Expert Witness Profiler

Tag: Probable Cause

  • Law Enforcement Expert Was Not Allowed to Opine on the Existence of Probable Cause

    Law Enforcement Expert Was Not Allowed to Opine on the Existence of Probable Cause

    This matter arises from Plaintiff Gina Kuhlman’s arrest by Officers David Grasha and Samantha Haggerty of the Cleveland Division of Police, for operating a motor vehicle under the influence (“OVI”) and for refusing to submit to a drug and alcohol test.

    To support her case, Kuhlman offered the expert reports of Rajeve Saini and Timothy A. Dimoff. Defendants filed a motion to disqualify the Plaintiff’s experts, Dimoff and Saini.

    Law Enforcement Expert Witness

    Timothy A. Dimoff has over 40 years of experience in law enforcement procedures, high-risk security issues and private security procedures.

    Dimoff graduated from Denison University with a B.A. in Sociology with an emphasis in Criminology. After finishing the police academy, Dimoff served as a patrol officer with the Akron Police Department (“APD”) for approximately two years. During that training period, he obtained “on-the-job training” from a “field training officer” in investigating suspects for driving under the influence. 

    Following his two (2) years on patrol, Dimoff was “handpicked from the entire department” to be an officer in APD’s “Special Crimes Unit” investigating “higher level types of crimes,” which also required him to be a S.W.A.T. response officer. 

    Get the full story on challenges to Timothy Dimoff’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study. 

    Phlebotomy Expert Witness

    Rajeve Saini is the owner of Advanced Medical Services, the company who performed a drug and alcohol screen for Plaintiff at her request on the day after her arrest. He was trained as a phlebotomist and ultimately became certified as a Paramedical Examiner.

    He and his company are certified and recognized by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration as Department of Transportation compliant in drug and alcohol collections and training.

    Want to know more about the challenges Rajeve Saini has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report. 

    Discussion by the Court

    Timothy Dimoff

    Defendants argued that (1) Dimoff lacked specialized knowledge regarding traffic stops or OVI arrests that would help the trier of fact because his only experience with traffic stops and OVI arrests was from “over thirty years ago” and (2) Dimoff’s expert report is predicated upon a flawed methodology.

    Analysis

    The Court found that Kuhlman has failed to satisfy her burden to show that Dimoff’s testimony is admissible.

    First, Kuhlman has not shown what “specialized knowledge” Dimoff possessed that would “help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue” because the determination of whether the Officers had probable cause to arrest Kuhlman is a legal, not a factual issue.

    Not only did Dimoff’s testimony demonstrate that he is opining on the ultimate issue or legal conclusion as to whether there was probable cause, but Kuhlman insisted four (4) times in her briefing that the purpose of Dimoff’s expert testimony is to show probable cause.

    Therefore, on this basis alone, because Kuhlman exclusively relied on Dimoff’s testimony to establish that probable cause did not exist for the Officers’ arrest of Kuhlman, and because using expert testimony for that purpose is improper, the Court will not consider Dimoff’s testimony.

    Second, the Court also agreed with Defendants’ contention that Dimoff’s methodology was insufficient because he failed to consult the Officers’ depositions, Kuhlman’s deposition, Cleveland’s policies and procedures related to the transport of arrestees, or, critically, the bodycam footage of Kuhlman at Chipotle.

    Rajeve Saini

    Kuhlman claimed that “Saini’s testimony show that on the day after the incident, Plaintiff went into an independent testing lab and gave a urine sample, which provided negative for alcohol and many commonly-ingested drugs.”

    Defendants disagreed, arguing that “Saini’s limited testimony as to the test results taken the day after Plaintiff’s arrest is not outside the scope of the knowledge of a juror and is unnecessary for purpose of Rule 702.”

    The parties agreed that the test that Saini’s company administered, and the Fairview test results, were negative as to the specific substances tested for. So, that fact is not “in issue.”

    And neither is whether Kuhlman actually consumed alcohol or drugs on December 30, 2018, or on December 31, 2018, because the probable cause inquiry turns on what the Officers perceived on the day of the arrest.

    It is the Court that must determine the ultimate legal issue of whether the undisputed material evidence demonstrates that the officers had probable cause to arrest Kuhlman. Since Saini’s expert report and deposition testimony offer no assistance in making this determination, the Court concluded that Saini’s expert report and deposition testimony cannot help the trier of fact determine a “fact in issue.” 

    Held

    The Court granted the Defendants’ motion to disqualify the Plaintiff’s experts, Timothy Dimoff and Rajeve Saini.

    Key Takeaway:

    Dimoff was disqualified as an expert in this case because Kuhlman introduced Dimoff’s testimony for the improper purpose of opining on the existence of probable cause, and because Dimoff did not consult the bodycam footage or depositions in rendering his opinions.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Kuhlman V. City Of Cleveland, Et Al
    Docket Number: 1:22cv536
    Court Name: United States District Court, Ohio Northern
    Order Date: July 21, 2025
  • Law Enforcement Expert Witness’ Opinion About Officer’s Demeanor Has Marginal Relevance

    Law Enforcement Expert Witness’ Opinion About Officer’s Demeanor Has Marginal Relevance

    Joshua Briggs was arrested for Disorderly Conduct and Harassment because he called Anchorage Police Officer Orean Yi a pig. Briggs filed this lawsuit alleging that he was arrested without probable cause in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights.

    Officer Yi asserted that he had probable cause to arrest Briggs because Briggs was making sufficient noise to violate Anchorage’s Disorderly Conduct Ordinance, AMC 08.30.120(A)(2).

    Briggs filed a motion to exclude the report and testimony by Defendants’ expert, James Borden, maintaining that Borden is “not qualified to testify on any matter in this case and his opinions are neither relevant nor reliable under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and the standards set forth in Daubert.”

    Law Enforcement Expert Witness

    James Borden has over 24 years of combined experience in law enforcement, force analysis, and video review and examination. James is court certified as an expert in the Following Topics: Controversial Use of Force, Police Performance Dynamics, Forensic Video Examination, Officer/subject movement dynamics, Controversial Officer-Involved Shootings, and Attentional Issues related to Officer-Involved Critical Incidents, Police Training and Police Policy, Procedure and Practice.

    Get the full story on challenges to James Borden’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study. 

    Discussion by the Court

    a. Qualifications and Reliability

    Briggs maintained that “none of Borden’s listed qualifications demonstrate expertise in determining what constitutes ‘legitimate law enforcement action,’ whether an arrest is ‘based on proper elements,’ whether a person has ‘committed the misdemeanor crime of Disorderly Conduct,’ whether the elements of harassment have been met, or whether Yi made ‘a mistake of the mind and not of the heart.’”

    The parties have filed Borden’s curriculum vitae and expert report, as well as a list of cases in which Borden has participated as an expert. The Court held that a review of Borden’s curriculum vitae demonstrates that he is qualified to testify as an expert on the use of force and police practices based on his experience as a police officer and his training on use-of-force issues.

    As to whether Borden’s opinions are derived from reliable principles and methods, Borden’s expert report explained that he reviewed relevant case documents, including any video evidence, to develop an understanding of the facts, and then analyzes the officer’s actions “to determine what the officers did, as well as their stated justification for what they did and why they did it.”

    He then “compares what the officers did and their reasons for doing so with the objective standards derived from police training and accepted police practice.” In Borden’s case, “relevant reliability concerns . . . focus upon personal knowledge or experience.” The Court found that reviewing case material and relevant documents, and then providing an assessment of the events in light of Borden’s personal experience in law enforcement, is a sufficiently reliable methodology.

    b. Relevance

    To be admissible, expert testimony must be relevant to the case: it must “help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue.”

    Borden’s Testimony

    Borden’s report contains four opinions:

    1. Opinion 1: Engagement. I believe Officer Yi had a legitimate law enforcement goal and objective in his arrest of Briggs for Disorderly Conduct, a violation of AMC 8.30.120(A)(2). Although detention was a component of the arrest, the detention was brief, and Briggs was released from the scene. The video evidence shows that Briggs appeared to be antagonistic during the detention.

    2. Opinion 2: Legitimate Law Enforcement action. Taking all evidence as factual and accurate, Briggs committed the misdemeanor crime of Disorderly Conduct in the presence of Officer Yi. Briggs’ behavior affected other individuals and caused other patrons in the store at the time of the occurrence to leave the premises without completing their transactions. With the elements of the violations being cited in multiple case documents, and prosecutorial merit being established by the Municipal Attorney’s Office, the charges were approved.

    3. Opinion 3: Use of Force. Officer Yi made the practical and appropriate decision to use handcuffs and detain Briggs as he was arrested. Force used was minimal to include controlling the movement of Briggs, the use of handcuffs and placing him in the back of the patrol car.

    4. Opinion 4: Harassment Charge. The Harassment violation, Code 8.10.110(A)(l), was not a valid charge. However, the elements of this Harassment charge were in place, a sworn officer generally cannot be a victim of Harassment. I believe Officer Yi and others made this oversight. However, the Harassment charge was ancillary to the charge of disorderly conduct and not the only charge that Briggs was issued a summons for. Additionally, Briggs was not taken into custody and booked into jail for the charges.

    Analysis

    The primary issue in this case is whether Officer Yi had probable cause to arrest Briggs during the exchange in the gas station. A dispute of material fact remains as to the volume of Briggs’ speech and any effect on the other patrons of the gas station, facts which are relevant to whether Officer Yi had probable cause.

    Opinion 1 essentially concludes that Officer Yi had probable cause to arrest Briggs for disorderly conduct, which is an impermissible legal conclusion. The Court held that Opinion 1 also does not aid the jury in determining the disputes of fact that remain, and Borden’s opinion as to Briggs’ detention is irrelevant, as the detention is not at issue in this case.

    The Court held that Opinion 2 is inadmissible for the same reason as Opinion 1: it is an impermissible legal conclusion.

    Opinion 3 has marginal relevance, as Briggs does not allege a use-of-force claim and Officer Yi’s use of handcuffs and his placement of Briggs in his patrol car is not disputed and its legality is not at issue. And yet as Briggs acknowledges, Officer Yi’s demeanor during the incident “may be relevant to his credibility.” Whether Officer Yi’s decision to use handcuffs and detain Briggs in the patrol car was “practical and appropriate” could similarly have relevance to Officer Yi’s credibility. The Court held that Borden may testify as to Opinion 3.

    The Court held that Opinion 4 is inadmissible because it is irrelevant and would not help the trier of fact understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue. It is undisputed that the harassment charge was dismissed in state court for lack of probable cause. Further, Opinion 4 is an improper legal conclusion.

    c. Rule 26

    In their opposition, Defendants contended that Borden could testify about numerous other topics that are not mentioned in his report. These topics include “how officers are trained to understand the difference between a suspect simply engaging in first amendment speech and what constitutes pre-assaultive indicators like body movement and tone during such encounter”; and “whether Officer Yi’s actions and decision to search the contents of the wallet for identification and contraband is appropriate under these circumstances.” On the current record, the Court held that Borden cannot testify as to any of those topics because they were not disclosed in his expert report. In other words, Borden’s expert report fails to contain a statement of the opinions Defendants raise above.

    Held

    The Court granted in part Briggs’ motion to exclude the testimony of James Borden; Borden can only testify as to Opinion 3 in his report.

    Key Takeaways:

    • The Court found that reviewing case material and relevant documents, and then providing an assessment of the events in light of Borden’s personal experience in law enforcement, is a sufficiently reliable methodology.
    • The Court held that Borden is qualified to testify as to police practices based on his personal knowledge and experience.
    • The Court decided that Borden’s opinion about Officer Yi’s decision to use handcuffs and detain Briggs in the patrol car has marginal relevance.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Briggs V. Yi Et Al
    Docket Number: 3:22cv265
    Court: United States District Court, Alaska
    Order Date: December 23, 2024
  • Law Enforcement Expert Witness Prohibited From Testifying About the Existence of Probable Cause For Arrest

    Law Enforcement Expert Witness Prohibited From Testifying About the Existence of Probable Cause For Arrest

    On February 26, 2024, the Defendant David Boruchowitz, a Deputy Sheriff with the Nye County Sheriff’s Office (NCSO), collaborated with Ken Johnson, a former Valley Electric Association (VEA) employee to arrest Angela Evans, the then-CEO of the Valley Electric Association (“VEA”), the entity responsible for providing power to residents of Nye County. Ken Johnson was a former employee of VEA who had competed for, and lost, the CEO position that Evans occupied. Because Boruchowitz had not yet secured a warrant, he made a probable cause arrest – as law enforcement officers are permitted to do – because Evans had received work at her personal residence, by VEA, for which she had not paid.

    Even though an “arresting officer’s state of mind (except for the facts he knows) is irrelevant to the existence of probable cause,” the government contended that Boruchowitz’ involvement in a grass-roots movement called “Members for Change,” which sought to make VEA a more responsive organization to its customers, created a conflict of interest so severe that it deprived the Evans arrest of probable cause.

    When Boruchowitz sought to introduce testimony from law enforcement expert Jeronimo Rodriguez, the Government argued that Rodriguez’s proffered testimony is irrelevant, misleading, and makes an impermissible legal conclusion. Boruchowitz responded that Rodriguez’s opinions are relevant to whether Boruchowitz’s arrest of Evans was unlawful and whether he acted willfully. The Government moved in limine to exclude testimony from Rodriguez.

    Law Enforcement Expert Witness

    Jeronimo Rodriguez began his policing career in the summer of 1986. He was an active police officer for 35 years and recently retired from active duty. Since retiring as a law enforcement officer in 2021, he has reviewed and consulted on police and law enforcement practices as a private police consultant. Since 2018, he has provided law enforcement training and management insight for various agencies throughout the United States.

    Want to know more about the challenges Jeronimo Rodriguez has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.   

    Discussion by the Court

    A. Probable Cause

    Rodriguez’s report indicates that he “was asked to review the Nye County Sheriff’s Office’s belief that Evans had committed a crime and opine whether it aligned with generally accepted practices.” Although Rodriguez does not always use the legal phrase “probable cause,” his report applies the facts of the case to conclude that there were sufficient grounds to arrest Evans. Boruchowitz argues that Rodriguez should be allowed to state this opinion because probable cause is an objective standard comparable to professional malpractice and does not go to an ultimate issue because it is only one element of the crime charged.

    However, expert opinion is required in medical or legal malpractice cases only when the negligence is not “within the ordinary knowledge and experience of a layman.” Whether a given set of facts constitutes probable cause to arrest or charge for a crime is within a jury’s ordinary knowledge and experience, as reflected in the constitutional requirement of indictment by grand jury. Regardless of whether it goes to an element or an ultimate issue, the existence of probable cause is a legal conclusion that must be left to the jury. The Court therefore granted the Government’s motion to prohibit Rodriguez from testifying as to whether Boruchowitz had probable cause to arrest Evans.

    B. Credibility of Sources

    The Government also argues that Rodriguez’s report improperly opines on the credibility of other witnesses. Boruchowitz does not respond to this argument in his opposition. Rodriguez states that Boruchowitz received invoices from “a credible source working for Valley Electric.” The jury is entitled to determine whether the Valley Electric employee’s information was credible based on the facts presented at trial. Therefore, the Court granted the Government’s motion to prohibit Rodriguez from testifying about whether informants or witnesses were credible.

    Because the Court granted the Government’s motion to exclude Rodriguez’s opinion on whether there was probable cause to arrest Evans, the Court need not address its request to preclude Rodriguez from relying on post-arrest information to support probable cause. Rodriguez may discuss post-arrest information or actions to the extent they are relevant to rebutting willfulness as described in this order.

    C. Willfulness

    Boruchowitz argued that Rodriguez’s report and testimony will demonstrate that Boruchowitz complied with Nye County Sheriff’s Office (NCSO) policies during the investigation leading up to Evans’ arrest, making it less likely that he willfully violated her rights. In support, he offers Rodriguez’s supplemental report, which opines that Boruchowitz complied with NCSO policies on street sources, informants, searches, and search warrants.

    The Court declared that Rodriguez’s testimony on NCSO policies and procedures would be helpful to the jury in understanding the difference between street sources and informants and how to treat information from such sources. Those concepts are peculiar to law enforcement and not within the average person’s knowledge, as is applying for and executing a search warrant. Rodriguez may thus testify about whether NCSO’s policies on these investigative methods conform to the national standard and whether Boruchowitz’s conduct conformed to the policies.

    Further, Rodriguez may not, however, testify in a way that offers a legal conclusion such as whether Boruchowitz sufficiently corroborated his source’s information, formed a reasonable belief that Evans committed a crime, or conformed to his training “to execute a probable cause arrest.” Rodriguez also may not instruct the jury on the legal standards for probable cause or proof beyond a reasonable doubt, which he describes in his original report.

    Held

    The Plaintiff’s motion to exclude the testimony of Law Expert Witness, Jeronimo Rodriguez is granted in part by the Court.

    Key Takeaways

    • Whether a given set of facts constitutes probable cause to arrest or charge for a crime is within a jury’s ordinary knowledge and experience, as reflected in the constitutional requirement of indictment by grand jury. Regardless of whether it goes to an element or an ultimate issue, the existence of probable cause is a legal conclusion that must be left to the jury. 
    • Rodriguez’s testimony on NCSO policies and procedures would be helpful to the jury in understanding the difference between street sources and informants and how to treat information from such sources. Those concepts are peculiar to law enforcement and not within the average person’s knowledge, as is applying for and executing a search warrant. 

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: United States v. Boruchowitz
    Docket Number: 2:23cr149
    Court: United States District Court for the District of Nevada
    Order Date: November 27, 2024
  • Law Enforcement Expert Witness’ Testimony About Presence of Probable Cause Excluded

    Law Enforcement Expert Witness’ Testimony About Presence of Probable Cause Excluded

    This case arose when Defendant Jacob Salamon, a police officer for the City of Loveland, Ohio, arrested Plaintiff Amanda Caton, an off-duty police officer for the City of Cincinnati, Ohio, for operating a vehicle when intoxicated (“OVI”). Plaintiff Patrick Caton, Amanda Caton’s husband and also an off-duty police officer for the City of Cincinnati, was a passenger in the vehicle when Amanda Caton was pulled over and arrested, and he was present when Officer Salamon later dropped off Amanda Caton at their home. The Catons have sued Officer Salamon, former Loveland Police Chief Dennis Rahe, Officer Shawn Parks, and the City of Loveland for violating their civil rights.

    Plaintiffs proffered Tony Corroto and Defendants proffered Joseph Suhre as their experts on police practices involving OVI investigations. Plaintiffs broadly moved to exclude or limit the expert report and testimony of Suhre under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993). Although Defendants move to strike Corroto’s expert opinion in full, they only specifically object to his opinion that Defendants lacked probable cause to stop and arrest Amanda Caton. 

    Law Enforcement Expert Witnesses

    Joseph Suhre is the owner and principal of Suhre & Associates DUI and Criminal Defense Lawyers. Suhre has dedicated his practice to the defense of OVI cases and other criminal offenses. Suhre has over 20 years of criminal defense experience and an additional 5 years of experience as a police officer. He has handled hundreds of DUI cases before dozens of judges in numerous counties. Because of this, Joe is uniquely qualified to defend his clients against DUI and criminal charges.

    As an attorney, he completed training in OVI detection through courses with the Nation Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) and Advanced Roadside Impaired Driving Enforcement, both likely more than fifteen years ago.

    Discover more cases with Joseph Suhre as an expert witness by ordering his comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

    Tony Corroto served the City of Atlanta Police Department as a police officer for 17 years, spending 14 of them as a senior police officer assigned to the driving under the influence (DUI) task force. He specialized as a standardized field sobriety test (SFST) and drug recognition expert (DRE) instructor. He taught 46 police recruit classes DUI enforcement at the Atlanta Police
    Academy (APA).

    Want to know more about the challenges Tony Corroto has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report. 

    Discussion by the Court

    Joseph Suhre

    Plaintiffs first argued that Suhre is not qualified to testify as a police practices expert. The Court agreed with Defendants that Plaintiffs framed the issue too broadly. The issue is whether Suhre is qualified to offer expert testimony on police practices involving investigations into potential instance of OVI by applying the NHTSA’s OVI-detection standards.

    Though Suhre has not offered expert testimony in a court of law before, he has been retained to instruct about NHTSA standards by the publishing industry, attorneys, and law enforcement organizations. The Court finds that he is qualified with specialized knowledge in the application of NHTSA standards that “will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.

    First, Plaintiffs criticized Suhre’s statement in his expert report that Officer Salamon observed what the NHTSA refers to as a “vigilance problem” when there was “a 4-second delay between the [traffic] light turning green and Caton’s vehicle proceeding forward.” The NHTSA Visual Detection publication does not define what amount of time is “normal” versus “unusually long.” With no further guidance, the Court cannot say that Suhre’s opinion applying his own judgment to the NHTSA standard is unreliable.

    Elsewhere, Suhre opines that Officer Salamon had probable cause to pull Amanda Caton over for traffic violations. However, the Court held that Suhre’s opinion that she did violate a certain traffic provision will not help a factfinder “determine a fact in issue” for purposes of Rule 702(a).

    Second, Plaintiffs objected that Suhre cannot testify about whether Officer Salamon had reasonable suspicion or probable cause to pull over Amanda Caton for a violation. The Court agreed because Suhre’s opinions constituted inadmissible legal conclusions.

    The Court also excluded Suhre from testifying on the application and meaning of statutes and case law generally.

    Tony Corroto

    Defendants do not challenge his Corroto’s qualifications to offer expert testimony. Rather, they moved to strike his testimony to the extent that he states in his report that Officer Salamon did not have probable cause to stop or arrest Amanda Caton. The Court already held in regard to Suhre’s testimony that an expert witness cannot testify about whether probable cause exists.

    Therefore, the Court will strike and not consider Corroto’s report to the extent that he opines that Officer Salamon did not have probable cause to stop or arrest Amanda Caton. However, the Court refused to exclude Corroto’s report or testimony in full because of the improper opinion about probable cause.

    Held

    The Court limited the opinions of both Joseph Suhre and Tony Corroto. Suhre will not be excluded from testifying because he is unqualified to give opinion testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. Corroto will not be permitted to testify about whether probable cause existed to stop or arrest Amanda Caton, but his report will not be otherwise excluded.

    Key Takeaways:

    • Expert witnesses may not testify to legal conclusions or to the applicability or interpretation of a particular statute or regulation. Courts are “capable” of interpreting statutes “without the assistance of an expert.
    • Although an expert’s opinion may ’embrace an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact, the issue embraced must be a factual one.
    • Courts permit experts to testify about discrete police-practice issues when those experts are properly credentialed and their testimony assists the trier of fact.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Caton V. Salamon
    Docket Number: 1:22cv345
    Court: United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Western Division
    Order Date: September 18, 2024