Expert Witness Profiler

Tag: Settlement

  • Accounting Expert Was Partly Allowed to Opine on the Business Relationship

    Accounting Expert Was Partly Allowed to Opine on the Business Relationship

    This case involves a contract dispute between the Douglas and Amy Mottram and Robert Radke. Prior to 2018, the Mottrams entered into four joint ventures with Radke, in which Radke would buy land in California, on which the Mottrams would construct homes to be resold for mutual profit. Beginning in 2018, the Mottrams and Radke decided to pursue a similar strategy in Kauai, purchasing two plots of land (“Lot C” and “Lot D”) using funds from both parties. The parties did not enter into a written contract for this Kauai joint venture, and, perhaps predictably, its exact nature and terms are in dispute.

    What is clear is that by 2023, the business relationship between the Mottrams and Radke had disintegrated due to, inter alia, conflict over the division of profits from Lot D, personal usage of the Kauai properties, and the Mottrams’ alleged siphoning of funds for a separate project with a third-party. On March 17, 2026, the Mottrams filed the instant motion, asserting that the Court should disqualify Radke’s proffered expert witness, Ross R. Murakami, on the grounds that his expert opinions failed to meet the standards of Federal Rule of Evidence 702.

    Accounting Expert Witness

    Ross R. Murakami has extensive experience in the real estate, construction, government, insurance, distribution, and retail industries, with over thirty-five years of experience providing audit, accounting, and consulting services to organizations based in Hawai‘i and the Pacific Basin and on the West Coast.

    Want to know more about the challenges Ross Murakami has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    I. Rule 408

    The Mottrams argued that Murakami’s expert report relied in part on information provided during settlement negotiations in violation of Rule 408.

    The Mottrams argued that the portions of Murakami’s report that rely upon the spreadsheet, namely Tables 7, 8, and 14 of Section III, should be excluded under Rule 408.

    Rule 408 is clear in stating that “a statement made during compromise negotiations” cannot be used to “prove or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim.” Rule 408 is clear in stating that “a statement made during compromise negotiations” cannot be used to “prove or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim.” The spreadsheet, prepared and provided as it was for the purposes of settlement, and used by Murakami to support his damages opinions, is unambiguously protected by Rule 408.

    During oral argument, Radke’s counsel proposed that Murakami be permitted to amend the portions of his report that rely on the spreadsheet. The Court declines to open that window. Put simply, a party is not entitled to correct a problem of their own making, particularly one so glaring as a violation of Rule 408.

    II. Insufficient Facts

    The Mottrams next argued that Murakami’s opinions should be excluded because he relied upon inaccurate interpretations of the record. The Mottrams claimed that those opinions failed to account for contradictory facts in the record and instead relied on mere assumptions provided by Radke’s counsel; therefore, they are not based on sufficient facts and data.

    The Court takes no position as to whether the Mottrams are correct in arguing that there is evidence contradicting Murakami’s opinions, precisely because doing so at this time is unnecessary and contrary to the Court’s assigned role.

    III. Reliability

    The Mottrams argued that Murakami was unable to identify or utilize any reliable accounting standards or authorities supporting his methods.

    Radke, on the other hand, argued that Murakami abided by professional standards in his analysis and that, beyond this, the field of forensic accounting does not have a single, uniform methodology to which he should have adhered.

    To begin, the Court agreed with Radke that Murakami’s expert opinions are not rooted in scientific evidence, given that forensic accounting is a specialized field in which factors like error rates or peer review are not accepted indicators of reliability.

    Accordingly, the focus of the reliability inquiry “depends heavily on the knowledge and expertise of the expert, rather than the methodology or theory behind it.”

    The Court is not convinced, however, by the Mottrams’ arguments. The Mottrams go too far in asserting that Murakami’s deposition testimony is proof of a lacking methodology. Murakami testified that there was not a single “professional standard” for calculating certain figures in his analysis, but-as Radke argued-that is merely a result of forensic accounting not having universal, scientific standards in the same way as other fields of expertise.

    Finally, the Mottrams also asserted that Murakami did not apply his methodology reliably because “Radke’s counsel instructed Murakami to assume that Radke’s share of the profits should be based on his share of capital contributions,” which the Mottrams argue was a flawed understanding of the case. Again, however, whether to exclude an expert does not depend on the “correctness of the expert’s conclusions,” and Murakami’s reliance on an assumption provided by counsel did not offer a basis to find he applied his methodology unreliably.

    The Court found that Murakami’s expert opinions have demonstrated sufficient reliability, and the Mottrams’ motion to disqualify on those grounds is denied.

    Held

    The Court granted in part and denied in part the Mottrams’ motion to disqualify expert witness, Ross Murakami.

    Key Takeaway

    While Rule 703 permits experts some leeway in basing their opinions on inadmissible evidence, courts have determined that it cannot be used to admit evidence excluded by Rule 408.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Mottram V. Radke
    Docket Number: 1:25cv45
    Court Name: United States District Court, Hawaii
    Order Date: June 16, 2026
  • Insurance Expert Witness’ Testimony Limited Because it is Needlessly Cumulative

    Insurance Expert Witness’ Testimony Limited Because it is Needlessly Cumulative

    This lawsuit stems from claims of breach of contract and statutory and common-law bad faith.

    It all started when Plaintiff, Paul Schulz, was injured when his motorcycle struck an oil spill in the roadway, causing the front tire to slide out and the motorcycle to overturn. Shortly thereafter, Schulz filed a claim with his insurer, Shelter Mutual Insurance Company (“Shelter”), for uninsured/underinsured motorist (“UIM”) coverage. After speaking with Schulz about the accident and the injuries he sustained, the claims adjuster determined Schulz was 100% at fault for the accident and denied coverage. When Schulz hired an attorney, Shelter agreed to consider any other information that might bear on the claim and ordered the police report. Nine days later, Shelter again denied the claim on the basis that Schulz was more than 50% at fault.

    Defendant filed a motion to strike certain opinions of Plaintiff’s industry standard expert Brian Seigal.

    Insurance Expert Witness

    Brian Seigal has been involved in the insurance industry throughout his career since 1995, working in and being responsible for claims departments. He has a multi-line background in P & C and Health Insurance. He has managed claims departments for carriers and TPAs, with experience spanning primary, excess, and reinsurance levels. Over the years, he has managed and trained hundreds of adjusters and has been involved with thousands of claims. He has also held department reserve and settlement authority.

    Get the full story on challenges to Brian Seigal’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study. 

    Discussion by the Court

    Seigal should be precluded from relying on averments in Shelter’s amended answer to the complaint

    Shelter first argued Seigal should be precluded from relying on averments in Shelter’s amended answer to the complaint to draw conclusions about the adequacy vel non of Shelter’s investigation. Essentially, in response to a series of allegations regarding the cause of the crash, the nature of Schulz’s injuries, and Shelter’s initial investigation, Shelter responded that it was without sufficient information to admit or deny those allegations. Seigal opined these answers demonstrate Shelter’s investigation was inadequate because they suggest Shelter was unclear as to the basic facts of the accident, the nature and extent of Schulz’s damages, and the results of its own investigation.

    The Court held that the relevant facts regarding Shelter’s initial investigation are recited in Shelter’s claim file notes and were the subject of inquiry at the 30(b)(6) depositions of the corporate representatives. Expert testimony regarding Shelter’s pleadings about these same matters therefore also would be needlessly cumulative and wasteful of limited trial time.

    Seigal’s opinion suggests Shelter’s investigation was unreasonable for failing to engage experts to vet Schulz’s claim prior to the initiation of litigation

    Seigal stated there exist a variety of tools of which a carrier may take advantage to fulfill its duty of reasonable investigation, and while there is no formulaic approach, not pursuing a particular investigative avenue may indicate a lack of good faith in particular circumstances. Seigal suggests this case presented a circumstance in which the adjuster should have engaged one or more experts as part of the investigation of the claim.

    Shelter points out that the insured bears the initial burden of producing sufficient evidence to suggest his damages were caused by an event that comes within the coverage of the policy.

    The Court held that it is not objectionable for Seigal to opine that Schulz’s case was one which warranted the retention of one or more experts as part of Shelter’s investigation.

    Seigal testified that Shelter’s attempt to condition payment of Schulz’s policy limits on his execution of a release was impermissible and unreasonable

    Shelter sought to preclude Seigal from testifying that Shelter’s attempt to condition payment of Schulz’s policy limits on his execution of a release was impermissible and unreasonable.

    Shelter attached a Release and Trust Agreement to his settlement letter which, inter alia, would have required Schulz to release Shelter from “all liability under any Uninsured Motorist/Underinsured Motorist/Uninsured Motorist Property Damage policy provisions for bodily injury, sickness, disease, or property damage (collectively “damages”) arising from the accident.”

    The Court denied the motion to exclude this portion of Seigal’s testimony because the insurer breaches its duty not to unreasonably delay or deny payment of undisputed benefits, even if additional benefits remain in dispute. Shelter’s recommendations with regard to the payment of benefits suggested that Shelter acknowledged Schulz was entitled to a payment of more than $138,000, but suggested withholding the remainder of the policy limits until he signed a release.

    Seigal opined, in regard to the withholding of the Fisher payment, that “other courts in Colorado have dealt with similar issues and provided orders against carriers who utilized these practices”

    Lastly, and relatedly, Shelter objected to Seigal testifying, in regard to the withholding of the Fisher payment, that “other courts in Colorado have dealt with similar issues and provided orders against carriers who utilized these practices.” Seigal’s supplemental report suggested that he will provide these cases in a further supplemental appendix, and Schulz claims by his response that they have been provided to Shelter in discovery (although Shelter disputes that suggestion).

    Critically, however, these cases are nowhere to be found in the record before the court. It therefore is impossible for the court to determine whether these cases are indeed analogous, as Seigal suggests. Even if they were, the Court held that allowing Seigal to discuss these other cases at trial runs too great a risk of confusing and misleading the jury, as well as wasting time on matters that can be, at best, merely tangential to the issues this jury will be asked to decide.

    Held

    The Court granted in part and denied in part Defendant’s motion to strike certain opinions of Plaintiff’s industry standard expert Brian Seigal.

    Key Takeaway:

    • The insured bears the initial burden of producing sufficient evidence to suggest his damages were caused by an event that comes within the coverage of the policy. As a result, Shelter’s investigation was unreasonable for failing to engage experts to vet Schulz’s claim prior to the initiation of litigation.
    • According to Shelter’s recommendations with regard to the payment of benefits, Shelter was aware that Schulz was entitled to a payment of more than $138,000, but suggested withholding the remainder of the policy limits until he signed a release. However, the insurer breaches its duty not to unreasonably delay or deny payment of undisputed benefits, even if additional benefits remain in dispute.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Schulz V. Shelter General Insurance Company
    Docket Number: 1:23cv1657
    Court: United States District Court, Colorado
    Order Date: September 12, 2024
  • Insurance Law Expert Witness’ Opinions Excluded Despite his Vast Experience

    Insurance Law Expert Witness’ Opinions Excluded Despite his Vast Experience

    A district judge in Ohio barred an expert in insurance law from testifying because he lacked sufficient expertise in insurance litigation despite his long and distinguished career.

    This action arises out of a material breach of insurance policies by Defendant Nancy Caraballo, who entered an unreasonable and collusive $36 million settlement with the Estate of Jordan Rodriguez (“Jordan”), a 5-year-old Cleveland boy who died tragically in late 2017, and whose body was discovered buried in his mother’s backyard. In connection with that tragic death, Caraballo pleaded guilty to four felonies concerning a benefits-fraud scheme she entered into with Jordan’s mother, which she tried to cover up by falsifying records related to her work purporting to provide Jordan’s mother with services as a parent educator.

    Prior to Caraballo’s breach, Princeton Excess and Surplus Lines Insurance Company (“PESLIC”), as the insurer of Caraballo’s former employer, Catholic Charities Corporation (“Catholic Charities”), was supporting good faith settlement discussions for a reasonable resolution with the Estate on behalf of both Caraballo and Catholic Charities. PESLIC had also agreed to reimburse Caraballo’s covered defense costs despite several policy defenses asserted under a reservation of rights.

    Caraballo was informed repeatedly that any settlement with the Estate in excess of the policies’ $1 million retained limit required the consent of PESLIC. Rather than honor her obligations to PESLIC, Caraballo agreed to a $36 million settlement, an amount that no independent rational actor would agree to pay. Caraballo’s material breach of the obligations imposed by the policies prevented both her and the Estate from obtaining indemnification or any other benefits from PESLIC.

    The Estate retained Judge William Taylor to render an opinion regarding whether PESLIC (1) “maintained control of” the underlying State Court litigation; and/or (2) engaged in “bad faith” towards Caraballo. 

    Plaintiff Princeton Excess and Surplus Lines Insurance Company (“PESLIC”) filed a motion to exclude the report and testimony of Judge William Taylor, submitted by Defendant Michelle Rodriguez, as the Administrator of the Estate of Jordan Rodriguez (“the Estate”).

    Insurance Law Expert Witness

    Judge William Taylor graduated from Northwestern University School of Law in 1979. He worked as an associate at the law firm of Peterson Ross from 1979 to 1982. While employed at Peterson Ross, Judge Taylor practiced insurance litigation, including representing Lloyd’s of London. Judge Taylor left Peterson Ross in 1982, and moved to Cuyahoga County, Ohio where he helped run a gubernatorial political campaign for Jerry Springer. After that, he moved to California and worked on another political campaign. In 1983, Judge Taylor joined the law firm of Sachnoff Weaver, where he practiced “business litigation.”

    Judge Taylor then worked as the Chief of Litigation of Revenue for the Illinois Attorney General’s Office from 1985 to 1987. He testified that, in this position, he was a “tax collector,” supervised 30 people, and appeared in court occasionally. From 1987 until approximately 1989 or 1990, Judge Taylor worked on several political campaigns, including those of Walter Mondale, Michael Dukakis, Harold Washington, and Carole Mosley Braun. In 1990 or 1991, Judge Taylor went into private practice, where he did “litigation, real estate, wills, divorces” and “whatever came in the door.”

    Get the full story on challenges to Judge William Taylor’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study. 

    Discussion by the Court

    The Estate retained Judge William Taylor to render an opinion regarding (1) PESLIC’s supposed control of “the litigation in the underlying case” in state court; and whether PESLIC (2) engaged in “bad faith” towards Caraballo. 

    Judge Taylor opined that “it was apparent that PESLIC refused to agree to indemnify Caraballo.” PESLIC argued that not only did Judge Taylor lack the requisite qualifications to testify, but also that his opinions were irrelevant and unreliable.

    Qualifications

    The Court held that Judge Taylor was unqualified to provide expert opinion regarding PESLIC’s control of the state court litigation and for PESLIC acting in bad faith in its control of the litigation regarding Caraballo. While Judge Taylor has a long and distinguished career as a lawyer, jurist, and campaign manager, the Court found that he did not have sufficient expertise in insurance litigation to provide a proper foundation for him to testify about whether PESLIC “maintained control of” the underlying state court litigation or engaged in bad faith under Ohio law.

    Reliability

    The Court found that neither Judge Taylor’s three years of experience at an insurance defense firm in the 1980’s nor his tenure as a state trial and appellate judge were sufficient to demonstrate that he had specialized knowledge and experience regarding whether an insurance company “maintains control of” litigation and/or engages in bad faith. To sum it up, Judge Taylor’s reliance on his experience and some ill-defined concept of “logic” to form his opinions did not constitute a reliable methodology.

    Legal Conclusions

    The Court found that several of Judge Taylor’s opinions crossed the line into inappropriate legal conclusions. For example, Judge Taylor opined that: (1) PESLIC’s alleged conduct “constituted legal maneuvering which at a minimum is a constructive refusal to indemnify;” (2) “PESLIC’s refusal to make any offer of settlement within their policy was arbitrary, capricious, and in bad faith;” and (3) “the decision of Caraballo to settle the claim despite the insurer refusing to give written consent was not arbitrary or unreasonable.” 

    Held

    The Court granted PELSIC’s motion to exclude the testimony of Judge William Taylor.

    Key Takeaways:

    Caraballo and the Estate entered into a $36 million settlement agreement without PESLIC’s consent—an obvious breach of the PESLIC insurance policies’ consent-to-settle provisions. Defendant’s expert, Judge Taylor was highly accomplished but his background and experience simply did not relate sufficiently to the subject matter on which he opined in the instant case. The Court held that several of Judge Taylor’s opinions about PESLIC’s alleged conduct crossed the line into inappropriate legal conclusions.

    • Expert testimony should not constitute legal conclusions regarding the ultimate legal issues.
    • Expert witness’ knowledge and experience should be such that his opinions will likely be helpful to or otherwise assist the trier of fact. 
    • Judge Taylor’s reliance on his experience and some ill-defined concept of “logic” to form his opinions did not constitute a reliable methodology.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Princeton Excess And Surplus Lines Insurance Company V. Caraballo Et Al
    Docket Number: 1:21cv1981
    Court: United States District Court, Ohio Northern
    Order Date: May 21, 2024