Tag: Pandemic

  • Economics Expert Witness’ Testimony Rejected on account of Half-Hearted Support for his Methodology

    Economics Expert Witness’ Testimony Rejected on account of Half-Hearted Support for his Methodology

    Plaintiffs James and Roxanne Thomas (“Plaintiffs”), on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, brought suit against GEICO Casualty Company, GEICO Indemnity Company, and GEICO General Insurance Company (collectively “GEICO” or “Defendants”) for violating the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (“ICFA”).

    Since 2013, Plaintiffs have been GEICO customers. Plaintiffs renewed their insurance policy with GEICO from January 22, 2020, to July 22, 2020. They asserted that GEICO had charged “excessive” premiums during the pandemic. Plaintiffs alleged that the premiums failed to account for the dramatic reduction in driving during that time. In other words, the premiums were not reflective of driving risks, which insurance companies assess when
    determining policy holders’ premium rates.

    GEICO instated a Giveback program, which offered a potential premium credit of 15% upon new and renewal of customers 6- or 12-month policies. Plaintiffs alleged that the discount inadequately accounted for the diminished insurance risk pool during the pandemic. According to Plaintiffs, GEICO provided no retroactive relief for consumers who had paid excessive premiums since the start of the pandemic and provided no additional premium relief as the pandemic continued.

    In their FAQ section, GEICO explained the Giveback program was created because “shelter in place laws have reduced driving,” and they were “passing these savings on to [their] auto, motorcycle, and RV customers.” Plaintiffs found this description misleading because it implied that customers would receive all the savings, whereas in reality, customers only received a 15% discount, while GEICO received a windfall of revenue.

    To determine what Plaintiffs’ refund should have been, or damages were, Plaintiffs relied on the testimony of Bernard “Birny” Birnbaum (“Birnbaum”). The parties disagreed on whether Birnbaum’s methodology was reliable, as required under Daubert, and whether it was admissible in this case. Plaintiffs also filed a motion for class certification.

    Economics Expert Witness

    Bernard Birnbaum is a consulting economist and former insurance regulator whose work focuses on insurance regulatory issues. Birny has served as an expert witness on a variety of economic and actuarial insurance issues in administrative and judicial proceedings.

    Discussion by the Court

    Plaintiffs sought GEICO to issue a refund for the “excessive” premiums, seeking monetary damages for the following:

    • policies they entered or renewed with GEICO that had a start date of effectiveness before March 21, 2020, and before GEICO’s Giveback program, but continued past March 21, 2020
    • policies they entered or renewed with GEICO after GEICO created its Giveback program

    In his report, Birnbaum explained that the purpose of his methodology was to calculate what refunds/damages Plaintiffs should have received for paying “excessive” insurance rates since the 2020 pandemic.

    Motion to Strike

    The Court separated the methodology employed by Birnbaum into two points for clarity. First, Birnbaum calculated the rate GEICO should have charged for policies effective on or after March 21, 2020, using information available at the time. This included policies initiated before the pandemic and those renewed or initiated after GEICO’s Giveback program launch. Termed the reasonable rate, this initial step mirrored a standard calculation for a private passenger automobile (“PPA”) insurance rate. While PPA rates typically consider future risks, Birnbaum’s approach was retroactive, determining 2020 rates today. Nonetheless, both methods analyzed risk transfers. Birnbaum justified his reasonable rate calculation with references to actuarial principles and model laws rooted in PPA ratemaking.

    Second, Birnbaum subtracted the reasonable rate from the rate GEICO charged Plaintiffs. The difference between the first and second steps was what GEICO would refund Plaintiffs. Birnbaum labeled this refund reasonable premium relief.

    The end date of the calculation was uncertain, as Birnbaum needed to assess GEICO’s records at the merits stage. Birnbaum performed his methodology to correspond with the relevant class members’ policy dates of effectiveness. The relevant class members are divided in the Unfairness Class and the Deception Class.

    Arguments Presented by Defendant

    Defendants argued that Birnbaum’s methodology was unreliable and therefore could not satisfy Federal Rule of Evidence 702. According to Defendants, the reasonable premium relief the Plaintiffs sought was applied retroactively, unlike other insurance calculations that were applied prospectively. Defendants argued that such a method allowed Birnbaum to determine what he believed GEICO should have charged for insurance rates based on what he knew then, whereas insurers usually issued premiums by assessing future risks based on information they knew at that given time.

    The Defendants supported their assertions by showing that Birnbaum failed to cite relevant examples, case law that found the method reliable, statutes, actuarial standards, model laws, or treatises that recognized reasonable premium relief.

    Arguments Presented by Plaintiff

    Plaintiffs explained that Birnbaum cited industry standard and actuarial principles as the roots of his methodology. They asserted that the standard Birnbaum used was the same methodology that GEICO had developed to create the Giveback program. Plaintiffs specified that the standards Birnbaum relied on explained that PPA rates might not be excessive and thus should reflect the cost of the transfer of risks. Plaintiffs further attempted to clarify that they applied the method prospectively, based on information GEICO knew at the time it decided the criteria and discount of the GEICO Giveback program, rather than retroactively.

    Court’s Decision on the Motion to Strike

    The Court deemed it imperative for Birnbaum’s methodology to be sound as a whole. The only time Plaintiffs cited a standard to support their arguments was when referring to ordinary PPA insurance ratemaking and/or determining what a reasonable rate would have been. The methodology before the Court at that time was not an ordinary PPA insurance rate. Instead, determining the PPA rate was only one part of the methodology, as Birnbaum first determined what the PPA rate or reasonable rate should have been and then subtracted that rate from the rate GEICO charged the Plaintiffs. Avoiding semantics, PPA rates determined future costs, while Birnbaum’s methodology sought to calculate returns. The Court concluded that Plaintiffs only attempted to support half of his methodology.

    The Court held that the Plaintiffs failed to raise in their briefing and oral argument that Birnbaum’s report cited a recognized methodology that mirrored the reasonable premium relief methodology. It could not simply rely on Plaintiffs’ assertions that Birnbaum said his methodology was rooted in industry standards. As for the Plaintiffs’ damages methodology, the Court made it clear that it did not “recognize” the Plaintiffs’ damages theory as truth.

    The Court denied the motion for class certification filed by the Plaintiffs, acknowledging commonalities with regard to the unfairness class but not the deception class, among other reasons.

    Held

    The Court granted Defendants’ motion to strike Birnbaum’s expert report and denied Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification.

    The Court has not arrived on an outcome for this case since the remaining issues involved in this case still await resolution.

    Key Takeaways:

    Reliability: The Court stressed the importance of Birnbaum’s methodology being sound overall. It highlighted the complexity of the methodology, which involved determining reasonable rates and calculating what returns Plaintiffs should receive. The Court found that Plaintiffs failed to fully support their argument, particularly regarding recognized methodologies and damages theory.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Thomas Et Al V. Geico Casualty Company Et Al
    Docket Number: 1:20cv4306
    Court: United States District Court, Illinois Northern
    Citation: 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42709
    Order Date: March 12, 2024
  • Real Estate Appraisal Expert Witness’ Valuation Excluding the Effect of the Pandemic Deemed Inadmissible

    Real Estate Appraisal Expert Witness’ Valuation Excluding the Effect of the Pandemic Deemed Inadmissible

    On August 16, 2021 (“Vesting Date”), the Plaintiff, the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (“Amtrak”), acquired the property at 260-270 Twelfth Avenue, New York, New York (New York County Block 675, Lot 1), through its power of eminent domain, as codified in 49 U.S.C. § 24311(a)(1), from the Defendant, 260 Twelfth Avenue Holdings, LLC. The acquisition was deemed necessary for Amtrak’s Hudson Tunnel Project, a part of the Gateway Project, involving the construction of two new rail tunnels under the Hudson River from New Jersey to New York.

    Amtrak claimed that it had already paid the Defendant $363,000,000 in principal as just compensation for the Property, representing the fair market value of the Property on the Vesting Date. This value was determined based on what a willing buyer would pay a willing seller at the time of the taking, taking into account the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on the New York City real estate market. Amtrak, having made the just compensation payment, believed that the Defendant was not entitled to any additional compensation.

    On the other hand, the Defendant sought just compensation for Amtrak’s eminent domain taking of the property on August 16, 2021, in accordance with the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 49 U.S.C. § 24311, and the New York Constitution, N.Y. Const. art. I § 7. Specifically, the Defendant sought $247,000,000, representing the difference between the value of the Property on August 16, 2021, excluding the negative impact of the COVID-19 pandemic ($610,000,000), and the amount Amtrak had paid the Defendant for the Property to date ($363,000,000), excluding interest.

    To sum it up, the parties disputed whether the calculation of just compensation should consider the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on the New York real estate market as of the Vesting Date. Amtrak urged the Court to restrict its analysis to the market value on the Vesting Date, while Defendants (“260 Twelfth Avenue”) contended that just compensation requires valuing the Property excluding the effect of the pandemic on market value.

    Plaintiff filed a motion to exclude any evidence or argument concerning the value of the condemned property (“Property”) on any date other than the date of taking (“Vesting Date”), and to preclude Defendants’ appraiser, Marc Nakleh from providing his opinion of the market value of the Property on any date other than the Vesting Date.

    Real Estate Appraisal Expert Witness

    Marc Nakleh started his real estate career in 2003 working as a residential sales agent focusing on investors looking to purchase property adjacent to the University of Florida. After two years, Nakleh made the switch from residential real estate to commercial real estate. He received his Master of Science in Real Estate degree at the University of Florida in 2006.

    Nakleh joined Cushman & Wakefield in September 2006. He was promoted to Associate Director in April 2009, Director in July 2010, Senior Director in April 2013, and further promoted to Executive Director in April 2018. Appraisal assignments have included office buildings, ground leases, vacant land, self-storage facilities, shopping centers, apartments, leaseholds, industrial properties and easement valuations. Nakleh’ s practice focuses on arbitration, litigation, and other complex assignments.

    Discussion by the Court

    The Court determined that in accordance with both federal and state law, it was mandated to establish the award of just compensation for the Property’s market value solely based on the Vesting Date. Any evidence regarding the property’s value on any other date was deemed irrelevant, and even if minimally relevant, the Court concluded that such information would be outweighed by the risk of causing unnecessary delays. It is black letter law that just compensation is “what a willing buyer would pay in cash to a willing seller at the time of the taking.” The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution precludes the taking of private property “without just compensation.” Accordingly, the Court must determine an amount of compensation that is “‘just’ both to an owner whose property is taken and to the public that must” foot the bill.

    The Court examined the principle that deviation from market value at the time of taking to determine just compensation is permissible only in specific circumstances, such as when market value is challenging to ascertain or would result in manifest injustice to the owner or the public. In the case of 260 Twelfth Avenue, the argument was made that valuing the property at a time when the pandemic had reduced the value of real estate in New York City allowed Amtrak to unfairly benefit at the property owner’s expense.

    The Court emphasized that the risk of “manifest injustice” would justify departing from the market value on the Vesting Date only if the owner demonstrated special conditions and hardships directly applicable to it. Despite the shocks experienced by the New York real estate market due to the pandemic, 260 Twelfth Avenue failed to show that it bore an unfair and disproportionate burden of the pandemic’s effects.

    The Court highlighted that market value, defined as the price at which property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, considering relevant facts, must be the primary measure of just compensation at the time of taking. The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic was deemed a relevant factor, and the Court acknowledged that market fluctuations, whether overcorrections or undercorrections, are inherent in the functioning of an efficient market.

    Addressing 260 Twelfth Avenue’s reliance on Great Depression-era cases, the Court deemed them irrelevant as the New York real estate market did not collapse entirely during the pandemic, making market value at the time of taking ascertainable. Additionally, the absence of a legislative directive from the New York state legislature to depart from the general rule further distinguished the current situation from the circumstances during the Great Depression. Ultimately, the Court concluded that 260 Twelfth Avenue did not suffer manifest injustice and had no basis to deviate from the established principles regarding just compensation.

    As for Amtrak’s Daubert motion directed toward the portions of Nakleh’s opinion relating to the value of the Property on a date other than the Vesting Date, the Court found that evidence regarding the Property’s value on a date other than the Vesting Date was irrelevant, expert testimony regarding the same was inadmissible pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 702.

    Held

    The Court granted Amtrak’s motion in limine to exclude evidence, testimony, or argument concerning the Property’s value on any date other than the Vesting Date, and its Daubert motion directed to Nakleh’s opinion regarding the same.

    The Court has not arrived on an outcome for this case since the remaining issues involved in this case still await resolution.

    Key Takeaways:

    The Court, guided by federal and state law, insisted on determining just compensation for the property solely based on the Vesting Date, deeming evidence of the property’s value on other dates irrelevant. Market value, defined as the price at the time of taking between a willing buyer and seller, was established as the primary measure of just compensation. While acknowledging the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on market value, the Court emphasized that the property owner failed to show an unfair burden due to the pandemic. Arguments relying on Great Depression-era cases were dismissed as irrelevant, and a legislative directive to deviate from market value was absent. In response to Amtrak’s Daubert motion filed against Marc Nakleh, the Court found evidence regarding the property’s value on dates other than the Vesting Date irrelevant and thus inadmissible, granting the Daubert motion against those portions of Nakleh’s testimony which covered the Property’s value on any date other than the Vesting Date.

    Case Details

    Case Caption National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) V. 78,441 Square Feet More Or Less Of Land And Improvements
    Docket Number 1:21cv5810
    Court United States District Court, New York Southern
    Citation 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17915
    Order Date February 1, 2024

  • Modifications to an expert report are allowed as long as there are no additions or substantive changes whatsoever; Court limits the testimony of both parties’ experts regarding the customs brokerage industry 

    Modifications to an expert report are allowed as long as there are no additions or substantive changes whatsoever; Court limits the testimony of both parties’ experts regarding the customs brokerage industry 

    This case involves a dispute between JAS Supply, Inc. (“Plaintiff”) and Radiant Customs Services, Inc. and Radiant Global Logistics, Inc. (“Defendants”) regarding the importation of alcohol wipes from foreign manufacturers. In 2020, Plaintiff contracted with Defendants to assist with importing alcohol wipes into the United States for the first time. Defendant Radiant Global Logistics provided freight forwarding services, while its related company Radiant Customs Services provided customs broker services to ensure compliance with customs regulations.  

    Plaintiff successfully imported 15 of 19 containers, but the final 4 were detained and eventually refused by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) due to missing information required by the FDA about the originating manufacturer. Plaintiff alleged that Defendants’ misconduct led to the damages from the refused products. Both sides retained experts on importation and customs brokerage industries – Plaintiff retained Kelli R. Thompson and Defendants retained Cameron W. Roberts. The parties filed motions to exclude each other’s expert testimony.  

    Customs Expert Witnesses 

    Kelli Thompson is a highly experienced Customs and International Trade Advisor with a diverse background. She is a licensed customs broker and certified customs specialist with extensive private sector and public sector experience in various areas of customs and trade, including classification, valuation, rules of origin, free trade agreements, drawback, and intellectual property rights. She also served for nearly seven years with U.S. Customs and Border Protection, rising from Import Specialist to Supervisory Import Specialist. 

    She founded her own trade consulting firm, which has catered to a wide range of clients, from small start-ups to large Fortune 500 companies. Kelli Thompson has a Master’s degree in Business Management from North Park University (2001-2003) and a Bachelor’s degree in Health Promotion & Education from the University of Cincinnati (1994-1999). 

    Cameron Roberts, a partner at Roberts & Kehagiaras LLP in Long Beach, California, brings over three decades of expertise in international trade to his practice. His focus areas encompass customs law, export compliance, domestic and international transportation law, maritime law, and trade and insurance matters. Cameron is an active member of various customs, international trade, and legal associations. He has served as President of the Foreign Trade Association and the Harbor Transportation Club. 

    In addition to his legal career, Mr. Roberts serves as an adjunct professor at California State University, Long Beach. He is a frequent presenter and author on topics within his practice areas. His qualifications include being a licensed customs broker since 1989 and having prior experience as a transportation executive. 

    Cameron holds a B.A. degree in political science and international relations from California State University, Long Beach, and has earned his J.D. degree from the Seattle University School of Law. He is recognized as an expert witness in both State and Federal courts, and he is admitted to practice in California and Washington. Cameron is also qualified to appear before the Court of International Trade and the Federal Maritime Commission. 

    Discussions by the Court 

    The Court first set forth the legal standard for expert testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which requires expert opinion to be both relevant and reliable. The Court acted as a gatekeeper to evaluate admissibility of expert opinions. General qualifications of both experts were not disputed and the focus was on assessing the reliability and relevance of the expert testimony.  

    The Plaintiff sought to limit Cameron Roberts’ anticipated testimony related to the COVID pandemic, arguing that he lacked the qualifications and that his testimony would lack relevance and reliability. The Defendants intended for Roberts to provide insights into “the pandemic’s effects on the import industry” and how it specifically impacted individuals involved in the case and their ability to work. The Plaintiff’s main contention was that Roberts did not possess relevant education or specialized knowledge about the COVID pandemic, particularly in areas like medicine or public health. However, it’s important to note that Roberts did not claim to be a pandemic expert in those fields. Instead, his opinions were rooted in his expertise in the customs brokerage industry, shaped by his observations and personal experiences during the pandemic. 

    The Plaintiff did not appear to dispute Roberts’ general industry expertise, which formed the basis of his opinions. As such, Roberts was considered qualified to offer expert insights into the relevant industries during the pandemic based on his personal knowledge, experience, and observations during that time. 

    The Plaintiff attempted to challenge the reliability and relevance of Roberts’ opinions as they applied to the specific facts of the case. They pointed out that Roberts’ opinions were often based on facts that were either in dispute or about which he had limited personal knowledge. However, it was clarified that this argument primarily called in question the weight and credibility of Roberts’ opinion testimony, rather than its reliability or relevance. 

    The Defendants’ primary argument for excluding Thompson as an expert was based on the assertion that her disclosed affirmative report contained numerous improper legal conclusions. Thompson had made numerous legal conclusions within her testimony, specifically regarding whether the Defendants’ conduct constituted negligence, whether they breached a fiduciary duty, or otherwise violated federal regulations. She even made express credibility determinations.  Similarly, the Plaintiff contended that Roberts’ anticipated testimony was improper because it extensively included inadmissible legal opinions on contested issues. For instance, he had defined gross negligence, mistake of fact, and inadvertence based on case law that was irrelevant to the facts of the specific case. Ultimately, he had arrived at a legal conclusion, stating that the Radiant Defendants were not grossly negligent but had committed a mistake of fact. He found that the Radiant Defendants’ belief that they had submitted the appropriate paperwork was reasonable. The Court concurred that such testimony would not be admissible. 

    Consequently, the Court partially granted the Plaintiff’s motion to limit Roberts’ testimony and partially granted the Defendants’ motion to exclude Thompson’s testimony. The Court’s order stipulated that neither expert would be allowed to offer testimony during the trial that purported to provide impermissible legal conclusions or interpretations. 

     
    Court assessed the dispute regarding whether Thompson should be disqualified as an expert due to the form of her report. Defendants argued that her conclusions were based on a skewed version of the factual record consisting of “regurgitated facts” provided by the Plaintiff’s counsel. They contended that within her report, Thompson made improper determinations on the credibility and culpability of lay witnesses, and these issues, coupled with the alleged formulation of her opinions as legal conclusions, led them to seek her disqualification as an expert witness. 

    Concerning the formulation of her opinions in her report, it was noted that Thompson’s written report, as disclosed to the Defendants, wouldn’t be admitted into evidence since it would be redundant with the testimony she would provide at trial. The Court emphasized that objections to the form of her testimony could be raised during the trial, but disqualifying her as an expert wasn’t warranted. Instead, traditional means such as cross-examination, presenting opposing evidence, and instructing the jury on the burden of proof were deemed appropriate for challenging her testimony. 

    Plaintiff recognized that Thompson’s opinions regarding the credibility of lay witnesses were improper and had shown a willingness to address and correct this issue. However, there was one statement challenged by the Defendants that Thompson had not rectified, and the Court determined it to be improper. Specifically, the Court ruled that Thompson could not provide opinions on the state of mind or understanding of other potential witnesses. The Court prohibited Thompson from opining on the credibility or culpability of lay witnesses. 

    Regarding the potentially inadmissible formulations of Thompson’s opinions, it was argued that these issues were curable. Plaintiff provided revised language to address the alleged improper conclusions, demonstrating how they could be presented as admissible opinions without altering their substance. Defendants contested this amended report, claiming it was an untimely supplement. However, the Court noted that it could excuse the untimeliness if it found the disclosure error to be harmless. Furthermore, it highlighted that even without the modified report, Thompson could still provide admissible opinions within the scope of her original disclosure. 

    The Court’s role was to determine whether Thompson was qualified to offer relevant and reliable testimony. Since there were no challenges to the experts’ general qualifications, and given that both parties had dueling expert testimonies on the same subject matter, the Court believed the intended dueling testimony would be relevant and reliable as long as it was presented appropriately and in an admissible form at trial. 

    Held 

    The Court granted the motions only to the extent of excluding improper legal conclusions and credibility opinions. It denied excluding the experts themselves. The Court found Roberts qualified to opine on the pandemic’s industry impact from his experience. The Court held Thompson’s opinions could be presented in an admissible manner, finding her report did not warrant blanket exclusion. With improper opinions excluded, the Court found both experts could offer helpful industry testimony. 

    The Court has not arrived on an outcome for this case since the remaining issues involved in this case still await resolution. 

    Key Takeaways:

    – Experts can testify to industry practices and standards based on their qualifications and experience in the field. However, experts cannot offer legal conclusions or interpretations.  

    – Minor deficiencies in an expert report do not always warrant blanket exclusion of the expert. Their opinions can still be presented in admissible form through testimony.  

    – While experts cannot opine on lay witness credibility, they can otherwise testify to the reasonableness of parties’ actions based on industry standards and their expertise. 

    – Untimely supplementation of an expert report may be excused when it does not substantively alter the opinions and causes no prejudice. 

    In summary, the Court set a high bar for exclusion of otherwise qualified experts. Their opinions must be screened for legal conclusions, but as long as their testimony assists the factfinder and clearance requirements are met, exclusion is disfavored.