Tag: charges

  • Medical Billing Expert’s Testimony Regarding the Reasonable Value of the Medical Treatment Admitted

    Medical Billing Expert’s Testimony Regarding the Reasonable Value of the Medical Treatment Admitted

    This case arises from a traffic accident that occurred on December 21, 2022 at an intersection on U.S. Highway 98, involving an 18-wheeler and a Ford F-150 pickup truck.

    Cameron Thompson and his son, J.C., brought this action seeking damages, which included, among other things, past medical expenses for injuries sustained in the accident. 

    Defendants retained Nancy Michalski to opine on the “reasonable value” of Cameron’s medical treatment. Of the $40,440.00 billed for medical services provided to Cameron, Michalski opined that the reasonable value of such services is only $33,166.60.

    Plaintiffs contended that Michalski’s opinions are inadmissible because the methodology Michalski used to arrive at her opinions violates Mississippi’s collateral source rule and because the opinions are otherwise not relevant or reliable.

    Medical Billing Expert Witness

    Nancy Fraser Michalski provides clients with practical ways to improve efficiency, quality, and outcomes of their bodily injury claims and litigation, including medical bill auditing, comprehensive claim reviews, medical record reviews, and life care planning. Drawing on her extensive experience as a nurse and medical billing expert, Michalski developed a methodology for medical bill audits that has been endorsed by peer review, as well as a patent pending system for medical record analysis.

    Want to know more about the challenges Nancy Michalski has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report. 

    Discussion by the Court

    Relevance

    Plaintiffs asserted that any testimony at all “about the so-called ‘reasonable value’ of Plaintiff’s medical bills are [sic] simply not referred to or a factual issue at dispute.”

    Given the Defendants’ right to rebut the “necessary and reasonable” presumption regarding evidence of medical bills, it seems clear that Michalski’s opinions may be relevant. Having reviewed the parties’ submissions, including Michalski’s report and affidavit, the Court found that Michalski’s opinions are indeed directed at the “reasonableness” of the amount of the medical bills by focusing on the charges themselves for the medical services rendered.

    It is through Michalski’s opinions that Defendants are attempting to rebut the presumption that the medical bills incurred were necessary and reasonable, and by reducing the charges, they would thereby reduce the amount recoverable on the medical bills.

    Therefore, the Court found that, because Michalski’s opinions would assist the jury in determining whether the medical bills paid or incurred were necessary and reasonable by focusing specifically on the amounts charged, the opinions were relevant. 

    Reliability

    Whether Michalski’s opinions violate the collateral source rule

    Mississippi’s collateral source rule bars a tortfeasor from reducing the damages it owes to a Plaintiff ‘by the amount of recovery the Plaintiff receives from other sources of compensation that are independent of (or collateral to) the tortfeasor.’”

    In other words any “compensation or indemnity for the loss received by Plaintiff from a collateral source, wholly independent of the wrongdoer, as from insurance, cannot be set up by the latter in mitigation or reduction of damages.” Typically, the rule bars a Defendant from introducing evidence that a Plaintiff has received payments from a collateral source to reduce that Defendant’s liability for the damages.

    Plaintiffs contended that Michalski’s opinions ran afoul of the collateral source rule. To be sure, Michalski’s ultimate opinion is that the reasonable value of the medical services rendered is less than the amount billed. However, she did not arrive at this opinion based on payments made on behalf of Plaintiffs either by insurance or Medicaid/Medicare or evidence in the form of write-offs or self-pay discounts.

    Her ultimate opinion is based on what is essentially a “sub-opinion” that some of the rates charged were too high. Defendants emphasized, and the Court agreed, that Michalski’s proposed testimony is not that Plaintiffs’ recovery should be reduced by payment from an independent source; rather, it is that the charges are not reasonable when ultimately compared to charges from other similarly situated providers. Because Michalski does not arrive at her opinions, as Plaintiffs contend, by deducting, or even considering, payments, gifts, or write-offs from third parties, the Court found that Michalski’s opinions, on their face, do not violate Mississippi’s collateral source rule.

    Whether Defendants have shown the opinions are otherwise reliable

    Plaintiffs claimed that Michalski “has not sufficiently established that her method for projecting these future costs is generally accepted in the relevant scientific community.”

    However, there is no opinion by Michalski as to future costs. She addresses only past medical treatment. Plaintiffs also argue that “Michalski’s methodology differentiates between expected charges for services as opposed to a reasonable value or actual cost to a patient.” While the meaning of this statement is a bit unclear, Plaintiffs never explain which part of Michalski’s report employs such methodology.

    The Court is left to speculate about the methodology’s unreliability because these general statements lack sufficient explanation.

    Critiques go to the weight not the admissibility of the opinion

    To begin with, Michalski used several nationally recognized sources to determine the reasonable value of the charges. She consulted multiple pricing databases including Physician’s Fee Reference, PMIC Medical Fees, Find-a-Code, and the American Hospital Directory, and then applied a geographic adjustment factor for the location where the services were provided and ultimately arrived at her opinion as to the reasonable value of the medical services rendered to Cameron.

    In their Reply, Plaintiffs assert that medical treatment is not a commodity or services that is like other goods or services. Plaintiffs claim that medical providers have their own system, “Chargemasters,” which establishes the prices for treatment provided. The Court cannot accept a bald assertion in a party’s brief as fact.

    Additionally, Plaintiffs complained that by comparing Cameron’s providers to other “unidentified” providers, Michalski failed to account for the quality of services, the cost of the services, or the continuity of care, making her opinion, a comparison of apples to “unidentified oranges.” The Court held that these critiques go to the weight not the admissibility of the opinion.

    Finally, Plaintiffs argued that numerous other courts have excluded experts who have used Michalski’s exact same methodology, citing several cases. Because Plaintiffs have misunderstood Michalski’s methodology, the Court cannot agree. 

    Held

    The Court denied the Plaintiffs’ motion to exclude the opinions by Nancy Michalski.

    Key Takeaways:

    • Michalski’s opinions would assist the jury in determining whether the medical bills paid or incurred were necessary and reasonable by focusing specifically on the amounts charged.
    • To address every case cited would seem to be an exercise in futility because “a district court has broad discretion to determine whether a body of evidence relied upon by an expert is sufficient to support that expert’s opinion.” This Court exercises its discretion here, and trusts that those courts did the same with what they were presented and reached the correct result.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Thompson Et Al V. Intermodal Cartage Co., Llc. Et Al
    Docket Number: 2:24cv34
    Court Name: United States District Court, Mississippi Southern
    Order Date: May 19, 2025
  • Law Enforcement Expert Witness’ Testimony on Officers’ Actions Excluded

    Law Enforcement Expert Witness’ Testimony on Officers’ Actions Excluded

    The present lawsuit revolves around Plaintiff Van Aelsytn’s claims of civil rights violations and malicious prosecution against Defendants Coleman Sparks and Scott Carnes. Both Defendants were officers with the Versailles Police Department and were involved in an investigation that led to domestic violence charges against Van Aelsytn. However, the Plaintiff possessed evidence suggesting his innocence. The parties disagreed over whether the Defendants received and reviewed this evidence properly. Van Aelsytn was arrested, and the case went before a grand jury, which ultimately decided not to indict him.

    The Defendants intended to call Assistant Chief Robert Young of the Versailles Police Department as a rebuttal law enforcement expert witness. Young was expected to testify that the Defendants’ actions during the investigation aligned with Kentucky law and the U.S. Constitution.

    Law Enforcement Expert Witness

    Law Enforcement Expert Witness

    Robert Young currently serves as the Assistant Chief at the Versailles Police Department. He is a retired special agent with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF).

    Want to know more about the challenges Robert Young has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.  

    Discussion by the Court

    Van Aelstyn argued that allowing Robert Young to testify about the Defendants’ actions being legal or “consistent with Kentucky law and the United States Constitution” would have been an improper “legal conclusion.” He believed this testimony would have been flagrant and inappropriate.

    In response, the Defendants clarified that Young would not offer legal conclusions in his testimony. They emphasized that Young would not testify whether Officers Carnes or Sparks violated the Constitution. However, they argued that Young could provide an opinion on whether the officers followed Versailles Police Department policies.

    The Plaintiff replied that it was unclear if the Defendants agreed Young could not provide this testimony. However, the Plaintiff did not seek to exclude testimony about the police department’s policies.

    The Court found that the parties agreed that Young’s initial proposed testimony, claiming the Defendants acted consistently with Kentucky law and the U.S. Constitution, would have been a legal conclusion. They also agreed that such a clear-cut legal conclusion would be impermissible. Accepting this assertion as true would have essentially instructed the jury that the Defendants did not violate the law.

    Held

    The Court granted the Plaintiff’s motion to exclude certain parts of Defendants’ law enforcement expert witness, Robert Young’s testimony. The Court held that Young could not testify about whether the Defendants’ actions were consistent with Kentucky law or the United States Constitution.

    Key Takeaways:

    The Court found that Young’s testimony about whether the Defendants’ actions were consistent with Kentucky law or the U.S. Constitution would constitute an impermissible legal conclusion, as it would effectively instruct the jury that the Defendants did not violate the law. This decision emphasized the need for expert testimony to avoid overstepping into legal determinations, ensuring the jury maintains its role in assessing the law’s application.

    Case Details:

    Case caption: Aelstyn v. Sparks
    Docket Number: 5:23cv136
    Court: United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, Central Division
    Dated: December 4, 2024