Expert Witness Profiler

Tag: Motion to Exclude

  • Emergency Medicine Expert Not Allowed to Opine on Loss of Vision

    Emergency Medicine Expert Not Allowed to Opine on Loss of Vision

    Plaintiff, Amaris I Ward, who was seventeen years old during the events of this case, sought medical treatment at Madigan Army Medical Center (“MAMC”) over several weeks in October 2022.

    Plaintiff alleged that emergency care providers at MAMC failed to properly evaluate and diagnose her with acute bacterial rhinosinusitis on October 16, 2022, which led to their failure to determine the extent of the sinusitis so it could be treated in a timely fashion. As a result, Plaintiff alleged that the bacterial infection progressed untreated for more than 30 hours, which caused permanent damage to the optic nerve in her left eye, resulting in permanent blindness in the left eye. Plaintiff alleged that these actions amounted to a breach of the standard of care of reasonably prudent emergency care providers when confronted with symptoms such as Plaintiff’s.

    Defendants filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff’s expert, Dr. Richard O. Cummins.

    Emergency Medicine Expert Witness

    Richard Oliver Cummins is board-certified in both internal medicine and emergency medicine.

    He joined the faculty of the Department of Medicine at the University of Washington in 1981, and was promoted to the rank of full Professor in 1993. As a member of the Department of Emergency Medicine he worked as an attending physician in the UWMC Emergency Department, providing clinical care, supervising medical students and emergency medicine residents in training, as well as providing direct patient care.

    Discover more cases with Richard Cummins as an expert witness by ordering his comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

    Discussion by the Court

    1. Cummins is qualified as an expert

    Defendants argued that Cummins did not have the clinical experience or educational basis to anchor his causation opinion about the cause of Plaintiff’s infection.

    The Court noted that Cummins is qualified to testify because he has been medical physician for several decades and is board-certified in both internal and emergency medicine.

    Although he is not an infectious disease specialist, he is a board-certified emergency medicine physician with over 39 years of experience. To the extent there is a challenge to Cummins’ qualifications, the Court is satisfied he has demonstrated at least a “minimal foundation of knowledge, skill, and expertise required” to give expert testimony on the issues in this case.

    2. Cummins’ methodology is not reliable

    Defendants argued that Cummins opined that the failure to start Plaintiff on either levofloxacin or moxifloxacin on October 16, 2026 caused her permanent loss of vision—and argued that this opinion is unreliable.

    According to Cummins, a “causal chain” of failures to comply with the standards of reasonable emergency department care led to Plaintiff’s vision loss. Within the “causal chain” was the failure to timely initiate “appropriate treatment,” otherwise identified as “appropriate intravenous antibiotics.”

    Cummins determined from review of available records that Plaintiff’s left eye blindness was caused by “damage to her optic nerve (optic neuropathy) from her infectious sphenoid sinusitis,” which contained fusobacterium necrophorium. But nowhere in Cummins’ expert report or deposition testimony did he explain why or how the failure to diagnose Plaintiff with severe bacterial pan-sinusitis caused damage to her optic nerve.

    Simply put, the Court cannot identify the generally accepted methodology Cummins used in arriving at his medical conclusions on causation. When asked how he reached the opinion that if physicians had given Plaintiff antibiotics on October, the antibiotics would have been effective to prevent Plaintiff’s vision loss, Cummins stated, “A general experience that antibiotics often work.” To the extent Cummins’ opinions are based on his general experience, he did not explain “how that experience leads to the conclusion reached, why that experience is a sufficient basis for the opinion, and how that experience is reliably applied to the facts.”

    Held

    The Court granted Defendants’ motion to exclude the testimony of Dr. Richard Cummins.

    Key Takeaway

    A medical expert may rely heavily on their experience, but they must still explain their methods. Put differently, the opinion must describe a “methodology that can be challenged in some objective sense” because “a subjective, conclusory approach cannot reasonably be assessed for reliability.”

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Ward V. United States Of America
    Docket Number: 3:24cv5836
    Court Name: United States District Court, Washington Western
    Order Date: June 12, 2026
  • Law Enforcement Expert Was Not Allowed to Opine on the Officers’ Intent

    Law Enforcement Expert Was Not Allowed to Opine on the Officers’ Intent

    This case arises from officers’ alleged excessive use of force during an investigation of a 911 call regarding Plaintiff Henry Barnhill (“Barnhill”).

    Defendants City of Hemet, Brett Maynard, Joshua Bishop, Pedro Aguila, Douglas Klinzing, Jamie Gonzalez, and Catherine Tipton (collectively, “Defendants”) filed two motions (1) to exclude certain opinion and testimony of expert Dr. Ryan O’Connor and (2) to exclude certain opinion and testimony of expert Roger Clark.

    Emergency Medicine Expert Witness

    Ryan Scarritt O’Connor is a 20-year attending ER physician who is board-certified and has completed several clinical rotations in neurology, ophthalmology, biomechanics, general surgery, and traumatic medicine, among others, and holds a Master of Science in criminalistics with education in crime scene reconstruction.

    Discover more cases with Ryan O’Connor as an expert witness by ordering his comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

    Law Enforcement Expert Witness

    Roger Alma Clark is a retired law enforcement professional with 27 years of experience in the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (LASD). He was hired on December 1, 1965, and served until his retirement on March 31, 1993. Throughout his distinguished career, he held several key positions, including six years as a Deputy Sheriff, six years as a Sergeant, and 15 years as a Lieutenant. Roger retired with a California Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) Advanced Certificate and is a graduate of the POST Command College, class #5, 1988.

    Get the full story on challenges to Roger Clark’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Discussion by the Court

    Ryan O’Connor

    Defendants sought to exclude the opinions of Barnhill’s medical expert, O’Connor, regarding his conclusions that the incident resulted in Barnhill sustaining certain injuries.

    Defendants based their arguments on the fact that (1) O’Connor is an ER doctor, rather than a specialist in ophthalmology; (2) O’Connor relied more heavily on the officers’ statements as opposed to the video evidence; and (3) O’Connor failed to take into consideration all of Barnhill’s medical history. However, given O’Connor’s education, credentials, and experience, the Court held that Defendants’ concerns speak to the weight, rather than admissibility under FRE 702 and Daubert.

    Roger Clark

    To begin with, Defendants sought to exclude opinions by Barnhill’s police-practices expert, Roger Clark, regarding his “legal conclusions concerning the officers’ use of force, standards within the City of Hemet and the Hemet Police Department, the officers’ mental and emotional states and intentions, interpretations of the videos taken from officers’ body cameras, and all other conclusions and opinions based on Clark’s flawed methodology, which omits important information contained in the footage and is admittedly impermissibly intertwined with Plaintiff’s counsel’s opinions.”

    To the extent that Clark offered legal conclusions, such as that the officers used unreasonable or excessive force during the incident, the Court granted the motion to exclude. Clark was also precluded from opining on the officers’ intent or emotional states and on the medical cause of Barnhill’s injuries.

    However, to the extent that Clark’s testimony was limited to whether the officers’ conduct was consistent with California Peace Officer Standards and Training (“POST”) standards governing the use of force, the Court denied the motion. This basically included determinations based on Clark’s review of the video evidence demonstrating how Barnhill was responding during the incident, which were relevant to whether the officers’ conduct comported with POST standards in light of Barnhill’s actions.

    Held

    • The Court denied Defendants’ motion to exclude the testimony of Ryan O’Connor.
    • The Court granted in part and denied in part the motion to exclude the testimony of Roger Clark.

    Key Takeaway

    In conclusion, a jury could rely on expert testimony as to whether police conduct comported with POST standards.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Henry Barnhill V. City Of Hemet
    Docket Number: 5:23cv589
    Court Name: United States District Court, California Central
    Order Date: June 03, 2026
  • Pathology Expert Allowed to Opine on Pain and Suffering

    Pathology Expert Allowed to Opine on Pain and Suffering

    Plaintiff Tabria Montgomery’s father, Michael Montgomery sustained fatal injuries while operating a Bobst Mastercut 145 PER 2.0 Die-Cutter machine. She asserted claims individually on behalf of herself and her father’s estate against Defendant Bobst Group North America, Inc. (“Bobst NA”) for strict products liability, negligence, wrongful death, and survival.

    Bobst NA filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff’s expert Wayne Ross, M.D., P.C.

    Pathology Expert Witness

    Wayne Kenneth Ross, M.D., P.C. is board-certified by both the National Board of Medical Examiners and the American Board of Pathology in Anatomic and Forensic Pathology. He maintains current medical licensure in
    Pennsylvania and has practiced continuously as a forensic pathologist for over three decades.

    Throughout his career, he has conducted thousands of autopsies and
    death investigations involving traumatic injuries, gunshot wounds, blunt force trauma, and other violent deaths where assessing consciousness and pain perception at the time of injury is critical.

    Want to know more about the challenges Wayne Ross has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    A. Reliability

    Bobst NA maintained that Ross used unreliable methods to reach his conclusion that Montgomery experienced sixty to ninety seconds of pain and suffering. The Court disagreed.

    Bobst NA sought to exclude Ross’ opinion based on its argument that Ross did not examine scientific literature as required, and instead cherry-picked studies to support his causal connections. It focuses its criticism of Ross’ report on its references to “studies pertaining to strangulation and suffocation events in children, examinations of hangings, and studies detailing the areas of the brain associated with fear response.” Bobst NA explained that Ross did not address “either in his report or his deposition . . . why he believed that studies focusing on children and strangulation were more appropriate in his analysis than studies of adults and traumatic compression asphyxia injuries.”

    While it is a close call, upon review, Ross’ opinion is not based only on “subjective belief or unsupported speculation.” While Bobst NA may disagree with the methods he used to reach his conclusions—formulating a hypothesis, analyzing available evidence and literature, and applying the principles of neuropathology—the methods used are enough to provide “good grounds” for his opinions under Rule 702.

    B. Fit

    Bobst NA also contended that Ross’ opinions did not “fit” the facts of this case, arguing that they “will not assist a jury” and “would only serve to cause confusion and misunderstanding.”

    Plaintiff has shown that Ross’ opinions fit the case because they have a nexus to and will assist the jury with the questions that jurors will be required to consider when determining whether Plaintiff can recover for survival.

    Held

    The Court denied Bobst NA’s motion to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff’s expert Wayne Ross, M.D., P.C.

    Key Takeaway

    When determining whether to admit expert testimony or not, the test “is not whether a particular scientific opinion has the best foundation or whether it is demonstrably correct.” Any gap between Ross’ opinion and the information underlying it must be “extreme” and “clear” for it to be excluded as unreliable.

    Please refer to the blog previously published about this case:

    Biomechanics Expert Allowed to Opine on the Cause of Death

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Montgomery V. Bobst Mex SA
    Docket Number: 2:24cv367
    Court Name: United States District Court, Pennsylvania Eastern
    Order Date: April 30, 2026
  • Corrections Expert’s Standard of Care Testimony Admitted

    Corrections Expert’s Standard of Care Testimony Admitted

    Terri Beth Mays died on November 4, 2021, while she was an inmate at the Whitley County Detention Center. Her Estate (“Mays’ Estate”) alleged that Jail personnel, nurses, and medical providers were responsible for ensuring her health and safety while she was in their custody, yet they failed to address her obviously serious medical needs and acted with deliberate indifference to those needs.

    Mays’ Estate named as Defendants Whitley County; Jailer Brian Lawson; Sergeants Austin Caldwell and Joseph Cureton; Deputy Jailers Sula Bowman, Kaytee George, Zach Hughes, and Nick Huddleston; Southern Health Partners, Inc.

    Defendants filed three motions to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff’s expert witnesses: Anthony Callisto as well as Doctors Terren Trott, MD and Lori Roscoe.

    Corrections Expert Witness

    Anthony Callisto, Jr. has over 40 years of experience in the correctional system. His experience is vast, ranging from correctional officer, Chief Deputy, Chief Law Enforcement Officer, American Jail Association President, and criminal justice professor.

    Get the full story on challenges to Anthony Callisto’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Nursing Expert Witness

    Lori E. Roscoe is an Advanced Practice Registered Nurse, certified through the National Commission on Correctional Health Care as a Certified Correctional Health Professional Registered Nurse (CCHP-RN).

    She has a Doctor of Nursing Practice degree from the University of Alabama, and a PhD in Healthcare Administration. Roscoe has a Master of Science degree in Nursing and a Master’s degree in Public Administration with a Healthcare Concentration. Roscoe began working in Corrections in 1995 as the Health Service Administrator for a female prison in the Northeastern United States. She has worked as an Associate Program Director and as a Regional Administrator on the statewide level. She has correctional business expertise in healthcare operations, policy and procedure development, project management, Continuous Quality Improvement, human resources, staff orientation and development, finance and contract auditing. Roscoe has worked with staff to achieve successful facility accreditation from both the National Commission on Correctional Health Care and the American Correctional Association.

    Discover more cases with Lori Roscoe as an expert witness by ordering her comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

    Emergency Medicine Expert Witness

    Dr. Terren R. Trott is an academic emergency medicine and critical care physician at the University of Kentucky College of Medicine.

    Want to know more about the challenges Terren Trott has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    A. Motion to Exclude the Testimony of Corrections Expert Anthony Castillo

    The Defendants argued that Castillo is unqualified and that his methodologies are unreliable. Further, the Defendants argued that his opinions are too general to be prescribed to any one Defendant.

    However, Castillo’s past background provided extensive technical and specialized knowledge that will help the jury understand the evidence on this case.

    The Defendants took issue with the fact that Castillo has never worked in Kentucky nor had he been in a small rural jail prior to his visit to the Whitley County Jail. The issue with the Defendants’ contention here is that it calls into question Castillo’s credibility, not admissibility.

    The Defendants accused Castillo of basing his opinions on “broad correctional standards rather than specific Kentucky statutes.” His report explicitly disproved this. Exhibit A of his report lists the “Sources Reflecting and Informing the Standard of Care.” Named among these standards are the Whitley County Detention Center Policies and Procedures, as well as multiple statutes and regulations. Likewise, Castillo’s report indicated that he reviewed all relevant pleadings, reports, depositions, and policies.

    Castillo’s ninety-nine page report is a comprehensive analysis of the Defendants’ roles and how their actions relate to the applicable standard of care. To the extent that the Defendants contested his opinion for being too generalized, they are disputing his conclusions, not his methodology.

    B. Motion to Exclude the Testimony of Dr. Terren Trott, MD and Dr. Lori Roscoe

    The Defendants’ motion as to Terren Trott and Lori Roscoe was simple. They argued that “neither witness is qualified to render opinions regarding Whitley County jail policies or practices.” Because of this, they objected to any testimony by either of these witnesses that non-medical personnel actions were negligent or reckless. The Plaintiff did not contest this motion.

    The Plaintiff agreed that neither of these experts will give opinions on Kentucky Jail standards, Whitley County Jail policies or procedures or that any non-medical Defendants’ actions violated the law. Finding no disagreement here, the Court concluded that Doctors Trott and Roscoe are barred from giving opinions regarding the non-medical Defendants’ culpability.

    Held

    • The Court denied Defendants’ motions to exclude the testimony of Anthony Castillo.
    • The Court granted Defendants’ motion to exclude the testimony of Doctors Terren Trott and Lori Roscoe.

    Key Takeaway

    Castillo’s lack of experience in an identical facility goes to the weight of his testimony, which is a matter properly left to the jury. Rule 702 does not require an expert to have identical background experience.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Webb V. Whitley County, Kentucky
    Docket Number: 6:23cv188
    Court Name: United States District Court, Kentucky Eastern
    Order Date: April 21, 2026
  • Accident Reconstruction Expert’s Testimony on Design Defects Excluded

    Accident Reconstruction Expert’s Testimony on Design Defects Excluded

    This case arises from a single, momentary sideswipe on Interstate 95 in which the rightfront tire of the U-Haul truck driven by Corey Hayes-Goode contacted the left-rear corner of Rigoberto Lagunas-Antunez’s GMC van.

     U-Haul filed certain motions challenging the testimony of Plaintiffs’ experts, Ruston Hunt, Daniel Wolfe, Steven Kean and Brooks Rugemer.

    The Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims against U-Haul that were brought under a design defect theory (the “design defect claims”), but denied the motion as to Plaintiffs’ claims against U-Haul under a failure-to-warn theory, as well as to the Estate of Rigoberto’s wrongful death claim against U-Haul. All of Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendant Hayes-Goode remained.

    Human Factors Expert Witness

    Ruston M. Hunt holds a B.S. and M.S. in Industrial Engineering and a Ph.D. in Mechanical Engineering from the University of Illinois, where he also taught and conducted applied research on human error and electro-mechanical systems. With over 40 years of experience in human factors engineering, he has led extensive research and development projects for major government
    agencies and Fortune 500 companies, focusing on operator support systems and human-system interfaces. Hunt has served as a faculty member and administrator at leading institutions, where he taught and developed programs in human factors and systems engineering.

    Fortify your strategy by reviewing a Challenge Study detailing grounds for excluding Ruston Hunt’s expert testimony.

    Accident Reconstruction Expert Witnesses

    Daniel M. Wolfe has a Bachelor of Science Degree in Engineering and a Doctor of Philosophy degree in Electrical and Electrical and Computer Engineering.

    He is a member of the Society of Automotive Engineers, the National Association of Accident Reconstruction Experts, and the Optical Society of America. He is certified by the Society of Automotive Engineers to access and interpret Heavy Vehicle Event Data Recorders in commercial vehicles and is certified as a BOSCH Crash Data Retrieval technician.

    Discover more cases with Daniel Wolfe as an expert witness by ordering his comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

    Steven T. Kean has over 25 years of experience in traffic crash investigation and reconstruction, including more than 1,000 crash investigations. He has served as an Accident Reconstruction Team member since 2001 and as Team Leader since 2008, and he holds full accreditation as a Traffic Accident Reconstructionist from ACTAR.

    Kean’s extensive specialized training—spanning advanced crash reconstruction, event data recorder analysis, heavy vehicle investigations, and human factors—demonstrates his comprehensive expertise in evaluating vehicle dynamics and driver behavior. He has been qualified and testified as an expert in multiple state courts, taught advanced crash reconstruction courses to law enforcement and legal professionals, and is an active member of leading professional organizations, including the National Association of Professional Accident Reconstruction Specialists and the Society of Automotive Engineers.

    Get the full story on challenges to Steven Kean’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Trucking Expert Witness

    Brooks Rugemer has over 30 years of experience in trucking safety, driver training, risk management, and accident investigation, including 12 years as a tractor-trailer operator with 1.4 million accident-free miles. He has hired and trained over 5,000 CDL drivers and is intimately familiar with FMCSRs, OSHA regulations, and accepted transportation safety practices.

    Want to know more about the challenges Brooks Rugemer has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    A. Motion to Exclude Expert Ruston Hunt

    U-Haul provided that Hunt opined as to the location of the van relative to the Subject Truck at the time of the accident, that the Subject Truck was defective and unreasonably dangerous due to lacking certain technologies, and that U-Haul allegedly failed to provide adequate warnings and training to inexperienced renters.

    On review of Hunt’s voluminous report, these opinions primarily involve (1) the Subject Truck being unreasonably dangerous and defective because “insufficient warnings and instructions were provided to renters” and because “it lacked a blind spot detection and warning system,” (2) the dangers of failing to “explicitly train” renters on the proper adjustment of the Subject Truck’s side view mirrors; and (3) the accident-prevention effect that blind-spot detection technologies “likely” would have had in this case, had they been installed on the Subject Truck.

    Because Plaintiffs’ design defect claims are no longer viable, Hunt’s opinions that the Subject Truck was defective and unreasonably dangerous due to an alleged design defect are not relevant.

    B. Motion to Exclude Expert Daniel Wolfe

    Wolfe testified as to the Subject Truck’s alleged design defects and alternative technologies that allegedly could have prevented the instant accident.

    As the proposed design-engineering expert, Wolfe’s testimony is relevant only with regard to the now-dismissed design defect claims. Therefore, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 401, the Court granted U-Haul’s motion to exclude the testimony of expert Wolfe.

    C. Motion to Exclude Expert Steven Kean

    U-Haul took issue with two specific opinions proffered by Kean in his deposition: Plaintiffs’ van was in the Subject Truck’s blind spot prior to the accident, and the van was traveling faster than the Subject Truck at impact.

    According to Plaintiffs, Kean’s testimony will “offer critical insight that will help the jury understand the sequence of events and the physical evidence underlying this collision.”

    Because the Court can foresee the potential relevance of an accident reconstructionist’s testimony to Plaintiffs’ remaining claims, the Court denied without prejudice U-Haul’s motion to exclude the testimony of expert Steven Kean at this juncture, subject to a Daubert hearing at the appropriate time in the proceedings to ascertain the reliability of his proffered testimony.

    D. Motion to Exclude Expert Brooks Rugemer

    U-Haul provided that Rugemer’s testimony concerned the countermeasures that U-Haul should have taken in order to prevent the instant accident, such as giving additional training and safety information to inexperienced drivers of rental trucks.

    According to Plaintiffs, Rugemer will “explain to the jury how commercial transportation companies manage blind spot and mirror adjustment risks, what reasonable industry practices exist to mitigate foreseeable lane-change collisions, and how U-Haul’s rental procedures fell short of those well-established standards.”

    Because the Court can foresee the potential relevance of a commercial safety expert’s testimony to Plaintiffs’ remaining claims, the Court denied without prejudice U-Haul’s motion to exclude the testimony of expert Brooks Rugemer at this juncture, subject to a Daubert hearing at the appropriate time in the proceedings to ascertain the reliability of his proffered testimony.

    Held

    • The Court granted U-Haul’s motions to exclude the testimony of Ruston Hunt and Daniel Wolfe.
    • The Court denied without prejudice U-Haul’s motions to exclude the testimony of Steven Kean and Brooks Rugemer.

    Key Takeaway

    Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence, and the fact is of consequence in determining the action.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Lagunas-Antunez V. Hayes-Goode
    Docket Number: 2:24cv416
    Court Name: United States District Court, Virginia Eastern
    Order Date: February 26, 2026
  • Law Enforcement Expert’s Opinion on Reaction Time Admitted

    Law Enforcement Expert’s Opinion on Reaction Time Admitted

    This case arises from the fatal shooting of Caleb Slay by federal Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) Agent Anthony Gasperoni. On November 2, 2020, Slay encountered DEA Agent Gasperoni and DEA Agent John Stuart. During the ensuing interaction, DEA Agent Gasperoni discharged his firearm, fatally shooting Slay. Slay’s mother, Tina Richardson, filed this case asserting numerous claims under federal and state law against the United States and DEA Agent Gasperoni for wrongful death. The parties timely designated expert witnesses in this case and now move to exclude the evidence and testimony of the other party’s expert.

    United States filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Robert W. Johnson while Plaintiff Richardson filed a motion to exclude the expert testimony of Craig Allen.

    Economics Expert Witness

    Robert Walton Johnson has more than 30 years of experience as a court-qualified economic expert and over 40 years of experience in financial and economic analysis. He has been qualified as an economic expert in both state and federal courts across more than 30 states. Johnson holds a Master of Business Administration from Stanford University and a Bachelor of Business Administration in Economics from Baruch College.

    He has directed and provided testimony on economic analyses for both plaintiff and defense clients in matters involving personal injury, wrongful death, wrongful termination, lost business profits, and antitrust cases. His professional background also includes Wall Street and corporate finance experience, including mergers and acquisitions, as well as roles as a securities analyst and portfolio manager.

    Get the full story on challenges to Robert Johnson’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Law Enforcement Expert Witness

    Craig Allen is currently employed as the Director of Training and Senior Instructor with the Force Science Institute. He been a Police Officer for 30 years.

    He has held positions within the Hillsboro Police Department ranging from Patrol Officer, Field Training Officer, SWAT, Undercover Narcotics Investigator, Detective, Patrol Sergeant, Training Sergeant, Lieutenant of Internal Affairs, Training Lieutenant, and Patrol Lieutenant.

    Want to know more about the challenges Craig Allen has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    I. Defendant United States’ Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony of Robert Johnson

    Johnson, a forensic economist, opined that the value of decedent Caleb Slay’s life is between $5,500,000 and $16,900,000, based on a “willingness-to-pay” methodology.

    As Johnson explained in his expert report, the willingness-to-pay methodology values human life based on “how much people are willing to pay (or willing to give up in dollars) to avoid an increase in the risk of death,” rather than taking into account any information specific to the decedent (such as physical health, history of mental illness, drug use, familial relationships, education, etc.).

    The willingness-to-pay model provided a value range for some general, average human life, rather than a value specific to a particular decedent. In addition to finding the willingness-to-pay methodology generally unreliable, the Court noted that Johnson’s report in particular has issues which cause his expert testimony to fall short of the Daubert standard.

    Johnson relied on two studies that are both now over 20 years old. Johnson did not explain why these studies were chosen, whether newer studies exist, or whether other studies exist with further variations in estimates of the value of human life.

    As a result, the Court found that Johnson’s expert testimony did not meet the standard under Rule 702 as amended and is inadmissible.

    II. Plaintiff Richardson’s Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony of Craig Allen

    A. “Force Science” Opinions

    Plaintiff Richardson sought to exclude Allen’s opinions that rely on “force science,” arguing that “force science” is not a generally accepted theory in the relevant scientific community and Allen is not qualified as an expert in a recognized scientific field such as cognitive psychology or behavioral science.
    Allen offered an opinion regarding the perception or reaction time of an officer responding to a threat, without opining about cognitive processes.

    Upon review, Allen’s opinion regarding reaction time did not appear to cross the line into cognitive psychology, physiology, behavioral science, or any other purely scientific field. Moreover, Allen’s opinion did not merely rely on his experiences at the Force Science Institute but also on his 30 years of experience as a police officer, over 25 formal certifications, relevant organization memberships, and review of publications on the issue of police perception and reaction times. Thus, it appeared to the Court that Allen’s area of expertise included police reaction times based on his experience as a police officer, his training, and his research.

    Plaintiff alternatively argued that Allen’s opinions relating to “force science” should be excluded under Rule 403 as unduly prejudicial. Plaintiff argued that the jury “may give force science too much weight over whether the DEA Agents Gasperoni and Stuart could have exercised other options, such as obtaining an arrest warrant based on probable cause.” First, the Court noted that this argument has little bearing on the specific opinion identified in the briefing—that is, Allen’s opinion that officer reaction time is longer when the officer must engage in decision-making. Second, the quoted language above is the entirety of Plaintiff’s argument that the Court should exclude this evidence under Rule 403. The Court is not persuaded that the value of the evidence is outweighed by any undue prejudice.

    B. Eyewitness Testimony Opinion

    Second, Plaintiff Richardson sought to exclude Allen’s opinions on eyewitness testimony, particularly his opinion elicited by Plaintiff Counsel in his deposition that “police officers involved in shootings can have specific, more precise memories of how the event unfurls as opposed to a lay witness watching the incident.” Plaintiff argued that Allen has no supporting education, credentials, or background in the field of memory and eyewitness testimony. 

    Here, Allen did not include any “eyewitness testimony” opinions in his report, and defense counsel states that they do not anticipate eliciting any such opinions from him at trial. Instead, the only reason Allen has opined on eyewitness testimony during the course of this litigation is because Plaintiff Counsel asked Allen in his deposition, “do you have some reason to believe that police officers who are active participants in a shooting incident would have better memories of the shooting incident than nonactive participants?” The Court is persuaded by Defendant United States’ argument that Allen should be able to respond to such questioning at trial, including providing his opinion, should Plaintiff Counsel again open that door.

    As set forth above, the Court found Richardson’s motion to exclude eyewitness testimony opinion premature, as Allen has not included any such opinions in his report and defense counsel did not intend to elicit any such opinions on direct examination.

    Held

    • The Court granted Defendant United States’ motion to exclude the expert testimony of Robert Johnson.
    • The Court denied Plaintiff Richardson’s motion to exclude the expert testimony of Craig Allen.

    Key Takeaway

    The Court joined the growing consensus among federal courts and concludes that the willingness-to-pay methodology generally is an unreliable way to measure the value of human life and did not satisfy the Daubert standard. Moreover, Johnson’s report in particular lacks sufficient explanation and support for his conclusions. The reasonable value of Slay’s life is within the purview and experience of the factfinder.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Richardson V. United States Of America
    Docket Number: 6:23cv3337
    Court Name: United States District Court, Missouri Western
    Order Date: March 02, 2026
  • Internal Medicine Expert’s Testimony on a Syncopal Episode Admitted

    Internal Medicine Expert’s Testimony on a Syncopal Episode Admitted

    On June 3, 2020, Matthew Vomero was driving a tractor trailer when his vehicle crashed into a building insured by Travelers Home and Marine Insurance Company (“Travelers”). At the time of the accident, Vomero was acting in the course and scope of his employment with U.S. Xpress.

    The parties dispute whether Defendants have presented admissible evidence supporting their assertion that Vomero had such a medical incident, and Travelers asserts that Vomero merely fell asleep while driving. 

    Defendants’ expert, Dr. Adam C. Sobel, a physician, offered an expert opinion that prior to crashing his tractor trailer, Vomero suffered a “syncopal episode” as a result of laughing, causing him to lose consciousness and the ability to steer his vehicle. Travelers filed a motion to exclude Sobel’s testimony under Rule 702.

    Travelers did not challenge Sobel’s qualifications but sought to have Sobel’s testimony excluded as unreliable and unhelpful to the jury because 1) his testimony was not supported by evidence in the record, 2) Sobel did not review enough of the record to come to a reliable conclusion, 3) Sobel did not cite to any scholarly materials supporting his diagnosis, and 4) Sobel failed to testify that he came to his conclusions with a reasonable degree of medical certainty.

    Internal Medicine Expert Witness

    Adam C. Sobel, M.D. is a board-certified internist with more than three decades of clinical, academic, and forensic medical experience. He earned his B.S. through Pennsylvania State University’s six-year pre-medicine/medical program and his M.D. from Jefferson Medical College, followed by an internal medicine internship, residency, and service as Chief Medical Resident at Thomas Jefferson University Hospital. Dr. Sobel is certified by the American Board of Internal Medicine and is licensed to practice medicine in Pennsylvania and New Jersey. He has served as a Clinical Assistant Professor of Medicine and as an attending physician at multiple major hospital systems, including Penn Medicine and Main Line HealthCare.

    Want to know more about the challenges Adam Sobel has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    His testimony was not supported by evidence in the record

    The Court found Travelers’ argument that Sobel’s testimony is unreliable to be contradicted by evidence in the record. According to Travelers, because Vomero was not laughing prior to the crash, Sobel’s conclusion that Vomero suffered a laughter-induced syncopal episode is frivolous. However, Defendants presented the testimony of Nicholas Rice (“Rice”), a fellow truck driver, who stated that he was speaking with Vomero on the phone prior to and during the crash. Rice testified that during his phone call with Vomero, he heard Vomero laughing, heard Vomero go silent for fifteen to twenty seconds, and then heard a crash. 

    Sobel did not review enough of the record to come to a reliable conclusion

    The Court further rejected Travelers’ assertion that Sobel did not review sufficient evidence to come to a reliable medical conclusion. According to Sobel’s report, Sobel reviewed Vomero’s medical records, lab tests, and various other parts of the record such as a police report and Vomero’s deposition transcript.

    Sobel did not cite to any scholarly materials supporting his diagnosis

    The Court similarly rejected Travelers’ contention that Sobel’s conclusions regarding a laughter-induced syncopal episode are unreliable because Sobel did not cite to any scholarly articles regarding such a condition.

    Sobel failed to testify that he came to his conclusions with a reasonable degree of medical certainty

    Finally, the Court did not accept Travelers’ conclusion that Sobel’s testimony is neither reliable nor helpful to the jury because he did not testify that he reached his conclusions to a reasonable degree of medical certainty. The Court acknowledged that Sobel’s report contains statements such as “it is more probable than not that a person laughing does not simply fall asleep and it is more likely than not that Vomero had a syncopal episode.”

    While such language would indicate that Sobel did not reach his conclusions to the degree of medical certainty required by Pennsylvania law, during his deposition, Sobel testified that there was close to a one hundred percent chance that Vomero did not fall asleep prior to the accident and confirmed that he reached his opinions to a reasonable degree of medical certainty.

    While a reasonable jury could choose to discredit Sobel’s testimony due to perceived inconsistencies, Sobel’s testimony is sufficient for purposes of the instant motion and such inconsistencies are proper topics for cross examination.

    Held

    The Court denied Traveler’s motion to exclude the testimony of Adam Sobel.

    Key Takeaway

    A medical expert is not required to cite to scholarly or peer reviewed articles in order to provide a reliable opinion.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: The Travelers Home And Marine Insurance Company V. U.S. Xpress, Inc.
    Docket Number: 3:22cv700
    Court Name: United States District Court, Pennsylvania Middle
    Order Date: February 25, 2026
  • Internal Medicine Expert Was Allowed to Opine on Medical Effects

    Internal Medicine Expert Was Allowed to Opine on Medical Effects

    Plaintiff, Robert Rone (“Rone”) asserted claims against Kiesha Pettway, RN, and Felicia Crawford, CRNP, for alleged violations of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 relating to Rone’s incarceration at the Mobile County Metro Jail on May 7, 2021.

    Crawford and Pettway filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Robert’s purported expert, Ramzy Rimawi, M.D., pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 702.

    Internal Medicine Expert Witness

    Ramzy Husam Rimawi, M.D. received his M.D. from Ross University School of Medicine, after which he completed his Internal Medicine internship and residency training at NYU Lutheran Medical Center, followed by two clinical fellowships in Critical Care Medicine and Infectious Diseases.

    He is triple American Board certified in Internal Medicine, Infectious Diseases and Critical Care Medicine.

    Want to know more about the challenges Ramzy Rimawi has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Crawford and Pettway argued that Rimawi’s opinions did not assist the Court with the decision as to whether Crawford and Pettway were deliberately indifferent to Robert’s serious medical need. Crawford and Pettway argued that Rimawi did not know the actions or inactions that were taken by either of them and he did not analyze the medical care and treatment they provided to Rone.

    Indeed, in Robert’s response to the motion to exclude, he acknowledged that Rimawi “does not know what the nurse Defendants did, what the jail or NaphCare policies are, or even what deliberate indifference is” and he is solely a causation expert in this matter, who opined the stress that Robert experienced from his arrest and surrounding events caused him to develop shingles and chronic postherpetic neuralgia, as well as suffer symptoms consistent with post-traumatic stress disorder. These may be effects, but this opinion is not relevant to the claims.

    Since Rimawi’s expert opinions are limited to medical effects and do not address whether Crawford and Pettway were deliberately indifferent to Robert’s serious medical need, they are not relevant to the claims. Rather, they would only be relevant as to any damages. Since the Court determined summary judgment is granted on the claims for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, the motion to exclude was denied.

    Held

    The Court denied Kiesha Pettway and Felicia Crawford’s rule 702 motion to exclude the testimony from Plaintiff’s purported expert Ramzy Rimawi, M.D.

    Key Takeaway

    The district court’s objective is to make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Rone V. Lott
    Docket Number: 1:22cv509
    Court Name: United States District Court, Alabama Southern
    Order Date: February 10, 2026
  • Insurance Expert Allowed to Opine on Claims Handling

    Insurance Expert Allowed to Opine on Claims Handling

    This is an insurance coverage and bad faith action involving a water loss under a homeowners policy. Safeco issued a homeowners policy to Plaintiffs Tessa and Tyrell Bradley for the policy period from September 24, 2022, to September 24, 2023 (the “Policy”). The claim arose in December 2022, when the Bradleys reported that a hot water line had burst in a bathroom, causing water damage throughout the home.

    Pursuant to Rule 37(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendant Safeco Insurance Company of America (“Safeco”) respectfully requested that the Court exclude Plaintiff’s claims handling expert, Jack Thomas, for the failure of his report to comply with the disclosure requirements of Rule 26(a)(2)(B).

    Insurance Expert Witness

    Jack D. Thomas has 53 years of professional experience as a claims adjuster in the insurance industry and in representing consumers.

    Discover more cases with Jack Thomas as an expert witness by ordering his comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Rule 26(a)(2)(B) requires that all retained experts produce a report containing a “complete statement” of all opinions the witness will express as well as: (i) “the basis and reasons for them”; (ii) “the facts or data considered by the witness in forming them”; (iii) “any exhibits that will be used”; (v) a “list of all other cases in which, during the previous 4 years, the witness testified as an expert”; and (vi) “a statement of the compensation to be paid for the study and testimony in the case.”

    Defendant argued that “the report produced by Plaintiff’s claims handling expert, Jack Thomas, contains none of this information.” The Court found that Thomas’ report is replete with conclusory statements.

    However, the report did broadly state that in Thomas’ opinion, based on his experience as a professional adjuster and the facts of this case, Defendant violated unspecified provisions of WAC 284-30-330. Thomas’ report also appeared to provide some reasons for this opinion. For example, his report states: “When the insureds submitted their claim with Proof of Loss many months after the event, Safeco essentially ignored the submission. Safeco’s regulatory obligation was to provide a response to the claim.”

    Analysis

    Initially, the Court agreed with Defendant that Thomas’ report lacked exhibits that will be used to summarize or support his opinions; a list of all publications authored by Thomas in the previous 10 years; a list of all other cases in which, during the previous four years, Thomas testified as an expert; and a statement of the compensation that Thomas is to be paid for his study and testimony. However, the “Declaration of Jack Thomas” that was filed with Plaintiffs’ response on Nov. 17, 2025, brought his report into sufficient (though hardly exemplary) compliance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B). Moreover, the Court has already forgiven the untimeliness of Plaintiffs’ response.

    Held

    The Court denied the Defendant’s motion to exclude Plaintiff’s claims handling expert, Jack Thomas.

    Key Takeaway

    While Plaintiffs’ actions here are unimpressive, the Court found that they are harmless with regard to the Defendant, and thus the automatic exclusion of Thomas’ report was not warranted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c).

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Bradley V. Safeco Insurance Company Of America
    Docket Number: 3:23cv5458
    Court Name: United States District Court, Washington Western
    Order Date: January 14, 2026
  • Trademarks Expert Was Allowed to Opine on Protectable Rights

    Trademarks Expert Was Allowed to Opine on Protectable Rights

    In 2017, twin brothers Michael and David Postar split their interests in Affordable Storage, a self-storage business that they jointly owned and operated for many years. As part of the split, the brothers assigned certain registered trademarks associated with the business to a holding company in which they both own a 50% stake. Michael has exclusive rights to use those marks in Lubbock County, whereas David has exclusive rights to use them in Tom Green and Midland Counties.

    Years after the split, David, through his company Gargoyle Management, Inc., licensed a derivative of one of the marks to the brothers’ former employee, Gavin Hyland. Hyland and his wife operate their own self-storage business, Slaton Affordable Storage, Inc. Their two locations—one of which is in Lubbock County—are also named Affordable Storage.

    Michael sued the Hylands, David, and their companies for, among other things, trademark infringement, unfair competition, common-law misappropriation, and civil conspiracy. Generally, Michael alleges that the Defendants are violating federal and state law by using unauthorized derivatives of the Affordable Storage IP to compete against Michael in Lubbock County.

    Michael identified John M. Cone as his expert witness to testify about (1) whether Michael has protectable rights in various marks; (2) whether those rights have priority over the Hylands’ use of certain marks; and (3) whether the Hylands’ use of those marks is likely to cause confusion.

    In response, the Hyland Defendants filed a motion to exclude the expert testimony of Cone, an attorney who specializes in trademark law.

    Trademarks Expert Witness

    John M. Cone worked as an agent and attorney in intellectual property matters, first in England and subsequently in the United States, since before 1970, concentrating on trademark law.

    In England, he was a Chartered Patent Agent and a Member of the Institute of Trademark Agents. Cone was responsible for the worldwide trademark practice of the firm of patent and trademark agents of which he was a partner. In 1980, he moved to the United States, and in 1983 received a Doctor of Jurisprudence degree from Southern Methodist University, graduating cum laude. Cone had obtained a B.A.(Hons.) from the University of Oxford, England in 1968.

    Get the full story on challenges to John Cone’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Discussion by the Court

    1. According to the Defendants, Cone’s opinions in his expert report are impermissible legal conclusions

    At the outset, the Defendants did not challenge Cone’s qualifications as an expert. Nor did they challenge the reliability of the methodology underlying Cone’s expert report. Instead, they argued that the opinions in his report are impermissible legal conclusions that invade the province of the Court and merely tell the jury what result to reach.

    In their motion, the Defendants objected to 30 statements or opinions contained in Cone’s report. Each objection features the same stock argument: “This is an improper legal conclusion, seeking to tell the jury what law governs an issue and what the law means. It is not an opinion to help the factfinder understand the evidence or an issue in question.” Taken together, these objections effectively sought a blanket prohibition on Cone’s testimony.

    In response, Michael assured the Court that “Cone’s ‘legal conclusions’ will not be presented to the jury.” Moreover, he argued that there is no way to know at this point whether these purported “legal opinions” will “actually be offered at trial.” Besides, he said, nothing prevented experts from relying on legal authority in forming their opinions.

    In response to the Defendants’ 30 objections, Michael offered his own stock response: “This is not a legal conclusion because it does not omit the supporting facts; it is based on Cone’s analysis of the relevant sources as applied to his independent and objective review of the pleadings and other documents identified in his report.”

    ii. It is premature to exclude Cone’s expert testimony

    The Court denied the Defendants’ motion to exclude Cone’s expert testimony as premature.

    Cone was expected to testify that the Hylands’ use of certain marks is likely to cause confusion with marks owned by Postar IP. His opinions could be inadmissible to the extent they articulate a legal standard or tell the jury what result to reach.

    The Court required additional context to determine whether Cone’s opinions, if offered, would take the form of impermissible legal conclusions. The Defendants are effectively asking for a blanket ban on Cone’s testimony, yet his report offers potentially permissible opinions that do not necessarily constitute improper statements of law.

    Held

    The Court denied the Hyland Defendants’ motion to exclude the expert testimony of John M. Cone

    Key Takeaway

    Courts have found that the presence of impermissible legal conclusions in an expert’s report is not a sufficient basis to strike the entirety of his testimony, particularly where, as here, the report provides additional, potentially admissible opinions.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Postar V. Hyland
    Docket Number: 5:24cv19
    Court Name: United States District Court, Texas Northern
    Order Date: January 20, 2026