Expert Witness Profiler

Tag: Deadline

  • Insurance Expert Witness’ Testimony Excluded Despite Being Crucial to Plaintiff’s Claims

    Insurance Expert Witness’ Testimony Excluded Despite Being Crucial to Plaintiff’s Claims

    The CLM Trust is the owner of real property including a home and multiple barns located at 25 Cattle Farm Road in Picayune, Mississippi. At all times relevant, these structures were insured under a homeowner’s policy issued by State Farm Fire and Casualty Company. CLM’s lawsuit arises from alleged damages caused by Tropical Storm Claudette on or about June 19, 2021, and additional damage caused by Hurricane Ida on or about August 29, 2021. State Farm’s estimate of damages to the home totalled $5,505.17, the actual cash value of which falls below the Policy deductible. On March 11, 2024, CLM designated its expert Public Adjuster/Appraiser, Richard Lyon to contest State Farm’s estimate of damages incurred. State Farm filed its motion to strike expert Lyon and supporting memorandum pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 and 37 and Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 403.

    CLM was required to designate its expert witnesses no later than March 12, 2024. CLM timely filed its expert designation identifying Lyon and incorporating his June 8, 2023, estimate of repair for the home and additional Property structures. In its purported designation, CLM stated “Lyon’s report will be supplemented upon completion.” On June 6, 2024, more than two months after expiration of CLM’s expert designation deadline, CLM filed its motion to supplement expert eeport and amend case management order incorporating Lyon’s written May 30, 2024, expert report. State Farm argued that, not only is Lyon’s original report inadequate, but the supplemental report is an untimely “initial report” and sought to strike Lyon’s opinions for non-compliance with Rule 26.

    Insurance Expert Witness

    Richard Lyon is a licensed and bonded public insurance adjuster. He the founding member of Gulf Coast Adjusting, and enjoys over 15 years of working in the construction and insurance industries.

    Lyon has been continually licensed by the State of Louisiana # 508253 and State of Mississippi # 10180259 and the State of New Jersey #1513282 as a Public Adjuster. He is proficient with insurance industry leading estimating software Xactimate and Xactcontents. Lyon is an admitted expert in the field of Claims Damage Estimating in Federal Court in the Eastern District of Louisiana.

    Get the full story on challenges to Richard Lyon’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study. 

    Discussion by the Court

    Adequacy of Plaintiff’s Expert Disclosure

    CLM’s initial expert designation included Lyon’s curriculum vitae, compensation rate, previous testimony, photographs, roof reports, and estimates. CLM’s initial designation did not include the basis and reasons for Lyon’s estimates; the facts or data relied upon by Lyon in forming his opinions; or a written, signed report as to Lyon’s expected testimony. The Court held that these documents clearly do not meet requirements of a written report and are deficient pursuant to Rule 26. According to Rule 26, the initial report must be complete and not vague. Moreover, the Court held that Lyon’s estimates, without explanation or opinions, constitute “conclusory unsupported allegations.”

    CLM argued that Lyon’s estimates constituted a report because it was to be supplemented at a later date. The Court held that CLM failed to properly designate Lyon as an expert on March 11, 2024. It was not until June 6, 2024, almost three months after CLM’s expert designation deadline, that it provided Lyon’s written May 30, 2024, report.

    Substantially Justified or Harmless Factors

    CLM argued that even if Lyon’s report was initially inadequate, the inadequacy should be excused as his report would still have to be substantially changed after State Farm provided its Supplemental Disclosures. CLM further argued that because a supplemental report would have been necessary regardless of Lyon’s initial report, any potential error is substantially harmless.

    The Court looks to the following factors to determine whether a party’s failure to timely disclose an expert is harmless or substantially justified: “(1) the explanation for the failure to identify the witness; (2) the importance of the testimony; (3) potential prejudice in allowing the testimony; and (4) the availability of a continuance to cure such prejudice.”

    The explanation for the failure to identify the witness

    The first factor weighed in favor of State Farm. State Farm’s production of critical documents on March 25, 2024, after CLM’s expert designation deadline necessitated the subsequent report. As addressed earlier, Lyon’s “subsequent report” is instead his initial report. CLM failed to state why the initial report was not produced until more than two and a half months after the designation deadline or why Lyon needed this time to review the “critical documents” necessary to author his report. Instead, it appeared to the Court that CLM failed to explain to Lyon his true assignment—to create a report—until well after the designation deadline, uprooting CLM’s argument that Lyon intended to make a report on March 12, 2024.

    The Court granted CLM an extension to March 12, 2024, in which to file its expert designation. CLM had ample time to submit Lyon’s initial report in a timely manner. Simply put, CLM was aware that the Rule 26 disclosures were due. It has failed to state why an initial report was not filed prior to the deadline.

    Plaintiff asserted that Lyon is absolutely essential to CLM’s claims. While this factor leans in favor of CLM, the Court held that the importance of proposed testimony cannot ‘singularly override the enforcement of local rules and scheduling orders.’ Additionally, the importance of the testimony underscores how critical it is for a Plaintiff to timely designate the expert.

    Potential prejudice in allowing the testimony

    CLM did not timely designate Lyon. So, Lyon’s untimely report left State Farm without the chance to retain a counter-expert. CLM’s motion for leave to file supplemental expert report on June 6, 2024, was the first time it provided Lyon’s May 30, 2024, supplemental report, more than two months after State Farm’s expert designation deadline had expired. Additionally, this failure left State Farm’s deposition of Lyon at a disadvantage to prepare for trial or anticipate his future testimony. During his May 30, 2024, deposition, Lyon repeatedly could not, or refused to, answer questions regarding his investigation and inspection of the CLM property. Additionally, Lyon testified in his deposition that the June 8, 2023, estimate produced in CLM’s initial expert designation is “no longer relevant.”

    The availability of a continuance to cure such prejudice

    The ability and opportunity for State Farm to depose Lyon as to his May 30, 2024, report with a continuance still does not solve the prejudice, as “this would obviously result in additional delay and increase the expense of defending this lawsuit.” While CLM offered State Farm “the option to re-depose Lyon at Plaintiff’s expense after submission of the supplemental reports” this offer does not address the likely delay in the case and prejudice to State Farm. Additionally, a continuance would not alleviate the prejudice to State Farm as the discovery and expert deadlines have expired. Absent a rescheduling of deadlines State Farm is unable to retain counter-experts. Granting an extension of those deadlines would require a continuance of the trial, which weighs in favor of the Court striking Lyon’s opinions.

    Held

    The Court granted State Farm’s motion to strike Plaintiff’s expert Richard Lyon.

    Key Takeaways:

    • Importance of proposed testimony cannot singularly override the enforcement of local rules and scheduling orders.
    • The ability and opportunity for State Farm to depose Lyon as to his May 30, 2024, report with a continuance still does not solve the prejudice, as “this would obviously result in additional delay and increase the expense of defending this lawsuit.” 
    • The delay of even a few weeks in disclosing expert testimony disrupts the Court’s schedule and the opponent’s preparation and is thus prejudicial.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Bigelow V. State Farm Fire And Casualty Company
    Docket Number: 1:23cv285
    Court: United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, Southern Division
    Order Date: October 27, 2024
  • Construction Expert Witness’ Damages Analysis Admitted Despite Late Disclosure

    Construction Expert Witness’ Damages Analysis Admitted Despite Late Disclosure

    This case stems from a 2022 subcontract between HBonilla (Plaintiff) and Defendant Ragle, Inc. (“Ragle”) for HBonilla to perform work for the City of Dallas. In 2023, Ragle claims it discovered that HBonilla had been overbilling  for its work. After a dispute, HBonilla stopped working on the project and filed a lawsuit against Ragle and its sureties, Colonial American Casualty and Surety Company (“Colonial”) and Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland (“Fidelity” and, collectively with Colonial, the “Sureties”). Ragle and the Sureties in turn brought counterclaims against HBonilla for the amount they alleged was overbilled.

    Shortly after, the Court issued a Scheduling Order, setting January 29, 2024, as the deadline for parties to designate experts for affirmative claims and February 28, 2024, for rebuttal experts. Unfortunately, Ragle and the Sureties’ previous counsel experienced a medical emergency in early 2024, and their current counsel appeared in April. The parties agreed to extend the deadline for rebuttal expert designations to May 20, 2024.

    By that date, Ragle and the Sureties designated three experts: William Tusa, Troy Ragle, and William Rather. Both Troy Ragle and William Rather were non-retained experts. Rather served as Controller at Ragle, Inc., while Troy Ragle was the Vice President. HBonilla argued that these experts addressed Ragle and the Sureties’ affirmative claims, not just rebuttal purposes, and claimed they were improperly designated after the affirmative expert deadline. Consequently, HBonilla filed a motion to exclude the Defendants’ expert testimony on the grounds that they designated the experts after the deadline had passed.

    Construction Expert Witness

    William Tusa is a Senior Managing Director at FTI Consulting. He is a member of the Construction, Projects & Assets practice and is based in Houston. Tusa has extensive experience providing a wide range of construction consulting and advisory services focused on analysis and resolution of construction contract disputes.

    Over Tusa’s career, he has consulted with clients on the preparation, monitoring and analysis of schedules and programs for construction projects both nationally and internationally.

    Tusa has provided program advisory services to executive level leadership and construction management personnel in the areas of process improvement, performance evaluation, CPM development, change order analysis, claim preservation and prevention, cost assessment, project control (cost and schedule) implementation, contract management, dispute resolution and project close out.

    Want to know more about the challenges William Tusa has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    In deciding whether to admit testimony from experts designated after the deadline, the Court considered four factors: (1) the explanation for the failure to identify the witness; (2) the importance of the testimony; (3) the potential prejudice in allowing the testimony; and (4) the availability of a continuance to cure any prejudice.

    Experts are not timely designated and disclosed

    First, the Court read through the explanation the parties provided for designating their experts late. Ragle and the Sureties’ current counsel had not yet appeared when the deadline to designate affirmative experts passed. They did not anticipate needing experts to substantiate their counterclaim for damages. After the deadline for designating affirmative experts had passed, Ragle and the Sureties claimed that Tusa conducted an analysis that resulted in a different damages amount. Ragle and the Sureties planned to Tusa’s analysis for both their rebuttal to HBonilla’s damages and for their own affirmative counterclaim.

    Ragle and the Sureties designated a rebuttal expert whose testimony supports their affirmative claim because of the intertwined nature of Ragle and the Sureties’ rebuttal to HBonilla’s damages claim and their own counterclaim.

    Importance of the Testimony

    Next, the Court considered the importance of the testimony. The case centered on calculations related to HBonilla’s work as a subcontractor for Ragle, including invoices and payments. The expert testimony directly addressed core issues of what the parties may owe each other, influencing the Court’s decision to allow it.

    Potential Prejudice from Allowing the Testimony

    The Court considered any potential prejudice permitting the testimony may cause. In this case, HBonilla has had ample time—four months—to consider the experts’ testimony before the close of discovery on September 16, 2024. HBonilla notes in its motion that it had no time to serve written discovery on Ragle regarding these experts, but that was before the Court granted an extension of the discovery period. On the other hand, it would be prejudicial to deprive Ragle and the Sureties of expert testimony regarding their counterclaim, and it would certainly be extremely prejudicial to deprive them of expert testimony to rebut HBonilla’s claims. Because their rebuttal and affirmative testimony is essentially the same, this factor cuts in favor of Ragle and the Sureties.

    Availability of a Continuance to Mitigate Prejudice

    Finally, the Court considered the availability of a continuance to alleviate any undue prejudice caused by allowing the expert testimony. Since HBonilla has already had time to conduct needed discovery, and even opposed a continuance in its motion, the Court found no need to grant one.

    Held

    The Court denied HBonilla’s motion to exclude Defendant’s expert witness William Tusa.

    Key Takeaway:

    The Court decided to admit the construction expert witness’ damages analysis despite the late disclosure. This case hinges on the parties’ calculations of HBonilla’s work as a subcontractor for Ragle and the invoices and payments related to that work. The central issue is the calculation of what the parties may owe each other, and this expert testimony speaks to those calculations. The Court noted that HBonilla had sufficient time to evaluate the expert testimony before the close of discovery and concluded that denying Ragle and the Sureties the opportunity to present this testimony would cause undue prejudice

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Hbonilla LLC v. Ragle, Inc., et al
    Docket Number: 3:23cv1478
    Court: United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division
    Order Date: September 13, 2024
  • Proposed Expert Witnesses Barred from Evaluating Psychological and Economic Damages

    Proposed Expert Witnesses Barred from Evaluating Psychological and Economic Damages

    Domski filed this lawsuit on August 11, 2023, alleging that she was wrongfully terminated from her employment by defendant Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan after she refused to comply with the company’s COVID-19 vaccination policy. Domski worked for Blue Cross Blue Shield from March 10, 2008 until her termination on January 5, 2022, most recently as an IT Process Specialist II.

    She submitted a written religious exemption request, which generally cited a belief that taking the vaccine would be immoral because “[t]he three COVID vaccines were ether developed or tested using fetal cells that originated in abortion.”

    The Defendant interviewed Domski regarding her religious beliefs but denied her request for an accommodation shortly thereafter, stating that “she did not meet the criteria for an exemption due to a sincerely held religious belief, practice, or observance.”

    On July 5, 2024, the Plaintiff filed a witness list indicating that Dr. Gerald A. Shiener would provide expert testimony regarding the Plaintiff’s psychological damages, and Jeffrey Bagalis would provide expert testimony as to the Plaintiff’s economic damages. The Plaintiff served Bagalis’ report on the Defendant on July 18, 2024. Generally, he opined that the Plaintiff’s economic damages exceed $1.2 million. At oral argument, the Plaintiff stated that she had furnished a report from Shiener on September 12, 2024.

    The Defendant asked the Court to exclude the testimony of Bagalis and Shiener because the disclosures were woefully late. Blue Cross maintained that the Plaintiff’s expert disclosures came as a surprise because she did not list either expert on her initial disclosures or include them in her responses to its discovery requests, and Blue Cross did not have an opportunity to depose them during the discovery period.

    Psychiatry Expert Witness

    Dr. Gerald Shiener, MD, is a board-certified psychiatrist with over 40 years of experience. He is also an Assistant Professor in the Department of Psychiatry at Michigan State University.

    Get the full story on challenges to Gerald Shiener’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study. 

    Accounting Expert Witness

    Jeffrey Bagalis is the Managing Member of Accurity Group, LLC (“Accurity”), a Certified Public Accountant (CPA), Accredited in Business Valuations (ABV), and Certified in Financial Forensics (CFF) with over 20 years of experience providing a wide range of professional service.

    Want to know more about the challenges Jeffrey Bagalis has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report. 

    Discussion by the Court

    The Court held that the Plaintiff’s expert disclosures in this case plainly were deficient. Under the scheduling order, Domski was obligated to serve her Rule 26(a)(2)(B) and (C) disclosures on or before December 7, 2024. Neither of her proposed expert witnesses was disclosed formally until July 5, 2024, more than half a year past the deadline.

    The Plaintiff’s disclosures also were substantively deficient. Because Shiener and Bagalis were retained experts, Rule 26(a)(2)(B) required Domski to furnish a report containing, among other things, a complete statement of the expert’s opinions and their basis, “the facts or data considered by the witness,” a statement of the expert’s experiences and qualifications, and information about the expert’s compensation. She did not provide a report for Bagalis until July 18, 2024 and did not provide a report from Shiener until after the briefing was completed on this motion.

    Citing Rule 26(a)(2)(D)(i), the Plaintiff appears to argue that her expert disclosure was timely because that rule establishes a deadline of 90 days before trial. She forgot, however, that this is a default rule, which only applies “[a]bsent a stipulation or a court order.”

    Surprise

    The Plaintiff argued that its expert disclosures did not surprise the Defendant for two reasons. Initially, she said that her responses to the Defendant’s interrogatories in November 2023 put it on notice of her intention to seek expert testimony regarding her economic and psychological damages. She added that her attorney’s February 4, 2024 email regarding expert discovery in the other cases the attorneys were managing together should have alerted him to her intentions in this case.

    Despite the Plaintiff’s representation about her intentions, it is uncontested that she never disclosed information about any expert by the December 7, 2023 deadline. By its own terms, the Plaintiff’s email would seem to exclude Domski’s case because the discovery deadline had already passed, and no dispositive motions had been filed. The Court expressly stated that the scheduling order in this case trumps any inconsistent provision of the consolidation order governing the other cases.

     All should have been aware that this case has its own scheduling order and deadlines for expert disclosure, so nothing about the email necessarily alerted the Defendant that the Plaintiff intended to use Bagalis and Shiener in this case.

    Therefore, the Court held that these two announcements did not minimize the effect of the Plaintiff’s late disclosures on this case; it was reasonable for the Defendant to believe that the Plaintiff did not anticipate using expert testimony in this matter. And even if the Defendant was informed that expert witnesses might be part of the Plaintiff’s evidentiary presentation, that information was not much use without the detail required by Rule 26(a)(2)(B).

    Ability to Cure Surprise and Disruption to Trial

    The Plaintiff’s argument that the surprise can be cured takes two paths. First, she says that it was the Defendant that “manufactured” the surprise by not moving to compel the production of the missing expert reports and by not responding to her attorney’s February 4, 2024 email containing her counsel’s “plan.”

    However, Rule 26(a)(2) places the disclosure obligation on the party offering the evidence, in this case, the Plaintiff. The Defendant was under no obligation to seek the production of a report it did not know existed and had no reason to suspect would be forthcoming, and the February 4, 2024 email contained no indication that it applied to this case. The Defendant only became aware of the Plaintiff’s intention to use experts for this case in July and filed a motion to exclude these untimely-disclosed witnesses shortly thereafter.

    The Plaintiff argued that there is ample opportunity to cure any surprise and only a small likelihood of disrupting the trial date because she can make her experts available for depositions before the trial, or the trial date can be adjusted.

    The Court disagreed. For one, taking these depositions is only one step in the Defendant’s likely trial preparation. It is reasonable to anticipate that the Defendant would want to find its own rebuttal experts, provide the factual materials to them, generate reports, and prepare them for trial. At oral argument, Plaintiff’s counsel acknowledged that Schiener actually examined the Plaintiff before completing his report. Presumably, a defense expert would want to do the same. And the Plaintiff forgets that compressing the schedule as she suggests would deprive the Defendant of mounting a Daubert challenge to the expert witnesses’ testimony.

    Certainly, issuing a new scheduling order would cure all of these difficulties. But the Plaintiff must demonstrate good cause for that relief.

    Importance of the Evidence

    Both sides seem to agree that the testimony of Bagalis and Shiener relates only to the question of damages. Excluding Bagalis and Shiener as witnesses will not make or break the Plaintiff’s liability case.

    In this case at least, the Court held that the unimportance of the evidence, when measured against the burden of providing the Defendant an opportunity to take expert discovery and procure rebuttal experts in an otherwise straight-forward case, weighs against the Plaintiff.

    Non-Disclosing Party’s Explanation

    The Plaintiff’s explanation for failing to disclose her expert reports by the ordered deadline is unclear, which, perhaps, is at least partially attributable to her apparent belief that the reports were submitted timely. The Plaintiff seems to view her lapse within the context of the other ongoing lawsuits against the Defendant being managed by her counsel.

    The Court held that this explanation is unpersuasive; it confounds the tasks of litigating wholesale multiple similar claims with producing discovery that is inherently individualized.

    And each of those Plaintiffs no doubt will present their own evidence of damages. Domski’s case stands on its own and is subject to its own scheduling order. As the Court has previously reminded the parties, “counsel should have evaluated whether it was prudent to take on this workload if they were not prepared to litigate each case to completion by the dates established in the Court’s scheduling order.”

    Held

    The Defendant’s motion to exclude the Plaintiff’s proposed expert witnesses Gerald A. Shiener and Jeffrey Bagalis is granted.

    Key Takeaway:

    Because of the Plaintiff’s late disclosure, the Defendant would be deprived of the opportunity for an evidentiary challenge under Evidence Rule 702 and probably would not be able to marshal rebuttal evidence in a measured and non-rushed manner, which the scheduling order was intended to avoid.

    The Plaintiff failed to comply with the deadlines for disclosing expert witness information, and she has not shown that the failure was substantially justified or harmless. The mandatory preclusion sanctions in Rule 37(c)(1) apply here.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Domski V. Blue Cross Blue Shield Of Michigan
    Docket Number: 2:23cv12023
    Court: United States District Court, Michigan Eastern
    Order Date: October 07, 2024
  • Late Service of Psychology Expert Witness’ Report Might Cause Severe Prejudice

    Late Service of Psychology Expert Witness’ Report Might Cause Severe Prejudice

    Plaintiff, Rudolph Mills filed this action against Defendant, Steuben Foods, Inc., alleging employment discrimination based on race after numerous complaints about shocking and wildly inappropriate racial slurs used against him by supervisors and managers.

    Defendants moved, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(f)(1)(C), 26(a)(2)(A), (D), 37(c)(1)(C), for an order striking the expert report of Mark D. Lerner, PhD. Alternatively, Defendants requested the Court award Defendants’ expenses which may be incurred to counter Lerner’s opinions, including any costs
    Defendants incur in connection with taking Lerner’s deposition.

    Plaintiff e-mailed Defendants a copy of a Confidential Psychological Report prepared by Lerner who was also expected to testify concerning Plaintiff’s alleged psychological and emotional distress Plaintiff suffered as a result of the alleged discriminatory conduct of Defendants. According to the report, Lerner examined Plaintiff on December 9, 2023 and issued the report on December 10, 2023.

    Plaintiff’s opposition is based on Plaintiff’s assertion that a dispute between Plaintiff’s counsel and one of Plaintiff’s other expert which “resulted in [a] delay of production of the expert report” does not warrant striking Lerner’s report and preclusion.

    Psychology Expert Witness

    Mark D. Lerner, Ph.D. is a clinical and forensic psychologist with over 35 years of experience helping people through challenging times. He sees individuals, couples, and families in his office in Melville, New York, and works with clients virtually online.

    Moreover, as chairman and CEO of The National Center for Emotional Wellness, Inc., Lerner provides practical information, training, and support for organizations, corporations, educational institutions, healthcare providers, and emergency responders worldwide.

    Get the full story on challenges to Mark Lerner’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Discussion by the Court

    The Court held that this reason for non-compliance fails to explain why Plaintiff’s counsel failed to secure a different psychological expert, presumably Lerner, prior to the deadline for Rule 26(b)(2) expert disclosure.

    To begin with, Plaintiff’s delay is not harmless as failing to strike Lerner’s report and preclude his expert testimony would necessitate granting Defendants an opportunity to secure a rebuttal expert who would need to interview Plaintiff thereby further prolonging the trial. Specifically, Lerner’s testimony would be limited to the question of Plaintiff’s damages, not Defendants’ liability, and, as such, is not critical to Plaintiff’s case. Moreover, the Defendants will be severely prejudiced by having the jury hear unrebutted expert testimony that Defendants’ racial slurs caused Plaintiff to suffer emotional distress.

    Finally, the Court saw that Plaintiff also failed to establish good cause required by Rule 16(b), for excusable neglect.

    Defendants also requested the Court, pursuant to Rule 37(c)(1)(A), award Defendants’ expenses in connection with taking Lerner’s deposition, or alternatively, pursuant to Rule 16(f) or Rule 37(c)(1)(A), Defendants’ expenses incurred in connection with bringing the instant motion.

    The Court decided that responsibility for the late service of Lerner’s report is solely attributable to Plaintiff’s counsel’s complete disregard of the deadline for service of Plaintiff’s expert report. Therefore, such responsibility should be assigned to Plaintiff’s counsel, Seamus P. Barrett, Esq. and the Derek Smith Law Group, PLLC, and not Plaintiff, should the Court award Defendants’ attorneys fees incurred in making the instant motion pursuant to Rule 16(f)(1)(C).

    Held

    The Court granted the Defendants’ motion to strike and preclude the report of Plaintiff’s expert Mark D. Lerner.

    Key Takeaways:

    The party that failed to comply with its discovery obligations bears the burden of proving that its failure was both substantially justified. Plaintiff’s delay is not harmless as failing to strike Lerner’s report and preclude his expert testimony would necessitate granting Defendants an opportunity to secure a rebuttal expert who would need to interview Plaintiff thereby further prolonging the trial.

    Moreover, harmlessness means an absence of prejudice. However, Defendants will be severely prejudiced by having the jury hear unrebutted expert testimony that Defendants’ racial slurs caused Plaintiff to suffer emotional distress

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Mills V. Steuben Foods, Incorporated Et Al
    Docket Number: 1:19cv1178
    Court: United States District Court, New York Western
    Order Date: September 18, 2024