Expert Witness Profiler

Tag: Deliberate Indifference

  • Law Enforcement Expert Allowed to Opine on Massage Business Inspections

    Law Enforcement Expert Allowed to Opine on Massage Business Inspections

    Plaintiff Dai Trang Thi Nguyen brought this action against Defendant City of San Jose and Individual Supervisor Defendants Joseph Hatfield and Rachel Roberts alleging that a former City Code Inspector William Gerry sexually assaulted and extorted Plaintiff during his code enforcement inspections of her massage business, and Defendants allowed Gerry’s conduct to occur in deliberate indifference to her rights to due process and equal protection.

    It is undisputed that former City Code Inspector Gerry repeatedly raped and extorted Plaintiff while inspecting her massage business in 2019.

    Defendants filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Officer Antonio Flores and Leonard Powell pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 while Plaintiff filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Dr. John M. Greene under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26.

    Law Enforcement Expert Witnesses

    Antonio “Tony” Flores has been a police officer with the San Francisco Police Department (“SFPD”) since 1982. During his career, Flores has conducted and supervised “several hundred” massage business inspections, often as many as fifty to sixty per year.

    Discover more cases with Antonio Flores as an expert witness by ordering his comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

    Leonard Powell served as the Code Enforcement Manager, Zoning Administrator, and Deputy Building Official for Dangerous Building Enforcement for the City of Fremont from 2001 to 2020, where he supervised officers enforcing zoning, housing, sanitation, and building codes.

    As part of this role, he developed processes and managed investigations in massage business regulation and enforcement, trained and supervised officers, and implemented ethics and accountability systems.

    Get the full story on challenges to Leonard Powell’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Psychiatry Expert Witness

    Dr. John M. Greene is board certified in both General and Forensic Psychiatry. He began practicing in the San Francisco Bay Area in 1997. He became a member of Stanford University’s Adjunct Clinical Faculty in 2005, and currently teaches topics on psychiatry and the law to the residents in the Department of Psychiatry at Stanford.

    With extensive training and expertise, Greene is regularly relied upon to provide expert testimony in civil and criminal cases regarding mental illness.

    Want to know more about the challenges John Greene has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Leonard Powell

    a. Helping the Jury Decide the Case

    Defendants argued that Powell’s testimony will not help the jury decide whether the City was deliberately indifferent. Powell’s report identified several “best practices” in the code enforcement industry that San Jose was not implementing at the time of Plaintiff’s injury, including: using partner systems for inspections; random supervisory audits; rotation of inspectors across industries; direct supervisory contact with regulated businesses; and formal post-action debriefs. However, during his deposition, Powell testified that he does not believe code inspectors are “likely” to extort or sexually assault people absent those “best practices.”

    The Court found that this did not disqualify Powell from testifying as an expert in this case. Although Powell declined to use the word “likely” in his deposition, he also testified there is “a high probability” that lone male enforcement officers would commit sexual assault and corruption, and that lone code enforcement officers going into massage businesses is an outdated practice because “there is a high probability” that something may go wrong.

    b. Reliability

    Defendants argued that Powell’s opinions are narrowly based on his experience in the City of Fremont and the City of San Rafael, which is insufficient to opine on industry-wide practices.

    The Court found Defendants’ arguments unpersuasive. Defendants’ assertion that Powell’s experience is limited only to Fremont and San Rafael is taken out of context and contradicted by his documented experience. As author of the California Code Enforcement Officer Standards Act and CACEO guidelines, Powell drafted California legislation and regulations that established statewide training and ethical standards for code enforcement officers, and he implemented these standards in Fremont. When asked about which other jurisdictions have implemented these standards, he listed San Rafael as one of the “other Bay Area cities” with similar practices.

    As for his reliance on external written documents, this is not necessary for Rule 702 purposes.

    Powell served as a code inspector supervisor for nearly two decades and authored the California legislation and regulation that established statewide training and ethical standards. In his report and his deposition, he has sufficiently explained how this experience formed his opinions on best practices in this industry, and he relied on that experience to opine on the facts of this case.

    c. Common Sense

    Finally, Defendants argued that Powell’s opinions on code inspector supervision amount only to “common sense,” not the opinion of an expert.

    Defendants also highlighted Powell’s testimony that his reassignment protocols are not specific to code enforcement, but rather are “kind of everywhere in life,” such as in consumer transactions: “If one person has a conflict with somebody else in a commercial setting, the general approach is, ‘Can I talk to somebody else?’”

    But, as Plaintiff highlights, Defendants’ excerpts of Powell’s deposition are taken out of context. For example, the phrase “common sense supervisory assessment” was counsel’s, not Powell’s.

    And before discussing his general observations of re-assignments in commercial settings, Powell testified that his knowledge of re-assignment practices for code enforcement inspectors was based on his experience in the code enforcement field.

    Upon reviewing the whole record, the Court found that Powell sufficiently used his expertise in the code enforcement industry, rather than common sense available to any lay person, to provide his opinions.

    Antonio Flores

    a. Expertise

    Defendants first argued that Flores lacked the code enforcement expertise necessary to offer opinions about the industry because he is a police officer, not a code enforcement inspector.

    The Court found that, despite his role as a police officer, Flores possessed the expertise required under Rule 702 to testify on code enforcement practices in massage businesses. Though Flores has never been a code inspector, Flores has worked extensively with code enforcement inspectors in his “several hundred” massage business inspections. Flores also testified that he has seen code inspectors operate with enforcement powers akin to those of police officers, particularly in the eyes of certain vulnerable communities including illicit massage business employees, such that the distinction between police officer and code enforcement investigator may be immaterial in this context.

    b. Reliability

    Next, Defendants argued that Flores lacked reliable support for his opinion that sexual assault or extortion is the likely outcome of a solo male code inspector working in massage businesses.

    Defendants contended that Flores testified he was not aware of any other instance in his experience in which a code enforcement inspector assaulted or extorted a massage business worker; he is not aware of any standards applicable to supervising code inspectors; he is not aware of any jurisdiction that actually supervises code enforcement inspectors the way he opines they should be supervised; and he could not point to any written standards that suggest re-assigning an employee about whom a complaint has been made.

    Analysis

    First, whether similar conduct has occurred in the past is not necessarily relevant to the theory of Plaintiff’s case—that the risks of exploitation were so obvious and well-known in the industry that the City did not need a pattern of similar instances to be on constructive notice.

    Second, Flores’s lack of experience in code enforcement supervision could foreseeably render some opinions on code enforcement inadmissible, but it does not render his entire testimony unreliable. Flores still sufficiently explained how he formed his opinions on code enforcement best practices based on his observations, trainings, and teachings conducted over forty-three years in the SFPD overseeing code enforcement inspections in massage businesses—including observations of employees vulnerable to exploitation, power dynamics, intimate spaces, and code enforcement investigators’ use of police powers.

    Third, as the Court noted above, written standards on re-assigning code inspectors after receiving complaints is unnecessary to forming a reliable opinion. The Court found that Flores may rely “solely or primarily on experience” because he has sufficiently explained how his experiences have led to his conclusions on code enforcement best practices in massage businesses, why that experience is a sufficient basis for his opinions, and how his experience is reliably applied to the facts of this case.

    c. Common Sense

    Finally, Defendants also argued that Flores’ opinions are no more than “common sense.” But upon review of the cited potions of Flores’ testimony, it appeared that Flores’ use of “common sense” referred to “common sense” among industry professionals.

    Upon reviewing Flores’s report and testimony in its entirety, the Court is satisfied that his opinions are based on his relevant experience, including experience conducting massage business inspections, rather than on the common sense available to any lay person.

    Accordingly, the Court also found that Flores is qualified as an expert by his knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education in the field of massage business inspections.

    John Greene

    Unlike Powell and Flores, Plaintiff did not challenge the admissibility of Greene’s opinions under Rule 702.

    Defendants first disclosed Greene during fact discovery on August 19, 2025, as the person who would conduct a psychiatric independent medical examination (“IME”) on Plaintiff. Plaintiff argued that Greene’s opinion must be excluded because Greene is not a “rebuttal” expert, but rather an initial expert, and he should have been disclosed as such prior to the deadline for initial expert disclosure on September 22, 2025.

    The Court agreed with Plaintiff that the timing of the IME and Greene’s report was unusual. However, Plaintiff has not provided any authority prohibiting the use of prior findings to rebut the opinion of an initial expert during trial. So long as Greene’s testimony only uses his IME findings to narrowly contradict or rebut the initial expert’s opinions on the same subject matter, the Court sees no reason for exclusion.

    Held

    • The Court denied the Defendants’ motion to exclude the testimony of Antonio Flores and Leonard Powell.
    • The Court also denied the Plaintiff’s motion to exclude the testimony of John Greene.

    Key Takeaway

    So long as the witness “explains how that experience leads to the conclusion reached, why that experience is a sufficient basis for the opinion, and how that experience is reliably applied to the facts,” than the witness may rely “solely or primarily on experience.”

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Dai Trang Thi Nguyen V. City of San Jose
    Docket Number: 5:21cv92
    Court Name: United States District Court, California Northern
    Order Date: January 22, 2026
  • Neurology Expert’s Legal Theories Excluded

    Neurology Expert’s Legal Theories Excluded

    J. M. was diagnosed with epilepsy in sixth grade. His condition was treated with multiple medications, but he continued to have breakthrough seizures. Sam’s Law (HB 684) requires all Texas public school personnel to be trained in the recognition of seizures and providing seizure first aid.

    On August 24, 2022, J. M. had a seizure while running on the school’s track. The school called his mother Apryl Mendoza to notify her that J. M. was seizing and that emergency medical services were in route. Apryl called Gabriel Mendoza, and when he arrived at the scene, J. M. had been seizing for approximately seventeen minutes and had not received his prescribed dose of nasal midazolam. Emergency medical personnel arrived and began performing CPR on J. M. before transporting him to the hospital. He died the following day at the age of fourteen.

    In this disability discrimination case, Plaintiffs sought to recover for injuries allegedly resulting from the prolonged seizure of fourteen-year-old J.M. while he was at school, and who later died as a result. Defendant is the school district where the alleged events took place.

    Defendant filed three motions to exclude Plaintiffs’ retained experts Dr. Dave Shahani, Ms. Monica Porras, and Dr. Francis Sheboy.

    Neurology Expert Witness

    Dr. Dave Naresh Shahani is a licensed and practicing physician, board-certified by the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology with special qualification in Child Neurology and Epilepsy. His practice is focused on the diagnosis and management of children and adolescents with neurologic conditions and intractable epilepsy.

    Discover more cases with Dave Shahani as an expert witness by ordering his comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

    Nursing Expert Witness

    Monica Porras, MSN, RN, NCSN has been an active licensed nurse since 2006 and specializes in pediatrics with a focus in school nursing. She has served as a school nurse for the last 9 years of her career. She is a Nationally Certified School Nurse.

    Want to know more about the challenges Monica Porras has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Education Expert Witness

    Francis N. Sheboy has 33 years of professional experience in public education. As an educator, she served as a high school social studies teacher; high school assistant principal and principal; assistant superintendent for curriculum, instruction, personnel, and technology; and superintendent of schools.

    His educational background included a bachelor’s degree in social studies education, a master’s degree in social studies education, a certificate program in educational administration with a focus on supervision and evaluation, and a doctoral degree in educational leadership, management, and policy from Seton Hall University in South Orange, New Jersey.

    Get the full story on challenges to Francis Sheboy’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Discussion by the Court

    Dave Shahani

    Defendant argued that Shahani’s November 2025 expert report “transforms previously uncertain factual points into definitive assertions,” and introduced “legal theories of ‘intentional discrimination’ and ‘deliberate indifference’” that were not in his previous June 2024 report.

    The Court agreed with Defendant that these are legal conclusions and should be excluded as irrelevant and unhelpful to the trier of fact.

    Defendant also asserted that Shahani’s discussion of Sam’s Law, found in both the June 2024 and November 2025 reports, should be excluded because “whether school personnel complied with statutory training requirements or internal policies is a legal and factual question for the Court and jury.”

    Shahani may discuss Sam’s Law in the context of his medical expertise, and may provide his opinion as to the facts of the case within that context. This includes how the law might relate to his testimony regarding the guidelines set out by the American Epilepsy Society or J. M.’s seizure action plan. However, Shahani cannot testify that “[J. M.] was not treated per the standard of care outlines by Sam’s Law.” First, because this is an impermissible legal conclusion, and second, because Defendant is correct that Sam’s Law does not provide a standard of care, such testimony would confuse and mislead the jury.

    Monica Porras

    Defendant also moved to exclude the testimony of Monica Porras, arguing that Porras’ testimony ‘substitutes legal conclusions and advocacy for expert analysis” and would “improperly instruct the jury on the law.” Porras’ November 2, 2025 report included testimony that a “knowing refusal to administer medication” constitutes “intentional discrimination or deliberate indifference under Title II of the ADA.” She then concluded that J. M. was “denied an ADA-protected accommodation” and “died as a result.”

    The Court agreed with the Plaintiffs that experts can opine as to industry standards and discuss whether conduct is consistent with those standards.

    As a result, testimony that a “knowing refusal to administer medication” constitutes “intentional discrimination or deliberate indifference under Title II of the ADA,” that J. M. was “denied an ADA-protected accommodation,” or any similar legal conclusions relating to the ADA was excluded.

    However, the Court refused to exclude testimony simply because it mentions the ADA within the context of Porras’ discussion of industry customs or practices related to her experience as a school nurse.

    Francis Sheboy

    Defendant moved to exclude the testimony of Plaintiffs’ expert Dr. Francis Sheboy because he “purports to offer opinions regarding the school’s compliance with federal disability laws and its alleged deliberate indifference.” Experts cannot offer legal conclusions in their testimony. As a result, any testimony by Sheboy containing legal conclusions, such as above, will be excluded. 

    Defendant also argued that Sheboy should not be able to opine as to J. M.’s disability status and eligibility under the ADA because he is not a medical doctor.

    Although Sheboy may discuss J. M.’s condition within the context of his experience in education administration, the Court held that statements like J. M.’s epilepsy and accompanying seizures “clearly constituted qualifying impairments that substantially limited major life activities” and “entitled him to protections under federal disability law” are legal conclusions that must be excluded.

    Held

    The Court agreed with Defendant that portions of each challenged expert’s testimony contain impermissible legal conclusions, are irrelevant, and risk confusing the jury. However, the Court also agreed with Plaintiffs that the appropriate remedy is limitation, not wholesale exclusion of the witnesses.

    Accordingly, the Court granted Defendant’s motions insofar as Plaintiffs’ experts will not be permitted to include any legal conclusions in their testimony, as explained above. This includes any testimony that states or applies ADA legal standards, or otherwise uses legal labels such as “deliberate indifference” or “intentional discrimination.” The Court denied Defendant’s motions to the extent they sought to exclude Plaintiffs’ experts and their opinions in their entirety.

    Key Takeaway

    Qualified experts are permitted to offer opinion testimony as to industry standards or norms and whether or not they were followed in a particular case, as long as such opinions involves questions of fact rather than purely legal matters.

    This could include the discussion of statutes, such as the ADA, in relation to how they relate to industry standards or practices, but cannot include legal conclusions relating to those statutes.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Mendoza V. Amarillo Independent School District
    Docket Number: 2:24cv169
    Court Name: United States District Court, Texas Northern
    Order Date: March 19, 2026
  • Emergency Medicine Expert’s Testimony on Jail Policies Admitted

    Emergency Medicine Expert’s Testimony on Jail Policies Admitted

    Jeff Trevillion, as Special Administrator for the Estate of Louis Perales,
    deceased (“the Estate”), filed a claim for cruel and unusual punishment against the arresting officer and the jail staff in their individual capacities, and Sheriff Scott Owen (“Owen”) in his official capacity as Sheriff of Washington County, Oklahoma.

    The Estate alleged that the Defendants’ policy of placing intoxicated inmates into holding cells until they “sobered up” constituted a deliberate indifference to Louis Perales’ serious medical needs.

    Owen filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Michael Jobin, M.D., an expert witness called by by the Estate.

    Emergency Medicine Expert Witness

    Michael J. Jobin, M.D., has been employed as a board-certified emergency room physician throughout his career, during which he has evaluated intoxicated patients and provided medical clearance examinations for patients in law enforcement custody. In that role, Jobin regularly decided whether arrestees who were intoxicated with alcohol or other drugs were fit for incarceration. 

    Want to know more about the challenges Michael Jobin has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.  

    Discussion by the Court

    Jobin is qualified to testify as an expert

    Owen argued that Jobin is not qualified to testify as an expert about either Perales’ medical needs or the jail staff’s actions and policies regarding intoxicated inmates because Jobin lacked specialized training in cardiovascular diseases or drug intoxication and has never worked in a jail or provided medical care in a jail setting. 

    However, Jobin is a board-certified emergency room physician who has provided medical clearances for patients in law enforcement custody throughout his career. 

    Jobin served on the Colorado Board of Medical Examiners, where he reviewed complaints made by prisoners about the medical care they received while in prison. 

    Jobin has previously served as an expert witness in cases in which he testified about inmates and medical care. In those instances, he was asked to review the basic emergency care policies of jail facilities, which he evaluated relative to the jail’s medical capabilities. In this case, he intended to offer his opinion that adequate medical evaluation procedures and emergency medical treatment for acute intoxication would have prevented Perales’ death by ensuring he was treated and monitored in a hospital.

    Further, while Jobin has not worked in a jail and is not trained regarding jail policies, his proposed testimony covers only whether the jail’s policies followed “normal medical practice” for an emergency setting, one which he compares to a “low-level emergency department.”

    The Court held that Jobin’s testimony on the jail’s policies is limited to his opinions about proper emergency medical policies and practices, and is therefore within the reasonable confines of his forty-five years of expertise in emergency medicine, including working as an emergency medicine professor and physician in multiple hospitals’ emergency departments and evaluating the medical needs of arrestees.

    Jobin’s opinions are reliable

    Owen argued that the expert opinions Jobin offered are unreliable because they are not based on sufficient facts or data and because some of the materials that he considered were unreliable.

    Jobin reviewed the following facts to reach his opinion: Perales’ medical records, which included the Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation report, ambulance records, and autopsy report; Perales’ jail records; the jail’s general policies; the jail’s policies relating to Perales; the police body camera footage from Perales’ arrest showing the EMTs attempting to take Perales’ blood pressure; the officers’ deposition testimony that Perales was cleared in the field for transport to the jail but without formal paperwork; and the jail video showing Perales flailing his arms in the holding cell. From these materials, Jobin concluded that adequate emergency medical care and procedures likely would have prevented Perales’ death. 

    The Court is persuaded that the facts that Jobin examined to develop his expert opinion are sufficient, even if not exhaustive. Jobin relied on his decades of experience in emergency medicine in assessing whether the facts showed that adequate procedures were in place to care for Perales.

    Jobin may not render legal opinions

    Owen argued that Jobin’s statement in his deposition that Perales’ death was caused by “deliberate indifference” is a legal opinion that Jobin is not qualified to offer.

    During his deposition, Jobin testified that he thought there was “deliberate indifference” in the jail’s actions in this case because the jail staff did not show proper regard to Perales’ well-being. Jobin admitted that he did not know an exact legal definition of “deliberate indifference,” and that he learned this phrase from another case in which he served as an expert.

    “Deliberate indifference” is an ultimate issue of law in this case, and its use by a witness would likely confuse the jury as to its role.

    As a result, the Court precluded Jobin from using the phrase “deliberate indifference” in his testimony.

    Held

    The Court granted in part and denied in part the Defendant Scott Owen’s motion to exclude the testimony of witness Dr. Michael Jobin.

    Key Takeaway:

    Jobin’s opinions are within the “reasonable confines of his subject area” of emergency medicine. His experience as an emergency room physician means that he is familiar with standard emergency medicine procedures and how to treat common conditions. Even if Jobin is not an expert in cardiology or drug intoxication specifically, he has made assessments about whether arrestees are fit for incarceration or need medical treatment outside of the place of incarceration. This necessarily involves assessing whether an arrestee’s medical condition will become dangerous if not treated in an acute care setting.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Trevillion V. Owen Et Al
    Docket Number: 4:22cv473
    Court Name: United States District Court, Oklahoma Northern
    Order Date: October 10, 2025
  • General Surgery Expert Was Barred From Using the Precise Legal Phrase “Deliberately Indifferent”

    General Surgery Expert Was Barred From Using the Precise Legal Phrase “Deliberately Indifferent”

    Dezmen McBride was booked into custody at the W.C. “Dub” Brassell Detention Center on May 21, 2021. McBride died 15 days later on June 5, 2021, at the age of 18 years old.

    Deborah McBride commenced this action alleging that County Defendants and Separate Defendant Lieutenant Samuel Baker, Jr., in his individual capacity: were deliberately indifferent to McBride’s serious medical needs; used excessive force against McBride; were negligent; were liable for McBride’s wrongful death; violated the Equal Protection Clause; and intentionally inflicted emotional distress on McBride. After McBride’s death, Tanaria Heard was substituted as the Special Administrator of the Estate of Dezmen McBride.

    County Defendants requested that the Court exclude the testimony of William Rutledge because, according to County Defendants, Rutledge’s testimony and opinions “would not assist the trier of fact, contain irrelevant opinions and a legal opinion, invade the province of the jury, contain speculation, and would causes [sic] juror confusion in the least.”

    General Surgery Expert Witness

    William L. Rutledge spent four years as the medical director of Forest Park Medical Clinic and Cumberland Park Medical Clinic, besides serving as an adjunct faculty member in the biology department of Arkansas Baptist College. 

    For nearly two years prior, Rutledge was a research assistant professor for University of Arkansas’ Department of Surgery. He spent a handful of years before as a staff physician, educator, and medical director, preceded by 16 years as a general surgeon for Arkansas Surgical Associates/William L. Rutledge M.D., P.A.

    Rutledge also performed duties as a surgeon for Arkansas Trauma Surgeons, LLC from 1997 to 2000, and was the medial director for Meharry Alcohol and Drug Abuse Program in Nashville, Tennessee, from 1982 to 1984.

    Get the full story on challenges to William Rutledge’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study. 

    Discussion by the Court

    The County Defendants argued that Rutledge’s claim that County Defendants’ deliberate indifference was the cause of McBride’s death is a legal conclusion only the Court can make. Conversely, Heard contended that Rutledge’s opinions touching on a jury question shouldn’t lead to his testimony being excluded.

    Rutledge’s report dated June 12, 2024, concerns whether the care that McBride received was proper and within care standards. Additionally, in his report, Rutledge provides his professional opinion in this matter based on a review of the following: the medical examiner’s report; medical records from Jefferson Regional Medical Center; attorney notes of timeline; call log and incident report from Jefferson County Sheriff’s Department; and a summary of the investigation.

    Rutledge offered many opinions in his report, and he stated that he gave those opinions “with a reasonable degree of medical certainty.” Specifically, Rutledge opined, in part, that “although the CT scan showed no intracranial hemorrhage, McBride clearly exhibited multiple signs of increased intracranial pressure.” For example, McBride exhibited nausea, vomiting, headaches, visual changes, changes in behavior, weakness, inability to stand and walk, confusion, and possible seizure activity. Furthermore, Rutledge also opined that the failure to get McBride evaluated and treated between June 2, 2021, and June 5, 2021, “more probably than not caused his demise.” In addition, Rutledge opined that “McBride progressively worsened” on June 2, 3, and 4, 2021, “as personnel were deliberately indifferent.” Ultimately, Rutledge’s report concluded that “[t]he delay in diagnosis and treatment of Dezmen McBride due to deliberate indifference by jail personnel and nursing personnel led to his death on June 5, 2021.”

    Analysis

    County Defendants asserted that Rutledge’s opinion is “unhelpful to the trier of fact considering the prevailing law, and threatens to cause jury confusion—particularly in a case that is not complex .”

    However, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has determined in a series of cases that, when alleging a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on an alleged delay in medical treatment, a Plaintiff’s failure to offer such evidence is fatal to his claim.

    Therefore, the Court ruled that Rutledge’s opinions are relevant to the issues in this matter—namely whether County Defendants were deliberately indifferent to McBride’s medical needs and consequently contributed to or caused McBride’s death.

    Moreover, that the state crime lab found McBride’s cause of death to be undetermined does not negate the relevancy of Rutledge’s opinions on McBride’s cause of death.

    Proving deliberate indifference requires that the Plaintiff “prove that officials knew about excessive risks to his health but disregarded them and that their unconstitutional actions in fact caused his injuries.” In this case, what County Defendants knew, what they did or did not do in response to that knowledge, and how quickly they acted or failed to act are all among the many questions of fact for the jury to determine.

    Because Rutledge’s testimony that County Defendants were deliberately indifferent is “not a fact-based opinion, but a statement of legal conclusion,” the Court excluded Rutledge’s testimony using this precise legal phrase.

    Held

    The Court granted, in part, and denied, in part, County Defendants’
    Daubert motion in limine to exclude Dr. William L. Rutledge’s report.

    Key Takeaway:

    While the Court found Rutledge’s medical opinions on the propriety of care, the progression of McBride’s condition, and the potential cause of death to be relevant to the claim of deliberate indifference, it excluded Rutledge’s direct statement that the “personnel were deliberately indifferent” and that the “delay in diagnosis and treatment…due to deliberate indifference…led to his death” because the Court deemed these statements to be legal conclusions, not fact-based opinions, which are reserved for the Court to decide.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Heard V. Association Of Arkansas Counties Risk Management Fund Et Al
    Docket Number: 4:24cv325
    Court: United States District Court, Arkansas Eastern
    Order Date: April 04, 2025
  • Hiring a Neutral Medical Expert Witness is Not Necessary When Complex Questions Are Not Raised

    Hiring a Neutral Medical Expert Witness is Not Necessary When Complex Questions Are Not Raised

    Plaintiff being a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a civil rights complaint sought the appointment of an expert witness in the field of psychiatry and mental health treatment and care and a neutral expert familiar with policies and procedures of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

    Plaintiff alleged that while he was housed at Mule Creek State Prison (“MCSP”), defendants A. Chandra, K. Mohr, J. Quiring, J. Charon, and J. Weiss: (a) retaliated against Plaintiff in violation of the First Amendment by, inter alia, verbally threatening plaintiff, and issuing a rules violation report (“RVR”) asserting false allegations in retaliation for Plaintiff filing a grievance against defendant A. Chandra; (b) violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights by, inter alia, housing him in segregated housing and detention, resulting in a long term deprivation of outdoor exercise, despite Plaintiff’s chronic depressive disorder and serious medical and mental health needs; and (c) conspired to violate plaintiff’s constitutional rights. In addition, Plaintiff alleged that Defendants Quiring and Weiss violated Plaintiff’s due process rights in connection with the hearing on the rules violation report asserting false allegations.

    Discussion by the Court

    Psychiatric and Mental Health Expert

    In his first motion, Plaintiff sought the appointment of an expert witness in the field of psychiatry and mental health treatment and care.

    Plaintiff argued that this case involved complex issues of fact, and an expert is required to assist the Court in evaluating Plaintiff’s medically diagnosed chronic depressive disorder and serious medical needs and determining whether subjecting him to C-Status segregated housing and detention and the lengthy deprivation of outdoor exercise “severely aggravated [Plaintiff’s] condition or caused him serious harm and injury.” 

    Prison Electronic Records Expert

    Plaintiff sought the appointment of a neutral expert familiar with policies and procedures of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) regarding the maintenance and retention of prison records who can audit all existing records kept and maintained within the MCSP Electronic Records Management System (“ERMS”) computer relevant to RVR #006953258 and testify as to “the actual date said RVR was generated with information [inputted] by Defendant A. Chandra reporting the CDCR disciplinary charges against [Plaintiff].”

    Analysis

    First, to the extent Plaintiff seeks appointment of an expert witness for his benefit, or to prove his case, the Court has no authority to grant such motion. Rule 706(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence permits the Court to appoint only neutral expert witnesses. An expert appointed pursuant to Rule 706 does not serve as an advocate for either party and each party retains the ability to call its own experts. 

    Second, Courts do not invoke Rule 706 simply to “appoint an expert on behalf of an indigent civil party.”

    Third, the Court held that the Plaintiff’s motions for a neutral expert witness are premature. A neutral expert witness may be necessary where there is “some evidence, admissible or otherwise, that demonstrates a serious dispute that could be resolved or understood through expert testimony.”  At the time Plaintiff filed his motions, the parties were still engaged in discovery, and Plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery responses is pending. There are no pending motions on which the Court may require special assistance, such as to resolve a motion for summary judgment.

    Finally, at least at this juncture, the Court held that Plaintiff’s claims of deliberate indifference to serious medical and mental health needs, retaliation and conspiracy are not so complex as to require an expert witness. 

    Held

    The Court found that at this stage of the proceedings an expert witness is not necessary and would not be significantly useful to the factfinder to comprehend a material issue in this case.

    Key Takeaway:

    Plaintiff contended that a neutral medical expert is required to evaluate whether the long term deprivation of outdoor exercise severely aggravated Plaintiff’s medical or mental health needs, causing him injury. However, Plaintiff’s claims do not raise “probing, complex questions” or require consideration of complex scientific evidence.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Garcia V. Chandra Et Al
    Docket Number: 2:22cv1221
    Court Name: United States District Court, California Eastern
    Order Date: November 13, 2024