This case arose from allegations of sexual abuse of a minor that purportedly occurred in 2006 but was not disclosed by the alleged victim until 2020. As the matter proceeded toward trial, both parties intended to introduce testimonial evidence at trial from experts in topics related to psychology. Although the Government did not challenge the qualifications of the Defendant’s proposed expert, Dr. Mary Lyndia Crotteau Huffman, it asked the Court to limit the scope of her testimony. In response, the Defendant agreed that Huffman would not offer opinions regarding the truthfulness or credibility of any witness.
The remaining expert testimony from Huffman that Defendant sought to exclude follows: characterizations of the victim’s delayed disclosure and the weight the jurors should assign to it in assessing credibility; characterizations of Defendant’s conduct relating to grooming; factually-applied opinions on memory and associated terminology; any testimony on false belief; and opinions on investigator bias.
Psychology Expert Witness
Mary Lyndia Crotteau Huffman obtained a PhD in human developmental and family studies and has served as a private consultant on children’s memory, eyewitness testimony, suggestibility, and interview techniques since 1997.
Huffman’s resume showed that she has authored numerous papers discussing the credibility of child victims, with titles like “Factors affecting the occurrence of lying in children”; “Categories of lies throughout childhood”; and “How reliable are children’s memories?”
Discussion by the Court
1. Delayed Disclosure
The Government asked the Court to limit Huffman’s testimony of delayed disclosure to general concepts and to prevent her from offering opinion on witness credibility.
Huffman provided scientific support for the general idea that disclosures among children are highly variable. However, reliability of Huffman’s testimony addressing those specific factors and their relationship with delayed disclosure is not supported. In fact, Huffman’s opinion on the variability of delayed disclosure counters Defendant’s argument for admissibility of expert testimony as to the consideration of specific factors to determine credibility.
Thus, while Huffman may discuss general concepts behind delayed disclosure, she will not be permitted to characterize facts here (long disclosure delay, postincident vacation with Defendant and counseling without disclosure) without providing a reliable basis for that opinion that adds to what the jury can already appropriately assess.
Huffman may identify general “situational and relational factors” which may influence disclosure; however, she shall not inform the jury what they should consider in determining credibility of the report. Accordingly, the Court denied the Government’s motion to exclude this testimony but imposed limits on Huffman’s testimony consistent with this ruling.
2. Grooming
The Government asked the Court to prohibit Huffman from testifying that the Defendant’s conduct was not grooming and whether such conduct contributed to delayed disclosure.
Huffman provided scientific support for her assertion that, “although grooming is a well-documented factor that can inhibit disclosure, research does not support the claim that it occurs in the majority of cases or that it alone explains disclosure timing.”
The Government accurately noted that the studies cited by Huffman supported the Government’s expert’s opinion that grooming has a relationship to delayed disclosure.
However, Huffman’s opinion, considering confounding variables in research, is also true. Accordingly, the Court permitted general discussions of grooming and rebuttal to the Government’s expert’s opinions.
Defendant also intended to have Huffman indicate that she is surprised by the characterization of Defendant’s conduct – rubbing the stomach of the victim with others in the room or sleeping in the same room as the victim – as grooming, and that grooming would more likely occur in other circumstances like preparing the children for bed, a responsibility of the Defendant’s wife.
The Government argued that such statements are not scientifically supported and that Huffman should be prohibited from testifying that the under-the-clothes touching was not grooming or whether it contributed to lack of immediate disclosure. If the methodology for such an opinion were sufficiently supported through studies or experience, the testimony may be admissible. Defendant did not indicate how Huffman’s experience or cited research studies informed her methodology characterizing Defendant’s conduct to be outside the definition of grooming. Nor did she support the opinion that other non-grooming conduct negates the Government’s evidence and theory of grooming. Accordingly, the Court granted the Government’s motion to exclude this testimony and imposed limits on Huffman’s testimony consistent with this ruling.
3. Memory and Suggestibility
The Government asked the Court to limit Huffman’s testimony about memory, particularly implantations of false memories and suggestibility during interviews, with consideration of the different goals of interviewers. Further, the Government sought to prevent Huffman from using terms such as “investigative bias,” “tainted,” “distorted,” or “memory error.”
Defendant intended to elicit testimony from Huffman explaining how memories are formed and how suggestibility can influence their formation. The Government is most concerned with her statement that “when conversations, therapy sessions, bias interviews, or repeated interviews cause non-experienced events to sound familiar and plausible, children and even adults may confuse the true source of the information with their actual experience. Because of these memory errors, someone cannot distinguish between the truth and a false belief.”
The Government argued that the scientific basis for Huffman’s testimony on false memories is too remote in nature to provide reliable methodology for application to the facts of this case. However, the Government has not addressed Huffman’s apparent expertise based on her published material on false memory and suggestibility evident on her resume.
The Court permitted general discussions on false memory, interviewer goals, and suggestibility. The Court, however, refused to permit application to the facts of this case. Further, without additional support, Huffman will not be permitted to testify that “disclosures made during pastoral counseling sessions may be the result of a biased interviewer who is looking for abuse to explain typical behaviors of alleged victims.”
Moreover, Huffman will not be permitted to use of phrases “investigative bias,” “tainted,” or “distorted.” However, the Court did not find “memory error” in a generalized context to be argumentative. Thus, Huffman was allowed to opine on false memories and use the term “memory error.”
4. Investigator Bias
The Government filed a motion to exclude Huffman’s expert testimony that “text messages Victim 1 sent after she had disclosed the sexual abuse ‘improperly tainted Victim 1 with his preconceived notions of Bowles’ guilt.’”
Defendant argued for admissibility of Huffman’s opinion as to the soundness of the U.S. Army investigator’s conduct when she sought the collection of evidence through advising the victim to communicate with the Defendant through text.
While an expert’s experience can validate the methodology used in forming an expert’s opinion, this opinion is not backed by her experience and Defendant does not provide alternative support for her opinion.
Held
The Court granted in part and denied in part the United States’ motion in limine to limit the testimony of Mary Lyndia Crotteau Huffman.
Key Takeaways:
- An expert’s testimony generally will not help the trier of fact when it offers nothing more than what lawyers for the parties can argue in closing arguments.
- Opinions based on knowledge or experience of the expert may be admissible if reliable.
Case Details:
| Case Caption: | United States of America V. Bowles |
| Docket Number: | 3:24cr100 |
| Court Name: | United States District Court, West Virginia Southern |
| Order Date: | April 01, 2026 |
