Tag: Safety

  • Safety Expert Allowed to Opine on Effectiveness of Warning Signs 

    Safety Expert Allowed to Opine on Effectiveness of Warning Signs 

    Plaintiff Anthony Rebmann sues Astec, Inc. d/b/a Astec of Tennessee and Astec Industries, Inc. (collectively, “Astec”) based on an incident on March 19, 2020, when, in the course of his employment at an asphalt plant, his left hand became entangled in an Astec baghouse screw conveyor. Astec has answered and has also filed a Third-Party Complaint against Rebmann’s employer at the time, Gernatt Asphalt Products, Inc. (“Gernatt”), claiming contribution and negligent training and supervision.

    Astec sought to strike the report of Plaintiff’s life-care expert, Nadeem I. Hussain, M.D. and has also filed motions in limine to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff’s products-warnings (or “human factors”) expert, Gerald M. Goldhaber, Ph.D. and Plaintiff’s products-liability expert Thomas A. Berry, P.E.

    Plaintiff has filed his own motion to exclude or limit the opinions of Astec’s expert, Dennis B. Brickman, P.E.

    Safety Expert Witness

    Dr. Gerald Martin Goldhaber has emerged as the nation’s leading safety warnings and communication expert. He is the publisher of the Goldhaber Warnings Report. His clients have included over 100 of the top 500 corporations in the U.S. Fifty of the top 100 law firms and government agencies, including the FDA (for whom he consulted on a new nutritional label). Goldhaber’s clients have also included the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) to establish guidelines for products ranging from All Terrain Vehicles (ATV’s) to soda bottles to in-line skates, the USDA for whom he has consulted about potential warnings for sugary products.

    Discover more cases with Gerald Goldhaber as an expert witness by ordering his comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

    Physical Medicine And Rehabilitation Expert Witness

    Dr. Nadeem Imran Hussain is a Physical Medicine & Rehabilitation specialist who has practiced medicine in New York since 2014.

    Hussain is a licensed physician in the state of New York, and he is certified by the American Board of Physical Medicine & Rehabilitation.

    Want to know more about the challenges Nadeem Hussain has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Mechanical Engineering Expert Witness

    Dennis Barry Brickman is an industry veteran with over 40 years of mechanical engineering and materials science experience.

    Brickman has developed specialized expertise in the safety of children’s products, outdoor power equipment, tree care machinery, elastic cord products, and automatic door sensor systems.

    Get the full story on challenges to Dennis Brickman’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Engineering Expert Witness

    Thomas Alan Berry holds a Master of Science in Mechanical Engineering from Wichita State University and a Bachelor of Science in Mechanical Engineering from the same institution.

    He has authored at least 15 peer-reviewed papers presented at ASAE/ASABE and ASME conferences between 1985 and 2013, covering topics such as PTO safety, agricultural equipment accidents, forklift tipover risks, pallet truck accidents, mower stability, and gasoline geysering hazards.

    Gain a comprehensive understanding of Thomas Berry’s qualifications and casework history with his Expert Witness Profile report.

    Discussion by the Court

    A. Thomas Berry, P.E.

    Plaintiff has retained Thomas Berry, P.E., as an engineering expert in this case. Berry has opined that Astec “knew or should have known of technically and economically feasible design alternatives that would have significantly reduced and/or eliminated the risk to operators without unnecessarily affecting the utility of the [baghouse] machine.”

    Astec sought to exclude Berry’s opinions regarding causation and alternative designs, arguing that he “failed to properly test and validate his opinions, basing them instead on unsupported assumptions.”

    1. Clearance Between Door and Nip/Shear Point

    The first alternative design is to add “clearance between the access door opening and the nip/shear point created by the extremely small distance between the auger flighting and the housing.” According to Berry, “this could be accomplished by raising the edge of the access door opening or providing a grate guard for the lower area of the opening, or by utilizing a left-hand flighted screw that would move the nip area to the back of the auger rather than directly below the access opening.”

    a. Testing

    The Court concluded that Berry did not need to perform testing as to his alternative of raising the edge of the access door opening. Astec’s expert has asserted that “[f]lighted screw augers typically have a close clearance with respect to their housing [because] otherwise, material builds up and does not adequately move near the housing interior structure.” That is sensible and understandable, but the housing in the area at issue appears to be rectangular, containing a cylindrical auger. With that geometry, the Court concluded that no testing would be required to support Berry’s opinion that raising the lower edge of the access door opening could put the pinch/nip point beyond the reach of fingers when the hand is grasping the lower edge of the housing.

    b. Cost

    Astec asserted that Berry has failed to conduct a “meaningful” comparison of the cost versus utility of his proposed alternative designs.

    Plaintiff did not dispute the importance of cost in the analysis. But Plaintiff maintained that the associated costs were zero, nominal, required by industry standards, or otherwise based on Berry’s training, education, and experience.

    As to cost, Berry asserted that raising the lip of the access opening could be provided “at no or little difference in cost.”

    Absent special considerations that are not immediately apparent and that could be the subject of cross-examination, the Court agreed that no further explanation or analysis is necessary for Berry’s opinion that designing or cutting the port in the auger housing to place the lip of the access door at a higher point would carry little or no cost difference.

    c. Efficacy

    Astec also argued that Berry’s report lacks evidence that the proposed alternative designs “could have prevented” Rebmann’s injuries. Plaintiff maintained that the standard is not whether the design would have “prevented” the injury, but whether the design would have resulted in greater safety.

    The Court agreed with Astec that designing the crossover screw with left flighting instead of right flighting would not have been materially safer. Berry asserted that the change “would move the nip area to the back of the auger.”

    Raising the lower edge of the inspection door opening, however, does not suffer from the same problem. Astec correctly observed that Berry’s supplemental report recommends raising the edge by “a few inches” which is not a particularly precise specification. And if “a few inches” means just two or three inches, then Astec may be correct that the modification would not eliminate the risk of entanglement for a hand grasping the bottom edge of the inspection door opening. But the Court is not persuaded that Berry needed to calculate precisely how many inches the edge would have to be raised. It is apparent from the layout and geometry of the inspection door opening that raising the bottom edge by some number of inches—more than two but less than half the height of the inspection door opening—would put the nip/shear point more than a finger’s length away.

    2. Bars on Lower Area of Access Opening, or Grate

    a. Testing

    Similar to the alternative of raising the bottom edge of the inspection door opening, the Court concluded that Berry did not need to test the alternative of adding bars across the lower area of the access opening. This solution is functionally identical to raising the edge of the door opening. The main difference is that that lower area of the access opening would be covered with parallel bars instead of solid metal.

    b. Cost

    Like the alternative of raising the bottom edge of the inspection door opening, Berry asserted that the cost of adding bars would be low; in his view, “less than $10-15.” Astec maintained that Berry’s cost estimate should be excluded for lack of any “meaningful explanation.”

    The Court is not persuaded that more explanation is required; the proposed alternative design appears to involve ordinary components that could be incorporated into the inspection door opening at modest cost.

    c. Efficacy

    Similar to raising the bottom edge of the inspection door opening, adding a sufficient number of bars at the lower area of the opening would put the nip/shear point more than a finger’s length away. Astec argued that dust accumulation in the area would prevent visibility through the bars.

    At his deposition, Berry conceded that dust accumulation between the bars would obstruct visibility if the bars were not cleaned off. Even if not cleaned off, the alternative design is for bars only on the lower area of the access opening; the upper area would still offer views into the enclosure. The Court concluded that Berry can testify to the bars as an alternative design.

    3. Interlock

    a. Testing

    Berry’s third proposed alternative design would be to provide an interlock system “such that the augers could not operate with the access doors open or [without] a grate guard in place” to prevent contact with the running auger that would “still allow the dust to escape during the clearing operation and would allow visual inspection of the augers and shafts.”

    There appears to be no dispute that interlock technology existed at the time the baghouse was designed and manufactured in the 1980s, But Astec asserted that Berry should have conducted testing to determine whether such a device “would work on the Baghouse.”

    The Court agreed that adding an interlock device would be a “more substantial modification” to the Baghouse, and that the practicality and specifics of installation of an interlock depends on the machine to which it would be applied.

    Although it appeared that it would at least be possible to conduct testing of an interlock system applied to the Baghouse, the Court concluded that the lack of any testing or modeling weighs somewhat against admission of Berry’s opinions on the interlock design.

    b. Cost

    In his report, Berry asserted that integrating “interlocked doors and grate guards” into the Baghouse would cost “approximately $200 per opening.”

    Astec maintained that Bery “gives no explanation, sources, or support” for that assertion.The Court agreed with Astec that further support is necessary for Berry’s price estimate because the cost estimate must consider more than purchase price.

    Astec noted that Conveyor Equipment Manufacturers Association (CEMA) industry manual is “an industry group not focused on regulation (or authorized to regulate) but on voluntary standardization of conveyor design.” Even assuming that the CEMA manual purported to require interlocks for applications like the Baghouse, the manual would not constitute regulatory or binding authority. Thus, the cost of an interlock system remains relevant to the reliability inquiry.

    c. Efficacy

    Perhaps the most important consideration as to the interlock design is whether it would improve safety without negatively impacting maintenance and inspection. Berry and Rebmann both testified that Rebmann needed the crossover screw to be running while he was looking into the inspection door because he needed to determine whether the repair to the screw was successful.

    The Court is unpersuaded on this point. If disabling the proposed interlock were the only way to accomplish the inspection, Plaintiff could argue that the time spent doing so could have called extra attention to the need for caution near the spinning auger. Moreover, disabling the interlock would not have necessarily been the only way for Rebmann to complete his task. One version of the interlock that Berry proposes is that it would prevent the augers from operating unless a grate guard was in place. In that scenario, Rebmann would likely have simply replaced the grate guard, rather than attempting to disable the interlock mechanism. The Court concluded that all of these questions about testing, cost, and efficacy of an interlock system are suitable for cross-examination but are not a basis to exclude Berry’s testimony on that alternative.

    4. Safety Signs

    There appears to be a dispute about whether Astec supplied safety signs on or near the inspection door when the product was delivered to Gernatt in 1984. No warning signs or labels are visible on or near the inspection door in the contemporaneous photographs. However, Astec Vice President George Francisco testified in 2024 that he worked for Astec for over 31 years, and that in his experience during that time, Astec would affix warning labels to areas like the inspection door on the baghouse at issue in this case.

    a. Testing

    Aster’s arguments about the proposed addition of safety signs or warning labels do not appear to include a lack-of-testing criticism. In the context of warning labels, the testing that is often most relevant involves “creating several warning labels that varied with respect only to a single characteristic and then gauging peoples’ reactions to the various labels.”

    Here, in contrast, the inquiry is only the presence or absence of any warning labels at all. Testing might be helpful to determine how long a safety sign would remain attached or visible in a dusty and vibrating environment, but the court does not conclude that such testing was necessary here.

    b. Cost

    Berry asserted that safety signs at each access door could have been provided “at a cost of less than $3 each.” Astec faults that assertion as unsupported by any explanation or sources.

    The Court concluded that no further support is required for the proposition that, at least compared to the total cost of a baghouse, industrial safety signs were relatively inexpensive in the 1980s. Whether special adhesion or paint might be required for equipment in a dusty and vibrating environment would be fair game for cross examination.

    c. Efficacy

    Astec contended that “there is a complete absence of factual support for Berry’s conclusion that the alleged failure to warn was a proximate cause of Plaintiff’s injuries.”

    Astec cited Berry’s testimony stating that he agreed that “it’s reasonable to expect that [warnings on equipment] [are] not going to be read.” Plaintiff countered that “the general concept that not all warnings are followed, does not negate Astec’s responsibility to adequately warn.”

    The Court agreed with Plaintiff on this point; safety signs and placards have long been established as “resulting in greater safety.” The Court’s reasoning below as to Astec’s motion to exclude Plaintiff’s products-warnings expert, Goldhaber, supports this conclusion.

    B. Gerald Goldhaber, Ph.D.

    1. “Unsupported Assumptions” on Effectiveness of Warnings

    Astec contended that Goldhaber’s opinions are “premised on the false narrative that Plaintiff was told to get close to the moving screw to check it.”

    At his deposition, Goldhaber asserted that Robert Rebmann, Anthony Rebmann’s uncle and immediate supervisor, directly ordered Anthony Rebmann to “first clean the dust out, and inspect those augers.”

    The fact that Robert Rebmann agreed that the “check” required the augers to be turning does not prove that he expressly instructed Anthony Rebmann to perform the check. Based on its review of Robert Rebmann and Anthony Rebmann’s testimony, the Court agreed with Astec that there is no support for the proposition that Robert Rebmann expressly instructed to carry out a “check” or “inspection” of the repaired crossover screw (or how to perform that check). The Court therefore agreed to limit Goldhaber’s testimony insofar as he might opine that Rebmann received instructions to put aside his training, background, or common sense.

    Astec has a further criticism about the factual basis for Goldhaber’s report: Astec contended that his opinions “disregard that Plaintiff habitually ignored safety protocols, safety training and safety procedures.” The original report, dated August 8, 2024, did not discuss Rebmann’s prior safety incidents. The Court concluded that, at best, it is debatable whether Rebmann’s prior workplace injuries and a verbal reprimand for failing to wear a hardhat show that he “habitually ignored” safety protocols, training, or procedures. In any case, Goldhaber has addressed Rebmann’s prior safety incidents in the supplemental report.

    2. Goldhaber’s Own Testimony and Writing on Effectiveness

    Astec further argued for exclusion of Goldhaber’s opinion about the effectiveness of warning signs or placards as being “in direct contradiction to his own testimony and work on the effectiveness of warnings.”

    However, the inquiry is not whether warning signage would have made the user aware of a danger of which they were previously unaware. The inquiry is whether a warning would have increased the user’s awareness of the danger. Rebmann testified that if warning signs or labels had been present “it would have made me think about becoming—it would have made me think about coming in close proximity a little bit more.” A jury can assess that testimony, and the Court will not exclude Goldhaber from offering similar testimony.

    3. Warnings Standards as of 1984

    Goldhaber’s report specifically faults Astec for failing to comply with ANSI Z535.4, which lie asserts “has been in effect since 1968.” Astec insisted that “in reality, the first version of the ANSI Z535.4 standard for product safety signs and labels was published in 1991, seven years after the Baghouse was manufactured and delivered to Gernatt.” Plaintiff maintained that ANSI Z35.1-1968 was approved in September 1968 and that the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) “adopted this standard in 1971, requiring workplaces to comply with it starting August 31, 1971.”

    Astec cited a post on the ANSI website indicating that ANSI Z535.4’s “initial publication” was in 1991—after the Baghouse was manufactured in 1984.

    The Court accepts that as true, but Astec’s argument on this point fails to account for the fact that ANSI Z535.4’s predecessor is USAS 235.1. And federal regulations incorporated the Z35.1-1968 standard in 1984.

    For all of the above reasons, the Court denied Astec’s motion to exclude Goldhaber’s testimony.

      C. Nadeem Hussain, M.D.

      Astec contended that Hussain’s report is “an entirely new report that fails to contradict, challenge, or rebut Defendant’s corresponding report,” and that it is “not based on any new or previously unavailable information that would trigger a duty for Plaintiff to supplement its report.”

      There is no dispute that Hussain’s report cannot qualify as an initial expert disclosure. Plaintiff’s deadline for initial expert disclosures was August 30, 2024, and Plaintiff submitted Hussain’s report well after that date.

      The Court concluded that Hussain’s report is partly a proper rebuttal and partly and improper new expert report. Insofar as the report violates the discovery rules, the Court considers the following factors below.

      a. Plaintiff’s Explanation

      Plaintiff’s explanation is that he offered Hussain’s report “to contradict or rebut evidence on the same subject matter.”

      The majority of Hussain’s life-care plan did not repel, counteract, or disprove the opposing expert’s diagnostic report. But there are exceptions: Hussain’s inclusion of massage therapy implicitly contradicts the opposing expert’s opinion that it is not medically necessary, and Hussain’s inclusion of costs for prosthetics and related supplies for Rebmaim’s lifetime implicitly challenges the opposing expert’s remark about prosthetic abandonment. This factor is therefore mixed.

      b. Importance of Hussain’s Testimony

      In general, a second life-care plan is not particularly important to Plaintiff’s case. But medical opinions on the necessity or utility of the highest dollar-value treatments are very important to Plaintiff’s damages case. This factor is also mixed.

      c. Prejudice to Astec

      Plaintiff argued that Hussain’s report does not prejudice Astec, particularly because Astec had “an opportunity to rebut his report in writing and did so.”

      Astec maintained that allowing Hussain would result in significant prejudice. The Court is not persuaded that any of the items that Astec lists weigh significantly in favor of striking Hussain’s report. Instructions to the jury can mitigate concerns about giving more weight based on the quantity of evidence. The discovery order can be amended without prejudicing either side. Preparing to oppose a second life-care expert will require some additional expense, but it is not excessive in proportion to all the other expenses in this litigation.

      d. Possibility of Continuance

      Finally, Plaintiff asserted that a continuance is possible because “there is time afforded by the current case management order to complete expert discovery and depositions; and there is no trial date.”

      In December 2024, when Plaintiff filed his opposition to Astec’s motion to strike Hussain’s report, the Court had ordered expert depositions completed by March 15, 2025. Now, in mid-2026, all of the deadlines in that prior order have passed. However, it remains true that there is no trial date set in this case.

      For the reasons discussed above, the Court declined to strike Hussain’s report. The Court instead elects to grant Astec an opportunity to serve a surrebuttal report.

      D. Dennis Brickman, P.E. 

      Plaintiff sought preclusion of Brickman’s March 2025 report, arguing that it is untimely insofar as it contains new information and references.

      The first issues are whether Brickman’s March 2025 report is a timely and proper supplementation. Plaintiff has identified no court order altering the deadline, and because no trial date has been set, Rule 26(a)(3)(B)‘s 30-day deadline has not yet expired.

      The Court therefore rejected Plaintiff’s assertion that Brickman’s March 2025 report is untimely supplementation. The more significant dispute is whether it is proper “supplementation” at all.

      Plaintiff argued that Brickman’s March 2025 report is not supplementation, asserting that Brickman “undertook new work and testing based on information and materials that were equally available to him at the time of his first report.”

      For the reasons above, the Court rejected Astec’s explanations for providing the “supplemental” report. In the Court’s view, Brickman’s March 2025 opinions regarding the AGSCO mesh guard are of limited importance because Berry cited that manufacturer’s product only as an example. The AGSCO product’s one-inch openings might allow a finger to pass through, but a different screen with openings smaller than one inch could be specified. Moreover, even a screen with one-inch openings would have been safer than no screen at all.

      At the same time, Brickman’s March 2025 opinions about reduced visibility from the proposed interlocked mesh guard are more detailed than his opinion on that topic in his October 2024 report. Plaintiff asserted that failure to exclude Brickman’s March 2025 report or related testimony would result in “extreme” prejudice. The Court concluded that any such prejudice can be mitigated by granting Plaintiff the opportunity for a surrebuttal.

        Held

        • The Court denied Astec’s motion in limine to exclude Gerald Goldhaber’s testimony.
        • The Court granted in part and denied in part Astec’s motion in limine to exclude Thomas Berry’s testimony.
        • The Court denied Astec’s motion to strike the expert report of Nadeem Hussain.
        • The Court denied Plaintiff’s motion to preclude the opinions of Dennis Brickman.

        Key Takeaway

        Turning to the question of the proper sanction for failure to conform to the discovery rules, the Court considers (1) the party’s explanation for the failure to comply with the discovery order; (2) the importance of the testimony of the precluded witness; (3) the prejudice suffered by the opposing party as a result of having to prepare to meet the new testimony; and (4) the possibility of a continuance.

        Case Details:

        Case Caption: Rebmann V. Astec, Inc.
        Docket Number: 1:21cv879
        Court Name: United States District Court, New York Western
        Order Date: July 13, 2026

      1. Human Factors Expert Was Allowed to Testify About Limits of Visual Perception

        Human Factors Expert Was Allowed to Testify About Limits of Visual Perception

        Plaintiff Judith Bean alleged that this action arose from a February 28, 2023, trip-and-fall incident at Walmart Supercenter Facility #5686, located at 1301 N. Victory Place, Burbank, California, and asserted causes of action for negligence and premises liability.

        Walmart filed a motion in limine to preclude Plaintiff’s expert witnesses, Alex J. Balian and Kuba Glazek, Ph.D., from testifying about certain topics. Plaintiff filed a motion in limine to exclude improper opinions by Walmart’s rebuttal safety expert, Michael V. Nichols.

        Retail Store Expert Witness

        Alex J. Balian has been in the retail industry as an owner, operator, and consultant for more than 65 years.

        He has testified as a safety and operations expert in all areas of retail
        store operations and public facilities involving supermarkets, commercial buildings, restaurants, warehouse facilities, home improvement stores and specialty stores for more than thirty years.

        He has qualified as a retail safety expert and given expert testimony in state and federal courts in matters pertaining to retail operations throughout the United States.

        Want to know more about the challenges Alex Balian has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

        Human Factors Expert Witness

        Kuba J. Glazek has a Ph.D. in Brain and Cognitive Sciences. He has researched, published, presented, and consulted on human factors since 2006 and has applied his background in human cognition and scientific methods to analyze a variety of legal cases, including but not limited to premises, transportation, construction, industrial, products, sports, dram shop, and warnings cases.

        Get the full story on challenges to Kuba Glazek’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

        Safety Expert Witness

        Michael V. Nichols has a Bachelor of Science in Occupational Health & Safety, along with ample experience in retail security and safety. He has been practicing as a Safety Consultant since 1992, conducting safety inspections and consulting on liability and workers’ compensation.

        Nichols also taught Accident Investigation, Cal-OSHA Law, and Workers’ Compensation at Cal State Dominguez Hills University for fifteen (15) years. As a safety expert witness, he has testified over 130 times and given more than 1300 depositions since 1992.

        Discover more cases with Michael Nichols as an expert witness by ordering his comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

        Discussion by the Court

        I. Walmart’s MIL No. 4

        First, Walmart argued that Balian, a “retail-safety” expert, cannot offer opinions regarding “human factors” because he has no expertise in that field.

        Second, Walmart argued that Balian cannot offer opinions regarding prior incidents because his deposition testimony shows that he did not study the prior incidents to verify whether they were substantially similar and therefore probative.

        Third, Walmart argued that Balian should be precluded from testifying that Walmart engaged in a “conscious and wanton disregard” for Plaintiff’s safety because he admitted at his deposition that he used the term in a non-legal way.

        Finally, Walmart’s notice of the motion in limine further sought to exclude Plaintiff’s human factors expert, Kuba Glazek, Ph.D., on the ground that his testimony is unnecessary.

        II. Plaintiff’s MIL No. 4

        Plaintiff sought to exclude certain testimony by Walmart’s rebuttal retail safety expert, Michael V. Nichols, on the grounds that his opinions are beyond his designation as a rebuttal expert and/or are inadmissible credibility, advocacy, legal conclusion, and factual determination conclusions that invade the province of the jury or attempt to contradict Walmart’s binding admissions.

        The Court’s Analysis

        The Court found that a considerable amount of the content in Balian’s report, Glazek’s report, and Nichols’ rebuttal report will be inadmissible testimony at trial as improper legal conclusions or determinations that invade the province of the jury.

        Accordingly, the Court will not permit any expert witness for either party to testify as to their conclusions regarding issues for the jury to decide, including: whether the stackbase at issue was “unsafe,” a “trip hazard,” a “dangerous condition,” or below industry safety standards; whether Walmart’s policies and/or training was adequate or met industry standards/a standard of care or whether Walmart employees could have prevented the incident.

        Given that the Court found much of what Walmart objected to in Balian’s report and what Plaintiff objected to in Nichols’ report improper for reasons other than the reasons underlying the motions in limine, the Court need not specifically rule on each of the grounds in the respective motions in limine.

        To the extent that Walmart sought to exclude Glazek from testifying as to human factors on the grounds that his testimony is unnecessary and cumulative, the Court denied Walmart’s motion. Glazek may provide testimony based on his specialized knowledge, such as to limits on visual perception, human behavior, etc., that would be helpful to the jury to interpret the evidence. But Glazek may not interpret the evidence for the jury. To the extent that Plaintiff sought to exclude Nichols’ testimony as outside of the scope of rebuttal, the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion at this time. Plaintiff may raise such an objection to specific testimony at trial.

        Held

        The Court denied Walmart’s fourth motion in limine to preclude certain testimony by Alex Balian and Kuba Glazek as well as Plaintiff’s fourth motion in limine to exclude certain testimony by Michael Nichols.

        Key Takeaway

        To avoid expert witnesses invading the province of the jury, the Court does not permit expert witnesses to interpret the factual evidence in this case. Instead, expert witnesses may testify about industry standards, customs, best practices, and norms, and specialized knowledge relating to relevant topics.

        Expert witnesses may be asked hypothetical questions to elicit expert opinions on the aforementioned topics but may not be asked to make conclusions about the facts or evidence of the instant case, as these are issues for the jury to decide.

        Case Details:

        Case Caption: Judith Bean V. Walmart Inc.
        Docket Number: 2:24cv8871
        Court Name: United States District Court for the Central District of California
        Order Date: May 18, 2026
      2. Accident Reconstruction Expert Not Allowed to Opine on Statutory Violation

        Accident Reconstruction Expert Not Allowed to Opine on Statutory Violation

        On July 13, 2021, Mark DeLeon lost his left arm in a horrendous accident while working the overnight shift at Norfolk Southern’s Burns Harbor Trainyard. This case arises out of that tragic event. DeLeon sued Norfolk Southern under the Federal Employer’s Liability Act seeking recovery for his injuries. He has two theories under FELA: one is for general negligence; the other is for per se negligence under FELA because of an alleged violation of the Safety Appliance Act (“SAA”).

        Norfolk sought the exclusion of three of DeLeon’s experts-Daniel Billington, Colon Fulk, and Jason Engle.

        Accident Reconstruction Expert Witness

        Daniel R. Billington II is an expert in accident reconstruction, including “human factors, visibility, and lighting.” Billington has been doing accident reconstructions for decades and has been permitted to testify in a number of cases. His knowledge has made him a speaker in high demand with many legal and insurance organizations.

        Get the full story on challenges to Daniel Billington’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

        Railroad Expert Witnesses

        Colon Ray Fulk has over three decades of experience in train operations. Notably, he has worked for Norfolk as a conductor, brakeman, locomotive engineer, and a foreman. He has extensive experience in railroad operations, including safety inspections and investigations.

        Discover more cases with Colon Fulk as an expert witness by ordering his comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

        Jason R. Engle has 18 years of experience in the railroad industry, holding both mechanical and transportation positions at multiple railway companies.

        Get the full story on challenges to Jason Engle’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

        Discussion by the Court

        The Court agreed with Norfolk that the expert reports of Billington, Fulk, and Engle had some improper legal conclusions. Billington, Fulk, and Engle all stated that certain facts constitute a statutory violation and/or negligence. These conclusions “abridge the jury’s role of applying the law to the facts” and, additionally, “usurp the judge’s role of instructing the jury as to the applicable law.”

        The experts will not be allowed to testify as to what satisfies a specific legal standard or what a particular statute or regulation means. However, of course, experts may offer opinions “relevant to applying a legal standard” including testimony “describing sound professional standards and identifying departures from them.”

        1. Daniel Billington

        Billington inspected the site of the incident, took various measurements, and reviewed the footage from the night in question, along with an extensive list of documentary evidence and depositions in this case. He concluded, among other things, that DeLeon struck the air station during the incident in question, that the air station was a close-clearance structure, that the yard was too dark, which posed a danger to employees, and that the bent ladder prevented DeLeon from standing upright, contributing to him hitting the air station.

        Billington took detailed and specific measurements at the railyard, including quantifiable lighting measurements under similar weather and time conditions, and he used his experience and measurements to produce a 3D render of the accident to explain how this tragic and perplexing incident occurred.

        The Court found that Billington was qualified to testify on these topics and that his inspection of the site, reliance on his experience, and review of the documents constituted a proper methodology for an accident reconstructionist.

        One argument Norfolk made that requires special attention is that Billington’s accident reconstruction testimony would not be helpful to a jury. The argument centers on the fact that much of his accident reconstruction is based on the video of the incident, which the jury can watch itself.

        This Court has watched the video of the incident several times. It does not speak for itself. The camera was set up far away from the site of the incident. The video is dark, at times blurry, and in black and white.

        2. Colon Fulk

        Fulk reached various conclusions about the safety of the train yard on the night of the incident, the safety rules Norfolk had in place at the time, and the factors that may have contributed to the accident. He testified about how difficult it is for on-the-ground railmen to know exactly how fast a train is going, especially in nighttime conditions, and opined that it was unsafe for Norfolk to have a rule allowing railmen to board moving trains at all. He testified about many other issues as well, including the dangers posed by the defective ladder and insufficient lighting at the railyard. In reaching his conclusions, he relied not only on the documentary evidence in this case but also on his inspection of the site of the incident.

        Norfolk’s main arguments to exclude Fulk’s opinions are that he lacked a reliable methodology and that his opinions are conclusory. However, the Court found that he has employed a proper methodology for an expert in his field and has explained his reasons sufficiently. He reviewed the records relevant to the incident, and inspected the site of the incident, taking specific measurements and photos, and explained the reasons for his findings in an expert report. This is not an area of expertise where, for example, an expert could point to specific mathematical methodology for his opinion. Fulk’s methodology and opinions (that are not legal conclusions, as discussed above) are proper, and are similar to many other cases in which he has been allowed to testify over the years.

        3. Jason Engle

        Engle’s conclusions include that the bent ladder was unsafe, that the railcar with the bent ladder should not have been in service until the ladder was fixed, and that Norfolk had insufficient, and at times even actively dangerous, safety procedures.

        Norfolk’s argument to exclude Engle is a bit shorter and refers to or mirrors the arguments on Fulk, namely that the expert lacks methodology and has conclusory opinions.

        The only notable difference is that they admit that Engle provided some “additional detail” compared to Fulk. Like Fulk’s expert report, Engle’s expert report exhibited that he has relevant, specialized experience and that he employed a reliable methodology.

        Held

        The Court granted in part and denied in part Norfolk’s omnibus motions in limine to exclude the causation opinions of experts Daniel Billington, Colon Fulk, and Jason Engle.

        Key Takeaway

        Indeed, courts often exclude expert testimony analyzing videos when a jury is just as capable of doing the same thing. While Norfolk argued that Billington brought no more to the table on this issue than a layperson who watches the video, a review of Billington’s report tells a different story.

        Billington relied on his extensive experience in accident reconstruction, used video enhancement techniques to view it more closely, employed the study of kinematics in his analysis, did an in-person inspection of the incident site, and produced a 3D model of the incident to help explain what happened. Billington has provided an analysis that goes way beyond a simple recounting of what he believes the video depicts. And to the extent Norfolk is dubious of Billington’s opinions, that’s what cross-examination is for.

        Case Details:

        Case Caption: Deleon V. Norfolk Southern Railway Company
        Docket Number: 2:21cv224
        Court Name: United States District Court, Indiana Northern
        Order Date: May 19, 2026
      3. Accident Reconstruction Expert Not Allowed to Opine on the Safety of the Seat Heater

        Accident Reconstruction Expert Not Allowed to Opine on the Safety of the Seat Heater

        Plaintiff Emily LaPrade has paraplegia with limited sensation in her lower body due to a spinal cord injury in 2014. While returning from a camping trip in September 2023, LaPrade rode in the front passenger seat of her family’s 2023 Volkswagen Tiguan. She claimed that she received second-degree burns after she used the vehicle’s seat heater for 20-30 minutes on the highest setting, and one hour on the heater’s middle setting.

        In 2024, LaPrade and Jonathan LaPrade (together, “Plaintiffs”) sued Defendant Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. (“Volkswagen” or “Defendant”) arguing that the seat heater in their car was defective.

        Defendant filed a Daubert motion to exclude the testimony of Plaintiffs’ expert, Roger Smedsrud.

        Accident Reconstruction Expert Witness

        Roger W. Smedsrud is a forensic mechanic specializing in accident reconstruction. With 32 years of experience as a mechanic and over 3,000 mechanical inspections of vehicles involved in traffic collisions, equipment accidents, or fraud, he has significant formal training on a variety of vehicles.

        Want to know more about the challenges Roger Smedsrud has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

        Discussion by the Court

        1. The Court will permit testimony regarding Smedsrud’s test results

        Smedsrud is qualified to testify about the seat heater temperatures he observed via infrared thermometer and diagnostic data from Plaintiffs’ Tiguan. Smedsrud’s significant experience in vehicle repairs, diagnostic systems, and accident reconstruction qualifies him to testify about the tools he used, tests he performed, and data he collected during his examination of Plaintiffs’ vehicle.

        Defendant contended that Smedsrud’s testimony in this area is unreliable or irrelevant because “he did not design or conduct his testing in accordance with any Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) or International Organization for Standardization (ISO) guidelines.”

        The Court concluded that Smedsrud’s background and experience are sufficient for him to testify about the data he gathered. That he did not refer to a specific standard does not necessarily invalidate the temperature readouts themselves.

        2. The Court will exclude testimony regarding the design or safety of the seat heater

        Defendant asked the Court to exclude Smedsrud’s testimony about the design of the Tiguan’s seat heater—namely, his conclusion “that the temperatures set in this vehicle heated seat system are set too high from the factory.”

        Smedsrud is not qualified to offer opinions about the design or safety of the Tiguan’s seat heater. Smedsrud’s opinion did not discuss any standard by which he judged the temperature of the seat heater to be “too high.” He testified that he did not rely upon SAE or ISO standards, and that that he was unaware of “any publication that sets the maximum reasonable temperature for a seat heater.” Instead, he formed his conclusion upon the fact that he had “never seen one this high before.” But as Defendant noted, Smedsrud has never investigated an incident where someone was injured from a seat heater. He has only ever repaired a seat heater once—in his own Toyota, after the seat heater stopped working entirely.

        Plaintiffs argued that, even if Smedsrud did not rely on any standard, the SAE and ISO standards supported his conclusion that the temperatures of the seat heater were indeed “too high.” But this is irrelevant to the Rule 702 inquiry, which focuses “solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.”

        Held

        The Court granted in part and denied in part Defendant’s Daubert motion to exclude the testimony of Roger Smedsrud.

        Key Takeaway

        The dispositive question is “whether an expert’s methodology can be ‘challenged in some objective sense, or whether it is instead simply a subjective, conclusory approach that cannot reasonably be assessed for reliability.’” Smedsrud’s methodology is the latter.

        Case Details:

        Case Caption: Laprade V. Volkswagen AG 
        Docket Number: 3:25cv5028
        Court Name: United States District Court, Washington Western
        Order Date: April 22, 2026
      4. Human Factors Expert Not Allowed to Opine on the Tile

        Human Factors Expert Not Allowed to Opine on the Tile

        Plaintiff Rebecca Bell alleged that she fell while an invitee at the Hobby Lobby store in Daphne, Alabama.

        She filed suit against Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and Alex Mendoza (manager of the Daphne Hobby Lobby store) asserting causes of action for negligence, wantonness, and negligent/wanton hiring, training, supervision or retention.

        Plaintiff stepped on an uneven tile while shopping inside the Hobby Lobby store in Daphne, Alabama. She argued that the uneven floor tile caused her to fall. Plaintiff did not trip or slip. Rather, Plaintiff alleges she stepped “half on good tile, half on bad tile,” causing her foot to roll. The depression in the subject tile was not greater than 1/4″.

        Plaintiff proffered the testimony of Dr. Ian Noy and an affidavit of John Shepherd. Both Noy and Shepherd opined that the subject tile constituted a hazardous condition. Defendants filed a motion to exclude Noy’s testimony and argued that Shepherd’s affidavit should be disregarded as conclusory.

        Human Factors Expert Witness

        Ian Yechiam Noy is immensely qualified as an expert in Human Factors and Ergonomics. He is a distinguished Human Factors and Ergonomics consultant and forensic expert with extensive background in innovative and applied safety research, industrial engineering, behavioral sciences, and science management.

        Want to know more about the challenges Ian Noy has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

        Retail Store Expert Witness

        John R. Shepherd has worked 40 years in the retail store industry, with 20 years at Walmart and 21 years at Delchamps grocery stores. 

        Throughout his experience in the retail store industry, he was directly involved in developing and implementing policies and procedures relating to floor safety, customer safety and injury prevention.

        Discover more cases with John Shepherd as an expert witness by ordering his comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

        Discussion by the Court

        Ian Noy

        Plaintiff retained Noy “to opine on the human factors contributions” to her injuries. Noy opined that the tile was a hazard “because it violated the industry best practice standard set forth in ASTM F-1637.” Noy’s opinion is tied to that standard. The standard mandates walkways be maintained as “flush and even to the extent possible.”

        Noy acknowledged that if a walkway is “as flush and even as possible,” the standard allows for up to a one quarter inch (1/4″) change in elevation. It is undisputed the subject walkway had no variation in elevation greater than a 1/4″. However, Noy contended the subject tile nevertheless violated the standard because the 1/4″ allowance applies only if the walkway is as “flush and even to the extent possible.” Noy opines the subject tile was not as “flush and even to the extent possible,” and therefore should have been “repaired.”

        Noy acknowledged that “flush and even to the extent possible” is a structural determination. He testified, “if it’s physically possible to make the floor flush and even, it should be done. If there was any structural or functional reason why there needs to be a change in elevation, then it has to be as small as possible.” However, Noy is not proffered as a structural expert. Furthermore, he never visited the Hobby Lobby store where Plaintiff fell. He has no knowledge of the construction of the floor or its substrate. He does not know what caused the depression in the subject tile, or when or how it developed. His opinion, though, that the floor should have been “repaired” and that the 1/4″ depression allowance is inapplicable is based on his belief that the floor was not “flush and even to the extent possible.” This belief is mere unsupported “ipse dixit.”

        The Court held that Noy is unqualified to opine that the floor was not “flush and even to the extent possible.” Therefore, he cannot opine the standard 1/4″ depression allowance is inapplicable. Noy’s opinion that “the depressed surface was a foreseeable hazard because it violated the industry best practice standard set forth in ASTM F-1637” is not permissible.

        John Shepherd

        Plaintiff also offered an affidavit of John Shepherd as evidence that the tile constituted a hazardous condition. Defendants argued that Shepherd’s affidavit is “conclusory” and cannot defeat summary judgment. The Court agreed, and found that Shepherd’s opinion suffered the same fatal defects as Noy’s. Shepherd would opine that the “uneven surface in the floor constitutes a fall hazard,” and that “not only should the tile be replaced but underneath the tile should have been replaced.”

        Like Noy, Shepherd is not proffered as a structural expert. He has experience relating to “floor safety, customer safety, and injury prevention.” However, he has no construction or structural expertise or experience. Neither did the record indicate he ever visited the Hobby Lobby store where Plaintiff fell. He had no knowledge of the construction of the floor or its “underneath” substrate, or whether or how it might be “replaced.” He has no knowledge of what caused the depression, or when or how it developed.

        The Court concluded that Shepherd is unqualified to opine the subject tile or its “underneath” should have been replaced. That, and his opinion the “uneven surface in the floor . . . constitutes a fall hazard” are mere conclusory statements that cannot satisfy Plaintiff’s burden to produce sufficient evidence of an “unreasonably” dangerous condition or hazard under Alabama law. His conclusory opinion is not based on any methodology.

        Held

        The Court granted Defendants’ motions to exclude the testimony of Dr. Ian Noy and John Shepherd.

        Key Takeaway

        Nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert.

        Case Details:

        Case Caption: Bell V. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.
        Docket Number: 1:24cv422
        Court Name: United States District Court, Alabama Southern
        Order Date: April 17, 2026
      5. Architecture Expert Was Allowed to Opine on the Safety Screening Area

        Architecture Expert Was Allowed to Opine on the Safety Screening Area

        This action arises out of a March 18, 2019 trip-and-fall accident (the “Accident”) that occurred in the lobby of the Suffolk County Supreme Court Courthouse located at 1 Court Street, Riverhead, New York (the “Courthouse”).

        Plaintiff Carole Gutterman was using a cane as she went through the Courthouse’s security checkpoint due to a prior, unrelated, motor vehicle accident. Gutterman sustained injuries as a result of stepping onto a platform.

        Defendant Suffolk County sought to preclude the Court from admitting the report of Plaintiff’s expert, Richard J. Robbins, R.A.

        The County asserted that Robbins’ “entire report is based upon the false premises that Plaintiff either stepped up onto the security platform, or attempted to step onto the platform, and that she was reaching for her belongings or attempted to reach for he belongings at the time that her accident occurred.”

        Architecture Expert Witness

        Richard James Robbins, R.A is a professional with over thirty years of experience in the administration and supervision of multi-million dollar design & construction contracts in the public & private sector.

        Get the full story on challenges to Richard Robbins’ expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

        Discussion by the Court

        Robbins is an architect who inspected the Courthouse and provided an expert opinion regarding the conditions of its safety screening area.

        Robbins opined that the platform from which Plaintiff sought to retrieve her cane presented three dangerous conditions:

        1. At a height of 6 3/8 inches, the platform adjacent to the conveyer belt is inaccessible to people with a disability;
        2. The color of the floor adjacent to the conveyer belt and the presence of a black-colored mat “makes it difficult for pedestrians to discern the presence of the significant change in level which exists in their immediate path of travel . . . .”; and
        3. The barrier reduced the clear width of the platform to 26 inches, whereas 36 inches of clearance is required.

        Regardless of whether Plaintiff stepped on to the platform, the Robbins Report still reached several relevant conclusions, namely that the platform at 6 3/8 inches was too high, that the color of the floor and platform made it difficult to discern the change in height, and that the width to clear the barrier was too narrow. All of these conclusions could be relevant to determine the cause of the accident, and, therefore, be helpful to the trier of fact in determining whether the County was negligent.

        Held

        The Court denied the motion to preclude Richard Robbins’ expert report.

        Key Takeaway

        The proponent of the expert testimony has the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the testimony is competent, relevant, and reliable. In evaluating the admissibility of expert testimony, the trial court must consider whether: (i) the witness is qualified as an expert on the topic at issue; (ii) the expert’s opinion is based on reliable data and methodology; and (iii) the expert’s opinion will assist the trier of fact.

        Case Details:

        Case Caption: Gutterman V. Suffolk County
        Docket Number: 2:20cv4168
        Court Name: United States District Court, New York Eastern
        Order Date: March 24, 2026
      6. Traffic Safety Expert’s Due Diligence Opinions Admitted

        Traffic Safety Expert’s Due Diligence Opinions Admitted

        In this civil action, the Plaintiffs—Jacob Yoder, Shawn Yoder, and Natasha Yoder—brought various state-law claims against Conaway Racing & Trucking, LLC (“Conaway”); Aaron J. Pacheco; Builders FirstSource, Inc., Builders FirstSource-Atlantic Group, and Probuild Company, LLC (collectively, the “BFS Defendants”); and D.R. Horton, Inc., along with an unnamed John Doe Defendant, arising from a motor-vehicle accident between Jacob Yoder’s 1994 Ford Bronco and Conaway’s tractor-trailer that occurred on October 2, 2020.

        The BFS Defendants filed a motion to exclude and/or strike the Plaintiffs’ liability expert Rose A. McMurray.

        Traffic Safety Expert Witness

        Rose Ann Ferrelli McMurray is a motor carrier safety expert providing advice and counsel to attorneys involved in motor carrier injury and death cases, as well as general consultant services. She is a former federal safety official with extensive knowledge of regulations and policies, and a lead official on traffic safety initiatives, including impaired driving occupant protection and speed management. She has held various volunteer leadership positions within the National Safety Council.

        Discover more cases with Rose McMurray as an expert witness by ordering her comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

        Discussion by the Court

        In her expert report, McMurray described the regulatory framework for operating as a motor carrier in the United States and she addresses the specific facts of this case. In this regard, McMurray explained that she reviewed documents regarding the facts of this case, road safety reports, motor carrier policies and practices and that she applied her skills acquired during her tenure as a Chief Safety Officer for the FMCSA in reaching the expert opinions contained in her report.

        Moreover, the Court found McMurray’s expert opinions relevant to the Plaintiffs’ negligent hiring and negligent entrustment claims in this case.

        McMurray testified that the BFS Defendants failed to exercise due diligence in ensuring that they entrusted goods to a competent motor carrier and should be held responsible for their decision to do business with a ‘high-risk motor carrier.’

        While the BFS Defendants understandably disagreed with McMurray’s expert opinions, they have not shown that her opinions are unreliable and should be excluded.

        The BFS Defendants argue that McMurray’s expert report is unreliable and irrelevant, because: (1) the alleged Conaway speeding violations on the FMCSA website are not relevant to the October 2, 2020, Accident; (2) the expert report lacked details about the alleged insufficient Conaway driver credentials; (3) the report did not explain why Pacheco’s CDL license is insufficient to satisfy industry safety standards; (4) Conaway had insurance coverage at the time of the October 2, 2020, Accident; and (4) the term “high risk” carrier is not defined in the expert report. But these concerns largely reflect disagreements about the evidence in this case and the weight that should be given to McMurray’s opinions by the trier-in-fact.

        As a result, the Court is satisfied that McMurray’s expert report met the above standards of reliability and relevance.

        Held

        The Court denied the BFS Defendants’ motion to exclude and/or strike the testimony of Rose McMurray.

        Key Takeaway

        A careful reading of the expert report of McMurray showed that the report and the opinions contained therein are based upon the factual evidence in this case, and the applicable motor carrier safety regulations and industry standards, and that McMurray has significant experience working in the area of motor carrier safety. And so, the Court declined to strike and/or exclude McMurray as an expert witness in this case.

        Case Details:

        Case Caption: Yoder V. Conaway Racing & Trucking, LLC
        Docket Number: 1:23cv1365
        Court Name: United States District Court, Maryland
        Order Date: March 16, 2026
      7. Safety Expert’s Clarified Opinions Excluded

        Safety Expert’s Clarified Opinions Excluded

        This case arises out of a slip-and-fall incident that occurred at US Bank’s branch office in Kirkland, Washington, on December 7, 2020. Carol Hummel alleges that she fell in the parking lot and suffered injuries as a result of US Bank’s failure to maintain its premises in a reasonably safe condition.

        Defendants U.S. Bancorp and U.S. Bank National Association (together, “US Bank”) filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff Carol Hummel’s expert, Tom Baird.

        Safety Expert Witness

        Tom Baird is a Certified Forensic Consultant, Certified Walkway Safety Auditor, and Certified Floor Safety Technician. He serves on the National Floor Safety Institute’s Committee on the Identification and Elimination of Interior and Exterior Trip Hazards on Walking Surfaces, Stairs, Steps, and Ramps.

        Want to know more about the challenges Tom Baird has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

        Discussion by the Court

        US Bank asserted that Baird’s testimony should be excluded because (1) his methodology is not sufficiently reliable, as it does not rely on “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge,” and (2) his testimony is not relevant and therefore would not assist the trier of fact.

        1. Baird’s testimony is sufficiently reliable

          Baird submitted a preliminary opinion report, which constitutes his sole expert report. The report includes exhibits such as photographs of Hummel’s injuries, photographs and Google Maps images of the US Bank location where the incident occurred, and photographs and a slope measurement obtained during a site visit.

          US Bank contended that Baird’s methodology is unreliable because it is not grounded in science or technical data and is instead backward-looking and conclusory, failing to establish a causal basis or connection.

          The Court disagreed. Baird’s credentials and experience demonstrate that he is qualified to offer the nine challenged opinions. In forming his opinions, Baird relied on multiple sources, including an interview with Ms. Hummel, a review of photographs of her injuries and the incident location, and a site inspection conducted by one of his associates on September 8, 2023. The Court found that reliability in this matter depended heavily on Baird’s specialized knowledge and experience rather than strictly scientific or technical data.

          2. Baird’s testimony is relevant

          The parties also disputed whether Baird’s testimony would assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or determining a fact in issue.

          The Court concluded that the knowledge underlying Baird’s expert report bears a valid connection to the issues in the case and logically advances a material aspect of the dispute. It rejected US Bank’s argument that the testimony would “muddle the issues at trial” or “mislead the trier of fact.” Because the Court itself is the trier of fact, it determined that it could appropriately evaluate and weigh Baird’s opinions.

          3. Baird’s New Declaration violates Rule 26(a)(2)(B)

          US Bank argued that the Court should reject Baird’s new declaration, which Hummel included with her response to US Bank’s motion, because it violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2) by “introducing additional factual assertions, new methodologies, and additional training and experience not in Baird’s original report.”

          The deadline for expert disclosures was October 9, 2024. The Court held that Hummel may not supplement Baird’s report through a new declaration filed after the disclosure deadline.

          Accordingly, the Court strictly limited Baird’s testimony to the nine opinions set forth in his expert report and the previously disclosed supporting facts. He may not offer additional or clarified opinions beyond those properly disclosed.

          Held

          The Court denied US Bank’s motion to exclude the testimony of Tom Baird, but limited that testimony to the opinions and facts set forth in Baird’s preliminary opinion report.

          Key Takeaway

          An expert opinion is relevant “if the knowledge underlying it has a valid connection to the pertinent inquiry.” Here, Baird’s specialized knowledge and experience were sufficiently connected to the facts of the case to assist the trier of fact.

          Case Details:

          Case Caption: Hummel V. U.S. Bancorp
          Docket Number: 2:23cv1915
          Court Name: United States District Court, Washington Western
          Order Date: January 29, 2026
        1. Human Factors Expert’s Testimony on Shopping Cart Maintenance Admitted

          Human Factors Expert’s Testimony on Shopping Cart Maintenance Admitted

          This case arises from the injuries sustained by Plaintiff, Jessica Loseke, and her husband while they were shopping at Menards in Omaha, Nebraska. They were loading a “refurbished cart” with bags of water softener when the cart broke and injured Loseke’s knee.

          Loseke filed a motion in limine to preclude the testimony of Defendant’s expert witness, Alex J. Balian, from being admitted at trial. Defendant, Menard, Inc., a Wisconsin Corporation (“Menards”), filed a motion in limine to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff’s expert William N. Nelson, BSME, MS, MBA, and any other evidence of and/or reference to Nelson’s opinions.

          Retail Store Expert Witness

          Alex J. Balian has been in the retail industry as an owner, operator, and consultant for more than 65 years.

          He has testified as a safety and operations expert in all areas of retail
          store operations and public facilities involving supermarkets, commercial buildings, restaurants, warehouse facilities, home improvement stores and specialty stores for more than thirty years.

          He has qualified as a retail safety expert and given expert testimony in state and federal courts in matters pertaining to retail operations throughout the United States.

          Want to know more about the challenges Alex Balian has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

          Human Factors Expert Witness

          William N. Nelson has over 20 years of experience in the application of Biomechanics, Ergonomics, Human Factors and Product Development. His consulting experience is very broad: from industrial to sports; from federal government to private enterprise; from medical institutions to aerospace.

          Nelson’s past work has involved customized training for injury prevention; ergonomic job analysis resulting in a rotation schedule which utilized biomechanical, physiological and skill level data; human factors analysis of Cumulative Trauma Disorder in production processes; development of workstation set up and design.

          Get the full story on challenges to William Nelson’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

          Discussion by the Court

          Opinions of Alex Balian

          Plaintiff argued that Balian’s proffered testimony is not reliable. Plaintiff stated that “Balian’s opinions are primarily based on his personal experience in the retail industry, rather than on any scientific or technical methodology. His report lacks any empirical data or testing to support his conclusions regarding the safety of Menards’ shopping cart inspection procedures.”

          Opinions of William Nelson

          Defendant argued that “Nelson’s opinions are unreliable. He believed that Menards should have some sort of “preventative maintenance” program, and that Menards should hire employees who are trained in welding to inspect carts. These opinions are not based on any retail-industry specific standards but rather drawn based on his own belief.”

          Analysis

          The Court has carefully reviewed the argument of the parties as well as the briefs, the evidence presented, and in particular, the opinions of both Nelson and Balian.

          Nelson is an engineer who has a working knowledge of welding requirements, and Nelson applied engineering principles from his educational background, studies, and work experience. With regard to Balian, the Court likewise found his testimony relevant and of assistance to the trier of fact in this case. Balian has served as a consultant for retail store operations, where he has advised, trained, and executed policies and procedures in supermarkets and other public facilities.

          Held

          • The Court denied Plaintiff’s motion in limine to preclude the testimony of Alex Balian.
          • The Court denied Defendant’s motion in limine to exclude the testimony of William Nelson.

          Key Takeaway:

          Both experts appeared to have the educational knowledge, training and experience to testify in this case. Their testimony appeared to be such as would assist the trier of fact without invading the province of the jury.

          Case Details:

          Case Caption: Loseke V. Menard, Inc.
          Docket Number: 8:23cv537
          Court Name: United States District Court, Nebraska
          Order Date: November 19, 2025
        2. Transportation Expert’s Testimony About Safety Considerations Admitted

          Transportation Expert’s Testimony About Safety Considerations Admitted

          This case arises out of injuries sustained by Brandon Jensen on his bicycle when he collided with a semi-truck who made a left turn through his lane of travel. The semi-truck was driven by Defendant Michael Beale. Beale was working for Crete Carrier at the time of the accident.

          The Plaintiffs designated Larry D. Baareman as an expert in traffic reconstruction and transportation. The Defendants filed a motion in limine to exclude the testimony of Baareman. 

          Transportation Expert Witness

          Larry Dale Baareman has several decades of experience driving trucks and training other truck drivers. He has taught State and Federal motor carrier regulations for over 32 years and is also a State of Michigan licensed CDL Instructor. He has 29 years of experience as a State of Michigan certified CDL Examiner.

          Want to know more about the challenges Larry Baareman has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

          Discussion by the Court

          The Defendants maintained that Baareman’s testimony should be excluded because it duplicates other testimony, would be a waste of judicial economy, and consisted of conclusory opinions that are not properly within the scope of expert testimony that would aid the trier of fact.

          Given Baareman’s qualifications and experience, the Court found that Baareman could properly offer his opinions about safety considerations while driving a truck, especially concerning left turns and the use of the truck horn during emergency situations.

          But the Court directed the witness to avoid using the term “right-of-way.” The Plaintiffs’ accident reconstruction expert, Dr. Jay Przybyla, used this term while testifying on November 12, 2025, and the Court instructed the jury to disregard that testimony.

          Whether Defendant Michael Beale should have yielded the right-of-way to Jensen is really a question about whether Jensen was “so close to the turning vehicle as to constitute an immediate hazard.” But this is a question of fact for the jury.

          In addition, the application of right-of-way principles to the facts of this case is not so technical or difficult to synthesize that an expert opinion would aid the trier of fact. Accordingly, the Court found that expert witnesses should avoid opining about who had the right-of-way.

          Held

          The Court denid the Defendants’ motion in limine to exclude testimony from Larry Baareman.

          Key Takeaway:

          While the Court has allowed the parties to present accident reconstruction experts to offer their opinions about timing and distance, any opinions about who had the right-of-way would come perilously close to an opinion on the ultimate issue presented to the jury.

          Case Details:

          Case Caption: Jensen V. Crete Carrier Corporation
          Docket Number: 1:23cv105
          Court Name: United States District Court for the District of Utah, Northern Division
          Order Date: November 17, 2025

          Please refer to the blog previously published about this case:

          Transportation Engineering Expert’s Testimony on Accident Reconstruction Admitted