Tag: Land Use

  • Environmental Engineering Expert’s Land Use Analysis Excluded

    Environmental Engineering Expert’s Land Use Analysis Excluded

    In this water contamination case, Plaintiff Suffolk County Water Authority (“Suffolk”) brought suit against manufacturers Dow Chemical Company (“Dow”) and Vibrantz Corporation (“Ferro”).

    Suffolk contended that dioxane-stabilized TCA is the source of dioxane contamination in the TCA Claim Wells and offered the opinions of its expert witnesses in support. Dow rebuts this proof through the opinions of its own expert, Steve L. McGinnis. Suffolk sought to exclude a narrow subset of McGinnis’ opinions.

    Environmental Engineering Expert Witness

    Steve Lee McGinnis received a B.S. in Biological and Agricultural Engineering with a secondary major in Natural Resources and Environmental Science from Kansas State University. He received a Masters of Engineering degree in Civil and Environmental Engineering from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is also certified as a Professional Engineer in fifteen states, a Certified Groundwater Professional, a Board-Certified Environmental Engineer, and a Petroleum Release Remediator in South Dakota.

    McGinnis has over twenty years of engineering experience “in the fields of environmental engineering, contaminated site investigation and remediation, contaminant fate and transport, and environmental forensics.” Moreover, he has consulted for numerous sites and facilities regarding contaminant releases, including in Suffolk County. In his consulting experience, McGinnis has overseen site investigation and remediation efforts, including specific experience treating 1,4-dioxane and 1,1,1-TCA.

    Want to know more about the challenges Steve McGinnis has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    According to McGinnis, Suffolk’s experts “failed to consider fully the implications of Suffolk County’s unique and long-standing reliance on an archaic network of hundreds of thousands of cesspools and septic systems to discharge sanitary wastewater in the subsurface of Suffolk County on the loading of 1,4-dioxane to the SCWA claim wells from the everyday use of common consumer products, which have long contained 1,4-dioxane.”

    Suffolk sought to exclude McGinnis’ opinion that the use and discharge of consumer products in residential areas likely constitutes a primary source of 1,4-dioxane, as well as his opinion that 1,4-dioxane trends are more closely linked to consumer products rather than 1,1,1-TCA.

    After walking through the historical implications of Long Island’s lack of sewering and longstanding reliance on a dense system of cesspools and septic systems, McGinnis explained that “residentially recharged contribution areas are known to consist of 1,4-dioxane sources due to everyday use of common, everyday consumer products.” He then stated that his “review of historical land use data confirms that the vast majority of claim wells (238 of 286) capture water from predominantly suburban residential areas” and opined that “the abundant suburban residential land uses in the contribution areas for these claim wells likely constitute a primary source of 1,4-dioxane due to the use and discharge of common, everyday consumer products containing 1,4-dioxane.”

    McGinnis summarized this opinion as follows: “it is my opinion that 1,4-dioxane trends are more closely linked to the historical and ongoing use of consumer products containing 1,4-dioxane, rather than 1,1,1-TCA use.”

    Analysis

    The Court agreed with Suffolk that McGinnis’ challenged opinions must be excluded for several reasons. First, it would mislead and confuse the jury to permit McGinnis to simultaneously opine that 1) a well-by-well analysis is required for a true source identification and 2) that consumer products are a “primary source” of dioxane in 238 wells without performing such a well-by-well analysis himself. It is permissible for McGinnis to opine that Suffolk’s experts failed to properly account for the impact of Suffolk County’s lack of sewering and the Claim Wells’ location on predominantly residential land. However, McGinnis cannot take the additional step of opining that consumer products are “likely” to be a “primary source” of dioxane in 238 wells while disavowing that he undertook a well-by-well analysis, which he opined was necessary to determine the source of dioxane in each well.

    McGinnis’ land use analysis must also be excluded for another reason: he did not identify in his report what analysis he used to classify each Claim Well’s contribution area or whatever judgment he may have used to reach his conclusions.

    Finally, McGinnis’ opinion that “1,4-dioxane trends are more closely linked to the historical and ongoing use of consumer products containing 1,4-dioxane, rather than 1,1,1-TCA use,” must be excluded for yet another, independent reason. Namely, McGinnis never analyzes TCA as a source of the dioxane in the Claim Wells at all.

    Held

    The Court granted Defendants’ motion to exclude the opinions of Steve McGinnis.

    Key Takeaway

    Exclusion is required because the link, if any, between the data McGinnis analyzed and his final land use conclusions is written in invisible ink.

    Please refer to the blog previously published about this case:

    Environmental Engineering Experts’ Source-Identification Conclusion Excluded

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Suffolk County Water Authority V. The Dow Chemical Company
    Docket Number: 2:17cv6980
    Court Name: United States District Court, New York Eastern
    Order Date: June 22, 2026
  • Land Use Expert Witness’ Testimony Regarding General Land Use and Development Industry Standards Rejected

    Land Use Expert Witness’ Testimony Regarding General Land Use and Development Industry Standards Rejected

    This federal diversity action arises out of a commercial lease agreement for a three-story building located at 2555 Park Boulevard in the City of Palo Alto, California (“City”). Plaintiff KJ-Park, LLC (“KJ-Park”) retained Erik Schoennauer, a land use consultant, to testify about land use entitlement and permitting procedures relating to the subject property. Defendants Match Group, Inc. and Match Group, LLC (collectively, “Match Group” or “Defendants”) filed a motion to exclude Schoennauer’s opinions.

    Land Use Expert Witness

    Erik Schoennauer draws upon 33 years of experience in local land use and redevelopment processes, public/media relations, community outreach, and political consulting to serve the clients of The Schoennauer Company. Moreover, he has a unique combination of experience, spending half his career in government service and the other half in private business, with extensive involvement inneighborhood and community affairs.

    Fortify your strategy by reviewing a Challenge Study detailing grounds for excluding Erik Schoennauer’s expert testimony. 

    Discussion by the Court

    Defendants Match Group movd to exclude Schoennauer’s opinions, primarily on the ground that his opinions are impermissible legal conclusions and that his opinions regarding KJ-Park’s alleged vested right with respect to the subject property are irrelevant. Additionally, Match Group argued that any probative value of Schoennauer’s opinions are “substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . confusing the issues, . . . wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence,” and therefore are excludable under Federal Rule of Evidence 403

    Schoennauer’s opinions largely concern whether the circumstances presented give rise to KJ-Park’s alleged vested right in the subject property, or warrant the application of estoppel principles.

    Legal Conclusion

    Schoennauer proposed to testify that, in his opinion, KJ-Park received “authorizations” for use of the subject property exclusively as office space that “vested through approval of the site-specific RLUA and/or issuance of the Building Permit.” However, he may not properly testify or offer opinions about issues of law, including the legal interpretation or significance of documents or events, or what the law requires with respect to the vested rights doctrine or the doctrine of estoppel. 

    The Court concluded that Schoennauer’s opinions about whether KJ-Park obtained an alleged vested right, or whether estoppel principles apply, including his opinions regarding the settlement agreement between KJ-Park and the City, must be excluded.

    Relevance

    KJ-Park contended that Schoennauer should be permitted to testify regarding general land use and development industry standards and practices. The vested rights doctrine and principles of equitable estoppel concern the legal rights and obligations as between KJ-Park and the City. Therefore, KJ-Park cannot, as a matter of law, use the vested rights doctrine or equitable estoppel as theories by which to hold Match Group liable under the subject lease and guaranty.

    In conclusion, the Court is not persuaded that testimony regarding general industry standards and practices is necessary or relevant to understand the evidence with respect to any matters that remain to be tried.

    Held

    The Court granted Match Group’s motion to exclude Erik Schoennauer’s opinions.

    Key Takeaways:

    • Firstly, Schoennauer may not properly testify or offer opinions about issues of law, including the legal interpretation or significance of documents or events, or what the law requires with respect to the vested rights doctrine or the doctrine of estoppel. 
    • Finally, testimony regarding general industry standards and practices is not necessary or relevant to understand the evidence with respect to any matters that remain to be tried.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Kj-Park, Llc V. Match Group, Llc Et Al
    Docket Number: 5:23cv2346
    Court: United States District Court, California Northern
    Order Date: September 05, 2024