Tag: Hypothetical

  • Human Resources Expert Allowed to Opine on Termination

    Human Resources Expert Allowed to Opine on Termination

    This action arises out of Plaintiff Jon Evans’ employment with Defendant Critter Control Operations, Inc.

    During this employment, Plaintiff brought multiple concerns to Defendants’ Human Resources (HR) staff Ms. Rebecca Dye regarding “unfair treatment, safety concerns, and potentially fraudulent activity.” After eight and a half months of employment, Defendants terminated Plaintiff on October 18, 2021. Since then, Plaintiff has become employed elsewhere.

    Defendants filed Daubert motions to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff’s experts Laura Ingegneri and Michael J. Stokes.

    Human Resources Expert Witness

    Laura Ingegneri has over thirty years of HR experience and has conducted or reviewed over three hundred investigations.

    Discover more cases with Laura Ingegneri as an expert witness by ordering her comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

    Economics Expert Witness

    Michael J. Stokes earned an MBA from the Isenberg School of Management at the University of Massachusetts Amherst with a focus in entrepreneurship. He has 8 years of experience in providing expert analysis and testimony related to forensic economics, accounting, finance and statistics.

    Want to know more about the challenges Michael J. Stokes has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report

    Discussion by the Court

    Laura Ingegneri

    In preparation of her report, Ingegneri reviewed the operative pleading, deposition transcripts of Ms. Dye and other employees of Critter Control, and over two dozen documents that were referenced during those depositions.
    She concluded that Plaintiff’s allegations of serious misconduct are required to be “investigated promptly and thoroughly,” but “this did not appear to occur.”

    Analysis

    First, Defendants argued that Ingegneri’s testimony will not help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact at issue because she did not use any specialized knowledge. Whether Defendants—specifically, their HR staff—faithfully applied those policies and practices is not as intuitive as Defendants contend, as it would require some baseline knowledge of the HR industry.

    Second, Defendants argued that Ingegneri failed to “identify any specific principles or methods,” failed to “apply any specific principles and methods to the facts,” and made speculative conclusions. The content of the report showed otherwise. Ingegneri expressly stated the standards of internal investigations and handling employee complaints established by publications, reviewed Defendants’ own policies, and applied those standards and policies to specific facts she derived from a list of documents and party testimony.

    Third, Defendants argued that Ingegneri’s testimony is unreliable because she based her report on incomplete information or false assumptions. According to Defendants, at Ingegneri incorrectly assumed that Defendants never investigated Plaintiff’s allegations. The Court did not adopt Defendants’ interpretation. Ingegneri concluded that a prompt and thorough investigation “did not appear to occur,” not that no investigation occurred at all.

    Fourth, Defendants argued that Ingegneri’s conclusions pertaining to Defendants’ investigation are not relevant to Plaintiff’s wrongful termination claim. According to Defendants, Ingegneri analyzed and opined “on allegations unrelated to the live claims” by listing the various categories of complaints made by Plaintiff before his termination that include, for example, wage and hour issues. But several of these complaints relate to the alleged “unlawful business practices” in which Plaintiff refused to participate, and those complaints are relevant to Plaintiff’s wrongful termination claim.

    Michael Stokes 

    In preparing his report, Stokes reviewed three “alternative” pre-termination annual salaries ($100,000; $130,000; and $165,000), Plaintiff’s work life expectancy based on his age at the time of termination, and an allocation of fringe benefits. Based on this information, Stokes concluded that the present value of loss of Plaintiff’s earnings and benefits ranged from $442,661 to $1,206,330.

    Analysis

    Defendants argued that the three base earnings Stokes used to calculate damages are improper because they are “aspirational” and higher than Plaintiff’s actual earnings in the eight months he was employed by Defendants ($51,589) or that he could have earned over the entire year ($72,703). But they did not argue that Stokes’ methods and application of those methods to those numbers, aspirational as they might be, were unreliable. Plaintiff contended, and the Court agreed, that the use of hypothetical base earnings goes to the testimony’s weight, not admissibility

    Defendants further took issue that the salary hypotheticals are borne only from Plaintiff’s counsel’s assumptions, so Stokes’ report violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B). Here, Stokes’ report openly recited what base earnings he relies upon for his calculations and explains that the source of those earnings was Plaintiff’s counsel. The Court found that this disclosure sufficient for the purposes of Rule 26.

    Defendants’ concern that there is no evidence Plaintiff ever made, or was on track to make, $100,000, $130,000, or $165,000 while in Defendants’ employ is well-taken, however. In response, Plaintiff alludes to evidence that supports these numbers but has not yet made a specific showing of it apart from stating that a co-worker made “nearly $120,000.” The Court will entertain Defendants’ objection if that foundational evidence is not admitted before Stokes testifies.

    Moreover, the fact that Stokes did not account for Plaintiff’s supposed mitigation of damages is another example of a point Defendants may test before the jury.

    Finally, Defendants argued that Stokes’ declaration is an improper supplement to his report. It is not. Stokes’ declaration is only used to support Plaintiff’s responsive brief to Defendants’ motion, and the Court reviews it as such.

    Held

    The Court denied Defendants’ Daubert motions to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff’s experts Laura Ingegneri and Michael J. Stokes.

    Key Takeaway

    The use of hypotheticals, on its own, does not render an expert’s testimony unreliable. Rather, the proper vehicle through which the hypotheticals can be tested is cross-examination and introduction of contrary evidence.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Evans V. Critter Control Operations Incorporated
    Docket Number: 2:22cv2049
    Court Name: United States District Court, Arizona
    Order Date: April 21, 2026
  • Accounting Expert was Allowed to Opine on the Fair Market Value

    Accounting Expert was Allowed to Opine on the Fair Market Value

    Upper Deck claimed that Pixels has marketed and sold wall décor featuring images that infringe upon Upper Deck’s trademarks and Michael Jordan’s name, image, likeness, and publicity rights. Basically, Upper Deck brought this action pursuant to an exclusive agreement with Jordan (the “Jordan Agreement”) for the use of his name, image, likeness, and other publicity rights. Upper Deck asserted that the agreement also gives Upper Deck the right to commence actions on behalf of Jordan for infringement of the rights assigned in the Jordan Agreement.

    Amongst other things, Upper Deck alleged violation and deprivation of the right of publicity, violations of the Lanham Act, registered trademark infringement, violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law, and California common law unfair competition. 

    Christian Tregillis was retained as a damages expert by Upper Deck to opine on the fair market value of Pixels’ alleged unauthorized use of Jordan’s rights. Pixels filed a motion to exclude Tregillis’ testimony, contending that his methodology is unreliable and based upon insufficient facts and data.

    Pixels also contended that the premium multiplier Tregillis uses in his fair market value calculation is unreliable and that Tregillis’s two “Evidence Indicates” opinions are irrelevant.

    Accounting Expert Witness

    Christian Dale Tregillis holds an M.B.A. in Finance and Accounting. He has more than thirty years of experience analyzing financial, accounting, economic, statistical, and market issues, primarily relating to disputes, valuations, and license agreements covering intellectual property rights.

    Tregillis has held leadership positions with many public accounting and licensing professional groups. He is also accredited in Business Valuation and certified in Financial Forensics, Public Accounting, and Licensing.

    Want to know more about the challenges Christian Tregillis has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    A. Methodology

    Tregillis calculated the fair market value of Pixels’ use of Jordan’s rights by analyzing comparable licenses for rights similar to those used by Pixels as a starting point to construct a hypothetical license.

    Tregillis then adjusted the value of the benchmark comparable license to account for the other athletes included in the benchmark license, the length of time of Pixels’ use, and the fact that Pixels’ use of Jordan’s rights was not subject to any quality assurance or approval clauses. Pixels argued that the benchmark agreement chosen by Tregillis is insufficiently comparable and that Tregillis made improper assumptions to inflate the value of the benchmark license.

    1. Underlying Facts and Data

    Tregillis determined the Trends Agreement to be the most comparable to the facts at issue here and uses this agreement as the benchmark for his hypothetical license analysis. The Trends Agreement was a licensing agreement between Brevettar, described as “the exclusive licensing agent for Upper Deck,” and Trends International, LLC. The Trends Agreement granted Trends a license to manufacture, distribute, and sell collector’s edition posters and calendars featuring the name, image, likeness, signature, and statistical data of Michael Jordan, Wayne Gretzky, and Tiger Woods. A later amendment to the Trends Agreement also allowed Trends to sell canvas wall décor.

    Pixels argued that the Trends Agreement is an improper comparable because Upper Deck was not a party to it, Upper Deck did not receive royalty payments from the agreement, and the Trends Agreement was not effective until two and a half years after Pixels alleged unauthorized sales began.

    Here, the Trends Agreement concerned the same rights at issue in this case, Jordan’s name, image, likeness, and publicity rights. Further, the Trends Agreement covered the same types of products as those at issue here—posters, calendars, and wall décor. The Trends Agreement also covered products similarly priced to those sold by Pixels. Consequently, the Court found the Trends Agreement sufficiently comparable to serve as a reliable basis for the hypothetical license analysis Tregillis conducts.

    2. The Premium Multiplier

    After identifying the Trends Agreement as the best benchmark for his hypothetical license analysis, Tregillis used a premium multiplier to adjust for the fact that Pixels’ use of Jordan’s rights was not authorized and not subject to the quality assurance and approval clauses typically included in Jordan’s licensing agreements.

    Tregillis calculated this multiplier by comparing two similar situations where Jordan’s rights were used, one of which was authorized (the “Hanes Transaction”) and one of which was unauthorized (the “Panini Settlement”). ) Tregillis compared the values of those transactions to calculate the percentage premium for unauthorized uses of Jordan’s rights.

    Pixels argued that the application of this premium multiplier is unreliable and that the Hanes Transaction and Panini Settlement are not reliably comparable to the conduct at issue here.

    Tregillis demonstrated the necessity of this premium adjustment by discussing Jordan’s carefully tailored brand and restrictive approach to licensing agreements.

    Then, Tregillis conducted a comparative analysis using otherwise analogous transactions to calculate the value of unauthorized uses of Jordan’s rights. This analysis is grounded in evidence, and Tregillis’s application of his analysis logically follows. Therefore, the premium multiplier calculation and its application to the hypothetical license are sufficiently reliable to present to a jury. 

    Tregillis spent paragraphs of his report, supported by citations to the record, discussing the Hanes Transaction and Panini Settlement as well as how he used them in his analysis.

    Tregillis did not use the Hanes Transaction and Panini Settlement as comparable to this case for the purpose of hypothetical license analysis; rather, he uses them in a comparative analysis to determine the value of Jordan’s rights when their use is not subject to any quality assurance or approval clauses.

    B. The “Evidence Indicates” Opinions

    Tregillis offered two “Evidence Indicates” opinions. First, “Evidence indicates that, as Upper Deck values its relationship with Jordan, one of the world’s most iconic athletes and personalities, Upper Deck protects both its rights and Jordan’s rights, while also ensuring it only produces and/or approves high-quality products that feature appropriate and value-enhancing uses of Jordan’s rights of publicity and trademarks.” And second, “Evidence indicates that the use made by Pixels is unauthorized and would not have been authorized by Jordan and/or Upper Deck.” Pixels argued that these opinions are irrelevant and should be excluded.

    The Court found that the two “Evidence Indicates” opinions will aid the jury in understanding Tregillis’ hypothetical license analysis. The “Evidence Indicates” opinions shed light on the fair market value of Jordan’s rights as Pixels used them and demonstrate the necessity of the premium multiplier. More specifically, the opinions will help the jury to understand how Upper Deck and Jordan value Jordan’s rights and typically license them.

    Pixels argued that the second “Evidence Indicates” opinion “is a naked attempt to elevate Upper Deck’s allegations of unauthorized use by Pixels into a liability opinion against Pixels.”

    The Court agreed that Tregillis’ second “Evidence Indicates” opinion goes to brand standards and addresses how the fair market value of Jordan’s rights is impacted when subject to quality assurance and approval clauses.

    However, grounding the second “Evidence Indicates” opinion in language about “authorization” toes the line of embodying a legal conclusion. Accordingly, while the Court found that Tregillis is not offering a legal conclusion, his testimony at trial should make clear that Tregillis is merely assuming Pixels’ liability for the purposes of his analysis and is offering opinions about authorization solely to support his damages analysis, not to offer a legal conclusion. 

      Held

      The Court denied Defendant Pixels.com’s motion to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff The Upper Deck Company’s expert witness, Christian Tregillis.

      Key Takeaway:

      Any lingering doubts as to the negative impact of Tregillis’s testimony can be managed by instructing the jury to follow only the judge’s instructions as to what the law is and to disregard any testimony that is inconsistent with those instructions.

      Case Details:

      Case Caption: The Upper Deck Company V. Pixels.Com, LLC
      Docket Number: 3:24cv923
      Court Name: United States District Court, California Southern
      Order Date: December 09, 2025
    1. Accounting Expert Witness Reliably Calculates Damages Measure by Reasonable Royalties

      Accounting Expert Witness Reliably Calculates Damages Measure by Reasonable Royalties

      This is a trademark infringement case involving the trademarked phrase “Freedom Pop”. Plaintiff Proccor Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Proccor”) contended that Defendant GAT Sports infringed upon its alleged trademark for a “Freedom Pop” flavored Pre-Rx pre-workout supplement. GAT Sports essentially argued that the phrase was used in a non-trademark, descriptive, way to describe the flavor of its product.

      Defendants filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Neil Beaton, whose report states that the Plaintiff retained him to “calculate Defendants’ profits and, separately, Proccor’s damages measure by reasonable royalties.”

      Accounting Expert Witness

      Neil J. Beaton is a Certified Public Accountant who has performed a reasonable royalty analysis 60 to 70 times during his forty year career and who has testified five times as a trademark damages expert in cases specifically involving nutritional supplements. He has assisted 30 times in negotiating royalties in nonlitigation related licensing engagements.

      Want to know more about the challenges Neil Beaton has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report

      Discussion by the Court

      The Defendants summarized several grounds for their motion:

      • there was no prior trademark licensing agreement between the parties
      • Plaintiff has never had a trademark licensing agreement with any party
      • Beaton’s analysis was based on litigation or prelitigation agreements that are vastly different from trademark licensing agreements
      • Beaton only addressed one of the applicable fifteen factors for determining what the royalty would have been had there been a hypothetical negotiation
      • Beaton never actually reviewed any of the alleged agreements that he relied on for data points in his analysis — all information in his analysis was supplied verbally by Plaintiff’s CEO
      • Beaton’s proposed per unit royalty rate ignores that it doubles the price of the product
      • Beaton’s damages are over 35 times greater than any amounts Proccor ever earned from litigation and prelitigation settlements — combined
      • Beaton did no comparability analysis between his hypothetical trademark license agreement and the litigation and prelitigation settlements he relied on, and/or

      Absence of a licensing history might affect the persuasiveness of an opinion but not the admissibility of the opinion

      The Court explained that many of the Defendants’ objections amount to iterations of the same assertion, which is that in the absence of a licensing history the damages caused by an infringement is not ascertainable with sufficient certainty to warrant admission into evidence of an expert opinion. The absence of a licensing history might complicate the task of formulating an opinion on damages by eliminating certain otherwise available methods of valuation, including the most popular method, the simplest method, or even the most reliable method.

      But the absence of a licensing history no more prevents a reasoned and professional opinion on damages than the absence of immediately comparable sales prevents a qualified real estate appraiser from formulating an opinion on real estate value; the appraiser resorts to other useful and available means of appraisal, including more remotely comparable sales. The absence of a licensing history might affect the persuasiveness of an opinion but not the admissibility of the opinion.

      The Court held that a review of Beaton’s report and his qualifications establish that he meets the threshold of possessing pertinent specialized knowledge based on training and extensive experience in a pertinent discipline and will assist a jury in determining a fact in dispute. The Defendants fail to demonstrate that Beaton’s method is based on insufficient facts or data (he appears to use the best, or perhaps the only, available in both instances); that his principles or his methods are demonstrably unreliable; or that his application of the announced facts, principles, and methods is demonstrably flawed.

      Held

      The Court denied the Defendants’ motion in limine to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff’s expert Neil Beaton.

      Key Takeaways:

      The standard for reviewing the admissibility of Rule 702 expert testimony is familiar, well understood, and explicit in the rule and the leading decisions. In each case, the rigor of the standard adapts to the subject matter of the opinion. An opinion about damages based on the loss of the probable price of something exchanged in the marketplace between a willing buyer under no compulsion to buy and a willing seller under no compulsion to sell is among the simplest and most common topics of expert testimony. Not every expert opinion demands the same level of scientific rigor, peer review, and the like.

      Please refer to the blog previously published about this case:

      Intellectual Property Expert Witness’ Testimony About Trademark Custom and Usage Admitted

      Case Details:

      Case Caption: Proccor Pharmaceuticals, Inc. V. World Health Products, Llc Et Al 
      Docket Number: 8:22cv2227
      Court: United States District Court, Florida Middle
      Date: September 30, 2024