Tag: Class Member

  • Data Privacy Expert Has Sufficient Experience in TCPA Compliance and Wrong Number Issues

    Data Privacy Expert Has Sufficient Experience in TCPA Compliance and Wrong Number Issues

    David Elliot filed a lawsuit against Humana, claiming the company violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) by repeatedly calling him with robocalls even though he wasn’t a customer and had informed them they had the wrong number. Elliot wants to pursue this as a class action, arguing that many others have experienced similar unwanted robocalls from Humana over a four-year period.

    To support his request for class certification, Elliot offered expert testimony from Anya Verkhovskaya, who believes Humana’s data allows for a reliable and efficient way to identify and notify potential class members, meeting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 and due process. Humana countered with their own expert, Margaret Daley, who argues that Verkhovskaya’s method for identifying class members who received prerecorded messages as non-customers is unreliable and that individualized investigations would be necessary. Daley also challenges the reliability of Verkhovskaya’s reverse-append methodology, claiming it does not reliably identify people who should receive notice. 

    Daley was admitted to opine on “whether there is a reliable way to determine on a class wide basis whether Humana non-members received prerecorded messages.”

    Data Privacy Expert Witness

    Margaret Daley is the Vice President at Charles River Associates (“CRA”) and a member of its Forensics Services practice group. Daley has specialized experience in TCPA compliance, and digital forensic investigations. She has also authored three publications on TCPA compliance and wrong number issues.

    Daley has significant experience providing expert testimony, litigation and regulatory support, and data analytics to law firms, Fortune 500 corporations, government agencies, and various regulatory bodies. 

    She is is a Certified Information Privacy Professional (CIPP), a Certified Fraud Examiner (CFE) and a licensed attorney in the state of Illinois. 

    Get the full story on challenges to Margaret Daley’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Discussion by the Court

    Qualifications

    Daley possesses ample experience in TCPA compliance, wrong number issues, and the reverse-append procedure proposed by Verkhovskaya. Consequently, her expert opinions will be helpful for the Court. Furthermore, other district courts have recognized Daley’s qualifications to testify on similar matters. Her education, certifications, and extensive experience demonstrate relevant training in the areas she has provided opinions on. Therefore, this Court finds Daley qualified by both training and experience to offer expert testimony on class action notice and TCPA claim issues, and Elliot’s opposing arguments are not persuasive.

    Reliability

    Elliot challenged Daley’s expert opinion, claiming it was based on “unsupported speculation” and a lack of factual knowledge. Humana countered that Daley had access to the same information as Elliot’s expert, Verkhovskaya, including her report, and even conducted her own analysis of that data. Humana emphasized that Daley’s opinion critiques Verkhovskaya’s methodology for identifying and notifying the class, drawing upon Daley’s experience in related fields. Because Daley relied on the same information provided by Humana’s records as Verkhovskaya, Humana argued that experts are permitted to base opinions on data provided by counsel and that a challenge to Daley’s factual basis is essentially a challenge to the already-deemed-reliable report of Verkhovskaya. Moreover, Humana pointed out that Daley went beyond what was required by testing aspects of Verkhovskaya’s methodology to ensure her own opinion’s reliability.

    Humana concluded that Daley’s opinion is sound both factually and methodologically. Finally, the Court asserted that Elliot’s objections regarding Daley’s reliability primarily concern the weight of her testimony, not its admissibility, especially since they target the foundation of her opinion – Verkhovskaya’s own report and data. Humana reminded the Court that Elliot will have the opportunity to cross-examine Daley at trial.

    Relevance

    Elliot challenged the relevance of Daley’s opinion on two grounds. First, he argued that Daley misinterpreted the notice procedure of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Second, Elliot claimed that Daley misrepresented Verkhovskaya’s testimony.

    In defining the proper scope of rebuttal testimony, courts have held that rebuttal evidence “identifies a flawed premise in an expert report that casts doubt on both that report’s conclusions and its author’s expertise.” The Court determined that Daley’s opinions are relevant because they point out potential weaknesses in Verkhovskaya’s analysis that are important for deciding key aspects of class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, specifically numerosity, typicality, ascertainability, and whether common questions predominate for class certification.

    Daley claimed Verkhovskaya’s opinion is irrelevant because it will misidentify and notice some non-class members

    According to Elliot, Daley claimed Verkhovskaya’s opinion is irrelevant because it will misidentify and notice some non-class members because of a “lack of knowledge of the standards for class notice,” which renders Daley’s opinion irrelevant as she does not know the standard.

    This argument fails for two main reasons. First, the claim that Daley lacks knowledge of class notice standards is essentially an attack on her qualifications, which the Court has already affirmed. Second, Elliot misinterprets Daley’s point. Daley’s argument isn’t simply about some non-class members being noticed improperly; she contends that identifying class members is impossible without individualized investigation, a fundamental flaw in the proposed process and relevant to a question that must be answered at this stage of the case.

    Daley misrepresents Verkhovskaya’ methodology as “a one item, reverse append, review”

    Elliot also argues that Daley mischaracterizes Verkhovskaya’s methodology as simply “a one item, reverse append, review,” but this is not supported by the evidence. Daley’s opinion considers Verkhovskaya’s entire analysis, focusing on the reverse append review because she believes this key component is unreliable for identifying class members. Daley simply dedicates more attention to the aspect of Verkhovskaya’s methodology she finds most problematic.

    Furthermore, Elliot suggests Daley’s opinion is irrelevant because it was developed solely for this lawsuit, not from her regular technical work. While courts may scrutinize such opinions more closely, Elliot provides no specific examples or evidence to support this claim about Daley or her testimony, nor does he explain why this would make her opinion inadmissible. Because Elliot offers only a bare assertion without developed argumentation or record citations, the Court does not need to consider this point, as perfunctory arguments are deemed waived. Elliot retains the right to question Daley about her reliability and the development of her opinion during cross-examination at trial.

    Held

    The Court denied David Elliot’s motion to exclude Margaret Daley’s testimony.

    Key Takeaway:

    Despite Elliot’s challenges arguing that Daley was not qualified, relied on speculation, and misrepresented the opposing expert’s methodology and lacked knowledge of the standards for class notice, the Court upheld Daley’s expertise, noting her extensive experience and the fact that her opinions identified potential flaws in Elliot’s expert’s methodology that are pertinent to the key requirements for class certification under Rule 23. The Court also dismissed Elliot’s argument that Daley’s opinion was solely litigation-driven due to lack of supporting evidence, emphasizing that these concerns could be addressed through cross-examination at trial.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Elliot V. Humana, Inc.
    Docket Number: 3:22cv329
    Court: United States District Court, Kentucky Western
    Order Date: March 28, 2025
  • Economics Expert’s Statistical Model Survives Daubert Challenge in NCAA Volunteer Coach Case

    Economics Expert’s Statistical Model Survives Daubert Challenge in NCAA Volunteer Coach Case

    The NCAA is an association whose members are colleges and universities competing in intercollegiate athletics. The NCAA governs student athletic competition at its member schools.

    NCAA schools are divided into three divisions: Division I, Division II, and Division III. Division I schools, which are at issue in this litigation, generally “manage the largest athletic budgets and offer the highest number of athletics scholarships.” Coach compensation is the largest athletics expense for NCAA Division I schools.

    NCAA bylaws limit the number of coaches that Division I schools can hire in a given sport. Prior to 2023, Division I programs other than basketball and men’s bowl-division football were permitted to hire a certain number of “unrestricted coaches,” who had no restrictions on compensation, plus one or two “volunteer coaches.” The bylaw at issue here, NCAA Bylaw 11.01.06 (hereinafter “Volunteer Coach Bylaw” or “the Bylaw”), defined a “volunteer coach” as “any coach who does not receive compensation or remuneration” from the school’s athletics department.

    Following the repeal of the Volunteer Coach Bylaw, effective July 2023, the volunteer coach designation was eliminated and the number of unrestricted coaches was increased, typically by the number of volunteer coaches allowed under the prior rule. For instance, programs previously permitted one volunteer coach were allotted one additional paid coach.

    Plaintiffs brought this putative class action alleging that the Volunteer Coach Bylaw violated § 1 of the Sherman Act. The proposed class consists of “[a]ll persons who, from March 17, 2019, to June 30, 2023, worked for an NCAA Division I sports program other than baseball in the position of ‘volunteer coach,’ as designated by NCAA Bylaws.” 

    Dr. Orley Ashenfelter created a statistical model to estimate the damages suffered by the members of the proposed class. Defendants, however, sought to exclude all evidence from this expert.

    Economics Expert Witness

    Orley C. Ashenfelter is an economist specializing in labor economics, antitrust policy, and the economic analysis of labor markets. He is the Joseph Douglas Green 1895 Professor of Economics, Emeritus, at Princeton University, where he also serves as a Senior Scholar in Economics.

    Ashenfelter holds a Ph.D. in Economics from Princeton University and a B.A. from Claremont McKenna College. His professional experience includes directing Princeton’s Industrial Relations Section and serving as President of multiple economic associations, including the American Economic Association, the Society of Labor Economists, and the American Law and Economics Association. He has also held editorial positions at the American Economic Review and Journal of Wine Economics.

    Get the full story on challenges to Orley Ashenfelter’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study. 

    Discussion by the Court

    Orley Ashenfelter

    To formulate his model, Ashenfelter relied upon wage data and other documentation from hundreds of NCAA Division I schools, focusing on those that expanded their coaching staff beyond the prior limits on the number of unrestricted coaches following the repeal of the Volunteer Coach Bylaw.

    He focuses on this subset of schools because they “provide the best currently-available evidence of what a competitive market will look like” in the absence of the repealed Bylaw. The model uses actual coach salary data following the Bylaw repeal as a “benchmark” to estimate the “but-for” compensation class members would have received. “But-for” analysis refers to the practice in antitrust cases of calculating classwide damages based on what class members’ economic position would have been absent the alleged antitrust violations (i.e., in the world that would have existed but for the alleged violation).

    Ashenfelter’s analysis proceeds in two steps. In the first step, Ashenfelter categorizes sports programs according to how many unrestricted coaches each program was permitted to have under NCAA rules beginning July 1, 2023 (i.e., following the repeal of the Bylaw).

    In the second step, Ashenfelter produces an estimate of the compensation class members would have received in the “but-for” world. 

    Defendant’s Objections

    In the instant case, discovery is ongoing and Ashenfelter is still receiving new data and updating his analysis, which indicates that a full Daubert analysis is “premature” at this stage of the proceedings.

    Ashenfelter’s Model Fails to Control for the Experience and Skill Level of Coaches

    Defendant argues that Ashenfelter’s report is nonetheless inadmissible because it fails to account for several key factors. First, Defendant contends that Ashenfelter’s model fails to control for the experience and skill level of coaches because (1) his calculations did not incorporate experience level as a variable, and (2) he did not address potential selection bias in the sample of additional paid coaches hired after the bylaw repeal, who could have higher experience levels and therefore warrant higher wages. The Court clarified that these arguments are factually unfounded, as Ashenfelter’s analysis does account for experience using both pay ranking within the coaching hierarchy and age as proxies for experience.

    Second, Defendant argues that Ashenfelter “excluded evidence from schools that did not add paid coaching positions after the bylaws were amended.” Again, this argument is unfounded.

    Ashenfelter’s Analysis is Based Around Groupings of Dissimilar Sports

    Finally, Defendant argues that Ashenfelter’s analysis is based around groupings of dissimilar sports and “tries to estimate market rates of pay for coaches in one sport by using salaries for coaching in other sports that are determined by different supply and demand conditions.” The Court ruled that this argument mischaracterizes Ashenfelter’s analysis. While the calculation of the step-down differential at step one uses groupings of sports based on how many coaches the NCAA permits a school to hire, the damage calculation at step two uses actual salary data from each sports program at each school and therefore accounts for differences across sports.

    To the extent that Defendant thinks Ashenfelter’s analysis inadequately accounts for the variables discussed above, that is not a basis for exclusion under Daubert, but rather goes to the weight of the evidence.

    It is undisputed that Ashenfelter possesses extensive experience and qualifications in the field of labor economics and that he based his analysis on the review of reliable documentation produced by NCAA Division I member schools. Regression analysis based on a “benchmark” or “yardstick,” like that employed by Ashenfelter, is a well-established method of calculating class-wide antitrust impact. 

    Held

    The Court denied Defendant’s motion to exclude the testimony of Orley Ashenfelter.

    Key Takeaway:

    The ruling reinforces the use of established economic methodologies, like benchmark regression analysis, in antitrust cases, and addresses the standard for admissibility of expert testimony under the Daubert standard.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Shannon Ray v. NCAA
    Docket Number: 1:23cv425
    Court: United States District Court, California Eastern
    Order Date: March 10, 2025