Tag: Conclusory

  • Accident Reconstruction Expert Not Allowed to Opine on Statutory Violation

    Accident Reconstruction Expert Not Allowed to Opine on Statutory Violation

    On July 13, 2021, Mark DeLeon lost his left arm in a horrendous accident while working the overnight shift at Norfolk Southern’s Burns Harbor Trainyard. This case arises out of that tragic event. DeLeon sued Norfolk Southern under the Federal Employer’s Liability Act seeking recovery for his injuries. He has two theories under FELA: one is for general negligence; the other is for per se negligence under FELA because of an alleged violation of the Safety Appliance Act (“SAA”).

    Norfolk sought the exclusion of three of DeLeon’s experts-Daniel Billington, Colon Fulk, and Jason Engle.

    Accident Reconstruction Expert Witness

    Daniel R. Billington II is an expert in accident reconstruction, including “human factors, visibility, and lighting.” Billington has been doing accident reconstructions for decades and has been permitted to testify in a number of cases. His knowledge has made him a speaker in high demand with many legal and insurance organizations.

    Get the full story on challenges to Daniel Billington’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Railroad Expert Witnesses

    Colon Ray Fulk has over three decades of experience in train operations. Notably, he has worked for Norfolk as a conductor, brakeman, locomotive engineer, and a foreman. He has extensive experience in railroad operations, including safety inspections and investigations.

    Discover more cases with Colon Fulk as an expert witness by ordering his comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

    Jason R. Engle has 18 years of experience in the railroad industry, holding both mechanical and transportation positions at multiple railway companies.

    Get the full story on challenges to Jason Engle’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Discussion by the Court

    The Court agreed with Norfolk that the expert reports of Billington, Fulk, and Engle had some improper legal conclusions. Billington, Fulk, and Engle all stated that certain facts constitute a statutory violation and/or negligence. These conclusions “abridge the jury’s role of applying the law to the facts” and, additionally, “usurp the judge’s role of instructing the jury as to the applicable law.”

    The experts will not be allowed to testify as to what satisfies a specific legal standard or what a particular statute or regulation means. However, of course, experts may offer opinions “relevant to applying a legal standard” including testimony “describing sound professional standards and identifying departures from them.”

    1. Daniel Billington

    Billington inspected the site of the incident, took various measurements, and reviewed the footage from the night in question, along with an extensive list of documentary evidence and depositions in this case. He concluded, among other things, that DeLeon struck the air station during the incident in question, that the air station was a close-clearance structure, that the yard was too dark, which posed a danger to employees, and that the bent ladder prevented DeLeon from standing upright, contributing to him hitting the air station.

    Billington took detailed and specific measurements at the railyard, including quantifiable lighting measurements under similar weather and time conditions, and he used his experience and measurements to produce a 3D render of the accident to explain how this tragic and perplexing incident occurred.

    The Court found that Billington was qualified to testify on these topics and that his inspection of the site, reliance on his experience, and review of the documents constituted a proper methodology for an accident reconstructionist.

    One argument Norfolk made that requires special attention is that Billington’s accident reconstruction testimony would not be helpful to a jury. The argument centers on the fact that much of his accident reconstruction is based on the video of the incident, which the jury can watch itself.

    This Court has watched the video of the incident several times. It does not speak for itself. The camera was set up far away from the site of the incident. The video is dark, at times blurry, and in black and white.

    2. Colon Fulk

    Fulk reached various conclusions about the safety of the train yard on the night of the incident, the safety rules Norfolk had in place at the time, and the factors that may have contributed to the accident. He testified about how difficult it is for on-the-ground railmen to know exactly how fast a train is going, especially in nighttime conditions, and opined that it was unsafe for Norfolk to have a rule allowing railmen to board moving trains at all. He testified about many other issues as well, including the dangers posed by the defective ladder and insufficient lighting at the railyard. In reaching his conclusions, he relied not only on the documentary evidence in this case but also on his inspection of the site of the incident.

    Norfolk’s main arguments to exclude Fulk’s opinions are that he lacked a reliable methodology and that his opinions are conclusory. However, the Court found that he has employed a proper methodology for an expert in his field and has explained his reasons sufficiently. He reviewed the records relevant to the incident, and inspected the site of the incident, taking specific measurements and photos, and explained the reasons for his findings in an expert report. This is not an area of expertise where, for example, an expert could point to specific mathematical methodology for his opinion. Fulk’s methodology and opinions (that are not legal conclusions, as discussed above) are proper, and are similar to many other cases in which he has been allowed to testify over the years.

    3. Jason Engle

    Engle’s conclusions include that the bent ladder was unsafe, that the railcar with the bent ladder should not have been in service until the ladder was fixed, and that Norfolk had insufficient, and at times even actively dangerous, safety procedures.

    Norfolk’s argument to exclude Engle is a bit shorter and refers to or mirrors the arguments on Fulk, namely that the expert lacks methodology and has conclusory opinions.

    The only notable difference is that they admit that Engle provided some “additional detail” compared to Fulk. Like Fulk’s expert report, Engle’s expert report exhibited that he has relevant, specialized experience and that he employed a reliable methodology.

    Held

    The Court granted in part and denied in part Norfolk’s omnibus motions in limine to exclude the causation opinions of experts Daniel Billington, Colon Fulk, and Jason Engle.

    Key Takeaway

    Indeed, courts often exclude expert testimony analyzing videos when a jury is just as capable of doing the same thing. While Norfolk argued that Billington brought no more to the table on this issue than a layperson who watches the video, a review of Billington’s report tells a different story.

    Billington relied on his extensive experience in accident reconstruction, used video enhancement techniques to view it more closely, employed the study of kinematics in his analysis, did an in-person inspection of the incident site, and produced a 3D model of the incident to help explain what happened. Billington has provided an analysis that goes way beyond a simple recounting of what he believes the video depicts. And to the extent Norfolk is dubious of Billington’s opinions, that’s what cross-examination is for.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Deleon V. Norfolk Southern Railway Company
    Docket Number: 2:21cv224
    Court Name: United States District Court, Indiana Northern
    Order Date: May 19, 2026
  • Law Enforcement Expert Witness’ Report Criticizing the Actions of SPD Deemed Conclusory

    Law Enforcement Expert Witness’ Report Criticizing the Actions of SPD Deemed Conclusory

    A district judge in Washington refused to admit the Law Enforcement Expert Witness’ testimony with regard to the claims of outrage, negligence and assault filed against the Seattle Police Department.

    On May 30, 2020, organizers planned two demonstrations in downtown Seattle to protest the May 25, 2020 killing of George Floyd in Minneapolis: (1) “The March for George Floyd,” scheduled from 12:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. on Fifth Avenue, and (2) “The Defiant Walk of Resistance Against Injustice,” scheduled to begin at 3:00 p.m. and to go from Westlake Park to the federal courthouse at Seventh Avenue and Stewart Street. Sergeant Sean Moore served as the leader of Platoon 1’s West Bikes #3 at The Defiant Walk of Resistance Against Injustice. 

    After learning about the demonstrations through his parents or his church, Avery decided to attend the events along with his young son J.A., other family members, and church members.

    Plaintiffs Are Injured During the May 30, 2020 Demonstrations

    An escalation between officers and demonstrators ensued after the arrest of one of the demonstrators. Several demonstrators, including two female demonstrators (one wearing a black sweatshirt and one wearing a white t-shirt and bike helmet), moved toward the police line. At one point, Officer Moore ran up to the line from behind and repeatedly yelled “Move back!” with a blast ball in his left hand and OC spray in his right hand. The female demonstrator wearing the bike helmet then shouted “You move back!” while pushing over the line, grabbing an officer’s baton, and pushing back against him.

    At the beginning of this disturbance, Avery moved quickly to his left towards the disturbance, holding J.A. to his right side and approaching until he was immediately behind the female demonstrator. Then, without verbal warning, Officer Moore deployed OC spray in the direction of this demonstrator.

    When Officer Moore deployed the OC spray at the female demonstrator in the bike helmet, Avery had his left arm around her waist as she turned away from the spray, exposing his left side to Officer Moore’s deployment. Avery had his right arm around J.A., who stood behind his father and the female demonstrator. As Avery and J.A. retreated from the altercation, Avery placed his left hand on or near J.A.’s face and kept his arms around him as they walked away. Moments later, J.A. began reacting to the OC spray’s painful effects and received assistance from other demonstrators.

    Motion to exclude

    Avery initiated this action in April 2022, raising claims for violations of the Washington Law Against Discrimination, outrage, negligence, assault, and constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

    The City moved to exclude the testimony of Plaintiffs’ law enforcement expert, Russ Hicks, because his report consisted of opinions which were “improper legal conclusions and lacked any expert analysis that might be helpful to a jury.”

    Law Enforcement Expert Witness

    Russ Hicks is a retired, 30-year law enforcement officer and former police academy supervisor and trainer. He was a commissioned police officer from 1991-2016. He was also an instructor at the Washington State Criminal Justice Training Commission (WSCJTC) from 2007-2021.

    Discover more cases with Russ Hicks as an expert witness by ordering his comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Many of Hicks’ Opinions Consisted of Legal Conclusions

    The Court agreed with the City when it contended that many of Hicks’ opinions consisted of legal conclusions. For instance, Hicks repeatedly characterized the actions of Seattle Police Department “SPD” as “negligent,” concluded that Officer Moore’s use of force was “excessive,” and stated that Plaintiffs “were seized” by Officer Moore’s use of force. The Court held that almost all of Hicks’ opinions are supported by nothing more than conclusory statements. 

    Hicks’ Opinions Were Mostly Unsupported

    Hicks speculated that it is more likely than not that if Officer Moore had provided a warning about the pepper spray, she would have let go of the baton and Sgt. Moore wouldn’t have deployed this MK-9 pepper spray. The Court held that Hicks provided no support whatsoever for this opinion, rendering it unreliable. He did not explain how his experience led to the conclusion reached.

    As for Hicks’ opinion that SPD’s failure to “provide or call for aid for Avery and his 7-year-old son” was contrary  to law, training, and policy, the Court held that it did not offer any specialized knowledge and in fact contradicted the video evidence. He asserted that the alleged failure to aid was contrary to training, explaining only that officers “are provided with instruction on providing first aid to subjects injured by law enforcement” at WSCJTC training. The Court held that he did not explain how such training bears on the facts at issue beyond the suggestion that officers knew how to administer first aid.

    The Court found Hicks’ opinion that “Officer Moore deviated from SPD policy regarding providing warnings in advance of deploying pepper spray despite having enough time to give a warning” similarly unsupported because untrained layman would be qualified to determine that issue.

    Finally, Hicks opined that Officer Moore should have used the MK-4 pepper spray instead of the MK-9 because “it is possible that the smaller dispersal area [of the MK-4] would have satisfied the immediate safety goal.” The Court, once again, held that Hicks failed to “back up his opinion with specific facts.”

    Held

    The Court granted the City’s motion to exclude the testimony of Plaintiffs’ law enforcement expert, Russ Hicks.

    Key Takeaway:

    The Court held that almost all of Hicks’ opinions were supported by nothing more than conclusory statements. Conclusory assertions like those contained in Hicks’ report would not assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence.

    Nothing in either Daubert or Rule 702 requires the district court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Avery V. City Of Seattle Et Al
    Docket Number: 2:22cv560
    Court: United States District Court, Washington Western
    Order Date: June 12, 2024