Tag: Mental State

  • Law Enforcement Expert Was Not Allowed to Opine on the Suspect’s Flight

    Law Enforcement Expert Was Not Allowed to Opine on the Suspect’s Flight

    Hakim Ledbetter was charged with: attempted possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine, 5 kilograms or more of cocaine, and 1,000 grams or more of PCP and aiding and abetting; possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime; and possession of a firearm by a felon.

    The Government intended to present at trial evidence of Ledbetter’s flight, and “argue that his flight establishes his consciousness of guilt.”

    Ledbetter thus sought to introduce Chuck Rylant‘s testimony “regarding psychological and physiological factors that affect human responses to threatening stimuli,” so that the jury could “understand alternative reasons for flight in situations of perceived threat.”

    The Government moved in limine to exclude Rylant’s testimony, or in the alternative, for a pretrial Daubert Hearing, arguing that his opinion is irrelevant and inadmissible.

    Law Enforcement Expert Witness

    Chuck J. Rylant is a former police officer who has investigated and reviewed crimes of violence—including fights, attacks, and homicides—committed with various weapons.

    He earned a doctorate in clinical psychology in addition to completing numerous master’s level classes in psychology.

    Want to know more about the challenges Chuck Rylant has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Qualifications

    Rylant is not qualified to testify as to Ledbetter’s psychology. Rylant received his “Psy.D.” degree from “California Southern University,” an exclusively online, unaccredited school. While Rylant purports to be an expert on the psychological and physiological limitations of what humans are capable of, the defense presented nothing to establish that Rylant is trained to evaluate the psychological basis for a suspect’s flight from the police. Most of Rylant’s teaching and lecturing occurred when he had earned only an MBA degree—well before he received his “Psy.D.” in 2020.

    Rylant’s curriculum vitae confirmed that his specialty is limited to police use of force decisions and self-defense. Moreover, Rylant purportedly could not recall in how many federal criminal cases he was qualified to testify as an expert. Although he initially said that his “understanding” was five cases, he then acknowledged it was three. In those cases, he opined only on the decision to use force. Finally, Rylant acknowledged that he had never before offered an expert opinion on the psychological reasons for a person’s flight from police.

    This case does not concern whether police use of force was reasonable, but whether Ledbetter’s flight from police showed consciousness of guilt. In other words, Rylant’s “specialized knowledge” otherwise has nothing to do with Ledbetter or this case. His work on police use of force aside, Rylant has authored two series of books: one titled “How to Be Rich,” and the other, a jiu-jitsu primer.

    Reliability

    According to the Court, Rylant’s “expert report”—which he drafted in an hour—was exceedingly general, including virtually no mention of the facts of this case. Indeed, Rylant testified that he had essentially cut and pasted his Ledbetter report from strikingly similar reports he had prepared for other cases having nothing to do with flight from the police.

    Rylant did not base his “expert” opinion respecting flight from police on reliable methodology. Indeed, Rylant never explained his methodology.

    He never spoke with Ledbetter or anyone else about why Ledbetter fled. He never visited the neighborhood where Ledbetter was arrested. Indeed, although he purported to be uncertain, he apparently has never visited Philadelphia. Rylant offered no studies that he or anyone else conducted about flight from police.

    Fit – Rule 403

    It is apparent that the “fit” of Rylant’s opinion to Ledbetter is poor. He sought to opine that something (which he never clearly identified) other than consciousness of guilt could cause someone in Ledbetter’s circumstances to flee in the manner Ledbetter did. Yet, in forming this opinion, Rylant was ignorant of circumstances that could well have caused Ledbetter to flee from the police. On October 15, 2024, Ledbetter:

    • was in violation of his parole because he had left the state of Georgia
    • effectively possessed three loaded handguns;
    • as a parolee, and a convicted felon, was prohibited from possessing any weapons;
    • was driving a truck containing drugs valued at over $1 million;
    • had previously fled from police when they executed a warrant;
    • had previously been convicted of federal drug charges; and
    • had previously shot someone and been convicted of aggravated assault.

    Rylant then reluctantly acknowledged that this new information could have provided reasons for why someone in Ledbetter’s circumstances would run from police. The potential for prejudice and jury confusion arising from the Government’s “other reasons for flight evidence”—with its attendant cautionary instructions—would plainly outweigh the probative value of Rylant’s unreliable opinion, which he was not qualified to give.

    Rule 704

    Rule 704(b) still prohibits an expert from opining about the “possible” mental state of a Defendant. Accordingly, the Court determined that the defense’s attempt to end-run Rule 704(b) was impermissible.

    Held

    The Court ruled that because Chuck Rylant’s proffered opinion did not pass muster under Rules 702, 704, and 403, he could not testify at trial.

    Key Takeaway

    Although proffered to opine on Hakim Ledbetter’s psychology, Rylant is not and has never been a psychologist. His “Psy.D.” was conferred in 2020 by an unaccredited, exclusively online institution. He appears never to have testified, written, or lectured on the issue he was called to address: the psychology of a suspect fleeing from police. The three federal cases in which he purportedly testified bear no resemblance to Ledbetter. Rylant’s methodology is unknown.

    Although he purported to base his opinion only on generalities, he “revised” that basis and impermissibly strayed into his belief that Defendant lacked mens rea in fleeing from police. Admitting Rylant’s opinion would thus likely open the door to other explanations highly damaging to Ledbetter—about why he fled, as well as cautionary instructions, which would certainly confuse the jury.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: United States V. Ledbetter
    Docket Number: 2:24cr423
    Court Name: United States District Court, Pennsylvania Eastern
    Order Date: April 02, 2026
  • Court Limits Psychiatry Expert’s Testimony, Citing Reliability Concerns 

    Court Limits Psychiatry Expert’s Testimony, Citing Reliability Concerns 

    Kevin Brent Buchanan had been charged with making threatening interstate communications. Specifically, the charges stemmed from five voicemails he allegedly left. The Government alleged that Buchanan recorded these voicemails from Utah. These voicemails, sent in late October 2023, targeted an organization that was headquartered in the District of Columbia.

    To defend himself, Buchanan designated Dr. Glen E. Johnson as an expert witness. Johnson is a board-certified psychiatrist. Evidently, he was expected to testify about Buchanan’s mental state. This testimony would relate to the time of the alleged offenses.

    Johnson was prepared to testify that Buchanan suffered from severe PTSD and recurring panic disorder. According to Johnson, Buchanan’s diagnoses means that Buchanan is prone to react reflexively and with poor impulse control. Johnson also stated that Buchanan “has never demonstrated any violence” or “following through with threats,” and he “poses no risk to anyone.” However, Buchanan has not submitted an expert report from Johnson, and neither his expert disclosure notice nor the accompanying attachments clearly set out the bases and reasons for Johnson’s opinions.

    Consequently, the Government filed a motion in limine requesting an order precluding Buchanan from offering evidence or argument at trial in support of a diminished capacity defense.

    Psychiatry Expert Witness 

    Dr. Glen E. Johnson graduated medical school 54 years ago and has spent the past 54 years in the field of psychiatry. Johnson has been an independently practicing psychiatrist for 47 years. Moreover, he became board-certified nearly 46 years ago. Johnson was a clinical instructor at the University of Utah Medical Center, Department of Psychiatry, for twelve years. Additionally, he was chairman of the Pioneer Valley Hospital Department of Psychiatry from 1986 through 1988, and has otherwise been affiliated with that hospital for 47 years.

    Want to know more about the challenges Glen Johnson has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court 

    Johnson’s proffered expert witness testimony about Buchanan’s reflexive and impulsive reactions could be relevant and helpful to the jury’s assessment of whether Buchanan had the requisite mens rea to commit the crimes with which he is charged in this case.

    i. Reliability 

    First of all, Johnson must not express an expert opinion to the jury about whether Buchanan was “unable to formulate the requisite specific intent to violate the statutes pursuant to which he is charged in the indictment.” 

    In other words, the Court held that a core part of the proffered expert opinion testimony described in Buchanan’s witness designation is plainly inadmissible.

    Second, Buchanan’s expert disclosure statement omitted necessary details about the scope of and basis for any other expert opinions that Johnson might be prepared to offer.

    Moreover, the Court observed that Buchanan’s opinion witness designation suggested that he may be planning to call Johnson both as a lay witness and as an expert witness, but Buchanan failed to delineate which topics Johnson will address as a lay witness and which he will address as an expert

    ii. Qualifications 

    The government argued that Johnson’s background lacked specific experience in forensic psychiatry, questioning the relevance of his testimony in assessing Buchanan’s mental state at the time of the alleged offenses.

    However, the Court noted that Johnson was qualified in general-practice psychiatry due to his decades of practice and board certification in that field.

    Therefore, the Court focused on whether Johnson’s experience and board certification in general-practice psychiatry were sufficient to provide expert testimony on Buchanan’s mental health, diagnoses, and related symptoms.
    According to the Court, if Johnson qualifies, his testimony will need to closely adhere to his expertise as a psychiatrist. In other words, he must testify based on expertise. However, the Court deferred final ruling on the reliability and admissibility of this testimony until after the forthcoming evidentiary hearing.

    Held 

    The Court granted in part, denied in part, and held in abeyance in part the government’s motion in limine .

    Specifically: 

    • The Court precluded Dr. Glen Johnson from opining on whether Buchanan did or did not have a mental state that constitutes an element of the crimes charged, including an opinion about whether he was capable of forming that mental state. 
    • Buchanan was ordered to produce a revised Rule 16(b)(1)(C) expert disclosure statement on or before April 25, 2025, containing “a complete statement” of all expert opinions that Buchanan intends to elicit from Johnson.
    • An pretrial evidentiary hearing was set to evaluate Johnson’s qualifications as an expert in general-practice psychiatry and the exact scope for any expert opinion testimony that Johnson intends to offer that would be admissible at trial.
    • Buchanan was allowed to introduce lay witness opinion testimony that is relevant to whether Buchanan was conscious of wrongdoing at the time of the alleged acts for which he is charged in this case.
    • The Court deferred final ruling on the admissibility under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 of the evidence at issue in the Government’s motion until the relevant issues arise at the forthcoming evidentiary hearing or at trial.

    Key Takeaway:

    Expert testimony regarding a Defendant’s mental state is strictly limited. Experts cannot offer opinions on whether the Defendant possessed the required mental state to commit the crime; their testimony must focus on diagnoses, the basis for those diagnoses, and the characteristics of relevant mental conditions.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: United States V. Buchanan
    Docket Number: 1:24cr256
    Court Name: United States District Court for the District of Columbia
    Order Date: April 14, 2025

     

  • Banking Expert Witness Not Allowed to Opine on the Materiality of Documents Submitted

    Banking Expert Witness Not Allowed to Opine on the Materiality of Documents Submitted

    A grand jury indicted Rasta Khalid Walid (“Walid”) on 17 counts, including failure to pay legal child support, bank fraud, false statements to a bank, engaging in monetary transactions, and false, fictitious, and fraudulent claims.

    Walid filed a notice disclosing the proposed testimony of two expert witnesses he intended to use at trial:

    1. Conor Newman, a certified public accountant, offers testimony regarding issues of Walid’s use of general accounting principles and Walid’s understanding of the tax code and regulations.
    2. Steve Bryant, a banking and paycheck protection program (“PPP”) expert, offers testimony regarding issues related to PPP loans.

    In response, the Government filed a motion in limine to exclude Walid’s expert testimony of Conor Newman and Steve Bryant.

    Banking Expert Witness

    Accounting Expert Witness

    Conor Newman is a Certified Public Accountant with Boyle, Deveny, and Meyer, a Montana accounting firm that provides consulting and tax services across the United States. He is responsible for services in the areas of compiled financial statements, tax consulting and compliance, and accounting system software consulting.

    Get the full story on challenges to Conor Newman’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.  

    Banking Expert Witness

    Steve Bryant is the Vice President of Commercial Lending at First Security Bank of Missoula, a division of Glacier Bank.

    Bryant has been in commercial lending since 2008. In 2020, Bryant played a critical role in reviewing and approving or declining Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loans.

    Want to know more about the challenges Steve Bryant has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.  

    Discussion by the Court

    The Court ruled in part from the bench on the scope of expert testimony. It allowed the parties to reserve further objections during the trial. The Court sought to clarify the scope of expert testimony at trial.

    Conor Newman

    Walid sought to elicit testimony from Newman regarding issues of Walid’s use of general accounting principles, the complexity of the tax code, and the procedural requirements for submissions like Walid’s. Newman made several findings in his report that addressed Walid’s mental state during the preparation of the report. Some of Walid’s charges requires the government to prove that Walid knew the claim was false, fictitious, or fraudulent. Newman sought to testify that Walid “held the incorrect belief” that Walid thought he had properly filed the forms. However, the Court held that Newman’s testimony with regard to Walid’s knowledge of whether he knew what he was filing was potentially fraudulent properly would be limited.

    The Court held that Newman could testify to what Walid’s filings looked like compared to others in similar circumstances for the jury to make inferences about Walid’s state of mind at the time he filed his taxes. The Court held that Walid may also testify to his own experience about what he knew at the time the claims were filed but may not use Newman to convey to the jury, Walid’s state of mind at the time he prepared his taxes.

    Steve Bryant

    Walid also sought to elicit testimony from Bryant regarding issues related to Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”) loans. Specifically, Bryant sought to testify about documents relevant to approving or denying PPP loans and offer an opinion on the submissions for PPP loans from Walid to certain banks.

    The Government contended that Bryant should not be allowed to testify to the materiality of what Walid submitted. Count 15 in the Indictment, requires Walid to have made statements that were “material” and “had a natural tendency to influence or were capable of influencing” a financial institution. The parties agree that this testimony properly may be limited through objection at trial and instructing the jury on the legal definition of “material”.

    The Court allowed Walid’s expert to testify based on their expert opinion on a review of Walid’s submissions to the Internal Revenue Service and financial institutions, but Walid’s proposed experts shall not testify to Walid’s willfulness or Walid’s personal knowledge of filing fraudulent, fictitious, or false claims. The Court reserves ruling on any other expert testimony until trial.

    Held

    The Court granted in part the Government’s motion in limine as follows:

    1. Walid’s expert Newman shall not testify to whether Walid knew the claim Walid filed was false, fictitious or fraudulent.

    2. Walid’s experts shall not testify to an ultimate issue of the crime charged.

    3. Walid’s expert Bryant shall not testify to Walid’s intent to defraud any financial institution.

    4. Walid’s expert Bryant shall not testify to the materiality of documents submitted by Walid to any financial institution.

    Key Takeaway:

    The Court allowed Newman to testify about Walid’s use of general accounting principles and Walid’s understanding of the tax code and regulations but prohibited him from opining on Walid’s mental state or willfulness in filing fraudulent claims. Similarly, the Court allowed Bryant to discuss documents and processes related to Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loans but barred him from testifying about Walid’s intent to defraud financial institutions or the materiality of submitted documents. These limitations preserved the jury’s role in determining Walid’s intent his state of mind.

    Case Details:

    Case caption: United States v. Walid
    Docket Number: 6:23cr12
    Court: United States District Court for the District of Montana, Helena Division
    Dated: January 17, 2025
  • Expert Testimony Admitted Because it Does Not Consist of Opinions on the Defendant’s Mental State

    Expert Testimony Admitted Because it Does Not Consist of Opinions on the Defendant’s Mental State

    Delilah Diaz was stopped at the U.S.-Mexico border with over 54 pounds of methamphetamine hidden in her vehicle. She was charged with importing methamphetamine and she claimed not to know that the drugs were hidden in the car. To rebut Diaz’s claim, the Government planned to call Homeland Security Investigations Special Agent Andrew Flood as an expert witness to testify that drug traffickers generally do not entrust large quantities of drugs to people who are unaware they are transporting them.

    Rule 704(b) provides that “in a criminal case, an expert witness must not state an opinion about whether the Defendant did or did not have a mental state or condition that constitutes an element of the crime charged or of a defense.”

    Discussion by the Court

    Federal Rule of Evidence 704(a) sets out a general rule that “an opinion is not objectionable just because it embraces an ultimate issue.”

    Rule 704(b) in criminal trials aims to prevent expert witnesses from directly stating their opinions about a Defendant’s mental state. This rule is crucial because it ensures that the jury independently evaluates and decides on the Defendant’s mental state, a central issue in the trial. By maintaining this separation, the rule upholds the jury’s primary responsibility to assess evidence and make determinations regarding the Defendant’s state of mind.

    The Court held that Agent Flood’s testimony did not violate Rule 704(b) because Agent Flood did not express an opinion about whether Diaz herself knowingly transported methamphetamine. Instead, he testified about the knowledge of most drug couriers. That opinion does not necessarily describe Diaz’s mental state.

    Diaz argued that Agent Flood functionally stated an opinion about whether she knowingly transported drugs when he opined that most couriers know that they are transporting drugs. The Court stated that an opinion about most couriers is not an opinion about all couriers.

    Agent Flood asserted that Diaz was part of a group of persons that may or may not have a particular mental state. The ultimate issue of Diaz’s mental state was thus left to the jury’s judgment.

    The Court agreed with Diaz that Agent Flood could not testify in absolute terms about whether all couriers knowingly transported drugs. But, insofar as Agent Flood planned to testify only that most couriers know they are transporting drugs, the Court concluded that his testimony was admissible.

    Held

    Agent Flood’s opinion that “most people” in a group have a particular mental state is not an opinion about “the Defendant” and thus did not violate Rule 704(b). Because Agent Flood did not opine about whether Diaz knowingly transported methamphetamine, the Court concluded that the testimony did not violate Rule 704(b).

    Key Takeaway:

    Rule 704(b) applies only to opinions about the Defendant. Because Agent Flood did not express an opinion about whether Diaz herself knowingly transported methamphetamine, his testimony did not violate Rule 704(b). Agent Flood instead testified about the knowledge of most drug couriers.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Diaz V. United States
    Docket Number: 23-14
    Court: Supreme Court of the United States
    Order Date: June 20, 2024