This case arises out of the tragic murder of four University of Idaho students in November 2022. Plaintiff Rebecca Scofield is a professor at the University of Idaho. She alleged that, despite never meeting any of these students or being involved with their murders in any way, Defendant Ashley Guillard posted numerous TikTok (and later YouTube) videos falsely claiming that Plaintiff (i) had an extramarital, same-sex, romantic affair with one of the victims; and then (ii) ordered the four murders to prevent the affair from coming to light.
Plaintiff sent cease-and-desist letters to Defendant in the following days and weeks. When Defendant did not stop, Plaintiff initiated this action. Plaintiff asserts two defamation claims against Defendant: one is premised upon the false statements regarding Plaintiff’s involvement with the murders themselves, the other is premised upon the false statement regarding Plaintiff’s romantic relationship with one of the murdered students.
Plaintiff has identified two experts who may testify at trial: Dr. Rebecca Tallent and Rebecca Bohn. In advance of trial, Defendant filed a motion to exclude these experts’ testimony pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 702.
Public Relations Expert Witness
Rebecca J. Tallent is a retired associate professor emerita with more than five decades of experience in journalism, public relations, and academia. She holds a bachelor’s degree in journalism, a master’s degree in education with a journalism emphasis, and a doctorate in education focused on higher education, classroom teaching, and mass communications.
During her career, Tallent taught public relations and journalism at the University of Idaho and other institutions, published scholarly and professional works on media and ethics, and worked professionally in journalism and public relations.
Rebecca Bohn is a licensed mental health counselor with a Master of Arts degree in counseling psychology and more than three decades of experience providing psychotherapy and behavioral health treatment.
Tallent offered opinions concerning how defamatory statements made via social medial can affect an individual’s professional reputation in an academic setting. She specifically opined that Defendant’s statements have damaged Plaintiff’s reputation to a significant degree and that it could take decades, or even a generation, for Plaintiff to restore her reputation, if ever.
Defendant argued that Tallent is not qualified to offer these opinions and that her testimony is unreliable because it is speculative, exaggerated, and unsupported by facts or data tied to Plaintiff’s actual circumstances.
The Court held that Tallent’s education, training, and extensive professional experience in journalism, public relations, and academia qualify her to testify as an expert regarding general principles of reputation, branding, and the ways in which negative publicity — particularly online — can impact professionals in academic environments.
Tallent’s testimony is also relevant. Testimony explaining how reputational harm can occur, how internet-based dissemination differs from traditional media, and how academics may be uniquely vulnerable to reputational injury may assist the trier of fact in understanding issues beyond the knowledge of a lay juror.
However, much of Tallent’s report is framed in conditional or probabilistic terms, such as statements that Defendant’s conduct “ha[s] the capacity” to affect Plaintiff’s reputation or “may cause” harm. Such phrasing underscores the speculative nature of her conclusions and highlights the absence of a reliable basis for opining that reputational harm has in fact occurred, or will occur, to any particular degree. Given the significant weight juries may place on expert testimony, Rule 702 requires more than unsupported statements grounded solely in the expert’s authority. Without a reliable foundation demonstrating how Tallent reached her conclusions about the existence, severity, or duration of Plaintiff’s reputational harm, those opinions risk misleading the jury.
Rebecca Bohn
Bohn began treating Plaintiff in May 2023 and has met with her regularly since that time. Based on her training, clinical experience, and longitudinal treatment of Plaintiff, Bohn diagnosed Plaintiff with post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) and opined that Plaintiff will require ongoing mental health treatment into the future.
Based on her training, clinical experience, and longitudinal treatment of Plaintiff, Bohn diagnosed Plaintiff with post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) and opined that Plaintiff will require ongoing mental health treatment into the future.
Defendant argued that Bohn is not qualified to diagnose PTSD, that her opinions are unreliable because they allegedly depart from the DSM-5 diagnostic criteria, and that defamation cannot, as a matter of law or medicine, constitute a qualifying traumatic event.
The Court disagreed and concluded that Bohn is qualified to testify and that Defendant’s challenges go to the weight of her testimony, not its admissibility. Moreover, testimony regarding Plaintiff’s mental health diagnosis, symptoms, treatment history, and prognosis may assist the jury in understanding the nature and scope of the claimed injury and in determining damages, if any. Accordingly, Bohn’s testimony satisfies Rule 702’s relevance requirement.
The Court additionally found Bohn’s testimony sufficiently reliable. As a psychotherapist, licensed mental health counselor, and behavior health educator, she is uniquely qualified to diagnose patients with mental impairments, including PTSD. Defendant’s unsupported argument that defamation cannot constitute a traumatic triggering event sufficient to support a PTSD diagnosis is ultimately a dispute over diagnostic criteria and causation.
Held
The Court granted in part and denied in part the Defendant’s motion to exclude the expert testimony and evidence of Rebecca Bohn and Rebecca Tallent.
Key Takeaway
Unlike an expert retained solely for litigation, Bohn’s opinions are premised upon a course of treatment, repeated clinical evaluations, and an ongoing relationship with Plaintiff. Courts recognize that such medical care provides a reliable basis for diagnostic opinions.
Whether Plaintiff’s experience satisfies the clinical requirements for PTSD are matters on which mental health professions may (or may not) disagree. Such disagreements are appropriately explored through cross-examination and, if Defendant chooses, competing expert testimony. They do not, however, render Bohn’s opinions unreliable for purposes of Rule 702. This is because courts routinely allow expert testimony linking psychological conditions to tortious conduct, including defamation.
Defendant Bryant Wilson (hereinafter “Defendant”) was charged with voluntary manslaughter and possession of contraband in prison, following a prison fight at USP Canaan that resulted in the stabbing death of Defendant’s victim on November 28, 2021.
Defendant did not contest that the fight happened, nor that the death of his victim resulted; rather, he asserted that he acted in self-defense.
On November 10, 2025, Defendant notified the Government that he wished to offer the expert testimony of Dr. Stephen M. Timchack, PsyD at trial, pursuant to Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. He indicated that Timchak would testify to Defendant’s symptoms consistent with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”).
Psychology Expert Witness
Dr. Stephen M. Timchack, PsyD has extensive training and background in both clinical and forensic psychology.
Timchack has held faculty positions at Wilkes University, Misericordia University, and the University of Scranton.
Psychiatric evidence cannot serve as a defense unless it renders the Defendant legally insane, and even if the Defendant is deemed insane, such evidence is inadmissible unless it negates the mens rea of the crime charged.
Here, the Government thoroughly analyzed this issue with respect to the mens rea requirement of voluntary manslaughter.
Defendant did not dispute the Government’s argument; instead, Defendant narrowly focused on admissibility of the psychiatric evidence for purposes of his self-defense claim. Thus, Defendant essentially conceded that his PTSD evidence did not truly negate mens rea.
The PTSD evidence did not negate mens rea, so it was inadmissible. Furthermore, Defendant’s analogous reasoning did not hold up under scrutiny. As the Government noted,
“Battered woman’s syndrome focuses on the perceived threat posed by the batterer on the battered, while PTSD, as shown by Timchak’s report, focuses on a more general, perceptual perceived threat posed to the PTSD-sufferer by his surroundings . . . Here, [Defendant] was not under duress or defending himself against his “batterer” or someone who had assaulted him in the past. So [Defendant’s] PTSD is much less probative to the disputed issues here than those in the cases relied on by the Defendant.”
Even if the Court were to find that PTSD negates the mens rea of voluntary manslaughter in this case, the psychiatric evidence would still be inadmissible as both irrelevant and confusing to the jury.
Held
The Court granted the Government’s motion in limine to preclude the expert testimony of Dr. Stephen Timchak.
Key Takeaway:
Simply, PTSD does not constitute insanity, nor does PTSD negate the mens rea for voluntary manslaughter. The Court posits, as a theory, that PTSD could have inflamed Defendant’s reaction such that he carried out the killing in the heat of passion. In other words, PTSD likely offers an explanation, not a negation.
Case Details:
Case Caption:
USA V. Wilson
Docket Number:
3:24cr239
Court Name:
United States District Court, Pennsylvania Middle
Order Date:
November 17, 2025
Please refer to the blog previously published about this case:
Mamnoon Khan (“Khan” or “Plaintiff”) brought this action against Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc. (“Sedgwick”), Kim Hottel (“Hottel”), and Colleen Van Tuyl (“Van Tuyl”) (together, “Defendants”), alleging workplace maltreatment and racial discrimination.
Dr. Joshua Kriegel is a board-certified psychiatrist that has been treating Plaintiff since August of 2023.
Defendants Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc. (“Sedgwick”), Colleen Van Tuyl and Kimberly Hottel filed a motion to disqualify Kriegel from testifying at trial as Plaintiff’s designated expert witness.
Psychiatry Expert Witness
Joshua Kriegel, M.D. is aboard certified psychiatrist licensed in Massachusetts and faculty member at UMass Chan Medical School.
He completed his medical degree at Boston University School of Medicine and his adult psychiatry residency at the UMass Chan Medical School.
On the record before the Court, Kriegel appears only to have drawn the conclusion that Plaintiff suffers from PTSD related to cumulative experiences over ten years in the workplace, including, at least in part, an incident with a coworker that involved a knife.
Kriegel’s specialized training and knowledge, his role as Plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist, and the evidence he received through his treatment of Plaintiff together appear adequate to support his expert opinion. Even if those experiences predated Plaintiff’s employment at Sedgwick, they are relevant for purposes of damages.
On the other hand, the fact that he is Plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist did not free him of the requirements of Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which will govern his testimony assuming that he is admitted as an expert.
Held
The Court denied the Defendants’ motion to disqualify Dr. Joshua Kriegel as Plaintiff’s expert.
Key Takeaway:
Kriegel’s testimony is relevant and helpful to the jury. As Plaintiff’s treating physician, he is uniquely situated to provide testimony regarding Plaintiff’s symptoms and their causes.
Plaintiff Arthur Williams (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants East Meadow Union Free School District, Matthew Melnick, Scott Eckers, Alisa Baroukh, Eileen Napolitano, Joseph Parisi, Marcee Rubenstein, Melissa Tell, Dr. Kenneth Card, and Dr. Patrick Pizzo (collectively, “Defendants”), alleging discrimination based on race, color, and age, as well as a hostile work environment and retaliatory actions.
The Plaintiff, a former employee of East Meadow Union Free School District, alleged that the Defendants discriminated against him based on his race and age and created a hostile work environment during his employment. In 2016 Defendant Patrick Pizzo, District Assistant Superintendent for Business and Finance, encouraged Plaintiff to apply for a position as Assistant to the Superintendent for Administration and Special Projects, for which he was subsequently hired. Despite his superior performance in that role, Plaintiff claimed that he was treated differently than his white counterparts and was subjected to excessive scrutiny and performance evaluations.
Following the Superintendent’s retirement, Pizzo made discriminatory comments on account of Plaintiff’s age and race and such conduct worsened upon Plaintiff attempting to report the conduct. Pizzo placed Plaintiff on a performance improvement plan, and ultimately Pizzo terminated Plaintiff from his position.
Discovery deadlines were extended numerous times for a host of reasons throughout the protracted history of this case. Following a status conference on July 10, 2024, the dates were extended so that expert in chief reports were due no later than July 15, 2024, rebuttal reports were due no later than September 11, 2024, and the end date of all expert discovery was October 2, 2024. The parties were forewarned that “[t]his will be the final extension of discovery dates and deadlines.”
Final Discovery Deadline Violation
Dr. Michael J. Vernarelli, Plaintiff’s forensic economist expert submitted his initial report on August 16, 2022, and, following his deposition, produced his supplemental report on October 14, 2024. Similarly, Dr. Darlene Powell Garlington , a clinical psychologist, submitted her initial report on July 12, 2024, was deposed by Defendants on October 2, 2024, and then submitted a supplemental report on November 6, 2024. It should be noted that both expert reports were served after the final discovery deadline.
Defendants filed a motion to strike both supplemental reports under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37, claiming they were not only untimely but also went beyond the permissible scope of supplemental reports. Plaintiff filed timely opposition to the motion on December 23, 2024.
Economics Expert Witness
Michael J. Vernarelli is a forensic economist and a noted academic. He has significant experience consulting with Plaintiff and Defense attorneys, performing appraisals of loss of lifetime earnings and economic value in cases of wrongful death, personal injury, age discrimination, and equitable distribution in addition to providing expert testimony.
Darlene Garlington is a nationally-recognized, licensed clinical psychologist, certified school psychologist, and media psychologist. She is a renowned author of eleven books which focus primarily on building resilience, parenting, family dynamics, spirituality, multiculturalism, co-parenting, male-female relationships and diversity.
Vernarelli’s initial and supplemental reports were prepared to calculate the lost back pay and front pay for Plaintiff as a result of his allegedly wrongful termination.
On October 14, 2024, Vernarelli amended his initial report, which he had submitted on August 16, 2022. In his amended expert disclosure, Vernarelli explained that during his deposition, he realized that he needed to deduct Plaintiff’s Social Security benefits as mitigating income for both lost back pay and lost front pay through Plaintiff’s projected retirement date. He admitted to making a “big oversight” and discovered “an error” in not taking into account these benefits in calculating either back pay or front pay. Vernarelli acknowledged that his calculation method was flawed because he did not account for the fact that this is a civil rights/discrimination case and not a personal injury case where social security benefits ordinarily are not an offset until post-verdict.
Moreover, Vernarelli failed to, but now admits he needed to, account for the higher Social Security benefits Plaintiff would receive upon turning 70—his projected age of retirement. As Vernarelli stated, this meant Plaintiff’s pre-retirement damages should be lower while his post-retirement damages should be higher. Indeed, Vernarelli initially concluded Plaintiff was entitled to lost earnings (back and front pay) of $892,308 and lost pension benefits (front pay) of $296,475. Conversely, in his amended report, after taking into account the Social Security benefits, Vernarelli determined Plaintiff’s lost earnings (back and front pay) should be $702,848 while his lost pension benefits (front pay) should be $545,192, thereby increasing the total damage assessment by $59,257.00.
The Garlington Reports:
Garlington’s initial report, submitted on July 12, 2024, was based on a psychological assessment of Plaintiff’s mental and emotional well-being. In this report, Garlington concluded that Plaintiff suffered from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) with co-occurring depression and anxiety, referencing bouts of low confidence and cognitive difficulties like inability to focus or recall events. Garlington added that PTSD is a “disease of non-recovery,” and concluded that symptoms “do not dissipate or become manageable to be able to function as the individual did prior to the trauma.”
On November 6, 2024, Garlington submitted an amended report after reviewing additional medical records provided by Plaintiff. These records included findings from Dr. Abraham Glasman, a neurologist who began treating Plaintiff in 2022, and Dr. Christine Weber, who conducted a neuropsychological consultation with Plaintiff in August 2022. Glasman diagnosed Plaintiff with “mild cognitive impairment,” and eventually updated it to “dementia with unspecified severity without behavioral disturbance, psychotic disturbance, mood disturbance and anxiety.” Weber diagnosed Plaintiff with “unspecified dementia with behavioral disturbance” after noting a slow and continuous progression of cognitive decline and corresponding symptoms.
Garlington concluded that Plaintiff had developed Complex PTSD (CPTSD), which she attributed to the ongoing nature of his traumatic experiences.
The Parties’ Arguments
Argument by Defendant
Defendants argued that both the supplemental reports should be struck due to their untimeliness. This case is in the Daubert and summary judgment briefing stage, thus reopening discovery on these experts’ new information would prejudice Defendants through increased costs and delays. Moreover, Vernarelli had ample opportunity to “update and revise” his initial findings as he had access to Plaintiff’s financial information for calculating damages, specifically Social Security damages, yet has failed to indicate why he did not revise his initial report sooner. Furthermore, Defendants posited that Vernarelli “significantly altered his prior damages assessment” by lowering Plaintiff’s pre-retirement damages while increasing post-retirement damages.
With respect to Garlington, Defendants argued that she “drastically revised” her conclusions after reviewing Plaintiff’s prior medical and psychological treatment records. In other words, her supplemental report introduced entirely new theories on which Defendants have had no discovery at all. With the new diagnosis, Defendants claimed that the scope of the first report expanded and is now inconsistent with the initial report.
Argument by Plaintiff
Plaintiff contended that the supplemental reports were a direct result of information raised at the experts’ respective depositions, ones scheduled for the last and second to last day of expert discovery.
Plaintiff specifically argued that Vernarelli’s supplemental report was in direct response to his realization during his deposition that his Social Security calculation was “not fully accurate.” Moreover, as alleged, his initial report did not account for the higher Social Security benefits Plaintiff would have received upon retirement at 70 years old. Such a drastic change in damages, as Plaintiff contends, “is a reflection of the accurate calculations.” Similarly, as argued, Garlington amended her report to provide a “fair and accurate depiction of Plaintiff’s psychological state” after learning, during her deposition, of prior medical reports diagnosing Plaintiff with dementia.
Analysis
Courts “will not admit supplemental expert evidence following the close of discovery when it expounds a wholly new and complex approach designed to fill a significant and logical gap in the first report.” To allow such new evidence to be presented would undermine the purpose of the discovery rules, circumvent the discovery schedule that was ordered by the Court, and prejudice a Plaintiff.
a. Vernarelli’s Report
Vernarelli, though his amended report sought to clarify an “inaccurate” calculation, nothing in the record indicates that the Social Security damages were “unknown or unavailable” to him. In fact, Vernarelli had access to all of Plaintiff’s financial information, including Social Security damages, when he formed his initial report. Additionally, Plaintiff sought to submit Vernarelli’s supplemental report in order to correct his flawed approach to his damages calculation. At bottom, the Court held that Vernarelli’s inaccurate damages calculation resulted from his utilization of a damages calculation tailored towards personal injury cases, not civil rights or discrimination cases. Having chosen to utilize an incorrect methodology in calculating damages, as Vernarelli has done here, does not warrant admitting a supplemental report aimed at correcting that flawed method.
b. Garlington’s Report
Garlington offered several new diagnoses in her amended report, like CPTSD and dementia, that stretched far beyond the scope of her conclusions enunciated in her initial report. The Court held that Garlington’s supplemental report offers new medical opinions and conclusions, rather than clarifying or elucidating the conclusions in her original report.
In considering whether to preclude supplemental experts reports under Federal Rule 37(c)(1), courts, in exercising their discretion, usually consider the following four factors:
The Party’s Explanation for the Delay in Advancing the New Evidence
Importance of the Precluded Evidence
Prejudice Suffered by the Opposing Party
Possibility of a Continuance
i. The Party’s Explanation for the Delay in Advancing the New Evidence
In conclusory fashion, Plaintiff stated that Vernarelli realized the Social Security benefits needed to be deducted and that he did not take them into account despite the fact that Vernarelli had access to this financial information when he formed his initial report. As to Garlington, it is argued that she did not know about the other expert’s reports before she was deposed, namely because Plaintiff allegedly withheld medical information from her. The Court noted that Garlington had numerous opportunities to ascertain this information as the discovery schedule was extended at several different points during this almost four-year litigation.
Plaintiff offered nothing to the Court explaining why Garlington could not obtain this new evidence before examining Plaintiff herself, or why Vernarelli did not account for Social Security damages in his initial report before discovery closed.
ii. Importance of the Precluded Evidence
The reports were important as each were crucial to different elements of Plaintiff’s damages. The Court recognized that evidence affecting even a relatively small portion of total damages could be sufficiently important to weigh against preclusion which is why this factor favors admitting Vernarelli’s report. Moreover, relevant to Garlington, previously conducted medical examinations and subsequent findings were important because they formed the basis for a change in diagnosis.
iii. Prejudice Suffered by the Opposing Party
The case was approaching four years since its commencement on June 11, 2021. Allowing these supplemental reports would necessitate reopening expert discovery, potentially leading to further depositions, reports, and motion practice, thereby resulting in increased time and resources to an already lengthy litigation nearing its end. The Court found this factor heavily favored preclusion keeping in mind the purported prejudice Defendants stood to suffer.
iv. Possibility of a Continuance
The Court held that a continuance was not appropriate as the case has been ongoing for almost four years, other discovery motions have been filed in addition to the current motion to strike, and discovery deadlines, particularly as to experts, have been continuously extended.
In sum, the Court excluded the supplemental reports offered by Vernarelli and Garlington.
Held
The Court granted Defendants’ motion to strike the supplemental expert reports of Michael J. Vernarelli and Darlene Powell Garlington.
Key Takeaway:
Vernarelli noted that his calculation method was wrong because he did not account for the fact that this is a civil rights/discrimination case and not a personal injury case where social security benefits ordinarily are not an offset until post-verdict. Similarly, Garlington’s revised report, which introduced new diagnoses of CPTSD and dementia, was deemed improper because it went beyond her initial psychological findings. The Court applied a four-factor test, considering the delay in submitting the reports, their importance to Plaintiff’s damages, the prejudice to Defendants, and the unavailability of a continuance. Ultimately, the Court ruled that allowing the reports would unfairly extend the litigation, increase costs, and introduce new, unvetted theories, thereby prejudicing the Defendants.
Case Details:
Case Caption:
Williams vs. East Meadow Union Free School District Et Al
Docket Number:
2:21cv3310
Court:
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York
Sarah Budd alleged that SkyWest (Defendant) discriminated against Budd by subjecting her to a sexually hostile work environment during her employment at SkyWest’s Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport facility and retaliating against her for reporting the harassment. Budd claimed that SkyWest placed her on indefinite administrative leave as retaliation.
In response, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) filed a motion to exclude Dr. Steven H. Berger‘s anticipated opinion testimony, which challenged the Plaintiffs’ expert Dr. Kristin W. Samuelson‘s diagnoses and the results of her assessment of Budd using the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory—Third Edition (MMPI-3).
Psychiatry Expert Witness
Steven H. Berger is a graduate of the University of Michigan Medical School (1972). He has been licensed as a physician in Nevada since 2004, in California since 1999, and in 6 other states. He is board certified in General Psychiatry (1978) and Forensic Psychiatry (1985, 1998, 2005, 2013, 2019). He is a Clinical Professor of Psychiatry, University of Nevada, Reno, School of Medicine. He is a member of the American Psychiatric Association (1975) and has been a Distinguished Life Fellow since 2009. He is a member of the American Medical Association (1974) and the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law (1985). He served as the Chairman of the Ethics Committee of the Michigan Psychiatric Society (1989-1994) and the Indiana Psychiatric Society (2001-2017).
A. Berger has received no specialized training on PTSD
Berger opined that Samuelson’s diagnosis of Budd suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) was incorrect. The EEOC contended that this opinion should be excluded, arguing that Berger was unqualified to render it and that it was irrelevant and unreliable. The Court held that Berger’s opinion and related testimony were inadmissible. He lacked the qualifications to critique Samuelson’s performance of the psychological assessments that support her diagnosis because he has never performed them himself, he is not qualified to read or interpret their resulting data, he has received no specialized training on PTSD, and he has never written on the topic.
The Court also deemed Berger’s opinion unreliable. His purported “common-sense” approach to interpreting the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition, did not meet the reliability standards required by Rule 702.
Furthermore, Berger claimed that the MMPI-3 assessment that Samuelson administered to Budd indicated that she over-reported some symptoms. The EEOC argued that this opinion did not occur to Berger, but to his colleague, Dr. Sarah Hall, to whom he provided Samuelson’s data. While SkyWest claimed Berger offered an independent analysis of Hall’s findings on the MMPI-3, the Court, once again, found this opinion inadmissible. It was unreliable, and rests on Berger’s common sense and life experience rather than an independent analysis of Hall’s findings. Moreover, the Court decided that Berger—who had never administered the MMPI-3 and was unable to read its test data—is unqualified both to opine on Budd’s MMPI-3 assessment and to independently analyze Hall’s MMPI-3 findings.
B. Berger draws impermissible legal conclusions
Berger stated that Budd failed to mitigate her symptoms and that her litigation stress was not compensable. The EEOC contended that Berger made impermissible conclusions of fact and law, while SkyWest argued that his testimony would help the jury understand the evidence. The Court determined these opinions were inadmissible as well. Berger was unqualified to offer legal conclusions, and his reliance on common sense and life experience rendered his opinions unreliable.
Held
The Court granted the EEOC’s motion to exclude Defendant’s expert witness, Steven H. Berger.
Key Takeaway:
Berger has received no specialized training on PTSD, and he has never written on the topic. Certain opinions offered by Berger rest on what he acknowledges are his common sense and life experience, and Hall’s findings, which he did not independently analyze. The Court did not admit his testimony.
Case Details:
Case Caption:
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission V. Skywest Airlines Inc
Docket Number:
3:22cv1807
Court:
United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division
