Expert Witness Profiler

Tag: Employee

  • Healthcare Administration Expert’s Testimony on Consent Form Excluded

    Healthcare Administration Expert’s Testimony on Consent Form Excluded

    Plaintiff Jacqueline Garrison applied for a job as a United Airlines ramp service employee. Garrison, like all ramp service applicants, had to perform a physical capability assessment. Like all applicants, Garrison had to fill out several forms, provided by Datafit, before taking the physical test. Garrison argued that the Consent & Authorization Form solicits family medical history in violation of the Illinois Genetic Information Privacy Act.

    Plaintiff has retained an expert, Dr. J. Richard Ludgin, who will testify that the consent form targets the identification of information that Plaintiff argued constitutes genetic information under GIPA’s broad definitions for same.

    United filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Garrison’s expert, Ludgin, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and the Daubert standard.

    Healthcare Administration Expert Witness

    Dr. John Richard Ludgin is the the former Chief Medical Officer of BayCare Health System, Inc. Since 1998, he has held senior hospital leadership roles, often titled Chief Medical Officer, though his responsibilities have consistently extended beyond traditional clinical leadership. In addition, he has played key roles in Joint Commission compliance, both local and national healthcare initiatives, clinical quality improvement, patient safety, IRB oversight, clinical research, protocol development and implementation, quality outcomes reporting, clinical risk management and regulatory compliance.

    Get the full story on challenges to J. Richard Ludgin’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Discussion by the Court

    Ludgin’s Opinion Is Not the Product of Reliable Principles and Methods

    United argued that Ludgin does not base his opinion on any reliable principle or method. Ludgin’s opinion focuses on the following language from the consent form: “I understand that I must notify the technician administering the assessment if I have any ailments that may impede my performance of the assessment.”

    In a written declaration, Ludgin asserted that this language on the consent form “reasonably and implicitly required” “family history of certain conditions” because these conditions “may constitute inherited bodily disorders which could impede the prospective employee’s performance of the assessment.”

    Then, during his deposition, Ludgin tried to flesh out his analysis. He testified that a job applicant could be inclined to provide more information than what the employer had requested because “people who are looking to get hired are very solicitous, especially when they want the job … they’re usually pretty forthcoming … more broadly than what is asked or what’s required, and maybe even into the realm of what’s prohibited to be requested.”

    Anslysis

    Nothing in Ludgin’s professional experience suggests that he is an expert in human resources, hiring processes, or the psychology of job applicants. At best, he testified that he has hired some unspecified number of people at unspecified times in the past.

    As a result, Ludgin’s testimony to that effect does not support his opinion regarding what information United’s consent form sought.

    The same is true for other support Ludgin proffered for his opinion: that, in his professional experience working in the healthcare industry, patients filling out consent forms construe “words like” “ailment” “much more broadly” and less “precisely” than medical practitioners. This phenomenon of imprecision may be true of patients receiving medical care—where Ludgin’s professional experience lies. Again, however, Ludgin did not connect the dots to the instant case.

    Ludgin did not point to anything in his professional experience that led him to the conclusion that the “common sense” or “just in general” meaning of “ailment” includes family health history.

    A jury is perfectly capable of assessing the “common sense” or “general” meaning of the word “ailment” themselves, without Ludgin’s input. The Court held that his opinion was unhelpful and inadmissible.

    Held

    The Court granted United’s motion to exclude Dr. J. Richard Ludgin’s opinions.

    Key Takeaway

    Ludgin has not connected his decades in healthcare administration to the question at hand: How a reasonable person, filling out the consent form pursuant to their United job application, would understand the statement: “I understand that I must notify the technician administering the assessment if I have any ailments that may impede my performance of the assessment.”

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: McKnight V. United Airlines, Inc
    Docket Number: 1:23cv16118
    Court Name: United States District Court, Illinois Northern
    Order Date: March 30, 2026
  • Expert Testimony on Wage and Hour Issues Admitted

    Expert Testimony on Wage and Hour Issues Admitted

    George Huerta filed a wage and hour class action based on his work at the California Flats Solar Project in Monterey County. First Solar, Inc., the project owner, hired CSI Electrical Contractors, Inc. (“CSI”) to manage Phase 2 construction. CSI employed a large workforce, including subcontracted labor from Milco National Constructors. Huerta worked on-site from June 13 to July 10, 2018, as a Milco employee reporting to CSI.

    Workers accessed the site through a guarded entrance and drove several miles to the Phase 2 Security Gate for badge scanning. At day’s end, they scanned out, sometimes waiting up to 20 minutes in vehicle lines.

    Basically, Huerta claimed this waiting time and allegedly restricted meal breaks were compensable under California law, arguing CSI retained control during breaks. However, CSI countered that employees were properly compensated and free to use break time as they wished.

    Therefore, CSI retained an expert witness Keith Mendes, who reviewed records and concluded Huerta and others were fully paid, including for badge-out delays. Huerta challenged Mendes’ declaration on wage issues and damages.

    Wage and Hour Expert Witness

    Keith Mendes has consulted in matters involving intellectual property, valuations, wage and hour class claims, issues related to wrongful terminations, business interruption, and calculation of complex damages. Mendes has been published and submitted an expert report regarding the determination of the appropriate “cram-down” interest rate in a bankruptcy setting. He also has testimony experience at both deposition and trial.

    Get the full story on challenges to Keith Mendes’ expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.  

    Discussion by the Court

    In assessing the parties’ arguments, the Court focused on whether CSI complied with wage and hour laws in compensating Huerta for all work performed, particularly regarding badge-out wait time and meal breaks.

    Huerta argued these periods were compensable, claiming CSI maintained control over employees during both. He challenged the credibility of CSI’s expert, Keith Mendes, criticizing his reliance on timesheets, invoices, and interviews instead of payroll records. Huerta further contended that Mendes’ analysis was based on unfounded assumptions and inadmissible hearsay.

    The Court rejected these objections, finding Mendes’ testimony admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. It held that experts may rely on otherwise inadmissible materials if properly applied within their field, and that challenges to Mendes’ assumptions affected the weight, not admissibility, of his opinion.

    As a result, the Court found Mendes’ analysis credibly showed CSI complied with wage laws, including pay for badge-out delays, and saw no evidence that meal breaks were unduly restricted.

    Held

    The Court overruled Huerta’s objections to Keith Mendes’ opinions.

    Key Takeaway:

    In this case, Huerta has not presented the opinion of his own expert, or any other evidence, from which this Court could conclude that reliance on timesheets and billing invoices, and any assumptions made in calculating wages, render Mendes’ methodology unreliable.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Huerta V. CSI Elec. Contrs., Inc.
    Docket Number: 5:18cv6761
    Court Name: United States District Court for the Northern District of California, San Jose Division
    Order Date: May 14, 2025
  • Pensions Expert Witness’ Testimony on Benefits under ERISA’s Accrual Rules Admitted

    Pensions Expert Witness’ Testimony on Benefits under ERISA’s Accrual Rules Admitted

    Plaintiffs bring this suit under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).

    ERISA’s central object is to “protect employees’ justified expectations of receiving the benefits their employers promise them.” This case centers on the Coastal Transition Benefit, a benefit formula that originated in the Coastal Plan and that, through a series of corporate transactions, now appears in the Plan. Plaintiffs alleged the Coastal Transition Benefit formula improperly accrued benefits over participants’ entire careers rather than over their first 30 years of service in violation of various provisions of ERISA.

    As the Court knows, two of Plaintiffs’ claims—Claims I and VI—center on Plaintiffs’ contentions that the Coastal Transition Benefit formula is impermissibly backloaded and that the Plan’s actuarial factors used to reduce benefits for commencement before normal retirement date are unreasonable.

    Defendants sought to exclude the testimony of Plaintiffs’ expert Michael L. Libman as unreliable under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. Plaintiffs offered Libman as an expert on benefits under ERISA’s accrual rules and “actuarial equivalent” reductions.

    Pensions Expert Witness

    Michael Libman has been a pension actuary for over forty years. In that time, he has testified as an expert on pension issues in many cases.

    Want to know more about the challenges Michael Libman has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report. 

    Discussion by the Court

    Libman’s expert reports supported Claims I and VI and his testimony is based upon a close read of statutory rules, Treasury Regulations, applicable legal precedent and authority, the Plan document, and relevant documentation provided by Defendants.

    Based on his read of the Plan provisions, Libman’s report set forth actuarial calculations to assess whether the Plan complies with ERISA’s anti-backloading and actuarial equivalence provisions.

    The Court held that while some of Libman’s interpretations of the Plan are perhaps open to question, there is no issue with the reliability of his testimony in general.

    Held

    The Court denied the Defendants’ motion to exclude the testimony of Michael Libman.

    Key Takeaway:

    After reviewing the parties’ filings and Libman’s testimony, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Libman’s testimony is reliable. In so finding, the Court notes that the Daubert inquiry does not require district courts to assess whether an expert’s testimony is correct; courts need only determine whether the testimony is reliable.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Pedersen Et Al V. Kinder Morgan, Inc. Et Al
    Docket Number: 4:21cv3590
    Court: United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division
    Order Date: July 24, 2024
  • Statistics Expert Witness’ Potential Backpay Calculation Excluded

    Statistics Expert Witness’ Potential Backpay Calculation Excluded

    Named Plaintiffs Mary Alice Clark, Christopher Coulter, Aaron Perez, Kevin Nelson and Phillip Roscher (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, brought this putative collective action against Defendant Capital Vision Services, LLC d/b/a MyEyeDr (“MyEyeDr” or the “Company”), claiming that MyEyeDr misclassified all General Managers (“GMs”) and General Managers-in-Training (“GMITs”) as exempt from the overtime pay requirements imposed by the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), as well as Massachusetts and Pennsylvania law.

    MyEyeDr filed a motion to exclude Plaintiffs’ proffered expert witness, Dr. Liesl M. Fox under Fed. R. Evid. 702 and 403.

    Statistics Expert Witness

    Liesl M. Fox, Ph.D. is a Senior Consultant and Partner at Quantitative Research Associates, a firm that provides statistical and computing consulting services. She has been a statistical consultant for over twenty-five years, including conducting analyses in the fields of litigation and medical research, and has testified as an expert witness.

    Furthermore, she has consulted on and testified in numerous matters involving wage-and-hour disputes, including claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (“FLSA”). These matters have involved allegations of unpaid overtime, off-the-clock work, employment misclassification, minimum wage violations, time-shaving, record-keeping violations, and other wage-and-hour issues.

    Get the full story on challenges to Liesl Fox’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study. 

    Discussion by the Court

    Reliability

    Initially, MyEyeDr challenged Fox’s opinions on several grounds. As to the calculation of potential backpay, she assumed that all of the GMs’ training last eight weeks when there was testimony from MyEyeDr’s Chief Revenue Cycle Officer that such period could be shortened, and two class members for which she had made such calculation, testified that neither undertook such training and others testified to a shorter training period.

    Consequently, the Court held that the fact that Fox’s calculation for backpay were premised on such unsupported assumptions undermined the reliability of those calculations. Similarly, in her opinion regarding whether Plaintiffs supervised the equivalent of two full-time employees (for the purposes of determining if the executive exemption applied), the Court found that she did not account for inventory hours spent by these employees “which artificially deflated the labor hours GMs supervised.”

    Moreover, according to the Court, the key is that there is no explanation of a reliable methodology in which she included some work hours in her analysis and excluded others.

    Helpfulness to the Trier of Fact

    Next, the Court questioned whether Fox’s opinions will be helpful to the trier of fact.

    If MyEyeDr is found to have violated the FLSA, it would owe backpay for uncompensated overtime hours worked by GMs at a rate of one and a half times their hourly rate. Upon determining the number of overtime hours each GM worked, the jury would be tasked with calculating each individual’s hourly rate by dividing the weekly salary by the number of hours worked that week. To calculate the backpay, the jury would (1) multiply the hourly rate by one and a half and (2) multiply that by the GM’s overtime hours that given week. Such calculations constituted basic math that a jury can compute without the opinion of an expert.

    However, Plaintiffs noted that the payroll data in this case “contains more than 95,400 rows of data” spanning five years with “81 different earnings code[s] some of which are included in the damage calculations and others that are not properly included in the regular rate,” and “it contains unpaid and paid time off hours that need to be excluded from hours work estimates, and . . . bonuses that need to be spread over the time periods during which they are earned.” They argued that, given the enormity of the data, a jury is unlikely to have the ability to do these calculations. 

    Nevertheless, the Court held that such data can be presented in summary fashion to the jury. Plaintiffs may explain the meaning of such numbers through lay witnesses and argue the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from same to the jury. The Court decided that this proffered “opinion” did not require specialized knowledge or would be helpful to the jury as required under Fed. R. Civ. P. 702.

    Risk of Undue Prejudice and Confusion to the Jury

    Furthermore, the Court held that there is a risk that the jury will attach undue significance to this opinion offered by Fox based on the deficiencies addressed above, such that any probative value of same is outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice and confusion to the jury under Rule 403.

    Held

    In conclusion, the Court granted the Defendants’ motion to exclude Plaintiffs’ proffered expert witness, Liesl M. Fox.

    Key Takeaways:

    To begin with, MyEyeDr did not challenge Fox’s credentials as a highly qualified statistical consultant, or the general relevance of her proffered opinions, but challenged their reliability on several grounds and posited that her proposed testimony would be unhelpful to the jury.

    • First of all, Fox’s testimony would not assist the jury because Fox’s calculations are basic math that a jury can compute without the opinion of an expert.
    • Secondly, Fox’s calculation for backpay were premised on unsupported assumptions. For instance, Fox assumed that all of the GMs’ training lasted eight weeks when there was testimony from MyEyeDr’s Chief Revenue Cycle Officer that such period could be shortened.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Clark Et Al V. Capital Vision Services, Llc
    Docket Number: 1:22cv10236
    Court: United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
    Order Date: July 18, 2024