Tag: Benefits

  • Insurance Expert Witness’ Testimony Limited Because it is Needlessly Cumulative

    Insurance Expert Witness’ Testimony Limited Because it is Needlessly Cumulative

    This lawsuit stems from claims of breach of contract and statutory and common-law bad faith.

    It all started when Plaintiff, Paul Schulz, was injured when his motorcycle struck an oil spill in the roadway, causing the front tire to slide out and the motorcycle to overturn. Shortly thereafter, Schulz filed a claim with his insurer, Shelter Mutual Insurance Company (“Shelter”), for uninsured/underinsured motorist (“UIM”) coverage. After speaking with Schulz about the accident and the injuries he sustained, the claims adjuster determined Schulz was 100% at fault for the accident and denied coverage. When Schulz hired an attorney, Shelter agreed to consider any other information that might bear on the claim and ordered the police report. Nine days later, Shelter again denied the claim on the basis that Schulz was more than 50% at fault.

    Defendant filed a motion to strike certain opinions of Plaintiff’s industry standard expert Brian Seigal.

    Insurance Expert Witness

    Brian Seigal has been involved in the insurance industry throughout his career since 1995, working in and being responsible for claims departments. He has a multi-line background in P & C and Health Insurance. He has managed claims departments for carriers and TPAs, with experience spanning primary, excess, and reinsurance levels. Over the years, he has managed and trained hundreds of adjusters and has been involved with thousands of claims. He has also held department reserve and settlement authority.

    Get the full story on challenges to Brian Seigal’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study. 

    Discussion by the Court

    Seigal should be precluded from relying on averments in Shelter’s amended answer to the complaint

    Shelter first argued Seigal should be precluded from relying on averments in Shelter’s amended answer to the complaint to draw conclusions about the adequacy vel non of Shelter’s investigation. Essentially, in response to a series of allegations regarding the cause of the crash, the nature of Schulz’s injuries, and Shelter’s initial investigation, Shelter responded that it was without sufficient information to admit or deny those allegations. Seigal opined these answers demonstrate Shelter’s investigation was inadequate because they suggest Shelter was unclear as to the basic facts of the accident, the nature and extent of Schulz’s damages, and the results of its own investigation.

    The Court held that the relevant facts regarding Shelter’s initial investigation are recited in Shelter’s claim file notes and were the subject of inquiry at the 30(b)(6) depositions of the corporate representatives. Expert testimony regarding Shelter’s pleadings about these same matters therefore also would be needlessly cumulative and wasteful of limited trial time.

    Seigal’s opinion suggests Shelter’s investigation was unreasonable for failing to engage experts to vet Schulz’s claim prior to the initiation of litigation

    Seigal stated there exist a variety of tools of which a carrier may take advantage to fulfill its duty of reasonable investigation, and while there is no formulaic approach, not pursuing a particular investigative avenue may indicate a lack of good faith in particular circumstances. Seigal suggests this case presented a circumstance in which the adjuster should have engaged one or more experts as part of the investigation of the claim.

    Shelter points out that the insured bears the initial burden of producing sufficient evidence to suggest his damages were caused by an event that comes within the coverage of the policy.

    The Court held that it is not objectionable for Seigal to opine that Schulz’s case was one which warranted the retention of one or more experts as part of Shelter’s investigation.

    Seigal testified that Shelter’s attempt to condition payment of Schulz’s policy limits on his execution of a release was impermissible and unreasonable

    Shelter sought to preclude Seigal from testifying that Shelter’s attempt to condition payment of Schulz’s policy limits on his execution of a release was impermissible and unreasonable.

    Shelter attached a Release and Trust Agreement to his settlement letter which, inter alia, would have required Schulz to release Shelter from “all liability under any Uninsured Motorist/Underinsured Motorist/Uninsured Motorist Property Damage policy provisions for bodily injury, sickness, disease, or property damage (collectively “damages”) arising from the accident.”

    The Court denied the motion to exclude this portion of Seigal’s testimony because the insurer breaches its duty not to unreasonably delay or deny payment of undisputed benefits, even if additional benefits remain in dispute. Shelter’s recommendations with regard to the payment of benefits suggested that Shelter acknowledged Schulz was entitled to a payment of more than $138,000, but suggested withholding the remainder of the policy limits until he signed a release.

    Seigal opined, in regard to the withholding of the Fisher payment, that “other courts in Colorado have dealt with similar issues and provided orders against carriers who utilized these practices”

    Lastly, and relatedly, Shelter objected to Seigal testifying, in regard to the withholding of the Fisher payment, that “other courts in Colorado have dealt with similar issues and provided orders against carriers who utilized these practices.” Seigal’s supplemental report suggested that he will provide these cases in a further supplemental appendix, and Schulz claims by his response that they have been provided to Shelter in discovery (although Shelter disputes that suggestion).

    Critically, however, these cases are nowhere to be found in the record before the court. It therefore is impossible for the court to determine whether these cases are indeed analogous, as Seigal suggests. Even if they were, the Court held that allowing Seigal to discuss these other cases at trial runs too great a risk of confusing and misleading the jury, as well as wasting time on matters that can be, at best, merely tangential to the issues this jury will be asked to decide.

    Held

    The Court granted in part and denied in part Defendant’s motion to strike certain opinions of Plaintiff’s industry standard expert Brian Seigal.

    Key Takeaway:

    • The insured bears the initial burden of producing sufficient evidence to suggest his damages were caused by an event that comes within the coverage of the policy. As a result, Shelter’s investigation was unreasonable for failing to engage experts to vet Schulz’s claim prior to the initiation of litigation.
    • According to Shelter’s recommendations with regard to the payment of benefits, Shelter was aware that Schulz was entitled to a payment of more than $138,000, but suggested withholding the remainder of the policy limits until he signed a release. However, the insurer breaches its duty not to unreasonably delay or deny payment of undisputed benefits, even if additional benefits remain in dispute.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Schulz V. Shelter General Insurance Company
    Docket Number: 1:23cv1657
    Court: United States District Court, Colorado
    Order Date: September 12, 2024
  • Retirement Plan Expert Witness’ State of Mind Opinions Excluded

    Retirement Plan Expert Witness’ State of Mind Opinions Excluded

    In 2016, Defendants Signode Industrial Group, LLC, and Illinois Tool Works, Inc. unlawfully terminated promised healthcare benefits for Plaintiffs, a class of retirees and their dependents. On March 26, 2019, this Court enjoined Defendants to reinstate Plaintiffs’ healthcare benefits that were in effect before January 1, 2016. Defendants implemented a new healthcare benefits plan effective January 1, 2020, but Plaintiffs contend that the new plan is deficient. In other words, Plaintiffs alleged that the 2020 Plan does not “reinstate, restore, and replicate” the 2002 Plan.

    Plaintiffs hired a healthcare consultant, Stuart Wohl to assess how the 2020 Plan compares to the 2002 Plan. Defendants filed a motion to exclude Wohl’s report and testimony. Defendants argued that the Wohl Report must be excluded because Wohl’s opinions allegedly “are not supported by appropriate citations and/or corresponding explanations,” are offered “about topics he does not understand,” and are “simply Wohl’s own speculation about retirees’ state of mind.”

    The parties did not dispute that Wohl is qualified as an expert to offer testimony on healthcare plans.

    Retirement Plan Expert Witness

    Stuart I. Wohl is a Senior Vice President and Senior Benefits Consultant for Segal, a human resource and benefits consulting firm hired by Plaintiffs. Wohl is a licensed Life and Health Insurance Consultant in multiple states with more than thirty years of healthcare consulting experience, specializing in retirement healthcare. 

    Want to know more about the challenges Stuart Wohl has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report. 

    Discussion by the Court

    The Wohl Report provides Wohl’s opinions with respect to the material differences between the 2002 Plan and the 2020 Plan, along with additional opinions related to the sufficiency of the 2020 Plan in restoring the retirees’ healthcare.

    Wohl first concluded in the Wohl Report that the 2020 Plan “is and will be understood by the retirees as being materially different from the [2002 Plan]” until it was discontinued in January 2016.  He also concluded that Defendants’ 2020 Plan “overcharges retirees and discourages retirees from participating in” that Plan. Wohl stated that Defendants’ proposed remedies to rectify the period between 2016 and 2019 when the retirees had no healthcare “imposes unfair burdens on the retirees.”

    Wohl Report appears to be based on Wohl’s speculations supported by his own expertise

    The Court held that the Wohl Report frequently makes declarations that begin with “in my opinion,” and then provides Wohl’s professional opinion on a certain matter related to the Plans, without citations or further explanations for that opinion. For instance, the Wohl Report assesses that the 2020 Plan provides different coverage for ambulances, chiropractic care, nursing, and vision but fails to cite to either Plan in support of that assessment.

    In other words, the Wohl Report does not sufficiently connect Wohl’s expertise to the opinions presented in the Report.

    Wohl Report improperly contains references to retirees’ states of mind

    State of mind opinions are not proper expert testimony when the expert provides no basis or foundation for making those opinions. The Court observed that Wohl makes these conclusions about the retirees’ state of mind without providing any evidence that he spoke to any of the retirees.

    Wohl Report contains legal conclusions about remedies

    Certain sections of the Wohl Report contain inadmissible legal conclusions about what remedies Wohl believes are available and adequate in this case. The remedies available in this action are a disputed issue in this case that are the subject of one of Plaintiffs’ pending motions. The Court held that it is outside the scope of appropriate expert testimony for the Wohl Report to make legal conclusions about remedies.

    Held

    The Court granted the Defendants’ motion to exclude the report and testimony of Stuart Wohl.

    Key Takeaways:

    • Because Wohl had no foundation to make state of mind opinions, they constitute inadmissible witness testimony.
    • Wohl summarizes and opines over various elements of the Plans without explaining how his experience yields his conclusions and without citing sufficient evidence to substantiate his opinions. Because the Court’s gatekeeping function “requires more than simply ‘taking the expert’s word for it,’ ” the opinions and conclusions about the Plans in the Wohl Report are not sufficiently reliable to be admissible.
    • Rule 704 of the Federal Rules of Evidence permits expert witnesses to testify as to the ultimate issue in an action, but it does not authorize those opinions to be legal conclusions that will determine the outcome of the case. Wohl Report contains inadmissible legal conclusions about what remedies Wohl believes are available and adequate in this case.

    Because the Report is based on unsupported opinions, inappropriate state
    of mind opinions, and legal conclusions, it is unreliable and not helpful to the Court.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Stone Et Al V. Signode Industrial Group Llc Et Al
    Docket Number: 1:17cv5360
    Court: United States District Court, Illinois Northern
    Order Date: September 30, 2024
  • Insurance Expert Witness’ Ultimate Conclusions about the Defendant’s Conduct  Rejected

    Insurance Expert Witness’ Ultimate Conclusions about the Defendant’s Conduct Rejected

    This matter arises out of a motor vehicle accident (“MVA”) on May 15, 2017, in Denver, Colorado. Plaintiff, Richard Marion Jr was driving a vehicle registered in the State of Nebraska and insured by American Family under a Nebraska family car policy and Umbrella policy (“Policy”) issued to Plaintiff’s parents, Richard and Angela Marion. Marion filed a claim against the tortfeasor and received American Family’s consent to settle with the tortfeasor’s insurance carrier for policy limits of $100,000.00. Plaintiff also sought underinsured motorist benefits (“UIM”) under his Policy.

    American Family evaluated the information received from Plaintiff and initially offered Plaintiff $60,000.00, followed by two additional offers of $70,000.00 and $80,000.00. Plaintiff did not respond to American Family’s offer of $80,000.00 and instead filed this action. He sought UIM benefits under two policies, a Nebraska family car policy with UIM coverage limits of $250,000.00, and an umbrella policy with UIM coverage limits of $1,000,000.00. Plaintiff asserted claims for: (1) breach of contract and/or determination of benefits owed; (2) common law bad faith under Colorado law; and (3) statutory bad faith.

    In support of his claims against American Family, Plaintiff disclosed Lorraine Berns as his retained liability expert, along with her affirmative expert report. Defendant American Family Mutual Insurance Company filed a motion to limit the testimony Plaintiff’s expert, Lorraine Berns, pursuant to Rule 702 and Rule 403.

    Insurance Expert Witness

    Lorraine Berns provides insurance consulting and expert witness testimony in the area of insurance bad faith/good faith claims-handling practices based upon insurance claims industry standards. She has worked in the insurance industry since 1991 and has been a consultant and expert witness in this field since 2006. She also provides consulting services to attorneys in the areas of settlement strategies, pre-litigation strategies, investigations, negotiations, and claims handling industry standards.

    Discover more cases with Lorraine Berns as an expert witness by ordering her comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Opinions that Defendant Unreasonably Delayed Benefits

    Defendant argued that Berns’ opinions that it unreasonably delayed benefits to Plaintiff are legal conclusions and therefore improper expert opinion that should be excluded from trial. Plaintiff responded that he had no intention of asking Berns to usurp the role of the jurors. Instead, Plaintiff explained that he intended to question Berns about her background in automobile insurance claim handling; the facts and data she reviewed; her knowledge of insurance industry standards applicable to the handling of UIM claims; her observations / conclusions as to whether the insurer’s claim handling evidenced compliance with industry standards.

    Under Federal Rule of Evidence 704(a), an expert’s opinion is not inadmissible simply because it embraces an ultimate issue to be determined by the trier of fact. The Court concluded that Berns may offer testimony articulating what she believes to be the relevant industry standards, and explaining—factually—how Defendant’s conduct did or did not comport with those standards. However, the Court excluded Berns’ opinions that Defendant’s conduct was unreasonable or insufficient as a matter of law, or was in violation of any statute.

    Opinions Concerning Defendant’s Motives or State of Mind

    Defendant argued that Berns’ “speculative opinions regarding American Family’s motives or state of mind during the handling of Plaintiff’s claim are impermissible and should be precluded from trial.” Defendant added that such opinions concerning Defendant’s motivation or state of mind regarding policy limits are not based on any personal knowledge or personally observed facts or data.

    The Court granted in part and denied in part this portion of the motion. The Court granted the Motion to the extent that Plaintiff may not elicit testimony regarding Defendant’s motives or state of mind because such testimony would constitute speculation. However, the Court denied the Motion to the extent Berns is permitted to testify about facts from which the jury could infer intent, as such testimony is proper expert testimony.

    Opinions Regarding Nebraska Law

    Defendant argued that Berns is not qualified to render opinions regarding Nebraska’s Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act. Defendant emphasized that Berns has not worked in the insurance industry in Nebraska, has not evaluated a Nebraska claim, and is not familiar with Nebraska law. Additionally, Defendant argued that opinions regarding American Family improperly or incorrectly applying Nebraska law (in other words, saying that Defendant should have applied Colorado law) to Plaintiff’s claims are also impermissible expert opinion that usurp the function of this Court.

    The Court granted the motion to the extent that Berns was precluded from offering opinions on Nebraska’s Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act. However, the motion was denied to the extent that Berns may offer opinions concerning whether Defendant’s offers of compromise complied with the applicable insurance industry standards.

    Held

    The Court granted in part and denied in part the Defendant American Family Mutual Insurance Company’s motion to limit the testimony Plaintiff’s Expert, Lorraine Berns.

    Key Takeaways:

    • The Court excluded Berns’ opinions that Defendant’s conduct was unreasonable or insufficient as a matter of law, or was in violation of any statute. She was unqualified to offer such opinions as a matter of legal expertise and such ultimate conclusions would not be helpful to the jury and would improperly intrude on its fact-finding function.
    • Only the Court will determine what law applies to the remaining claims in this case, and Berns may not offer opinions concerning which state’s law Defendant should have applied.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Marion V. American Family Mutual Insurance Company, S.I.
    Docket Number: 1:22cv1330
    Court: United States District Court, Colorado
    Order Date: July 12, 2024