Expert Witness Profiler

Tag: Investigation

  • Consumer Credit Expert Not Allowed to Opine on Policies

    Consumer Credit Expert Not Allowed to Opine on Policies

    Plaintiff Alycia Johns brought this action under the Fair Credit Reporting Act and Fair Debt Collection Practices Act following several years of disputing various tradelines with credit reporting agencies based on her claim of identity theft.

    Johns relied on her expert, Douglas Hollon, to assert that Nelnet failed to conduct an adequate investigation of the disputes.

    Defendant Nelnet Servicing, LLC, along with Equifax, TransUnion, LVNV, Resurgent, and First Premier, filed motions to limit or exclude the testimony of Hollon

     

    Consumer Credit Expert Witness

    Douglas A. Hollon holds a Bachelor of Science in Business Finance. He has received FCRA certifications from the Consumer Data Industry Association, has a Credit Analysis Certification from the New York Institute of Finance, has certifications in Credit Risk Modeling and Credit Scorecard Development from SASInstitute, Inc., and has completed the American Bankers Association Certification in Lending Compliance for Compliance Professionals.

    He worked at Experian from 2005 until 2019, where he began in a position assisting consumers with their disputes, and then handled escalated credit report disputes for his remaining years with Experian. While at Experian, he received specialized training involving fraud and “mixed file” disputes. Prior to his time at Experian, he was an investigator with the U.S. Army CID, where he conducted investigations for sixteen years.

    Want to know more about the challenges Douglas Hollon has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report. 

    Discussion by the Court

    A. Qualification

    Defendants asserted that Hollon is not qualified to opine on their investigations, or their policies or procedures. They argued that his opinions are based on the dictionary definition of “investigation” and his personal experience as an investigator with the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Division (“CID”).

    Hollon’s expertise is based primarily on his experience. In his report, Hollon explained that his experience at Experian involved handling disputes, assisting tens of thousands of customers, explaining credit score factors, and understanding information received from Public Record Vendors.

    While Hollon’s explanation of how his experience led to the conclusions reached in this respect is minimal, the Court found that Hollon is sufficiently qualified to testify as an expert regarding investigations and reinvestigations of credit disputes by CRAs and furnishers.

    The Court also found that Hollon is qualified to speak, “in general terms and as found relevant at trial, about the sort of damages that are typically caused on consumer reports.”

    C. Reliability

    Defendants argued that Hollon’s opinions on Defendants’ investigations, and their policies and procedures, are not reliable. Specifically, they argued that his opinions on policies and procedures are based on prior knowledge of Experian’s procedures, regulatory agency publications, case law, deposition transcripts, and “company manuals or publications and other related documents” that he is unable to identify.

    Johns asserted that there is no standard procedure for a reasonable investigation under the FCRA, and so Hollon’s experience “is the closest the jury will get to a standard, industry-wide practice.”

    While Johns suggested that it is the Defendants’ burden to show why Hollon’s CID investigative experience is not applicable to the FCRA context, that disregarded the burden imposed under Rule 702 on the proponent of the expert testimony.

    Hollon’s reliability further falters as he is unable to identify what he relied on. For instance, he references deposition transcripts involving these Defendants in other cases, but cannot identify what cases they came from.

    Hollon’s opinions are rendered more unreliable because they do not dependably flow from the facts. He asserts: “I believe that she submitted a police report which is — and she was a victim of identity theft. That is my opinion.” His report opens with, “Plaintiff, Alycia Johns, is a victim of identity theft.” But the alleged identity theft in this case is not so clearly established. Rather, it is only Johns’ testimony and the police report—based on her statement, which does not specify which tradelines she asserted are the result of identity theft—which support this conclusion. It is the province of the jury, not an expert, to make credibility determinations.

    The Court found that Hollon’s opinions are unreliable because generalized statements from Hollon regarding the harm other consumers have faced when their consumer reports contained inaccuracies is not relevant to the present case.

    Held

    The Court granted the Defendants’ motions to exclude the testimony of Douglas Hollon.

    Key Takeaway

    An expert’s experience, without an explanation of how that experience supports the conclusion, cannot be a substitute for reliable principles or methods. Hollon repeatedly stated that his opinions are based on his “experience, skills, and knowledge,” yet he offered no explanation of what aspects of that experience, skills, or knowledge he drew upon in reaching his conclusions. An expert’s opinion cannot be deemed reliable when it rests solely on the expert’s ipse dixit.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Johns V. Nelnet
    Docket Number: 2:22cv4791
    Court Name: United States District Court, Pennsylvania Eastern
    Order Date: March 31, 2026
  • Law Enforcement Expert Allowed to Opine on the Dynamics of Consensual Adult Sex Work

    Law Enforcement Expert Allowed to Opine on the Dynamics of Consensual Adult Sex Work

    Defendants Brandon Washington and Maria Georgianna Palm are charged with various crimes arising out of their scheme to recruit, entice, harbor, transport, provide, obtain, and maintain vulnerable women, and to perform commercial sex acts for their financial benefit via threats of force, fraud, and coercion.

    The government retained FBI Supervisory Special Agent Steven Vienneau to testify at trial about the commercial sex industry and the commercialized sexual exploitation of victims by individuals who manipulate, coerce, entice, persuade, and control individuals to participate in prostitution.

    The Defendants contended that the agent is unqualified to opine on adult consensual sex work dynamics in cases involving adult women. They argued that his professional background is “overwhelmingly” rooted in child exploitation and juvenile sex trafficking. Defendants also contended that his proposed testimony fails Fed. R. Evid. 702 reliability requirements. And last, Defendants asked the Court to exclude the testimony under Fed. R. Evid. 403 suggesting the risk of unfair prejudice given the testimony invokes emotionally charged concepts.

    Law Enforcement Expert Witness

    Steven Vienneau has been a Special Agent with the FBI since 2003. He supervised the squad responsible for investigating crimes against children and human trafficking including abductions homicides sexual abuse sex trafficking labor trafficking enticement child pornography and online sexual exploitation of children. He also provided training to local state federal and international law enforcement partners in conducting investigation into these matters.

    Get the full story on challenges to Steven Vienneau’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Discussion by the Court

    The essence of the testimony of Vienneau is to provide expert testimony about the pimp-prostitute relationship and subculture. According to the Court, such evidence will assist the jury in assessing the veracity of witness testimony who may be testifying about relationships between pimps and prostitutes. It will also assist the jury in understanding the subculture of the sex trafficking industry.

    The Defendant’s allegation that the agent lacks qualifications to provide expert testimony on adult sex trafficking fails to consider the extent and depth of his experience. His experience is not limited to only minors. As explained in his disclosure, since 2004 his experience has been involved in human trafficking involving both adults and minors. His qualifications involve interviewing over 200 females involved in commercial sex, including approximately 125 adults and 75 minors. Based upon the Government submissions, Vienneau is qualified to testify as an expert on the topic of sex trafficking subculture of adults due to his knowledge, experience, training and education.

    The Defendants contended that Vienneau did not meet the reliability requirement of Rule 702. The Government disclosures belie the Defendant’s assertions. The disclosures demonstrate the agent has gained his expertise through 20 years as an FBI Special Agent specializing in sex trafficking crimes. He also has honed this expertise through hundreds of hours of training and participated in over 100 investigations of sex trafficking offenses, personal interviews with over 200 victims and potential victims of sex trafficking regarding their experience with prostitution and conducted personal interviews with approximately 20 suspected traffickers.

    Held

    The Court denied the Defendant’s motion to exclude the testimony of Government’s expert Steven Vienneau.

    Key Takeaway

    Expert testimony on “the relationship between prostitutes and pimps” is relevant in a sex trafficking case as it can assist the jury in understanding a relationship which is not the subject of common knowledge of jurors.

    The probative value of the agent’s testimony is great, and it goes to assisting the jury in understanding the witness’s testimony and help assess the credibility of the victims and witnesses in this case. Any risk of unfair prejudice is greatly outweighed by the probative value of the proposed evidence.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: United States V. Washington
    Docket Number: 2:23cr58
    Court Name: United States District Court, Washington Western
    Order Date: February 02, 2026
  • Law Enforcement Expert Witness’ Testimony on Officers’ Actions Excluded

    Law Enforcement Expert Witness’ Testimony on Officers’ Actions Excluded

    The present lawsuit revolves around Plaintiff Van Aelsytn’s claims of civil rights violations and malicious prosecution against Defendants Coleman Sparks and Scott Carnes. Both Defendants were officers with the Versailles Police Department and were involved in an investigation that led to domestic violence charges against Van Aelsytn. However, the Plaintiff possessed evidence suggesting his innocence. The parties disagreed over whether the Defendants received and reviewed this evidence properly. Van Aelsytn was arrested, and the case went before a grand jury, which ultimately decided not to indict him.

    The Defendants intended to call Assistant Chief Robert Young of the Versailles Police Department as a rebuttal law enforcement expert witness. Young was expected to testify that the Defendants’ actions during the investigation aligned with Kentucky law and the U.S. Constitution.

    Law Enforcement Expert Witness

    Law Enforcement Expert Witness

    Robert Young currently serves as the Assistant Chief at the Versailles Police Department. He is a retired special agent with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF).

    Want to know more about the challenges Robert Young has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.  

    Discussion by the Court

    Van Aelstyn argued that allowing Robert Young to testify about the Defendants’ actions being legal or “consistent with Kentucky law and the United States Constitution” would have been an improper “legal conclusion.” He believed this testimony would have been flagrant and inappropriate.

    In response, the Defendants clarified that Young would not offer legal conclusions in his testimony. They emphasized that Young would not testify whether Officers Carnes or Sparks violated the Constitution. However, they argued that Young could provide an opinion on whether the officers followed Versailles Police Department policies.

    The Plaintiff replied that it was unclear if the Defendants agreed Young could not provide this testimony. However, the Plaintiff did not seek to exclude testimony about the police department’s policies.

    The Court found that the parties agreed that Young’s initial proposed testimony, claiming the Defendants acted consistently with Kentucky law and the U.S. Constitution, would have been a legal conclusion. They also agreed that such a clear-cut legal conclusion would be impermissible. Accepting this assertion as true would have essentially instructed the jury that the Defendants did not violate the law.

    Held

    The Court granted the Plaintiff’s motion to exclude certain parts of Defendants’ law enforcement expert witness, Robert Young’s testimony. The Court held that Young could not testify about whether the Defendants’ actions were consistent with Kentucky law or the United States Constitution.

    Key Takeaways:

    The Court found that Young’s testimony about whether the Defendants’ actions were consistent with Kentucky law or the U.S. Constitution would constitute an impermissible legal conclusion, as it would effectively instruct the jury that the Defendants did not violate the law. This decision emphasized the need for expert testimony to avoid overstepping into legal determinations, ensuring the jury maintains its role in assessing the law’s application.

    Case Details:

    Case caption: Aelstyn v. Sparks
    Docket Number: 5:23cv136
    Court: United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, Central Division
    Dated: December 4, 2024
  • Lucy Letby Objected to the Prosecution’s Lead Expert’s Testimony Regarding the Collapse of Each Baby

    Lucy Letby Objected to the Prosecution’s Lead Expert’s Testimony Regarding the Collapse of Each Baby

    Between 2015 and 2016, Lucy Letby harmed babies in her care with the intention of killing them. The means of harm varied: causing air embolus by introducing air via intravenous lines; forcing air into the abdomen via nasogastric tubes; force feeding milk; poisoning by administering insulin; physical trauma. She alone was present on the unit at the time of all the deaths and deteriorations.

    Following an internal review of the deaths, and the suspension of the applicant from nursing duties, the police began an investigation in May 2017. Letby was convicted in August 2023 of seven counts of murder and seven of attempted murder of infants at the neonatal unit at the Countess of Chester Hospital. She was acquitted on two further counts of attempted murder and the jury was unable to agree on a further six counts of attempted murder. The Court of Appeal rejected Letby’s application for leave to appeal against her convictions after the credibility of Prosecution’s lead expert, Dewi Evans‘ testimony was affirmed.

    Evans, a retired paediatrician, was asked to review initially 33 sets of clinical records involving death or deterioration of an infant on the unit and then a further 28 sets of records.

    He was asked to provide an opinion on the cause of the collapse of each baby. As the lead expert during the investigation, he advised the police to seek further expertise from the fields of histopathology; paediatric radiology; paediatric haematology; paediatric endocrinology; paediatric neuroradiology and paediatric surgery.

    Pediatrics Expert Witness

    Dewi Evans provides expert medical advice regarding clinical issues where child abuse is suspected or where there are allegations of clinical negligence. He has prepared reports for the Court for over 25 years and has given evidence in court in Wales, England, Ireland and Northern Ireland.

    He was appointed a consultant paediatrician in 1980; he had been trained in neonatology although, at the time, this was not a specific sub-specialty, hence he was never a consultant neonatologist; he set up a neonatal intensive care service in Swansea; he designed a new neonatal unit in 1990.

    Get the full story on challenges to Dewi Evans’ expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study. 

    Discussion by the Court

    Dewi Evans

    On appeal, Letby argued that Evans’ evidence should have been excluded from the jury’s consideration because he was not a neonatologist; he had not been in full time practice since 2009; most of his current work was purely as an expert witness; he could not be considered sufficiently independent because he had been part of the original investigation; his evidence was not sufficiently reliable to be admitted; he had been the subject of previous adverse judicial comment.

    The Court, however, found him to be a “highly experienced consultant paediatrician” with “decades of clinical hands-on experience with neonates”. Moreover, to the extent that he was acting as an investigator or director of the investigation, he was not doing so in a way that precluded him from being an expert witness in the case. Evans’ evidence was provided without him being given access to the other circumstantial material, so it was uninfluenced by matters outside his expertise and knowledge. Also, his opinions were independently corroborated by other expert witnesses.

    As for being the subject of previous adverse judicial comment, Evans pointed out that the document in question was not in fact an expert witness report for Court, but a letter to solicitors in a care case. It had been used by them without his knowledge or consent in applying for permission to appeal. The criticism was put to him; he had not been aware of it before; he explained his understanding of the context; the matter was left for the jury to consider. The Court found nothing wrong with that approach.

    Air Embolus in Neonates

    Letby sought to admit fresh evidence in the form of two reports from a neonatologist, Shoo Lee, to address the defense assertion that the prosecution experts were wrong to diagnose air embolus on the basis of a research paper. The Court held that ““although their direct clinical experience of air embolus in neonates was inevitably very limited, each of the prosecution’s expert witnesses was well qualified in their respective fields to give the evidence which they gave.”

    Defense did not call any expert witness evidence at trial

    It was open to the defense to call expert evidence of their own. They did instruct a number of experts and serve their reports on the prosecution, but they did not call any expert witness evidence at trial.

    In the trial, the result was that the prosecution expert witnesses were challenged strongly by the defense; but the points made in the challenge could only become evidence in the case if, either the defense called their own witnesses who could then provide that evidence, or the prosecution witnesses accepted the points made in the challenge.

    Held

    The Court of Appeal admitted Dewi Evans’ testimony and rejected Letby’s application for leave to appeal against her convictions.

    Key Takeaway:

    Evans was familiar with the courts’ approach and ready to deal with the inevitable challenges of the criminal justice system.

    The issue of admissibility (whether or not evidence is put before the jury) is a question of law which is dealt with by the judge. If they rule that the evidence is admissible, it is then considered by the jury. The ruling to admit the evidence can be challenged on appeal.

    The issue of the weight to give to any evidence is a matter entirely for the jury. Counsel can seek to persuade them to take one view or another of the evidence. The judge must leave it up to the jury. What weight the jury has in fact given to each piece of evidence might be inferred from the verdict that they reach.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Letby V. R
    Case Number: 202303209B4
    Court: Court of Appeal, Criminal Division
    Order Date: July 2, 2024