Expert Witness Profiler

Tag: Fiduciary

  • Finance Expert Witness’ Testimony on ESG Activism Does Not Require Specific Scientific Support

    Finance Expert Witness’ Testimony on ESG Activism Does Not Require Specific Scientific Support

    Every year millions of workers set aside their hard-earned dollars to save for retirement. To protect the interests of these workers, Congress passed the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), to remedy “the great personal tragedy” caused by mismanagement of retirement plans that left workers with little to no savings.

    This class action lawsuit is about whether American Airlines (“American”) and the American Airlines Employee Benefits Committee (“EBC” and, together with American, “Defendants”) breached certain fiduciary duties under ERISA when investing—or relying on others to invest—their employees’ retirement assets towards environmental, social, and governance (“ESG”) objectives. In response to Defendants’ ESG-focused investment practices, Plaintiff Bryan Spence, on behalf of the class members, asserts two causes of action under ERISA: (1) Defendants breached their duties of loyalty and prudence and (2) Defendants breached their duty to monitor.

    Plaintiff argued that Defendants violated these fiduciary duties by mismanaging the retirement plan when they utilized “investment managers pursuing non-financial and non-pecuniary ESG policy goals through proxy voting and shareholder activism” — specifically, BlackRock Institutional Trust Company, Inc. According to Plaintiff, BlackRock pursues a pervasive ESG agenda that “covertly converts the [retirement] [p]lan’s core index portfolios to ESG funds.”

     As a result, Plaintiff contended that BlackRock’s inclusion as an investment manager harmed the financial interests of retirement plan participants and their beneficiaries due to pursuing socio-political outcomes rather than exclusively financial returns.

    Defendants filed a motion to partially exclude Plaintiff’s expert witness, J.B. Heaton.

    Finance Expert Witness

    James Breckenridge Heaton, III received Ph.D. and MBA degrees from respected programs at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business. He likewise graduated from the University of Chicago School of Law. His professional experience includes publishing extensively in several peer-reviewed journals on finance topics, including key issues in this case: asset management, index investing, shareholder activism, hedge fund activism, event studies and price impact in securities litigation, corporate finance, corporate governance, and ESG investing. Given his expertise in these subject areas, Heaton has also taught law and finance courses at law schools and business schools across the nation. Beyond his academic experience, Heaton practiced law at the litigation boutique Bartlit Beck LLP for nearly two decades and even served as a fiduciary member of Bartlit Beck’s 401(k) plan committee. During his fiduciary tenure, he monitored the 401(k) plan’s investment options and performance.

    Get the full story on challenges to James Heaton’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study. 

    Discussion by the Court

    Defendants’ motion largely challenged Heaton’s methodology for calculating losses to the Plan as well as the economic value of a potential injunction. Defendants also sought exclusion of any testimony from Heaton about whether Defendants met their fiduciary obligations in accordance with then-prevailing standards and practices, as well as how BlackRock would have responded to a hypothetical proxy voting intervention.

    It should be noted that the the standards for admitting expert testimony in a bench trial are lower than a jury trial.

    Qualifications

    Starting with Heaton’s qualifications, the Court held that his research and background fit squarely with Plaintiff’s theory of the case and his expert testimony is precisely what the Federal Rules of Evidence contemplate by requiring an “expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education” who will apply that “specialized knowledge” to “help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”

    Due to his extensive education, research, and overall experience, it should be noted that Heaton has developed particular skills and specialized knowledge to help the Court—the trier of fact in this case—understand the evidence and determine facts in issue.

    Relevance

    Plaintiff has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that both the nature of Heaton’s testimony and purpose for which he offers it are relevant to key issues in this case, including whether BlackRock engaged in ESG activism through proxy voting and whether any losses occurred as a result. The Court held that such testimony can properly be applied to the facts at issue and will assist the Court with understanding the evidence. To the extent Heaton’s testimony could be viewed in any way as attempting to opine on whether Defendants qualified as ERISA fiduciaries or whether they breached their fiduciaries duties, those are questions of law for the Court to determine—not Heaton.

    According to the Court, the closest any expert testimony may permissibly get to these legal questions is by offering an opinion as to whether a particular party’s conduct fell short of prevailing fiduciary practices. Because Heaton’s reports offered no such opinions and his testimony at trial focused on (1) “whether and how BlackRock engaged in ESG-driven proxy voting and shareholder activism, and (2) “whether that ESG-driven proxy voting and shareholder activism injured [P]lan participants,” there is no reason to exclude Heaton’s non-existent testimony regarding prevailing fiduciary standards.

    Reliability

    Plaintiff has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Heaton’s testimony is reliable. The Court held that many of Heaton’s opinions are based on, among other things, his clear experience in asset management and research on shareholder activism. His opinions regarding BlackRock’s ESG activism do not require specific scientific support because Heaton relies on his personal observations, professional experience, training, and education. Given Heaton’s qualifications, the Court found him sufficiently qualified to opine on this topic. As to his opinions regarding the economic effects of BlackRock’s ESG activism on the Plan, the event studies used by Heaton are widely accepted. Even Defendants’ own expert uses the event study methodology. Courts across the country have also cited Heaton’s article regarding statistical power.

    Although Defendants challenged the statistical significance of Heaton’s results and argued his methodology diverges from standard scientific practices, the Court held that these arguments are more properly applied to the weight of Heaton’s testimony rather than its admissibility.

    While the Court takes note of Defendants’ arguments—particularly those regarding the reliability and relevance of Heaton’s expert testimony—these are not grounds for exclusion.

    Held

    The Court therefore denied Defendants’ motion to partially exclude and admitted J.B Heaton as an expert.

    Key Takeaway:

    The Court concluded that Heaton’s testimony is unquestionably relevant to this case and sufficiently reliable to permit admission. Instead, Defendants’ arguments (and any counter-expert testimony) bear on the weight assigned to Heaton’s testimony, which will matter when the Court addresses in a subsequent ruling the deferred issues of any losses suffered by the Plan and the appropriateness of an injunction.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Spence V. American Airlines, Inc., Et Al
    Docket Number: 4:23cv552
    Court: United States District Court, Texas Northern
    Order Date: January 10, 2025
  • Testimony of Finance Expert Witnesses About Monitoring Responsibilities Under ERISA Admitted

    Testimony of Finance Expert Witnesses About Monitoring Responsibilities Under ERISA Admitted

    Class Representatives Peter Trauernicht and Zachary Wright (“Plaintiffs”), on behalf of themselves, the Genworth Financial Inc. Retirement and Savings Plan (the “Plan”), and all other similarly situated individuals, filed suit against Genworth Financial, Inc. (“Genworth” or “Defendant”) alleging that Genworth breached its fiduciary duties under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act.

    Plaintiffs claimed that Genworth violated its fiduciary duties under ERISA by failing to appropriately monitor, and as a result, imprudently retaining the BlackRock LifePath Target Date Funds (“BlackRock TDFs”) in the Plan despite their significant underperformance. According to Plaintiffs, the retention of the BlackRock TDFs caused the Plan to incur substantial losses.

    Genworth produced two expert reports in response to Plaintiffs’ experts. Genworth retained Lorie L. Latham to offer opinions regarding the Plan’s governance structure and monitoring process. Latham opined that the Plan’s governance structure and monitoring processes of the BlackRock TDFs were reasonable and consistent with widely accepted retirement plan fiduciary practices.

    Genworth also retained Dr. Russell R. Wermers who explained that the BlackRock TDFs are economically reasonable investments once you account for their specific risk-balancing strategies and features, including their asset allocations and glide paths.

    Finance Expert Witnesses

    Russell R. Wermers is the Paul J. Cinquegrana ’63 Endowed Chair in Finance at the Smith School of Business, University of Maryland at College Park. Wermers’ research focuses on analyzing investment strategies of professional asset managers, including how to properly measure the risk-adjusted performance of such strategies. He has published in academic and professional journals on investment fund performance evaluation, equity strategies, the drivers of mutual fund and hedge fund investor flows, and the behavior of institutional investors. He has also previously testified as an expert on numerous ERISA cases involving 401(k) and other defined contribution plans. 

    Get the full story on challenges to Russell Wermers’ expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study. 

    Lorie L. Latham is the founder and president of L. Latham Consulting, LLC, an independent consultancy where she provides financial and strategic advice to financial firms and retirement plan fiduciaries, boards, and committees. Before that, Latham served in senior executive and consulting roles advising on strategies and investment selection for defined contribution plans. That work involved guiding plan fiduciaries in establishing reasonable and appropriate governance and monitoring practices for their defined contribution plans. Latham has also co-authored numerous publications, including articles on defined-contribution plan governance decision making.

    Get the full story on challenges to Lorie L. Latham’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study. 

    Discussion by the Court

    Whether Wermers and Latham Have Specialized Knowledge That Will Assist the Trier of Fact under Rule 702(a)

    Wermers’ Qualifications and Opinions

    Plaintiffs argued that Wermers lacked the relevant qualifications to address the issues in this case because he has no experience with retirement plan investing, including the monitoring responsibilities of investment fiduciaries governed by ERISA. He has never served as a fiduciary nor advised a retirement committee.

    The record does not provide, and the Court does not see, any reason why an expert must be trained in fiduciary monitoring or ERISA, as opposed to general investment theory, to testify on the relative performance and comparability of various target date funds to aid the trier of fact in the determination of whether the BlackRock TDFs violated the Plan’s Investment Policy Statement’s (IPS) criteria.

    The fact that Wermers’ offers more generalized opinions on the BlackRock TDFs and their comparators rather than opinions directly tied to fiduciary monitoring goes to the weight rather than admissibility of his testimony.

    Latham’s Qualifications and Opinions

    Plaintiffs also argued that Latham did not have specialized expertise or knowledge that will assist the trier of fact. Plaintiffs said that her experience came from generalized personal observations and work experience while consulting with plan sponsors and discretionary fiduciaries.

    The Court found that, based on that experience, Latham has the requisite qualifications to assist the trier of fact regarding plan governance and fiduciary monitoring standards. The degree of connection between her experience and her opinions goes to the weight of her testimony. At trial, Plaintiffs will have the opportunity to cross-examine Latham on the relevancy of her experience and how that experience has informed her opinions.

    Whether Latham’s and Wermers’ Opinions Are Supported by Reliable Principles and Methods

    Whether Wermers’ Economic Reasonableness Analysis is Based on Reliable Principles and Methods

    Plaintiffs argued that Wermers’ assessment of “economic reasonableness” is not based on any method or discipline recognized within his industry, and instead, is based on his own subjective view of what represents an “attractive combination” between risk and return.

    The Court disagreed. Plaintiffs’ complaint is essentially that Wermers’ concept of “economic reasonableness” is not reducible to a rigid, rules-based methodology. However, a formulaic methodology is not required for a witness to offer an expert opinion. Wermers relied on his specialized knowledge and experience to offer guiding principles on how to evaluate and compare the performance of target date funds, and he applied those principles to the BlackRock TDFs under a standard he calls “economic reasonableness.” 

     Wermers explained that an “economically reasonable” investment is one that “offers ex-ante an attractive combination of risk and return” based on its “qualitative and quantitative characteristics and its investment strategy.” Rather than a term of art, economic reasonableness is just another way of saying an investment is reasonable from an economic perspective.

    Plaintiffs did not challenge the reliability of any of Wermer’s specific analyses or conclusions, only that his overarching concept of “economic reasonableness” lacked clear guiding rules and principles.

    The Court found that Wermers’ opinions are reliable because he thoroughly articulated his specialized knowledge on the evaluation of target date funds with supporting citations to peer-reviewed articles and other industry sources, and then he applied that knowledge in evaluating the “economic reasonableness” of the BlackRock TDFs and in criticizing Marin’s analyses. 

    Whether Latham’s “Accepted Fiduciary Practices” Analysis is Based on Reliable Principles and Methods

    Plaintiffs argued that Latham’s testimony is unreliable because her opinions on “accepted fiduciary practices” are based on her work experience with unspecified clients rather than any specified method or discipline recognized within her industry. Her failure to explain how her opinions derive from those client experiences, without other guiding industry standards, makes her testimony unreliable according to Plaintiffs.

    However, the Court is satisfied that Latham has the requisite experience to provide reliable experience-based opinions on the topics she addresses at this stage.

    Second, Plaintiffs claimed that Latham’s opinions are unreliable and unhelpful ipse dixit because she did not rely on any objective, consistent, or rules-based analytical approaches for what she calls “accepted fiduciary practices.”

    The Court held that rules-based standards are not necessary for an expert’s opinion to be the product of reliable principles and methods, particularly when the testimony is not scientific in nature. Latham explained that “there’s not a written checklist” of accepted practices and “[p]lan governance structures vary, depending upon the size and culture of the plan sponsor, the type of plan, and other factors.”

    Consequently, in her report, Latham reviewed the specific practices of the Genworth Committee from the evidentiary record, and explains whether, in her professional experience, those individual practices comport with the typical industry practices she has observed over her decades-long career. Latham is permitted to rely on her experience to testify in that capacity. The Court held that Plaintiffs’ concerns over the objectivity of Latham’s opinions and the specific experiences on which she relies can be addressed on cross-examination and with contrary evidence.

    Whether Latham and Wermers Reliably Applied Their Principles and Methods to the Facts of the Case

    Whether Wermers Reliably Applied His Principles and Methods to the Facts of the Case

    Plaintiffs argued that Wermers failed to fully consider the IPS in his analysis and relied on other data that was cherry-picked and never relied on by the Plan’s fiduciaries. According to Plaintiffs, that made Wermers’ analysis irrelevant to whether the Plan’s fiduciaries acted prudently in retaining the BlackRock TDFs. Plaintiffs also claimed that Wermers ignored discrepancies between his data and the data presented in materials provided to the Genworth Committee.

    The Court held that Wermers was primarily retained to offer an opinion on whether the BlackRock TDFs were an “economically reasonable” investment and to rebut Marin’s conclusions, particularly those based on his ex-post performance comparisons of the BlackRock TDFs to other funds and benchmarks. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ criticisms about “the lack of references to the Plan’s Investment Policy Statement does not undermine the reliability of [Wermers’] methodology” because that methodology was not predicated on evaluating the BlackRock TDFs’ performance against the IPS’s criteria.

    For the same reasons, it was not problematic for Wermers to have relied on external data which was not provided to the Genworth Committee. For instance, Wermers looked at third-party analyst ratings of the BlackRock TDFs as well as the BlackRock TDFs’ prevalence in the broader retirement plan market to demonstrate that Marin’s views on the BlackRock TDFs’ performance were not widely held among the industry. The Court held that using such data was not irrelevant or unreliable “cherry-picking.”

    When Plaintiffs said that Wermers ignored discrepancies between his data and the data presented to Genworth’s Committee, the Court held that it would seem appropriate for Wermers to use that data if Plaintiffs’ own expert also used it.

    Whether Latham Reliably Applied Her Principles and Methods to the Facts of the Case

    Plaintiffs argued that Latham failed to sufficiently consider the Plan’s IPS in forming her opinions. According to Plaintiffs, Latham stated that the Plan’s IPS was merely a non-binding, guiding document even though the Plan’s fiduciary counsel provided advice to the Genworth Committee that the IPS was a binding, Plan document.

    Plaintiffs did not dispute that Latham reviewed and relied on the IPS in forming her opinions. Instead, Plaintiffs disagreement was over Latham’s understanding of the IPS’ effect. 

    Since, the dispute appeared to be over what constituted a violation of the IPS, not whether the IPS is a legally binding plan document or not. The Court held that just because the Plaintiffs disagreed with Latham’s understanding of the IPS’ effect did not mean she failed to reliably apply her methods to the facts of the case.

    Whether The Testimony Is Admissible Under Rule 403

    Plaintiffs argued that Wermers’ and Latham’s testimony should also be excluded under Rule 403 because it threatens to mislead or confuse the issues for the same reasons already discussed.

    Having found Wermers’ and Latham’s testimony to be admissible under Rule 702, the Court also finds that their testimony is generally admissible under Rule 403 for the reasons discussed. Moreover, in a bench trial, the risk that an expert’s testimony will be unduly confusing or misleading is much lower and excluding evidence under Rule 403 for such reasons is generally not appropriate. 

    Held

    The Court denied Plaintiffs’ motion to exclude opinions and testimony of Lorie L. Latham And Russell R. Wermers, Ph.D.

    Key Takeaways:

    Wermers’ opinions are reliable because he thoroughly articulated his specialized knowledge on the evaluation of target date funds with supporting citations to peer-reviewed articles and other industry sources. Also, Plaintiffs’ concerns over the objectivity of Latham’s opinions and the specific experiences on which she relies can be addressed on cross-examination and with contrary evidence.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Trauernicht, Et Al. V. Genworth Financial Inc., Et Al.
    Docket Number: 3:22cv532
    Court: United States District Court, Virginia Eastern
    Order Date: August 29, 2024
  • Securities Expert Witness’ Opinion on Defendant’s Breach of Fiduciary Duties Admitted

    Securities Expert Witness’ Opinion on Defendant’s Breach of Fiduciary Duties Admitted

    Plaintiffs are former Salesforce employees who participated in the Salesforce 401(k) Plan. They alleged Defendants breached their fiduciary duties to the Plan and Plan participants in violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”).

    Plaintiffs alleged the Investment Advisory Committee, Joseph Allanson, Stan Dunlap, and Joachim Wettermark (collectively, “Committee Defendants”) breached their fiduciary duty of prudence by selecting and retaining investment options with high costs relative to other, comparable investments. They relied on Robert E. Conner to support their claims against Defendants—fiduciaries of the Salesforce 401(k) Plan—under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended (“ERISA”).

    Robert Conner stated that Defendants’ oversight of the Salesforce 401(k) Plan was not “consistent with the standard of care of a prudent fiduciary,” and that the Plan participants incurred “losses . . . as a result of the Plan fiduciaries’ failure to provide oversight.”

    Defendants sought an order excluding Conner’s opinions pursuant to Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, arguing he was “not qualified to opine on the standard of care applicable to such fiduciaries under ERISA” and that his opinions were based on “flawed methodology and unreliable information.”

    Securities Expert Witness

    Robert E. Conner holds an M.B.A. in Finance from Harvard Business School. Conner is currently the President and co-founder of Datura Analytics, LLC and the co-founding officer of Thornapple Associates, Inc; two expert witness firms specializing in litigation support for investment disputes, investment industry standards, and damages. He has 46 years of experience in the securities industry serving clients in areas such as “ERISA pension and profit-sharing plans, registered and nonregistered investment managers and advisors, non-profit organizations and foundations, bankruptcy trustees, trusts and estates.”

    Conner’s opinions were partly based on his experience as a fiduciary in, among other things, investment portfolio management, including within the retirement plan industry. Conner has been an expert witness in several analogous ERISA cases.

    Discussion by the Court

    Conner Lacks the Requisite Experience

    Defendant argued that Conner never “served on a 401(k) or other pension plan committee” and has never “served as an expert witness where the ERISA fiduciary standard of care has been at issue.”

    However, Conner “managed discretionary accounts” and “provided research and transactional coverage of non-discretionary accounts” including pension plans from 1977 to 1980. From 1983 to 1998, he managed equity portfolios for pension accounts as a portfolio manager, all of which experience included managing ERISA plan assets. Since 1998, Conner has worked at two expert witness firms, supporting litigation in “the securities and commodities industry” and in “investment industry disputes.”

    In conclusion, the Court determined that the Defendants’ criticism of Conner’s experience only affected the weight of his opinions, not admissibility.

    Conner’s Opinions are based on Flawed Methodology and Unreliable Information

    Conner opined the Committee breached its fiduciary duty by choosing “investments and share classes with higher expenses even though identical investments with lower expenses were available” by: (1) as to Target Date Funds (“TDFs”), “failing to choose or switch to the JPMorgan Smart Retirement 2020 R5 share class . . . or the R6 share class when they became available”; and (2) failing to offer the “Fidelity Contra Commingled Pool (CIT)” and “Fidelity Contra Fund K6.”

    JPMorgan SmartRetirement Target Date Funds

    Defendants first argued Conner based his criticism of the Committee’s failure to substitute the Institutional share class of the JPMorgan TDFs for the R5 share class “on flawed methodology and unreliable information.”

    The underlying factual record indisputably showed that the Plan was invested in the Institutional (later renamed R5) class from the beginning of the Class Period through December 2017.”

    Plaintiffs did not dispute that the R5 and Institutional share classes were identical. Instead, they argued the “essential part” of Conner’s TDF share class opinion “focused on . . . why the R6 share class should have replaced the more expensive [Institutional/R5] share classes” more promptly, and, as Plaintiffs also pointed out, the supporting data contained in the exhibit submitted in connection with Conner’s report could support a calculation demonstrating the difference between the Institutional/R5 and R6 share classes. In light thereof, the Court found the above-described error concerned the weight, rather than the admissibility, of Conner’s opinions.

    Defendants next criticized Conner for ignoring the benefit of revenue sharing to offset Plan administrative expenses, which was provided by the R5 class but not the R6 class. Although Conner conceded that revenue sharing was applied toward expenses with the fund, he stated he did not account for the revenue sharing credit paid by the Institutional/R5 share class in his damages calculations because revenue sharing made recordkeeping and administrative costs interdependent with plan participant returns and reduced the investment returns plan participants received.

    The Court found that the above challenge primarily concerned the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims, rather than whether the report was based on sufficient facts and data.

    Collective Investment Trusts

    Defendants also sought to exclude Conner’s opinion that the Defendants breached their fiduciary duty of prudence by failing to replace the JPMorgan TDFs, the Fidelity Contrafund K, and the Fidelity Diversified International Fund K on the Plan’s investment menu with cheaper CITs sooner than they did. They argued Conner’s methodology was flawed because he inappropriately compared mutual funds with CITs, which were entirely different investment vehicles with different features. Conner did not dispute the above-referenced differences but offered his opinion that such concerns did not permit a prudent fiduciary to “rule out” CITs entirely. The Court again found Defendants’ challenge questioned the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims rather than the admissibility of Conner’s opinions in support thereof.

    Damages

    Defendants first sought to exclude Conner’s damages calculations because he did not obtain the underlying data himself and failed to properly assure its accuracy. Conner testified that he verified the numbers upon which he relied and based his own opinions upon. Accordingly, the Court declined to exclude Conner’s testimony on the basis of his use of such data.

    Flaws:

    Defendants additionally argued Conner’s damages calculations suffered from several fundamental flaws specifically:

    (1) He treated the R5 and Institutional share classes of the JPMorgan TDFs as distinct share classes;

    (2) He failed to account for the difference in expense ratios varying over the 2015 to 2017 period and by vintage; and

    (3) He multiplied his calculation of expense ratio differences by Plan assets in the challenged funds as of year-end keeping in mind expenses accrued throughout the year rather than at year end.

    As to the first of the above-listed “flaws,” the Court declined to exclude Conner’s damages calculations because, as discussed above, it isolated the mistake from the rest of Conner’s analysis.

    As to the second flaw, Conner acknowledged that the share class expense ratios could change at different times causing smaller or larger spreads, but he explained that the difference typically is about 0.10%, which is the figure he opted to use. The Court held that an expert’s arguably improper focus on damages at a particular point in time is a question of fact, rather than grounds for exclusion.

    Similarly, as to the third “flaw,”  the Court found the parties’ respective experts’ disagreement as to whether it was preferable to use monthly asset averages, as was done by Defendants’ expert, or instead to use year-end assets, as was done by Plaintiffs’ expert, concerned the weight of each such opinion, not its admissibility.

    Opinions as to Excluded Claims

    Defendants sought to exclude Conner’s opinions to the extent they pertained to claims brought solely in the Second Amended Complaint, which Plaintiffs were not permitted to file, and to claims whose dismissal from the First Amended Complaint was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit. Plaintiffs agreed that such opinions “could be stricken.”

    Held

    The Court denied the Defendant’s motion to exclude Securities Expert Witness Robert Conner with the exception of the opinions as to excluded claims.

    Key Takeaways:

    1. Requisite Qualification: Conner managed discretionary accounts and provided research and transactional coverage of non-discretionary accounts. He also worked at two expert witness firms. The Court held that he was qualified to opine.
    2. Methodological Basis: The Court’s decision emphasized that Conner thoroughly checked the numbers used in his damages calculations, ensuring that he based his opinions on a sound methodology.
    3. Challenge to Merits: Defendants argued that Conner’s methodology was flawed because he inappropriately compared mutual funds with CITs, which were entirely different investment vehicles with different features. The Court held that the Defendants’ challenge concerned the merit of Plaintiff’s claims.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Miguel v. Salesforce.Com
    Docket Number: 3:20cv1753
    Court: United States District Court, California Northern
    Order Date: March 20, 2024