on the lower area of the access opening; the upper area would still offer views into the enclosure. The Court concluded that Berry can testify to the bars as an alternative design.

    3. Interlock

    a. Testing

    Berry’s third proposed alternative design would be to provide an interlock system “such that the augers could not operate with the access doors open or [without] a grate guard in place” to prevent contact with the running auger that would “still allow the dust to escape during the clearing operation and would allow visual inspection of the augers and shafts.”

    There appears to be no dispute that interlock technology existed at the time the baghouse was designed and manufactured in the 1980s, But Astec asserted that Berry should have conducted testing to determine whether such a device “would work on the Baghouse.”

    The Court agreed that adding an interlock device would be a “more substantial modification” to the Baghouse, and that the practicality and specifics of installation of an interlock depends on the machine to which it would be applied.

    Although it appeared that it would at least be possible to conduct testing of an interlock system applied to the Baghouse, the Court concluded that the lack of any testing or modeling weighs somewhat against admission of Berry’s opinions on the interlock design.

    b. Cost

    In his report, Berry asserted that integrating “interlocked doors and grate guards” into the Baghouse would cost “approximately $200 per opening.”

    Astec maintained that Bery “gives no explanation, sources, or support” for that assertion.The Court agreed with Astec that further support is necessary for Berry’s price estimate because the cost estimate must consider more than purchase price.

    Astec noted that Conveyor Equipment Manufacturers Association (CEMA) industry manual is “an industry group not focused on regulation (or authorized to regulate) but on voluntary standardization of conveyor design.” Even assuming that the CEMA manual purported to require interlocks for applications like the Baghouse, the manual would not constitute regulatory or binding authority. Thus, the cost of an interlock system remains relevant to the reliability inquiry.

    c. Efficacy

    Perhaps the most important consideration as to the interlock design is whether it would improve safety without negatively impacting maintenance and inspection. Berry and Rebmann both testified that Rebmann needed the crossover screw to be running while he was looking into the inspection door because he needed to determine whether the repair to the screw was successful.

    The Court is unpersuaded on this point. If disabling the proposed interlock were the only way to accomplish the inspection, Plaintiff could argue that the time spent doing so could have called extra attention to the need for caution near the spinning auger. Moreover, disabling the interlock would not have necessarily been the only way for Rebmann to complete his task. One version of the interlock that Berry proposes is that it would prevent the augers from operating unless a grate guard was in place. In that scenario, Rebmann would likely have simply replaced the grate guard, rather than attempting to disable the interlock mechanism. The Court concluded that all of these questions about testing, cost, and efficacy of an interlock system are suitable for cross-examination but are not a basis to exclude Berry’s testimony on that alternative.

    4. Safety Signs

    There appears to be a dispute about whether Astec supplied safety signs on or near the inspection door when the product was delivered to Gernatt in 1984. No warning signs or labels are visible on or near the inspection door in the contemporaneous photographs. However, Astec Vice President George Francisco testified in 2024 that he worked for Astec for over 31 years, and that in his experience during that time, Astec would affix warning labels to areas like the inspection door on the baghouse at issue in this case.

    a. Testing

    Aster’s arguments about the proposed addition of safety signs or warning labels do not appear to include a lack-of-testing criticism. In the context of warning labels, the testing that is often most relevant involves “creating several warning labels that varied with respect only to a single characteristic and then gauging peoples’ reactions to the various labels.”

    Here, in contrast, the inquiry is only the presence or absence of any warning labels at all. Testing might be helpful to determine how long a safety sign would remain attached or visible in a dusty and vibrating environment, but the court does not conclude that such testing was necessary here.

    b. Cost

    Berry asserted that safety signs at each access door could have been provided “at a cost of less than $3 each.” Astec faults that assertion as unsupported by any explanation or sources.

    The Court concluded that no further support is required for the proposition that, at least compared to the total cost of a baghouse, industrial safety signs were relatively inexpensive in the 1980s. Whether special adhesion or paint might be required for equipment in a dusty and vibrating environment would be fair game for cross examination.

    c. Efficacy

    Astec contended that “there is a complete absence of factual support for Berry’s conclusion that the alleged failure to warn was a proximate cause of Plaintiff’s injuries.”

    Astec cited Berry’s testimony stating that he agreed that “it’s reasonable to expect that [warnings on equipment] [are] not going to be read.” Plaintiff countered that “the general concept that not all warnings are followed, does not negate Astec’s responsibility to adequately warn.”

    The Court agreed with Plaintiff on this point; safety signs and placards have long been established as “resulting in greater safety.” The Court’s reasoning below as to Astec’s motion to exclude Plaintiff’s products-warnings expert, Goldhaber, supports this conclusion.

    B. Gerald Goldhaber, Ph.D.

    1. “Unsupported Assumptions” on Effectiveness of Warnings

    Astec contended that Goldhaber’s opinions are “premised on the false narrative that Plaintiff was told to get close to the moving screw to check it.”

    At his deposition, Goldhaber asserted that Robert Rebmann, Anthony Rebmann’s uncle and immediate supervisor, directly ordered Anthony Rebmann to “first clean the dust out, and inspect those augers.”

    The fact that Robert Rebmann agreed that the “check” required the augers to be turning does not prove that he expressly instructed Anthony Rebmann to perform the check. Based on its review of Robert Rebmann and Anthony Rebmann’s testimony, the Court agreed with Astec that there is no support for the proposition that Robert Rebmann expressly instructed to carry out a “check” or “inspection” of the repaired crossover screw (or how to perform that check). The Court therefore agreed to limit Goldhaber’s testimony insofar as he might opine that Rebmann received instructions to put aside his training, background, or common sense.

    Astec has a further criticism about the factual basis for Goldhaber’s report: Astec contended that his opinions “disregard that Plaintiff habitually ignored safety protocols, safety training and safety procedures.” The original report, dated August 8, 2024, did not discuss Rebmann’s prior safety incidents. The Court concluded that, at best, it is debatable whether Rebmann’s prior workplace injuries and a verbal reprimand for failing to wear a hardhat show that he “habitually ignored” safety protocols, training, or procedures. In any case, Goldhaber has addressed Rebmann’s prior safety incidents in the supplemental report.

    2. Goldhaber’s Own Testimony and Writing on Effectiveness

    Astec further argued for exclusion of Goldhaber’s opinion about the effectiveness of warning signs or placards as being “in direct contradiction to his own testimony and work on the effectiveness of warnings.”

    However, the inquiry is not whether warning signage would have made the user aware of a danger of which they were previously unaware. The inquiry is whether a warning would have increased the user’s awareness of the danger. Rebmann testified that if warning signs or labels had been present “it would have made me think about becoming—it would have made me think about coming in close proximity a little bit more.” A jury can assess that testimony, and the Court will not exclude Goldhaber from offering similar testimony.

    3. Warnings Standards as of 1984

    Goldhaber’s report specifically faults Astec for failing to comply with ANSI Z535.4, which lie asserts “has been in effect since 1968.” Astec insisted that “in reality, the first version of the ANSI Z535.4 standard for product safety signs and labels was published in 1991, seven years after the Baghouse was manufactured and delivered to Gernatt.” Plaintiff maintained that ANSI Z35.1-1968 was approved in September 1968 and that the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) “adopted this standard in 1971, requiring workplaces to comply with it starting August 31, 1971.”

    Astec cited a post on the ANSI website indicating that ANSI Z535.4’s “initial publication” was in 1991—after the Baghouse was manufactured in 1984.

    The Court accepts that as true, but Astec’s argument on this point fails to account for the fact that ANSI Z535.4’s predecessor is USAS 235.1. And federal regulations incorporated the Z35.1-1968 standard in 1984.

    For all of the above reasons, the Court denied Astec’s motion to exclude Goldhaber’s testimony.

      C. Nadeem Hussain, M.D.

      Astec contended that Hussain’s report is “an entirely new report that fails to contradict, challenge, or rebut Defendant’s corresponding report,” and that it is “not based on any new or previously unavailable information that would trigger a duty for Plaintiff to supplement its report.”

      There is no dispute that Hussain’s report cannot qualify as an initial expert disclosure. Plaintiff’s deadline for initial expert disclosures was August 30, 2024, and Plaintiff submitted Hussain’s report well after that date.

      The Court concluded that Hussain’s report is partly a proper rebuttal and partly and improper new expert report. Insofar as the report violates the discovery rules, the Court considers the following factors below.

      a. Plaintiff’s Explanation

      Plaintiff’s explanation is that he offered Hussain’s report “to contradict or rebut evidence on the same subject matter.”

      The majority of Hussain’s life-care plan did not repel, counteract, or disprove the opposing expert’s diagnostic report. But there are exceptions: Hussain’s inclusion of massage therapy implicitly contradicts the opposing expert’s opinion that it is not medically necessary, and Hussain’s inclusion of costs for prosthetics and related supplies for Rebmaim’s lifetime implicitly challenges the opposing expert’s remark about prosthetic abandonment. This factor is therefore mixed.

      b. Importance of Hussain’s Testimony

      In general, a second life-care plan is not particularly important to Plaintiff’s case. But medical opinions on the necessity or utility of the highest dollar-value treatments are very important to Plaintiff’s damages case. This factor is also mixed.

      c. Prejudice to Astec

      Plaintiff argued that Hussain’s report does not prejudice Astec, particularly because Astec had “an opportunity to rebut his report in writing and did so.”

      Astec maintained that allowing Hussain would result in significant prejudice. The Court is not persuaded that any of the items that Astec lists weigh significantly in favor of striking Hussain’s report. Instructions to the jury can mitigate concerns about giving more weight based on the quantity of evidence. The discovery order can be amended without prejudicing either side. Preparing to oppose a second life-care expert will require some additional expense, but it is not excessive in proportion to all the other expenses in this litigation.

      d. Possibility of Continuance

      Finally, Plaintiff asserted that a continuance is possible because “there is time afforded by the current case management order to complete expert discovery and depositions; and there is no trial date.”

      In December 2024, when Plaintiff filed his opposition to Astec’s motion to strike Hussain’s report, the Court had ordered expert depositions completed by March 15, 2025. Now, in mid-2026, all of the deadlines in that prior order have passed. However, it remains true that there is no trial date set in this case.

      For the reasons discussed above, the Court declined to strike Hussain’s report. The Court instead elects to grant Astec an opportunity to serve a surrebuttal report.

      D. Dennis Brickman, P.E. 

      Plaintiff sought preclusion of Brickman’s March 2025 report, arguing that it is untimely insofar as it contains new information and references.

      The first issues are whether Brickman’s March 2025 report is a timely and proper supplementation. Plaintiff has identified no court order altering the deadline, and because no trial date has been set, Rule 26(a)(3)(B)‘s 30-day deadline has not yet expired.

      The Court therefore rejected Plaintiff’s assertion that Brickman’s March 2025 report is untimely supplementation. The more significant dispute is whether it is proper “supplementation” at all.

      Plaintiff argued that Brickman’s March 2025 report is not supplementation, asserting that Brickman “undertook new work and testing based on information and materials that were equally available to him at the time of his first report.”

      For the reasons above, the Court rejected Astec’s explanations for providing the “supplemental” report. In the Court’s view, Brickman’s March 2025 opinions regarding the AGSCO mesh guard are of limited importance because Berry cited that manufacturer’s product only as an example. The AGSCO product’s one-inch openings might allow a finger to pass through, but a different screen with openings smaller than one inch could be specified. Moreover, even a screen with one-inch openings would have been safer than no screen at all.

      At the same time, Brickman’s March 2025 opinions about reduced visibility from the proposed interlocked mesh guard are more detailed than his opinion on that topic in his October 2024 report. Plaintiff asserted that failure to exclude Brickman’s March 2025 report or related testimony would result in “extreme” prejudice. The Court concluded that any such prejudice can be mitigated by granting Plaintiff the opportunity for a surrebuttal.

        Held

        • The Court denied Astec’s motion in limine to exclude Gerald Goldhaber’s testimony.
        • The Court granted in part and denied in part Astec’s motion in limine to exclude Thomas Berry’s testimony.
        • The Court denied Astec’s motion to strike the expert report of Nadeem Hussain.
        • The Court denied Plaintiff’s motion to preclude the opinions of Dennis Brickman.

        Key Takeaway

        Turning to the question of the proper sanction for failure to conform to the discovery rules, the Court considers (1) the party’s explanation for the failure to comply with the discovery order; (2) the importance of the testimony of the precluded witness; (3) the prejudice suffered by the opposing party as a result of having to prepare to meet the new testimony; and (4) the possibility of a continuance.

        Case Details:

        Case Caption: Rebmann V. Astec, Inc.
        Docket Number: 1:21cv879
        Court Name: United States District Court, New York Western
        Order Date: July 13, 2026

      1. Economics Expert Witness’ Estimate of ED Treatment Utilization Deemed Reliable

        Economics Expert Witness’ Estimate of ED Treatment Utilization Deemed Reliable

        Plaintiffs Molly C. and Naomi L. are beneficiaries of group health insurance plans administered by Defendant Oxford Health Insurance, Inc. (Oxford). Beginning in 2019, Plaintiffs were diagnosed with eating disorders, received outpatient nutritional counseling as part of their treatment, and submitted claims for that counseling to Oxford, which denied them on the ground that their plans did not cover  those services. Because Oxford did cover nutritional counseling for diabetes, Plaintiffs contended that its failure to do the same for eating disorders violated the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act (Parity Act).

        Plaintiffs sought to certify a class consisting of all persons who were covered under an Oxford group health insurance plan in New York, were diagnosed with one of five specified eating disorders (EDs), received outpatient nutritional counseling from November 30, 2015 to the present (the Class Period), and either (a) submitted claims for that counseling, which Oxford denied on the ground that it was “not a covered benefit” (the Denied Claims Subclass), or (b) did not submit claims (the No Claims Subclass). In order to establish the required numerosity of each proposed subclass, Plaintiffs rely on two expert declarations from Frank Fox, Ph.D., who estimates — based on claims data supplied by Oxford — that during the Class Period at least 458 Oxford members with EDs submitted at least 1,461 claims for outpatient nutritional counseling that were denied because the treatment was “not a covered benefit.”

        Motion to Exclude

        Fox also opines that, during the same period, 1,300 to 1,795 Oxford members per year would have received nutritional counseling for their EDs, had it been a covered benefit, and that 513 to 709 Oxford members per year actually did receive such treatment.

        Oxford filed a motion to exclude Fox’s opinions pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 702 and the standards set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) and its progeny.

        Economics Expert Witness

        Frank Fox is an economist, who has owned and operated his own consulting practice since 1996. He earned his Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Washington in 1977. He has extensive experience providing expert testimony estimating utilization and cost expenditures for various disease states.

        Get the full story on challenges to Frank Fox’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study. 

        Discussion by the Court

        In his initial declaration, Fox (i) estimates the number of Oxford members in New York who received nutritional counseling for EDs between November 30, 2015 and the present (the Study Period); (ii) analyzes the claims data produced by Oxford (OXF0032564) to independently determine the number of claims for such counseling that were submitted over the Study Period, as well as those that were denied on the ground that the services were not covered; and (iii) compares the two sets of figures, offering a hypothesis as to the difference.

        In his supplemental declaration, Fox defends his analysis against Michael J.  Petron’s challenges. He disagreed with Petron’s definition of an “allowed” claim, calling it “overly expansive.” Even using that expansive definition, Fox counts 413 unique members whose nutritional counseling claims for EDs were denied before Oxford’s 2021 reconfiguration, and estimates that there were 430 (still well above the numerosity threshold) across the entire Study Period. Fox also “disagree[s] with Petron’s conclusion that it is not possible to estimate the population of individuals within the proposed Class from the provided Claims Data.” He argued that Petron’s “conjectured hypothetical” that some nutritional counseling claims might have been denied for other reasons is “meaningless,” because, by definition, a member with an ED whose claim was denied for lack of coverage meets the criteria for inclusion in the class.

        Lastly (as relevant here), Fox agreed that his utilization estimates for nutritional counseling are based on “statistics with degrees of uncertainty,” but defended his conclusions as “reliable and reasonable” in light of available data.

        In their class certification papers, Plaintiffs relied on Fox’s work to show that both the Denied Claims Subclass and No Claims Subclass were sufficiently numerous to permit certification.

        Reliability

        Oxford challenged the reliability of Fox’s opinions on several different grounds.

        Rule 26(a)(1)(B)

        During his deposition, Fox drew a distinction between a declaration and an expert report. He explained that his initial declaration (at 14 pages, not including his CV and list of prior testimony) “was intended to be succinct,”  whereas, in his experience, expert reports are longer, “more like 40 to 80 pages,” “much more in depth, [with] much more support, much more analysis, much more exploration of why I reached the conclusions I did, more quantitative, more qualitative.” From this testimony, Oxford concluded that Fox has “admitted” that neither of his declarations is an expert report “as required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” and has “fully acknowledged” that his testimony “does not even come close to meeting the exacting standard for reliable testimony.”

        The Court held that Fox’s declarations satisfy this standard. Although Oxford argued that Fox failed to “test certain assumptions,” failed to “comprehensively analyze the studies he relied upon,” and failed to “document his assessment” of those studies, these critiques go to the quality of his analysis, not his compliance with Rule 26(a)(2)(b).

        Insufficient Data

        Oxford argued that Fox’s estimates are unreliable because he had insufficient data to “validate his assumptions.”

        Specifically, Oxford asserted, Fox failed to validate his “assumption that the age and sex mix of Oxford’s ERISA plan members is comparable to that of the entire state [of] New York,” because he “didn’t have the data.” But Oxford — which does have the data — offers no reason to believe that the age and sex mix of its covered population in New York differs in any material respect from the age and sex mix of all New York residents.

        Oxford also faults Fox for relying on the 2019 Ward Study for his estimates of “one-year treatment rates by condition,” without “validating his assumptions.” At deposition, Fox explained that “he did not have any ‘better data than the originators of the study.” 

        According to Oxford, this rendered Fox’s opinions “unreliable and subject to exclusion.” The Court noted that Defendant presented no inconsistent data or contradictory research. Nor does it suggest that experts in Fox’s field cannot “reasonably rely” on prior academic research such as the Ward Study to construct healthcare utilization models. 

        The courts draw a distinction between insufficient data and imperfect data. If a proposed expert lacks the basic information required by professionals in his field to form an opinion, his testimony will be excluded.

        The Court held that Defendant has failed to show either that Fox’s opinions were based on “insufficient data,” in violation of Rule 702, or that he relied upon facts or data beyond those that experts in his field “would reasonably rely on,” in violation of Rule 703.

         Unrepresentative Studies

        Lastly, Oxford contended that the studies upon which Fox relied rendered his opinions unreliable because they were too old, not specific to New York, or “cherry-picked” to support Fox’s conclusions. For example, Oxford questioned Fox’s reliance on the “first nationally representative study of eating disorders in the United States,” because he “did not perform any analysis to confirm that this data was representative of recent nutritional counseling rates in New York for eating disorders.” But Fox did not rely on the Hudson Study to determine “recent nutritional counseling rates in New York.” He relied on it (in part) to determine overall “treatment rates” for EDs. And Oxford offered no reason to believe that overall ED treatment rates in the State of New York are materially different from those in the rest of the country.

        The research that Fox actually relied on for his “low estimate” (that 24% of the Oxford members in New York who were in treatment for their EDs received nutritional counseling as part of their treatment) was the Yager Survey, published in 1989, based on a survey of 641 American women with eating disorders. Oxford characterizes that data as “outdated” and argues that it “cannot be used to reliably forecast current eating disorder treatment trends.”

        The Court held that although Oxford might have raised questions about some of the assumptions made by Fox, it has not shown that his reliance on the Ward Study, the Hudson Study, or the Yager Survey is “so ‘speculative,’ ‘conjectural,’ or ‘unrealistic and contradictory’ that they render his estimate of [ED treatment utilization] fundamentally unreliable.”

        Held

        The Court denied the Defendant’s motion to exclude Frank Fox’s opinions.

        Key Takeaways:

        • An expert need not base his or her opinion on the best possible evidence, regardless of availability, but upon good grounds, based on what is known.
        • Imperfect data goes to the weight of the expert’s opinion, not its admissibility, and is not grounds for exclusion. 

        Case Details:

        Case Caption: Molly C. Et Al V. Oxford Health Insurance, Inc.
        Docket Number: 1:21cv10144
        Court: United States District Court, New York Southern
        Order Date: November 21, 2024
      2. Testimony of Plant Genetics Expert Witness Based on his own Academic Research Admitted

        Testimony of Plant Genetics Expert Witness Based on his own Academic Research Admitted

        A district judge in Arizona decided against excluding the testimony of a plant geneticist considering his specialized technical expertise in wheat genetics and breeding.

        Plaintiff, Calyxt Inc. is an agricultural company specializing in gene-editing technology for crops like wheat and soybeans. In October 2019, Calyxt planted a genetically engineered high fiber wheat (“HFW”) product in two different fields in Yuma, Arizona (“Field One” and “Field Two,” respectively). Calyxt claims that in 2019, pesticides sprayed aerially on nearby fields drifted onto Calyxt’s two respective fields and destroyed parts of the HFW crops in each field.

        Plaintiff alleged two incidents of pesticide drift (collectively, “the Yuma Incident”), one incident affecting Field One and the other affecting Field Two. Field One and Field Two are miles apart. The aerial application near Field One occurred six days prior to the aerial application near Field Two. Moreover, the incidents involve two separate sets of Defendants. The Field One incident involved Amigo Farms, Inc. (“Amigo”), Morris AG Air Southwest (“Morris”), and Jeffrey Nigh, all of whom are no longer parties to this suit. The remaining Defendants—D’Arrigo, Tri-Rotor, Consaul, and Luke—are all allegedly involved with the pesticide drift onto Field Two.

        Field Two Defendants’ filed motions to exclude two of Plaintiff’s expert witnesses, Michael J. Giroux and William W. Wilson.

        Plant Genetics Expert Witness

        Dr. Michael J. Giroux is a plant geneticist and breeder and has a Ph.D. in plant molecular and cellular biology. Currently, he is a professor and department head of the Plant Sciences and Plant Pathology Department at Montana State University. 

        Fortify your strategy by reviewing a Challenge Study detailing grounds for excluding Michael Giroux’s expert testimony. 

        Agriculture Expert Witness

        Dr. William W. Wilson, Ph.D. is a Professor at North Dakota State University in Agribusiness and Applied Economics with periodic sabbaticals at Stanford University. Moreover, he received his PhD in Agricultural Economics from the University of Manitoba in 1980.

        Get the full story on challenges to William Wilson’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study. 

        Discussion by the Court

        Field Two Defendants’ Motion to Exclude Dr. Michael J. Giroux

        Giroux has specialized technical expertise in wheat genetics and breeding

        To begin with, Calyxt retained Giroux to opine on the reasonableness of Calyxt’s actions in developing its HFW product, both before and after it suffered damage from the alleged 2019 drift, and on the agronomic importance of Calyxt’s HFW project.

        Field Two Defendants challenged four parts of Giroux’s opinion: (1) that Calyxt’s HFW product is “valuable” and “innovative;” (2) that the Yuma Incident killed Calyxt’s most desirable wheat lines; (3) that Calyxt’s HFW development plan post-Yuma Incident was reasonable; and (4) that Calyxt followed industry standards in developing its HFW product. Field Two Defendants did not challenge the reliability of Giroux’s methods or his application of such methods. Rather, they contended that Giroux is not qualified to opine on the value of Calyxt’s HFW and that Giroux’s remaining opinions are based on insufficient facts and data.

        There is no dispute that Giroux has specialized technical expertise in wheat genetics and breeding. However, Field Two Defendants asserted that because Giroux is not an economist, he cannot testify about the “value” of Calyxt’s HFW.

        The Court held that Giroux’s opinion on Calyxt’s product is based on his own knowledge, experience, and research in plant genetics and breeding and not, as Field Two Defendants contend, some unfounded understanding of the economy. Giroux noted that starch-based foods with increased resistant starch are associated with a variety of health benefits.

        Giroux reviewed case pleadings and discovery materials

        Also, Giroux reviewed case pleadings and discovery materials submitted by each party, including written discovery responses, deposition testimony, exhibits, and documents produced in the case. Moreover, these materials detailed, among other things, Calyxt’s HFW genetic selection and breeding process (including the specific gene-edits Calyxt used); Calyxt’s planting strategy (such as what seed lines were planted, how much was planted, and where the lines were planted); the testing and analysis of Calyxt’s HFW; and the phased design of Calyxt’s commercialization plan. Giroux also relied on his own as well as outside academic research and studies to support his findings. 

        To conclude, the Court found that Giroux’s opinion was based on sufficient facts and data.

        Field Two Defendants argued that Giroux’s opinion on the value of Calyxt’s product was based on a speculative assumption that consumers want to eat higher dietary foods. The Court held that Giroux’s report sufficiently supported such an assumption with research and data.

        Moreover, Field Two Defendants argued that Giroux did not examine breeding techniques that Calyxt’s competitors use; and that Giroux did not review certain documents related to Calyxt’s development plan post-Yuma Incident. Still, Field Two Defendants failed to persuade the Court that these points demonstrated that Giroux’s opinions were baseless.

        Field Two Defendants’ Motion to Exclude Dr. William W. Wilson

        Field Two Defendants did not challenge Wilson’s qualifications or credentials. Nor did they challenge his general methodology for calculating damages—using an empirical model to derive the estimated damages using standard net present value analysis.

        Rather, Field Two Defendants challenged five assumptions that Wilson made in computing the estimated damages: (1) that the Yuma Incident was the sole cause of the one-year delay in Calyxt’s commercialization of its HFW; (2) that HFW will comprise 45% of the domestic wheat market by 2028; (3) that 2022 is the appropriate start date for the logistics market adoption curve model; (4) that Calyxt’s HFW product would capture one-third of the HFW market share; and (5) the royalty fee for Calyxt’s HFW product.

        To begin with, Field Two Defendants’ asserted that Wilson failed to consider other potential setbacks that could have caused the one-year delay in commercialization and this failure was fatal to the reliability of Wilson’s opinion. Whether other potential setbacks could have caused the one-year delay is an issue related to causation. The Court held that Wilson was not retained to opine on causation; his opinion was limited to providing an approximate estimation of damages.

        As to the remaining four assumptions that Field Two Defendants challenged, the Court held that any criticisms go to the weight of Wilson’s opinion, not the admissibility. To conclude, although other assumptions could have been made, this does not render Wilson’s opinion so fundamentally flawed that it could be of no assistance to the jury on the issue of damages. 

        Held

        To sum it up, the Court denied the Field Two Defendants’ motions to exclude Michael Giroux and William Wilson.

        Key Takeaways:

        • First, as a plant geneticist, the Court held that Giroux was qualified to opine about the import of developing higher-fiber wheat crops. Contrary to Field Two Defendants’ assertion, Giroux need not be a trained economist to be sufficiently qualified to understand and opine about the wheat industry and to conclude that higher-fiber foods are valuable products.
        • Second, the Court also found that Wilson was not retained to opine on causation; his opinion was limited to providing an approximate estimation of damages because it is perfectly permissible for an expert to assume liability (of which causation is an element) and simply focus on the issue of damages.

        Case Details:

        Case Caption: Calyxt Incorporated V. Morris Ag Air & Sons Incorporated Et Al
        Docket Number: 2:20cv1221
        Court: United States District Court, Arizona
        Order Date: May 23, 2024
      3. Testimony of Audio Engineering Expert Witness Admitted Despite Being Based on Assumptions

        Testimony of Audio Engineering Expert Witness Admitted Despite Being Based on Assumptions

        This case arises out of the shooting of Plaintiff Jake L. Sheeler (“Plaintiff”) on September 25, 2020 by officers of the Pocatello Police Department.

        Plaintiff Jake Sheeler was on the run from the police at the time that he was shot. He stole a Taurus Judge (a .45 caliber handgun) from a resident of Pocatello, Kirk Hendricks. Plaintiff then threatened Mr. Hendricks, his wife Mary Hendricks, and their neighbor Mr. Richard Hernandez with the Taurus Judge before he fled.

        Officers Eldridge and McArthur finally located Plaintiff and gave him commands to surrender. Plaintiff ignored the commands that he was given and shouted “I gotta gun!” and “back up!” at Eldridge and McArthur. Officers McArthur and Eldridge reacted to this threat to themselves and to others in the area by shooting Plaintiff.

        When Sheeler initiated this lawsuit against Defendants, Defendants moved for summary judgment on all of Sheeler’s claims. Sheeler opposed Defendants’ summary judgment motion and filed a motion to exclude their expert Durant Begault’s testimony.

        Audio Engineering Expert Witness

        Durant R. Begault is an expert in “audio-video media authentication, voice identification, enhancement of audio-video media, audibility of speech and warning signals, recorded gunshot analysis, and forensic musicology.” 

        He is a research scientist specializing in psychoacoustics, human factors, multimodal systems, and communications engineering. In 2002, Durand Begault bagged the Audio Engineering Society Fellowship Award for his many contributions.

        Get the full story on challenges to Durant Begault’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study. 

        Discussion by the Court

        Defendant retained Begault mainly to enhance and interpret the footage from Officer McArthur’s bodycam.

        Begault’s audio enhancement was not reliable

        Sheeler raised four challenges to Begault. First, Sheeler argued Begault’s audio enhancement was not reliable. In support, he noted Begault “did not disclose metadata nor hash values of the recordings” or “the software, equipment, or import settings, features or expert setting used to create and export the video.”

        Sheeler contended that, without this information, Begault’s results cannot be replicated, verified, or shown to be reliable.  In support, Sheeler cited the deposition testimony of his rebuttal expert, who reported he cannot duplicate Begault’s results without the missing information.

        The Court held that Sheeler cited no legal authority in support of his assertion that an expert’s work is inherently unreliable if it cannot be verified through duplication.

        Although Begault offered at his deposition on January 3, 2024, to provide Sheeler with the information, Sheeler responded that offer came after the expert disclosure deadlines.

        The Court held that Defendants timely disclosed the report at least by October 2, the deadline for Defendants’ expert disclosures. Sheeler’s rebuttal deadline was not until October 16. Based on this timeline, Sheeler could have requested the information his rebuttal expert needed for purposes of attempting to duplicate Begault’s work before the rebuttal deadline. 

        Begault did not perform any measurements

        Second, Sheeler challenged Begault’s opinion that Sheeler, not an officer, can be heard saying “back up” on the bodycam footage. Sheeler claims this opinion “depends solely upon distances of the various officers at the time of the shooting” and “Begault did not perform any measurements [but rather] relied on estimates provided by Defendants’ counsel.”

        According to Rule 702, an expert may rely on assumptions when formulating his opinions.That Begault did not himself perform the measurements and relied on counsel to provide him that information is not a basis to exclude his opinions. The Court held that Begault assumed the accuracy of the measurements counsel provided him.  The Court refused to exclude Begault’s testimony simply because he relied on assumptions Defendants’ counsel provided.

        Begault’s opinions regarding what the footage reveals

        Sheeler’s third and fourth challenges relate to Begault’s opinions about what can be heard on the enhanced audio of the bodycam footage. Sheeler claimed Begault admitted that “he has no greater ability than the jury to listen to the enhanced audio,” admitted that “he made no attempt to decipher any commands given to Sheeler,” and yet offered an opinion that “Sheeler did not comply with commands.” 

        The Court could not exclude Begault’s opinions regarding what the footage reveals without a more detailed analysis of the specific opinions Sheeler sought to exclude.

        The Court granted in part and denied in part the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

        Held

        The Court denied without prejudice Plaintiff’s motion to exclude or limit the testimony of Durand R. Begault.

        Key Takeaways:

        • First, Sheeler cited no legal authority in support of his assertion that an expert’s work is inherently unreliable if it cannot be verified through duplication.
        • Second, the Court refused to exclude Begault’s opinions just because he did not himself perform the measurements and relied on counsel to provide him that information. An expert may rely on assumptions when formulating his opinions.

        Case Details:

        Case Caption: Sheeler V. Eldridge, Et Al
        Docket Number: 4:22cv313
        Court: United States District Court for the District of Idaho
        Order Date: June 12, 2024