This is a failure to accommodate case brought by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on behalf of two former Walmart associates, Marvin Montoya (“Montoya”) and Raymond Moore (“Moore”) (collectively, “Claimants”), alleging Walmart violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) when it purportedly failed to accommodate the Claimants’ disability, resulting in their constructive discharge.
Walmart filed a motion to exclude the EEOC’s expert, Roger C. Williams, who was supposed to opine on deafness, communication between deaf and hearing individuals, and how sign language interpretation may assist deaf individuals communicate at work.
Deaf Culture Expert Witness
Roger C. Williams specializes “in consulting and training related to the needs of deaf adults in the mental health system.” He has worked in various roles related to interpretation, treatment, and access for deaf individuals. In one of his prior roles, he advised a state department “on matters related to the recruitment, hiring, and retention of individuals with a hearing loss.”
He received his B.S.W. from the Rochester Institute of Technology and his M.S.W., specializing in community mental health, from the University of Illinois.
Discussion by the Court
Williams’ testimony can be summarized as four opinions. To begin with, he opined that Walmart did not provide effective accommodation to Montoya and Moore that would allow them to “enjoy all the benefits and privileges of their employment” or to “receive the same access to information provided to hearing co-workers.” His second opinion is that Walmart failed to follow its own policies requiring it to provide reasonable accommodations to deaf employees. Third, he opined that Walmart failed to provide an effective interpreter for Montoya and Moore, instead providing an unqualified interpreter—Walter-Gates—to translate between Walmart managers and Montoya and Moore. Finally, he concluded that Walmart’s procedure for requesting an accommodation and its forms that employees are required to complete are “inherently inaccessible for individuals who are deaf and do not have the written English competence to understand the forms.”
Walmart filed a motion to exclude Williams’ testimony. First, it argued that Williams’ opinions are unreliable and irrelevant because they misstate the record and make generalizations based on a small sample of experience. Second, it asserted that Williams’ opinions invaded the province of the jury by applying the law to the facts and telling the jury what to decide. Third, it said that Williams’ opinions will unfairly prejudice Walmart in a way that substantially outweighs the probative value of those opinions.
The concerns Walmart raised speak to the weight of Williams’ opinion and are more properly addressed on cross examination than through exclusion
Walmart first challenged Williams’ opinion that David Walter-Gates was not a qualified sign language interpreter. Its only argument in support is that Williams misstated the record, meaning Williams relied on unreliable facts and data to arrive at his conclusions.
Williams’ challenged opinion relied, in part, on Walter-Gates’s own statement that “he was not qualified to interpret.” Walmart asserted that Walter-Gates was referring to statements he made because Montoya and Moore were attempting to use him as an interpreter—rather than Walmart attempting to use Walter-Gates as an interpreter to accommodate Montoya and Moore.
According to Walmart, it is misleading for Wiliams to use that statement in support of his opinion that Walmart improperly used Walter-Gates as an unqualified interpreter for Moore and Montoya.
For one thing, the record did not support Walmart’s assertion. Walter-Gates stated that “he made it clear to everyone that he was not an ASL interpreter and that he knew very little sign language,” that “he would get called over when there were conversations with [Montoya and Moore],” and that “he would always tell them right away that he was not an interpreter.” In any event, the Court held that the concerns Walmart raised speak to the weight of Williams’ opinion and are more properly addressed on cross examination than through exclusion.
Walmart made a similar reliability challenge to Williams’ statement that Montoya and Moore’s supervisor, Austin Duvall, refused to train Montoya and Moore on powerlifting equipment because they were deaf.
Walmart argued that the facts and data on which Williams’ conclusion is based—i.e., Duvall’s deposition testimony—are inaccurate.
But Williams relied on the EEOC’s evidence that Duvall told Montoya that he could not train him on powerlifting equipment because his hearing limitations would create a safety issue for himself and others.
Williams is qualified to opine about whether Walmart’s actions complied with its reasonable accommodation policy
Walmart objected to Williams’ opinion that Walmart’s policy is inaccessible for deaf individuals because it apparently is based on an unreliable generalization. It added that Williams’ opinion is irrelevant because it goes beyond the scope of the lawsuit.
The Court held that Williams is qualified to opine about whether Walmart’s actions complied with its reasonable accommodation policy. Walmart contended that Williams’ opinions about Walmart’s policies are based only on his general experience as a supervisor. But Williams’ qualifications are more specific than that. When he worked at a state department of mental health, he was not just a supervisor: He “was responsible for hiring and supervising multiple deaf employees, as well as advising the Department’s Human Resources division on matters related to the recruitment, hiring, and retention of individuals with a hearing loss.”
Moreover, the Court held that Williams’ opinion will help the jury understand how a deaf individual, like Montoya, may have misunderstood the requirements of Walmart’s policies and how a sign language interpreter may have been able to help deaf employees understand what they needed to do to ensure that they were reasonably accommodated at work.
If Williams’ testimony at trial strays into the governing law, a contemporaneous objection can address this concern
Walmart challenged five of Williams’s opinions as impermissible legal conclusions. Those opinions are that Walmart “failed to provide effective communication,” “prevented Moore and Montoya from having access to the range of employment-related knowledge,” “did not provide effective accommodation which would have allowed Moore and Montoya to enjoy all the benefits and privileges of their employment,” “did not provide an effective interpreter,” and that “Walmart’s procedure for filing and documenting a disability and requesting accommodation is inherently inaccessible for individuals who are deaf.”
The legal conclusions that the jury must decide are whether Walmart failed to accommodate Montoya and Moore’s disabilities and whether Montoya and Moore were constructively discharged. Williams’ opinions are premised on his explanation of deafness, communication, and Montoya and Moore’s specific abilities and limitations.
While some of the language in Williams’ opinion mirrors the legal standard, the Court held that he does not attempt to opine on what the law requires or whether Walmart complied with specific federal statutes.
Walmart has not shown that the extraordinary remedy of excluding evidence based on the danger of unfair prejudice is warranted
Walmart’s final argument to exclude Williams’s testimony is that his opinion is more prejudicial than probative.
Walmart relied on the same arguments it made above. It asserted that Williams encroaches on the jury’s role, provides unhelpful opinions, and that his opinions are unreliable. Those arguments have already been rejected, so Walmart has not shown that the extraordinary remedy of excluding evidence based on the danger of unfair prejudice is warranted.
Held
The Court denied Walmart’s motion to preclude the testimony of EEOC’s expert, Roger Williams.
Key Takeaway:
Walmart’s argument appeared to rely on the fact that Williams’ statement about Duvall is based on a contested fact. Walmart has not pointed to any authority suggesting that an expert may only rely on uncontested facts to support his or her conclusions. Rather, experts regularly rely on deposition testimony to form their opinions.
It may be different if Williams’ entire opinion were that Duvall refused powerlifting equipment training for Montoya and Moore because they were deaf. Instead, it is one fact among fourteen pages of facts and data that Williams considered in forming his opinions about the effectiveness of Walmart’s accommodations.
Walmart may attempt to disprove the allegation that Williams relies on or make a contemporaneous objection if the helpfulness of Williams’ opinions regarding powerlifting equipment lessens after Walmart’s summary judgment motion is resolved. But Walmart’s concerns do not support a pretrial ruling excluding Williams’ opinion.
Case Details:
| Case Caption: | Equal Employment Opportunity Commission V. Walmart Inc. |
| Docket Number: | 2:23cv2395 |
| Court Name: | United States District Court, Kansas |
| Order Date: | August 08, 2025 |
