Expert Witness Profiler

Tag: Insurance

  • The Insurance Expert’s Testimony on Claims Handling Contained Deficiencies

    The Insurance Expert’s Testimony on Claims Handling Contained Deficiencies

    This is an insurance coverage dispute arising from a car accident between Plaintiffs, in which Plaintiffs seek to enforce a liability insurance policy issued by Defendant to Plaintiff Anita Myers that was later assigned to Plaintiff Sarah Montalvan.

    Defendant sought to exclude the testimony of Peter Knowe, Plaintiffs’ designated insurance claims handling expert while Plaintiffs sought to exclude the opinions of GailAnn Stargardter, Defendants’ designated insurance claims-handling expert.

    Insurance Expert Witness

    Peter Knowe has specialized qualifications and experience in adjusting, investigating, and evaluating insurance claims. During his career in the insurance industry spanning 26 years, he was trained in evaluating and responding to policy limit demands and time-limited demands.

    Want to know more about the challenges Peter Knowe has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Law And Legal Expert Witness

    GailAnn Y. Stargardter is a practicing attorney specializing in “insurance coverage and bad faith,” and has been practicing in Washington since 1988, and California since 2007.

    Stargardter’s practice is limited to insurance coverage and bad faith. Stargardter was previously employed as a claim attorney for an insurance company, where she reviewed files to “determine whether claims were being handled consistent with state and company requirements.” She also provides training to insurance clients regarding the California state settlement regulations, is a “co-author of California Insurance Law (The Recorder (2015)),” and previously testified as an expert witness.

    Discover more cases with GailAnn Stargardter as an expert witness by ordering her comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

    Discussion by the Court

    A. Defendant’s Motion to Exclude the Expert Testimony of Peter Knowe

    1. Qualifications

    Based on Knowe’s description of his experience and attached curriculum vitae, the Court found that Knowe is qualified to provide expert testimony in this case.

    Therefore, the Court denied the Knowe motion insofar as it sought to exclude, on the ground of Knowe’s lack of qualifications, his testimony regarding industry customs and practices in handling insurance claims.

    2. Reliability and Methodology

    Plaintiffs offered Knowe as an expert on the topic of whether Defendant “complied with the practices and standards of the insurance industry in its handling of the liability claim brought by Sarah Montalvan against Anita Myers.”

    Based on Knowe’s review of various materials, including Defendant’s claim file, the deposition transcript of Starla Tuck, Defendant’s claims adjuster, and other case specific documents, Knowe opined that Defendant’s claim handling “fell below the insurance industry standard of care” in twelve different ways.

    Based on the Court’s review of the Knowe Report, the Court agreed with Defendant that the Report (1) did not sufficiently articulate the bases for Knowe’s proffered “industry standards,” and (2) lacked a described nexus between the described industry standards and Knowe’s opinions.

    Analysis

    In his Report, Knowe listed sixteen standards “for claims handling,” which are “national in scope and apply in all states.” However, the Knowe Report did not identify the specific source for each standard.

    Other than to cite his training and experience, the Knowe Report did not explain how Knowe derived his sixteen standards from the above-referenced insurance industry texts and articles.

    In addition, as articulated by Defendant during the hearing on the motions, it is unclear whether each of the sixteen standards Knowe describes in his report were applicable when Defendant evaluated Plaintiffs’ claim in 2018. Further, even if the Knowe Report were to describe the basis for the standards described therein, it is unclear how Knowe “applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.”

    Nevertheless, the Court found that the above deficiencies may be curable. Based on Knowe’s described experience with insurance claims handling as a senior technical representative, manager of California-based field offices at a nationwide insurance company, and experience as an expert witness in other proceedings, the Court is inclined to give Knowe the opportunity to explain how he derived the 16 standards, whether those standards existed at the time of the claim, and how he applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of this case.

    B. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Exclude GailAnn Stargardter

    1. Qualifications

    Plaintiffs presented no argument that Stargardter is unqualified. Based on Stargardter’s described experience, the Court found that she possesses sufficient “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education” to provide expert testimony regarding insurance claim handling.

    2. Ultimate Issue Testimony

    Plaintiffs argued that “the Stargardter Report is a legal brief masquerading as expert testimony” in that the Stargardter’s opinions are no more that impermissible conclusions and are one-sided, incomplete, and unreliable.

    Based on the Court’s review of the Stargardter Report and Stargardter Rebuttal, the Court concluded that the Stargardter Report and Stargardter Rebuttal provided legal opinions on ultimate issues of law, and such opinions should be excluded.

    Anlaysis

    Stargardter opined that Defendant’s handling of Plaintiffs’ claims “was within the standard of care, consistent with the standards, customs, and practices in the insurance industry, compliant with the CUCPA and the Regulations, and compliant with National General’s own internal guidelines.”

    In particular, according to Stargardter’s opinion, Defendant “conducted a full, fair, objective and timely investigation of Sarah Montalvan’s claim,” “fully, fairly, objectively, proactively, and timely evaluated Sarah Montalvan’s claim, and extended settlement offers commensurate with the claims as documented by her counsel.”

    This opinion, plainly, amounts to legal analysis. The Stargardter Report and Stargardter Rebuttal rely on legal authorities to assert that Defendant’s handling of Plaintiffs’ claims was “within the standard of care, consistent with the standards, customs, and practices in the insurance industry, compliant with the CUCPA and the Regulations, and compliant with National General’s own internal guidelines.”

    The only portion of Stargardter’s testimony that does not provide legal analysis is what Defendant characterize as “a detailed claim-file chronology tracking Defendant’s handling from the initial loss report on September 24, 2017, through the filing of the suit.”

    Based on the Court’s review of the Stargardter Report and the parties’ arguments at the hearing, both the Stargardter Report and Stargardter Rebuttal offered legal opinions that will not be helpful to the jury

    Held

    Having considered the parties’ submissions, oral arguments, the relevant law, and the record in this case, the Court ordered the parties’ respective experts to file supplemental expert reports that address the deficiencies and reserved ruling on the motions until after the supplemental reports are filed.

    Key Takeaway

    In describing the bases for her opinions, Stargardter does not reference her experience handling insurance claims or Defendant’s internal guidelines. Neither the Stargardter Report nor Stargardter Rebuttal describe whether Defendant’s conduct was reasonable based on industry practices and norms.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Montalvan V. National General Insurance Company
    Docket Number: 5:25cv441
    Court Name: United States District Court, California Central
    Order Date: July 07, 2026
  • Law and Legal Expert Allowed to Opine on Environmental Insurance Products

    Law and Legal Expert Allowed to Opine on Environmental Insurance Products

    ResinTech commenced this action against AIG and Odell arising from AIG’s denial of coverage for environmental liabilities asserted against ResinTech by the Camden County Municipal Utilities Authority (“CCMUA”) and the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (“NJDEP”).

    ResinTech asserted claims against AIG for breach of contract and declaratory judgment and, in the alternative, asserted claims against Odell arising from Odell’s alleged failure to procure appropriate insurance coverage and advise ResinTech concerning its pollution-liability risks.

    Odell sought to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff’s insurance-industry expert, Howard Tollin.

    Law And Legal Expert Witness

    Howard M. Tollin is an attorney, environmental risk consultant, and licensed property and casualty broker. Over the past 30 years, he has facilitated thousands of real estate, corporate M&A transactions and litigation and claims settlements.

    Want to know more about the challenges Howard Tollin has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Tollin is qualified to offer opinions concerning environmental insurance, pollution-liability coverage, insurance-broker practices, and industry customs. He has decades of experience as both an attorney and insurance broker specializing in environmental and pollution coverage. His report and deposition testimony demonstrate substantial experience placing pollution-liability policies, negotiating policy language, advising policyholders regarding environmental risks, and participating in the environmental-insurance marketplace. The Court is satisfied that his specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact.

    Odell’s principal criticisms concerned the basis for Tollin’s opinions rather than his qualifications. Odell argued that Tollin relied primarily on his professional experience rather than identified treatises, regulations, or formal industry standards. That argument is unavailing. Tollin reviewed the record and applied his experience to the facts of this case. To the extent Odell disputes his assumptions, methodology, or conclusions, those objections go to the weight of the testimony and may be explored through cross-examination and the presentation of contrary evidence.

    The Court likewise rejected Odell’s contention that Tollin’s opinions are impermissibly speculative. Odell’s challenges largely concerned the factual premises underlying Tollin’s opinions and the conclusions he drew from the record.

    The Court agreed, however, that Tollin may not offer legal conclusions or instruct the jury on the governing law. Accordingly, Tollin may testify regarding insurance-industry customs and practices, the availability and characteristics of environmental insurance products, the role and responsibilities commonly undertaken by brokers and risk-management advisors, and whether the conduct alleged in this case was consistent with those customs and practices. He may not opine that Odell was negligent, breached a legal duty, violated New Jersey law, or otherwise offered legal conclusions reserved for the Court and jury.

    Held

    The Court denied Odell’s motion to exclude the testimony of Howard Tollin subject to certain limitations.

    Key Takeaway

    Rule 702 expressly permits expert testimony grounded in specialized experience, and the absence of a particular treatise or published methodology does not render such testimony inadmissible.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: ResinTech, Inc. V. AIG Specialty Insurance Company
    Docket Number: 1:21cv19843
    Court Name: United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
    Order Date: June 30, 2026
  • Real Estate Expert Not Allowed to Opine on Undue Hardship

    Real Estate Expert Not Allowed to Opine on Undue Hardship

    On September 24, 2024, Plaintiff Pharilyn Chhang filed the operative second amended complaint against Defendants West Coast and Sergio Madrigal, alleging causes of action under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), wrongful eviction; invasion of private right to occupancy; and breach of duty. Plaintiff claimed that she is a disabled person who requires her emotional support animal, Onyx, to reside with her.

    Defendants intended to call Robert S. Griswold to testify as an expert witness “regarding the standard of care for a property owner/manager as it relates to accommodation requests, insurance issues and costs, ineligible risks and liability exposure and related issues.” However, Plaintiff filed a motion to exclude Griswold.

    Plaintiff also filed a motion to preclude Defendants’ expert witness Kevin J. Valine.

    Real Estate Expert Witness

    Robert Stephen Griswold is a recognized expert on management of all types of residential real estate. He has actively managed over 70,000 residential units and several million square feet of commercial, industrial, self-storage, and retail properties nationally in the last 40+ years.

    He is a 3-time graduate of the distinguished Marshall School of Business at the University of Southern California with a BS (’81), MBA (’86), and MSBA (2nd Masters) (’88) in real estate and related disciplines.

    Get the full story on challenges to Robert Griswold’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Insurance Expert Witness

    Kevin J. Valine has more than 45 years of experience in the field of property/casualty insurance and risk management.

    He has been licensed by the California Department of Insurance to transact Property and Casualty insurance since 1983.

    Discover more cases with Kevin Valine as an expert witness by ordering his comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

    Discussion by the Court

    I. Robert Griswold

    The Court found that the standard of care is not relevant to the claims at issue. Additionally, the expert did not appear to have expertise in disability accommodations consistent with the claims herein, nor did it appear that the expert reviewed the insurance policy exclusions.

    As a result, the motion was granted as to Griswold’s opinions that Plaintiff’s request for an emotional support animal was denied on “legitimate grounds,” and that Defendants met the applicable standard of care in their ownership, operation, property management, and maintenance with respect to Plaintiff’s request. The motion was further granted as to Griswold’s opinion regarding undue hardship, the feasibility of a reasonable accommodation, and that Defendants acted reasonably by offering to temporarily allow Plaintiff to keep Onyx on the property while Plaintiff sought to relocate. Finally, the motion was granted as to Griswold’s opinion that allowing Plaintiff to keep Onyx on the property would have violated the insurance carrier’s exclusions.

    However, the Court denied the motion as to Griswold’s opinion that the property’s insurance could have been non-renewed or canceled for allowing an animal on a breed-restriction list; that permitting Plaintiff to keep such an animal would expose Defendants to financial repercussion; and that a loss of insurance would have imposed a significant burden on the property’s residents and occupants, subject to Defendants laying a proper foundation that the applicable insurance policy excluded the animal in question.

    II. Kevin Valine

    The Court also found that Valine’s opinions regarding the appropriate standard of care for a reasonably prudent insurance broker were not relevant to the claims at issue.

    Although Defendants argued at the hearing that Valine had opined that granting Plaintiff’s accommodation would have exposed Defendants to an “uninsured exposure to risk of catastrophic proportion,” that statement appeared within his broader analysis that “D&D met the standard of care for a reasonably prudent insurance broker.”

    As a result, the Court concluded that expert testimony on this issue is unnecessary, as it would not assist the trier of fact given the irrelevance of the standard of care.

    Held

    • The Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to preclude Defendants’ expert witness Kevin J. Valine.
    • The Court granted in part and denied in part Plaintiff’s motion to preclude Defendants’ expert witness Robert Griswold.

    Key Takeaway

    Certain expert opinions offered by Griswold and Valine were deemed inadmissible because the standard-of-care analysis had no bearing on the claims at issue.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Chhang V. West Coast USA Properties LLC
    Docket Number: 1:23cv1335
    Court Name: United States District Court, California Eastern
    Order Date: June 02, 2026
  • Roofing Expert’s Causation Opinion Excluded

    Roofing Expert’s Causation Opinion Excluded

    This case arises out of an insurance claim (the “Claim”) Plaintiff Mike Nguyen submitted to Allstate seeking coverage under his homeowners insurance policy (the “Policy”) for damages to the roof and certain exterior components of his dwelling (the “Property”) that he said were caused by a hail storm that occurred on May 1, 2022 (the “Storm”). However, Allstate inspected the Property and alleged that the damages to the steel roof were not covered pursuant to the Metal Roof Surfaces Cosmetic Damage Exclusion Endorsement to the Policy (the “Cosmetic Damage Endorsement”).

    Allstate sought to exclude the testimony of the Plaintiff’s retained experts, Chris Rhynehart and Brandon Allen.

    Roofing Expert Witness

    Chris Rhynehart has served as the owner and operator of Rhynehart Roofing and Construction for over thirty-five years.

    Get the full story on challenges to Chris Rhynehart’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Insurance Expert Witness

    Brandon Benjamin Allen, AIC is a licensed adjuster in Texas and Louisiana with almost twenty years of experience adjusting claims. He also holds credentials
    including an Associate in Claims, and he is a HAAG Certified Roof Inspector, which means he received specialized training to assess roof damage.

    Want to know more about the challenges Brandon Allen has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    A. Chris Rhynehart

    Allstate argued that Rhynehart’s opinions are irrelevant because he made no attempt to connect the damage to the May 1 storm or any storm that occurred during the Policy period of February 1, 2022 to February 1, 2023.

    Rhynehart’s report said only that the Plaintiff’s property “shows clear signs of a previous severe hail storm,” with multiple areas “indicating significant impact damage.” He made no attempt to connect that damage to the May 1 storm, or to date the damage at all. His report included a weather report showing that a hail storm occurred near the Plaintiff’s property on May 1, 2022, but the same report lists eleven other hail storms that impacted the Plaintiff’s property in the years before the May 1 storm. Rhynehart also failed to consider any possible alternative causes of the damage. Nor did he present any information about the condition of the Plaintiff’s roof before the storm.

    The Plaintiff conceded that Rhynehart’s opinions failed to connect the roof damage to the May 1 storm.

    The Court found that Rhynehart’s expert opinions as to causation are not relevant because they failed to speak to whether the May 1 storm caused the damage that resulted in a leak in the Plaintiff’s roof. It is the Plaintiff’s burden to establish this.

    However, Allstate did not contest Rhynehart’s competence to testify about the overall “condition of the property, the presence of wind and hail damage, the extent of the damage, and to provide an unbiased estimate” as to the cost of repair.

    B. Brandon Allen

    Plaintiff designated Allen as a “testifying expert to contradict or rebut the evidence, opinions, analysis, and expert designations” of Allstate’s retained expert witnesses.

    Allen’s expert report—much like Rhynehart’s report—simply offered a view of the evidence that favored the Plaintiff. The Court found that Allen’s report did not even mention Allstate’s experts, much less attempt to contradict specific findings they made in their reports.

    Allen’s report did not attempt to specifically rebut the findings of Allstate’s experts. But even if it had, his report went far beyond that and offered its own “separate and distinct analysis.”

    Held

    The Court granted in part and denied in part Allstate’s motion to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff’s retained expert witnesses Chris Rhynehart and Brandon Allen.

    Key Takeaway

    A rebuttal expert’s report must relate to the specific findings advanced by the opposing expert, not simply offer a different view of the case.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Nguyen V. Allstate Vehicle And Property Insurance Company
    Docket Number: 2:24cv186
    Court Name: United States District Court, Texas Northern
    Order Date: February 23, 2026
  • Roofing Expert Witness Allowed to Opine on the Specialty Tile

    Roofing Expert Witness Allowed to Opine on the Specialty Tile

    This is a hail damage case. The Plaintiff, First Evangelical Lutheran Church of Lincoln, Nebraska, alleged that its roof was damaged in a hailstorm. Allegedly, the Defendant, Brotherhood Mutual Insurance Company, wrongfully delayed or denied certain benefits under its insurance policy.

    Basically, the Plaintiff alleged that its clay tiles, aluminum gutters, copper flashing, and other metal components suffered extensive damage, some of which allegedly caused interior leaks.

    The Plaintiff has designated two experts: Toby Duncan, a roofing consultant, and Matthew Y. Merrell, a licensed professional civil engineer. Specifically, the Defendant sought to exclude any opinions from these experts that a hailstorm occurred on the property, that a storm caused the damage, any “site-specific” storm conditions, such as wind speed or hail size, or that the damage is attributable to a specific weather event.

    The Plaintiff, on the other hand, sought to exclude the opinions of Vincent Hobson, the Defendant’s expert witness.

    Roofing Expert Witnesses

    Toby Duncan is a commercial and residential roofing consultant and project manager specializing in clay tile, slate, and copper roofs.

    Discover more cases with Toby Duncan as an expert witness by ordering his comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

    Vincent H. Hobson has over fifty years of experience in roofing and tiles. He also provides extensive consulting services to homeowners, architects, roofing contractors, historians and even other consultants in the tile roofing arena. 

    Get the full story on challenges to Vincent Hobson’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Civil Engineering Expert Witness

    Matthew Yates Merrell has developed a diverse engineering background focused on new construction and resolving difficult construction issues.

    Want to know more about the challenges Matthew Merrell has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Merrell

    To begin with, Merrell relied on industry-standard impact tests to determine that the damage he observed on the church’s roof was consistent with damage caused by hail measuring 1.5 inches in diameter. He considered a consulting meteorologist’s report that a hailstorm on April 12 passed over the subject property, and that storm produced hail measuring a maximum of 1.5 inches in diameter. He relied on an interview with the church property committee indicating that the church’s roof had been repaired in 2018, and there were no “cracked, chipped, or fractured tiles” following those repairs.

    His expert report concluded that “impact damage consistent with hail strikes was widespread at the church.” It also concluded, “within a reasonable degree of engineering certainty, that the storm on April 12, 2020 damaged the subject property.”

    The Defendant argued that Merrell had no basis to opine about storm conditions on April 12, including whether a hailstorm occurred or the size of the hail. According to the Defendant, engineers may not give opinions about these kinds of “site-specific storm conditions.”

    However, Merrell attested that he regularly relied on data from meteorologists to form opinions about the cause of damage, and such reliance is an industry standard. Merrell’s report considered other causes of damages, and specifically excluded “damage that appeared unrelated to high winds and hail.” Merrell used the data from the meteorologist to support his findings about the damage to the roof, and that such damage is consistent with 1.5-inch hail; based on the record before the Court, that meteorological data is being used to support his conclusions based on his expertise, not supplant them. The Defendant challenged the factual basis and foundation of Merrell’s conclusions, but in this Court’s view, those arguments go to weight and not admissibility.

    Duncan

    The Defendant also sought to exclude Duncan’s opinions involving assumptions that hail of a particular size struck the property. While Duncan cannot give expert testimony that a hailstorm on April 12 caused the damage, he is not precluded from giving lay testimony regarding the same. Duncan was in Lincoln the day of the alleged hailstorm, and he visited the Plaintiff’s church property.

    He may give expert testimony that, through his professional experience, what he saw appeared to be consistent with hail damage. And, based on his personal knowledge of the weather conditions on April 12, he may testify as to his observations of the size or other characteristics of the hail.

    The Court made it clear that neither Merrell nor Duncan may provide expert opinions that hail of a particular size struck the church on April 12, 2020. However, both may provide the reason they believe hail of a certain size struck the building. Merrell relied on a meteorological consultant to confirm his measurements and the physical indication of certain-sized hail. Duncan relied on his measurements and personal experience with the hail to draw similar conclusions.

    Hobson

    Hobson inspected the church roof at the Defendant’s request, and issued a report in August 2022. The Plaintiff argued that Hobson’s opinions are “unsupported conjecture” and should be excluded.

    It’s clear from Hobson’s deposition testimony that he based his opinions on his fifty years of experience in roofing and tiles. That experience is an appropriate foundation upon which to base expert testimony, including the testimony that an HVAC installation process damaged the tile, that the specialty tile may have manufacturing defects, or that the damage was not widespread enough to have been caused by hail. As a result, the Plaintiff’s arguments all go to weight, not admissibility, and the motion to exclude will be denied by the Court.

    Held

    • The Court granted in part the Defendant’s motion to exclude or limit the testimony of Plaintiff’s experts, Toby Duncan and Matthew Merrell.
    • The Court denied the Plaintiff’s motion to exclude the testimony of the Defendant’s expert, Vincent Hobson.

    Key Takeaway

    In exercising its gatekeeping function, the Court must make a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the proposed expert testimony is valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue, focusing specifically on the methodology and not the conclusions. To that end, expert testimony that is speculative, unsupported by sufficient facts, or contrary to the facts of the case, is inadmissible.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: First Evangelical Lutheran Church Of Lincoln, Nebraska V. Brotherhood Mutual Insurance Company
    Docket Number: 4:23cv3180
    Court Name: United States District Court, Nebraska
    Order Date: May 15, 2026
  • Construction Management Expert Allowed to Opine on Project Delays

    Construction Management Expert Allowed to Opine on Project Delays

    This action concerns insurance claims arising from water inundation events at the McCook Reservoir Tunnel Project in Hodgkins, Illinois.

    Walsh filed a motion to exclude the declaration and expert reports of Lexington’s expert, Rachel Domingo.

    Construction Management Expert Witness

    Rachel Domingo has more than 10 years of experience specializing in project controls, project scheduling, delay damages, productivity and performance damages, change order negotiations, litigation support, and the development or defense of construction claims.

    Domingo earned a Bachelor of Science degree in Construction Management from Polytechnic Institute of New York University.

    Get the full story on challenges to Rachel Domingo’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Discussion by the Court

    Walsh argued that Domingo’s declaration and reports should be excluded because: (1) her testimony is irrelevant and her opinions are not tied to the Policy’s language nor the facts of the case; and (2) they are inadmissible.

    A. Expert Testimony

    On August 10, 2022, Domingo issued a report which concluded that delays in the project were driven by delays in the fabrication of the gate system rather than the Floods. Because Domingo’s opinion directly informs why Lexington denied the claims, it is undoubtedly relevant to the issues in this case.

    Walsh further contended that Domingo’s declaration and report should be excluded because her opinions are not tied to the terms of the Policy. Specifically, Walsh argued that Domingo’s analysis is tied to the project’s completion date instead of the construction schedule in place at the time of the alleged loss, as required by the Policy. However, Domingo is opining on whether Walsh actually incurred the costs claimed and whether either Flood actually caused the alleged Expediting Expenses and Extra Expenses. The Court found that Domingo’s failure to ground her opinions in the Policy language did not mean her testimony is irrelevant or unhelpful to the factfinder; indeed, it is relevant to causation.

    Walsh also disagreed with Domingo’s determination that in the absence of either Flood, Walsh would have had months of downtime due to delays unrelated to the Floods, such that Walsh did not incur Expediting Expenses or Extra Expenses. But Walsh’s disagreement with Domingo’s conclusion is not a basis for exclusion, it is a basis for cross-examination.

    B. Admissibility

    Next, Walsh argued that the Court should not consider Domingo’s declaration or expert reports because they are inadmissible hearsay. Expert reports and declarations, themselves, are generally not admissible at trial.

    However, Domingo’s declaration summarizes her reports, her reports are sworn to in her declaration, and the reports reflect what she would testify to at trial. 

    Moreover, Domingo stated that she “reviewed documents provided by Walsh during the claim adjustment and additional documents produced in this litigation,” and that the documents she considered are identified in the footnotes of her Rule 26 expert report. 

    Held

    The Court denied Walsh’s motion to exclude the declaration and reports of Rachel Domingo.

    Key Takeaway

    The Court’s primary concern is “the validity of the methodology employed by an expert, not the quality of the data used in applying the methodology or the conclusions produced.”

    Additionally, expert testimony must be tied to the case’s facts and issues. A Court should not exclude expert testimony that speaks on a relevant issue that the factfinder must decide.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Walsh Construction Company II, LLC V. Lexington Insurance Company
    Docket Number: 1:22cv6842
    Court Name: United States District Court, Illinois Northern
    Order Date: April 28, 2026
  • Insurance Expert Not Allowed to Opine on the Cause of Death

    Insurance Expert Not Allowed to Opine on the Cause of Death

    Plaintiffs are the estate and heirs of Timothy Hunt, who was killed in a grain engulfment accident. Defendant is the insurance company who insured the farm (Butts Farms) where the accident occurred. Defendant denied coverage for the accident under the policy. Butts Farms assigned its claims to Plaintiffs as part of an arbitration and non-execution agreement. Plaintiffs secured an arbitration award of approximately $12 million against Butts Farms and seeks to collect that from Defendant.

    Plaintiffs designated Ronald Clifton as an expert on Defendant’s claims handling practices. Clifton’s report outlined the facts of the case, and in doing so concluded that the grain vacuum Hunt was using was attached to the trailer. He opined on the liability of Butts Farms, coverage of the loss under the policy, claims handling deficiencies by Defendant, Defendant’s conformance with its “Claims Best Practices” and the Kansas Unfair Claim Settlement Practices Act, and Defendant’s breach of fiduciary duty toward Butts Farms.

    The Defendant filed a motion to exclude Plaintiffs’ expert Clifton.

    Insurance Expert Witness

    Ronald Clifton has over 37 years of claim handling experience. He has also served as an insurance claims litigation consultant for over 21 years.

    Get the full story on challenges to Ronald Clifton’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Discussion by the Court

    Clifton’s opinion is “that a reasonable insurer would have settled this claim and paid the full available policy limits,” that Defendant acted negligently by failing to settle the claim for policy limits, and that Defendant failed to act in good faith in handling the claim.

    The Court has reviewed Clifton’s report. It shared many of the concerns raised by Defendant. Clifton’s report includes an extensive discussion of policy provisions and a conclusion that the accident is covered under the policy.

    Analysis

    To begin with, Clifton concluded without elaboration that the grain vacuum was attached to the grain trailer. But that is a factual question the jury will be asked to decide—a fact question that does not require expert testimony. If a jury finds the grain vacuum was attached to the trailer (which can include being tied), coverage exists under the policy. It is not Clifton’s role to tell the jury how they should decide by simply declaring there is coverage based on the grain vacuum being attached. 

    To the Court’s knowledge, there are no disputes about any other provisions in the policy. Even to the extent there was an issue about the policy, it is not Clifton’s role to opine on what the policy says or does not say because that is a legal issue for the Court to decide.

    Clifton’s report also repeated opinions of others, including a doctor’s opinion about Hunt’s cause of death. Clifton is not qualified to opine on that issue, nor is it proper for him to simply repeat what others have said. To the Court’s knowledge, Hunt’s cause of death is not an open issue in this case.

    There are other opinions that do not seem to “fit” the case. For example, Clifton’s report included a series of opinions that Butts Farms had a duty to exercise reasonable care toward Hunt, and it breached that duty. To the Court’s knowledge, Butts Farms’ obligations toward Hunt are not an issue the jury will be asked to decide. Additionally, Clifton opined that Defendant breached its fiduciary duty to Butts Farms. This opinion is conclusory and veers into legal opinion.

    Held

    The Court granted in part and denied without prejudice in part the Defendant’s motion to exclude the testimony of Ronald Clifton.

    Key Takeaway

    The Court found that many of Clifton’s opinions are not relevant, would not aid the jury, or touch on legal matters or on matters beyond his expertise. However, Clifton did have some expertise that qualifies him to offer opinions about insurance industry standards and practices. What those opinions are and the basis for them are not clear from the report, however. Accordingly, the Court will voir dire Clifton before the trial.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Hodges V. Farm Bureau Property & Casualty Insurance Company
    Docket Number: 6:24cv1031
    Court Name: United States District Court, Kansas
    Order Date: February 10, 2026
  • Insurance Expert Not Allowed to Opine on Industry Standards

    Insurance Expert Not Allowed to Opine on Industry Standards

    This action arises from an insurance claim related to a vehicle fire that occurred on May 31, 2024, in Arkansas while Plaintiff Anthony Nicholas was driving from Tennessee to Oklahoma. Plaintiff submitted a claim to Defendant Progressive Direct Insurance Company that same day. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant failed to handle the claim in good faith and improperly subjected him to a fraud investigation.

    Also, Plaintiff retained Deborah C. Rankin as an expert related to Progressive’s handling of Plaintiff’s comprehensive coverage claim.

    Rankin’s expert report outlined her opinions on standards she asserted formed the basis for properly handling insurance claims and Progressive’s failure to follow those standards.

    Defendant filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff’s expert Rankin.

    Insurance Expert Witness

    Deborah C. Rankin worked as a licensed insurance adjuster for thirty-three years, retiring from State Farm Insurance in 2016.

    Get the full story on challenges to Deborah Rankin’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Discussion by the Court

    I. Rankin is not qualified to provide expert testimony in this case

    While Rankin stated that she handled hundreds of property claims earlier in her career, Defendant noted that the last such claim she handled was in 1995.

    The Court found that Rankin is likely not qualified to offer expert testimony in this case. Rankin has been admitted as an expert in another case in this district, though that case dealt with an action for bad faith breach of a UM/UIM motorist policy. This case doesn’t involve a UM/UIM claim, but rather a comprehensive property claim.

    The Court is unconvinced that Plaintiff has met his burden to show that Rankin’s experience is sufficiently timely to qualify her as an expert in testifying to the claims handling process for comprehensive claims such as this. In reviewing the cases in which Rankin represents she’s provided expert testimony, it appears none of these cases were related to comprehensive claims like the one in this case. None of this is to say that Rankin might not be qualified to testify as an expert in a UM/UIM case—indeed, she has been—but that isn’t this case.

    II. Rankin’s opinions are not reliable

    Even if the Court had found Rankin qualified to opine on the issues in this case, the Court did not find Rankin’s methodology and reasoning reliable, for the simple reason that it was not clear to the Court how Rankin arrived at her reported conclusions. Rankin’s report failed to cite any specific industry standards to which insurers were to be held. Rankin vaguely stated that “insurance standards are based on multiple sources that work together to result in best practices.” She went on to say that those standards were based on state law, state case law, industry training, and best practices, but other than a cursory cite to the Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act, Rankin did not further develop the foundation for the industry standards with which she contrasted Progressive’s actions.

    Further, the Court was uncomfortable admitting Rankin as an expert because, as the Defendant noted in her report, she misstated Oklahoma law in arguing that insurance adjusters were required to be licensed in Oklahoma and meet venue-specific training requirements.

    III. Rankin’s testimony will not assist the triers of fact to determine the facts in issue

    Finally, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate how Rankin’s testimony will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. The question in this case is whether Progressive “unreasonably, and in bad faith,” withheld payment of Plaintiff’s claim. Bad faith is a common law tort that requires the judgment of “reasonable, prudent people.”

    The jury will be called upon to consider the facts of the case and apply its own conceptions of reasonableness to them in rendering its verdict. The jury is not required to determine the reasonableness of Progressive’s actions with respect to any industry standards. That isn’t to say that failure to comport with industry standards can never be probative of bad faith, but when those “industry standards” are based on amorphous, vague, and sometimes incorrect references to supposedly governing laws, the testimony is more likely to confuse the jury than aid it.

    Held

    The Court granted Defendant’s motion to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff’s expert Deborah Rankin.

    Key Takeaway

    Plaintiff has failed to show that Rankin’s opinions reflect a reliable application of principles and methods to the facts of the case due to her inability to properly interpret Oklahoma law related to adjuster licensing.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Nicholas V. Progressive Direct Insurance Company
    Docket Number: 5:24cv813
    Court Name: United States District Court, Oklahoma Western
    Order Date: March 31, 2026
  • Insurance Expert’s Breach-of-Duty Testimony Admitted

    Insurance Expert’s Breach-of-Duty Testimony Admitted

    On May 19, 2023, Plaintiff John Gianacopoulos filed this action against Defendants Acuity, a mutual insurance company (“Acuity”), and Joyce Jackman & Bell, LLC (“JJB”), concerning a fire that occurred on September 12, 2022, at 1124 Saint Ann Street in Scranton, Pennsylvania (the “Scranton Property”).

    According to Plaintiff’s expert witness, James Stevenson, JJB breached its professional duty of care by failing to procure the correct policy for John Gianacopoulos and by failing to explain the differences in coverage between a homeowners’ insurance policy and a dwelling fire insurance policy.

    JJB has moved to exclude Stevenson’s expert report and testimony, arguing that they are inadmissible because it lacked the requisite reliability and application to the specific facts of this case in violation of Rule 702.

    Insurance Expert Witness

    James W. Stevenson is an underwriter, consultant, and broker with over thirty years of experience in the insurance field.

    Want to know more about the challenges James Stevenson has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Stevenson’s opinion is supported by his “education, training, experience and expertise in the property and liability insurance industry over the past [thirty-seven] years,” and, moreover, his opinion concerned facts pertinent to this case. He stated in his report that JJB should have been aware of the Plaintiff’s changed residence and that “once [JJB] was made aware that John Gianacopoulos had purchased a new home and was making it his residence, [JJB] was or should have been aware that the [Scranton Property] was no longer [his] residence.” As a result, the Court found that Stevenson has satisfied both contested prongs of Rule 702.

    He further opined that JJB breached its duty by failing to procure the correct policy for the Plaintiff’s Scranton Property—a dwelling fire insurance policy—that would have provided property coverage for the fire loss at the property. Stevenson also explained in his deposition that “it’s up to the agent, being the trained expert they are in the insurance industry, to recommend or explain the coverages available and the policies available to the insured/prospect,” and that JJB had an obligation to advise the Plaintiff in this action because “[y]ou can’t have two homeowners’ policies with primary residences.”

    Held

    The Court denied JJB’s motion to exclude the testimony of James Stevenson.

    Key Takeaway

    The expert’s testimony must be relevant to the purpose of the case and must assist the trier of fact. Stevenson’s opinion, as expressed in his report and at his deposition, created a genuine dispute of material fact as to the duty that JJB owed the Plaintiff, which must be determined by the factfinder.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Gianacopoulos V. Joyce Jackman & Bell, LLC
    Docket Number: 3:23cv992
    Court Name: United States District Court, Pennsylvania Middle
    Order Date: February 13, 2026
  • Legal Expert’s Testimony on Life Insurance Investor Practices Excluded

    Legal Expert’s Testimony on Life Insurance Investor Practices Excluded

    Stranger originated life insurance (“STOLI”) policies, specifically, “involve speculators collaborating with an individual to obtain a life insurance policy in the name of that individual and then selling some or all of the death benefit payable upon the death of the insured to stranger investors.”

    On March 3, 2023, Plaintiff Ameritas Life Insurance Corp. (“Ameritas” or “Plaintiff”) filed its complaint, requesting that the Court declare that the $3 million policy at issue on the life of Marvin Flaks (the “Policy”) constitutes a STOLI policy and, thus, is void for lack of an insurable interest.

    Defendant Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB’s (“Wilmington Savings” or “Defendant”) filed a Daubert motion to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff and Counter-Defendant Ameritas Life Insurance Corp.’s expert Michael L. Vild under Federal Rule of Evidence 702.

    Law And Legal Expert Witness

    Michael L. Vild obtained his Juris Doctor from Notre Dame Law School in 1991 and his Bachelor of Music from Ohio State University in 1988.

    Since January 2019, Vild has been a partner at the law firm of Cross & Simons, LLC (“Cross & Simmons”). His practice at the firm “primarily involves corporate and commercial litigation in state and federal courts in Delaware.”

    Aside from his bar memberships, Vild served as “board member of captive insurance companies in the SCOR family of companies; . . . as member of the Board of Directors of Scottish Re (U.S.) and related life reinsurance entities and as Delaware resident director of several small captive insurance companies.”

    Want to know more about the challenges Michael Vild has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Wilmington Savings requested that the Court exclude Vild’s opinions and testimony with respect to four issues: (1) the choice of law inquiry; (2) the insurable interest issue; (3) the reasonableness of Ameritas’ investigation conduct; and (4) life insurance investor practices.

    A. The Court Excludes-in-Part and Does Not Exclude-in-Part Vild’s Opinions and Testimony Concerning the Choice-of-Law Analysis

    Wilmington Savings contended that the Court should exclude Vild’s opinions and testimony concerning the choice-of-law analysis because, according to Wilmington Savings, Vild is not qualified to opine on this issue and, separately, because his opinions and testimony are not helpful.

    First, while Vild cannot testify on the ultimate answer to the choice-of-law analysis, Vild is qualified to opine and testify, as the former Deputy Insurance Commissioner of the Delaware Department of Insurance, on whether Delaware has an interest in its insurance law being applied to the insurance policy at issue in this action. Likewise, as the former Deputy Insurance Commissioner of the Delaware Department of Insurance, Vild is qualified to opine and testify on how the need to regulate STOLI arose and STOLI principles generally.

    Second, Vild’s opinions and testimony on these topics would be helpful because this action and Delaware’s interest in its law being applied to the insurance policy in this action involves complex issues of insurance, including as they relate to STOLI, that can be simplified or clarified by an expert with relevant experience in insurance, such as Vild.

    Thus, the Court excluded-in-part and did not exclude-in-part Vild’s opinions and testimony concerning the choice-of-law analysis.

    B. The Court Excludes Vild’s Opinions and Testimony Concerning STOLI and Insurable Interests

    Wilmington Savings contended that the Court should exclude Vild’s opinions and testimony concerning STOLI and insurable interests because, according to Wilmington Savings, Vild is not qualified to opine on these issues and, separately, because his opinions and testimony are not helpful.

    First, Vild, as an expert witness, cannot testify on the legal conclusion as to whether the insurance policy in this action constitutes STOLI.

    Second, Vild’s opinions and testimony on these topics would be helpful because this action involves complex issues of insurance, including as they relate to STOLI, that can be simplified or clarified by an expert with relevant experience in insurance, such as Vild.

    The Court acknowledged that much of Vild’s experience did not concern insurance or even STOLI specifically and that Vild has many years of experience and expertise in other subjects from his time at various institutions (for example, his nine years of in-house counsel experience from two different casinos). However, that a person has expertise deriving from many years of experience in a particular subject does not foreclose that person from also being qualified in another subject and, thus, able to provide helpful testimony on that subject.

    Thus, the Court excluded-in-part and did not exclude-in-part Vild’s opinions and testimony concerning STOLI and insurable interests.

    C. The Court Excludes the Opinion and Testimony of Vild Concerning the Reasonableness of Ameritas’ Conduct

    Wilmington Savings contended that “Vild is not qualified to opine on whether Ameritas acted reasonably.”Wilmington Savings provided several grounds in support of this contention, including, but not limited to, that “Vild has admitted he is ‘not a claims administration expert.’

    Ameritas merely contended that “Vild offered opinions grounded in decades of regulatory and advisory experience evaluating insurer conduct under comparable conditions” and that courts “regularly admit such testimony from experts with regulatory or legal backgrounds.” However, even if courts regularly admit such testimony, the Court is unable to discern the purportedly “comparable conditions” that have purportedly informed Vild’s experience since Ameritas fails to cite anything in the record to evince as much.

    The Court determined that Vild was able to opine and testify on whether Delaware has an interest in its law being applied to the insurance policy at issue in this action, how the need to regulate STOLI arose, and STOLI principles generally. As the former Deputy Insurance Commissioner of the Delaware Department of Insurance, Vild has direct and substantial experience on these insurance issues from the enforcement and regulatory perspective, thereby qualifying him and rendering his testimony helpful.

    Here, however, Ameritas has failed to demonstrate that Vild has any relevant experience on the process by which insurers complete their investigations, including with respect to STOLI and insurable interests. For example, Vild never worked at an insurer and, in his private practice experience, he never litigated or provided any counsel on STOLI issues.

    D. The Court Excludes the Opinion and Testimony of Vild Concerning Life Insurance Investor Practices

    In his rebuttal report, Vild opined on several investor practices, including whether (1) it is “the industry practice for investors to rely upon the underwriting and diligence performed by insurance companies,” (2) it is reasonable for investors to rely on letters from legal counsel concerning whether an insurance policy is “valid under the insurable interest laws of various states,” and (3) “investors reasonably expect that an insurer will disclose a suspicion that a policy is potential STOLI.”

    Wilmington Savings contended that “Vild is not qualified to opine on [these] life insurance investor practices.” Wilmington Savings provided several grounds in support of this contention, including, but not limited to, that Vild “has no experience working for an investor or participating in a transaction to buy or sell life insurance in the secondary or tertiary markets.” In response, Ameritas failed to cite anything in the record evincing the purported qualifications of Vild to opine on life insurance investor practices. Instead, Ameritas resorts to, for example, generically contending that what “STOLI investors …. customarily do is wrong.”

    However, generic contentions about industry custom and attempted explanations of legal precedent are irrelevant to the question of Vild’s qualifications to opine on life insurance investor practices. For these reasons, the Court found that Ameritas failed to show that Vild has any experience as an insurance investor, working for or regulating an insurance investor, participating in a transaction to buy or sell life insurance in the secondary or tertiary markets, or otherwise is qualified to opine on life insurance investor practices. Thus, the Court excluded Vild’s opinion and testimony concerning life insurance investor practices.

    Held

    The Court granted-in-part and denied-in-part the Defendant’s Daubert motion to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff and Counter-Defendant Ameritas Life Insurance Corp.’s expert Michael L. Vild.

    Key Takeaway:

    It is not necessary that the expert have expertise in the precise subject matter at issue, and an expert should not be excluded simply because the trial court does not deem the proposed expert to be the best qualified or because the proposed expert does not have the specialization that the Court considers most appropriate.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Ameritas Life Insurance Corp. V. Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB
    Docket Number: 1:23cv236
    Court Name: United States District Court for the District of Delaware
    Order Date: November 07, 2025