Expert Witness Profiler

Tag: Industry

  • Corrections Expert Was Allowed to Opine on High-Risk Inmates

    Corrections Expert Was Allowed to Opine on High-Risk Inmates

    This case arises from the preventable death of Dalton Milby, who died by suicide on February 12, 2022, while in the custody of the Larue County Detention Center (“LCDC”).

    He was taken to LCDC, where he was put on suicide watch and issued an anti-suicide smock. Despite this, Milby managed to gain access to a standard jail jumpsuit, which he used to take his own life shortly before 4:00 p.m.

    Plaintiffs offered the opinion of Timothy J. Murray to help the jury understand standards of care applicable to high-risk inmates like Milby and whether LCDC officers complied with those standards.

    Corrections Expert Witness

    Timothy J. Murray worked at various levels of the New York State Department of Correctional Services (“NYSDOCS”) for thirty-one years and has since served as a correctional consultant for nearly two decades.

    Want to know more about the challenges Timothy Murray has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    1. Qualification

    Defendants contended that Murray lacked an understanding of the “qualifications required to serve as a jailer in Kentucky,”’ and that this makes him unqualified to offer testimony on whether Defendants complied with relevant standards.

    Murray’s CV reveals that he worked in corrections in New York for over thirty years, serving at three separate correctional facilities.

    Murray’s academic background supplements his lengthy career in corrections. He possesses a Bachelor of Science in Education, a Master of Science in Education, and a Certificate of Advanced Study in Educational Administration, as well as specialized training from the United States Department of Justice and the American Correctional Association.

    2. Relevance

    Defendants maintained that Murray did not review the LCDC policies and procedures or the Kentucky Jail Standards developed by the Kentucky Department of Corrections.

    Notably, Murray’s report references both the Kentucky Administrative Regulations and the ACA standards of correctional operations.

    The report explained that LCDC staff are bound by not only Kentucky legal standards, but also professional standards in the industry. Murray also opined as to what constitutes appropriate staff training for dealing with high-risk inmates and whether staff at LCDC were sufficiently trained and supervised.

    Even if Murray did apply national standards, this does not automatically render his opinion unhelpful to the jury. Defendants did not point to any differences between the Kentucky standard of care and the national standard of care that would render testimony about the national standard of care entirely unhelpful to the jury. Furthermore, expert opinions that rely in part on national professional standards such as this are regularly found to be relevant.

    3. Reliability

    Defendants once again argued that Murray’s failure to apply Kentucky standards references his opinion unreliable. As the Court has already explained, however, Murray did reference the Kentucky standards in his report, and he testified that he reviewed the regulations in creating his report. Nor did Defendants explain why Murray’s reference to the ACA standards constitute an unreliable principle or method. They simply argued that Murray’s testimony amounts to “his belief as to what should have been done in an ACA accredited facility, not a Kentucky facility governed by the Kentucky Jail Standards and the Policies and Procedures of LCDC.”

    Once again, Defendants pointed to no substantive differences between the ACA standard and the Kentucky standard such that the ACA standard would constitute an “unreliable” standard as applied to a Kentucky jail. Murray relied on the ACA, Kentucky regulations, and his own personal experience in corrections to provide an opinion on the appropriate standard of care. He compared the actions of Defendants against that standard using facts he ascertained from depositions and camera footage. He therefore explained the “how” and “why” he reached his conclusions.

      Held

      The Court denied Defendants’ motion to exclude the testimony of Timothy Murray.

      Key Takeaway

      The jury will be tasked with determining several key issues related to the applicable standard of care and whether Defendants complied with that standard of care. Understanding generally accepted correctional practices will help the trier of fact determine what constitutes reasonable conduct by jail workers dealing with a suicidal inmate.

      Case Details:

      Case Caption: Milby V. Underwood
      Docket Number: 3:23cv49
      Court Name: United States District Court, Kentucky Western
      Order Date: April 13, 2026
    1. Insurance Expert’s Testimony on Market Multiples Range Excluded

      Insurance Expert’s Testimony on Market Multiples Range Excluded

      The matter before the Court stems from Plaintiff USI Insurance Services LLC’s (“USI”) lawsuit against Defendants Alliant Insurance Services Incorporated (“Alliant”), William J. Havard III, Robert Engles, Jenise Purser, and Justin Walsh (collectively, “Defendants,” or without referring to Alliant, the “Individual Defendants”) relating to allegations that, among other things, they engaged in the improper solicitation of USI’s clients on Alliant’s behalf after resigning from USI.

      Defendants filed a motion to exclude certain trial testimony and the opinions of USI’s industry expert witness, Thomas R. Linn.

      Insurance Expert Witness

      Thomas Richard Linn has extensive experience in the insurance industry, having served as the Executive Vice President of Marsh, Berry & Company, Inc., one of the nation’s largest insurance agency consulting firms. Throughout his 22-year tenure at MarshBerry, Linn advised industry players on financial and organizational development and served as an intermediary to insurance-related mergers and acquisitions totaling more than $2 billion.

      Get the full story on challenges to Thomas R. Linn ‘s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study. 

      Discussion by the Court

      Defendants objected to Linn’s testimony concerning (1) certain “market multiples” derived from other undisclosed insurance transactions and (2) opinions on the enforceability and interpretations of the restrictive covenants in the Individual Defendants’ employment agreements.

      Market Multiples

      USI planned to offer Linn’s testimony on the process for buying, selling, and acquiring books of business (“BOB(s)”) in the commercial insurance industry and the typical pricing for such assets. Linn opined that industry uses “multiples of revenue” as a rule of thumb to price of a firm or BOB and “multiples of EBITDA” to calculate the sale price. He further provided specific ranges of multiples for revenue and for EBITDA in which the range covers standard business risks in the insurance industry and unique, transaction-specific risks.

      Defendants attacked Linn’s factual basis for reaching the proffered multiples. According to Defendants, Linn based his multiples every transaction he worked on during his twenty-two-year career, including those concerning the sale of entire insurance brokerage firms and isolated BOBs.

      Defendants also pointed out that when their counsel asked him to identify specific comparable transactions involving the sale of BOBs underlying his multiples, Linn refused to identify the names, revenues, locations, and acquisition prices as confidential and indicted that he based the multiples on the “the judgment [he] . . . gained after 22 years of experience.”

      Linn testified that he spoke with partners who worked at his former company for “touch points and points of reference for which he used to form [his] opinion” regarding the status of the marketplace and current pricing multiples. These conversations related to the sale of entire brokerage firms, not BOBs, and Linn did not receive any information regarding any specific transactions.

      He further testified that asking about BOBs in particular was unnecessary because the valuation of a BOB incorporates a discount from the valuation of the entire firm, which remained the same since the time he was with the company.

      Analysis

      Though it is possible that business assets like BOBs may sell at some multiple that accounts for various discounts or premiums based on various performance and market-based factors as a matter of general principle, Linn opined to a specific range of multiples by applying that rule, i.e., the principle, to a set of unidentified facts.

      The proffered range of multiples is not a matter of general principle but rather a conclusion drawn from analytical reasoning based on Linn’s facts and experience. But Linn, however, refused to disclose the facts, i.e., the transactions, underlying the range, removing the Court’s ability to evaluate whether those transactions provide a sufficient factual basis to support his opinion.

      Linn indiscriminately included every transaction from his career without explaining how the various factors impacted his analysis to arrive at specific numbers that define the boundaries of the range. Consequently, Linn failed to link his experience in valuing BOBs with his conclusion on the range of multiples, and by never explaining how the relevant factors apply to determine a particular multiple, the Court is left with no basis to determine whether he reliably applied such factors to reach his ultimate conclusion.

      Additionally, by failing to explain how the particular factors apply to discount a BOB, Linn’s testimony on a range provided the jury with no guidance on how to determine the appropriate multiple within that range. Therefore, the Court excluded Linn’s testimony pertaining to the specific range of market multiples. This exclusion, however, is narrow because the Defendants’ challenge pertains to the ranges themselves and not the general principles underlying the sales process. Linn may testify to the other general market-based principles addressed prior to arriving at the specific multiple.

      Enforceability and Interpretations of the Restrictive Covenants

      The parties disputed whether Linn should have been permitted to testify that the restrictive covenants in the Individual Defendants’ employment agreements reflected industry standards and remained reasonable. Their disagreement focused on the relevance of his opinion to the covenants’ enforceability. They raised these arguments before the Court issued its summary-judgment ruling, which resolved the enforceability question. After that decision, any additional testimony became unnecessary and irrelevant.

      Held

      The Court granted the Defendants’ motion to exclude certain testimony of Thomas R. Linn.

      Key Takeaway:

      An expert must establish the reliability of the principles and methods, “along with the particular method of analyzing data thereby obtained, to draw a conclusion regarding the particular matter to which the expert testimony was directly relevant.” In other words, without more, Linn generated his proffered range of multiples based on mere ipse dixit.

      Case Details:

      Case Caption: USI Insurance Services LLC V. Alliant Insurance Services Incorporated Et Al
      Docket Number: 2:23cv192
      Court Name: United States District Court, Arizona
      Order Date: June 26, 2025
    2. Certain Opinions of Environmental Expert Witness Excluded Because They Amount to Contract Interpretation

      Certain Opinions of Environmental Expert Witness Excluded Because They Amount to Contract Interpretation

      Plaintiffs Box Elder Kids, LLC filed a class action lawsuit against Defendants Anadarko Petroleum Corporation, Anadarko E & P Onshore, LLC, and other associated entities alleging a breach of Surface Owner Agreements (SOAs). These agreements obligated Anadarko, as successor to Union Pacific Land Resources Company, to pay a percentage of the value from oil, gas, and other hydrocarbons extracted from lands in Colorado, Wyoming, and Utah, which were previously owned by Union Pacific, to the Plaintiffs.

      The Plaintiffs owned the surface land where these hydrocarbons were extracted. The complaint sought recovery of these payments, referred to as the “Surface Owner Payment.” Additionally, the Plaintiffs claim unjust enrichment and allege fraud, deceit, and constructive fraud against Anadarko and its affiliates.

      Section 2 of the Shaklee SOA contains the following payment provision, which gives the surface owner a contractual right to cash payments based on the value of oil and gas produced from or allocated to the lands covered by the SOAs:

      [Anadarko] agrees, so long as it is receiving oil and/or gas production from or oil and/or gas royalties upon production from the described premises or allocated thereto under the provisions of a unitization agreement, to pay or cause to be paid to the Landowner in cash the value (which shall never be greater than the amount realized by [Anadarko] from the sale of such production) on the premises of two and one-half percent (2-1/2%) of all the oil and gas and associated liquid hydrocarbons hereafter produced, saved, and marketed therefrom or allocated thereto as aforesaid, . . .

      This breach of contract dispute centers around the meaning of ambiguous terms in Section 2 of the parties’ SOAs. The Court considered Plaintiffs’ motion to generally disqualify Defendants’ expert witness, Jamie Jost, and to prevent her from testifying as to various opinions contained her report.

      Environmental Expert Witness

      Jamie Jost is known for her dedication and passion to the Rocky Mountain Region’s environmental and economic sustainability in legal, land use and oil and gas development matters. She is the founder and managing shareholder of Jost Energy Law, P.C., a 100% female owned and operated firm specializing in natural resources and land use law.

      Want to know more about the challenges Jamie Jost has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report. 

      Discussion by the Court

      According to Jost, “When Anadarko’s predecessors and Plaintiffs’ predecessors entered into the SOAs, the parties stated their intent that the described premises may be used for oil and gas development. Section 2 of the SOAs obligates Anadarko to pay Plaintiffs 2.5% of the value of the oil and gas produced from, or allocated to pursuant to a unitization agreement, the surface owner’s described premises subject to the SOA. The SOAs do not require Anadarko to pay more than 2.5% of the value of the oil and gas allocated to the described premises under a unitization agreement. Oil and gas industry terms, custom, and practice support Anadarko’s payment of 2.5% of the value of the oil and gas allocated to the SOA described premises under a unitization agreement.”

      Plaintiffs asked the Court to exclude Jost’s opinions pertaining to (1) the “reasonable” interpretation of the original contracting parties’ intent; (2) oil and gas industry custom; and (3) what the “correct” interpretation of the contract is.

      Section 2 of the Surface Owner Agreement

      Jost’s opinions asserting what Section 2 of the SOAs obligates Defendants to pay, and by what methodology, pertain to the dispositive issue the trier of fact must decide in this case. The Court held that those opinions, which are effectively tantamount to contract interpretation, are inadmissible and will not be permitted.

      Plaintiffs also objected to any opinions offered by Jost that discuss whether Defendants’ interpretation of Section 2 is supported by oil and gas industry custom. In support, they argued that such evidence is inadmissible parol evidence because, “where one party to the agreement is not familiar with the industry, like the original contracting surface landowners here, evidence of industry custom is not helpful to the trier of fact for determining the parties’ intent.” 

      According to the Court, “there appears to be disputed evidence as to whether the original parties had experience dealing in oil and gas contracts.” Whether evidence of industry standards and customs is relevant cannot be determined until the jury decides this threshold fact question. Until then, Jost will be permitted to opine on whether industry standards and customs support Defendants’ interpretation of Section 2’s ambiguous terms.

      What remained in Plaintiffs’ motion challenging Jost are various arguments pertaining to whether her opinions are supported and consistent with language in the SOAs and their competing interpretation of the relevant parol evidence. The Court concluded, however, that such evidence bears on the weight of such evidence, not its admissibility.

      Held

      In sum, the Court will not altogether exclude Jamie Jost’s opinions regarding the ambiguous provisions of Section 2, but it will exclude those opinions that amount to contract interpretation.

      Key Takeaways:

      Jost’s opinions asserting what Section 2 of the SOAs obligates Defendants to pay, and by what methodology, pertain to the dispositive issue the trier of fact must decide in this case. An opinion is not objectionable just because it embraces an ultimate issue. Nevertheless, an expert witness’s testimony may not usurp the jury’s fact-finding function.

      Please refer to the blog previously published about this case:

      Environmental History Expert Witness’ Testimony About the Original Parties’ Motivations Admitted

      Case Details:

      Case Caption: Box Elder Kids, Llc Et Al V. Anadarko E & P Onshore, Llc Et Al
      Docket Number: 1:20cv2352
      Court: United States District Court for the District of Colorado
      Order Date: August 27, 2024

    3. Oil & Gas Expert Witness’ Statements of industry Customs and Practices Deemed Admissible

      Oil & Gas Expert Witness’ Statements of industry Customs and Practices Deemed Admissible

      On March 22, 2021, Plaintiff Brandon Long, an employee of Helmerich & Payne International Drilling Co. (“H&P”), was supervising the de-rigging of an oil rig in the Unita Basin near Myton, Utah.

      H&P hired a subcontractor to assist with moving the drilling rig and other equipment, which in turn hired Defendant J&C Enterprises, Inc. (“J&C”) to operate a crane as part of the de-rigging process. While Long was on the rig, employees of J&C allegedly removed some pins from a rig deck, which caused the load to shift and swing uncontrolled towards Long, hitting Long’s foot and pinning it between two other pieces of equipment. Long claimed J&C was negligent in securing the rig deck to the crane hook and has sued to recover for the injuries he sustained as a result.

      In defense of these claims, J&C has designated Daniel T. Reinke as an expert in oil and gas operations to testify on its behalf. Reinke opined that Long’s injury was the result of his own actions.

      Long filed a motion to strike Reinke’s opinions pursuant to Rule 702 as his “statements were simply lay testimony given the imprimatur of expert opinion and/or were unhelpful to the jury because they were untethered from any authority suggesting the customs and practices of the industry.”

      Oil & Gas Expert Witness

      Daniel Reinke is a professional engineer who has over 48 years of experience, both as an employee and consultant, in oil and gas operations. He has served as an operator, drilling engineer, reservoir engineer, and production engineer on over 2,000 oil and gas wells. He is the founder and president of an operating company which has served as operator and contract operator of more than 100 wells.

      Want to know more about the challenges Daniel Reinke has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report. 

      Discussion by the Court

      The Court admitted Reinke’s opinions that Long’s injuries were the result of his own actions

      The Court held that since Long has not shown Reinke’s articulation of industry customs and practices is contrary to established standards or otherwise infirm, Reinke’s statement of those standards based on his own experience is sufficient for admissibility. In other words, there is nothing objectionable in Reinke’s statements that everyone on site has Stop Work Authority, that each employee is responsible for his own safety while working at the site and must follow his own employer’s safety policies, that each contractor performs specialized services requiring different skills and safety protocols, and that it is a basic safety rule of the oilfield not to locate oneself between two unstable pieces of equipment.

      The Court added that Reinke’s opinion that J&C was not directing the work reasonably appeared to be an outgrowth of his observations that each contractor was responsible for its own piece of the de-rigging process and that, as the owner of the rig, H&P was responsible for directing the work.

      Moreover, it is unlikely a lay jury could be expected to know the layout and components of an oil rig or how the various parts of the rig and the equipment involved in the derigging process move and interact with one another which is why the Court admitted Reinke’s opinions that Long’s injuries were the result of his own actions and not the fault of J&C, as well as his suggestion that Long would not have been injured had he located himself anywhere else.

      According to Rule 704, the Court found that Reinke explained the bases of his conclusions as to the relative fault of each party, and to the extent his testimony may embrace an ultimate issue in the case, it seemed likely to “assist, rather than supplant, the jury’s judgment.”

      One of Reinke’s opinions struck the Court as potentially problematic

      However, Reinke’s conclusion that, “based on the incident report published by H&P, Long did not follow the safety policies and procedures of his employer” struck the Court as potentially problematic.

      Since Reinke did not describe the contents of the report; it may be the conclusion whether Long violated his employer’s safety policies is self-evident from the document itself.

      Held

      The Court granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiff’s motion to strike the testimony of Daniel Reinke.

      Key Takeaway:

      The Court held that there is nothing objectionable in Reinke’s statements that everyone on site has Stop Work Authority, that each employee is responsible for his own safety while working at the site and must follow his own employer’s safety policies, that each contractor performs specialized services requiring different skills and safety protocols, and that it is a basic safety rule of the oilfield not to locate oneself between two unstable pieces of equipment. However, Reinke’s conclusion that, “based on the incident report published by H&P, Long did not follow the safety policies and procedures of his employer” struck the Court as potentially problematic since it was not at all apparent why it required expert interpretation.

      Case Details:

      Case Caption: Long V. J & C Enterprises, Incorporated
      Docket Number: 1:22cv2999
      Court: United States District Court, Colorado
      Order Date: May 15, 2024