This case concerns a motor vehicle collision that occurred between Plaintiff Bryan Russell Arnett (“Plaintiff”) and Defendant Larry Tyrone Fairell, II (“Fairell”) on December 14, 2022.
Fairell filed a motion to partially strike the testimony of Arnett’s retained transportation safety expert, David Hedgpeth.
Transportation Safety Expert Witness
David Hedgpeth is the principal owner of Hill Country Transportation Resources, LLC and has over 35 years of experience in the commercial transportation industry.
Hedgpeth has a comprehensive understanding of commercial transportation industry standards, best practices, and regulatory guidelines, and in particular, what would be considered usual and customary, with employees, commercial drivers, delivery services and company management.
Arnett designated Hedgpeth, of Hill Country Transportation Resources, LLC, in his First Supplemental Expert Designations on March 24, 2025. The designation stated that Hedgpeth “will testify about transportation safety, regulatory compliance, fleet management, commercial motor vehicle accident investigation, and industry standards of care.”
On May 06, 2025, Arnett served his Eleventh Supplemental Rule 26 Disclosures, which included Hedgpeth’s supplemental report.
The parties did not dispute that Arnett’s original designation of Hedgpeth was timely. But the Defendants took issue with the service of Hedgpeth’s supplemental report, which they asserted “addresses new topics and offers new opinions not addressed in Hedgpeth’s original report not disclosed in Plaintiff’s Designations.”
And, so, Defendants contended that Hedgpeth’s supplemental report should be stricken because it is untimely and fails to comply with Rule 26’s disclosure requirements and because the opinions contained in it are unreliable and, consequently, inadmissible under Rule 702 and Daubert.
Rule 26
Defendants argued that Hedgpeth’s supplemental report is untimely because it consisted of “new” opinions about whether speeding was a contributing factor to the incident at issue, which were not contained in his original report.
Arnett stated that the original report analyzed compliance with Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (“FMCSR”) and, specifically, section 395.8(2)(i), which requires drivers to record their duty status. And the supplemental report “builds on this” by analyzing newly produced bills of lading, which “provide additional data regarding the driving hours and mileage of Defendant Fairell [and] directly relate to the original opinion about FMCSR compliance and safety concerns.”
Arnett contended that the supplemental report bolsters Hedgpeth’s original conclusions about FMCSR compliance and safety concerns but did not exceed the scope of his original report.
Based on its review of Hedgpeth’s original and supplemental reports, the Court agreed with Arnett.
Hedgpeth’s supplemental report serves to elaborate – more generally – on his original opinions about compliance with federal safety regulations. And, so, it does not depart from his original report in material respects.
As to timeliness, the documents (bills of lading) that formed the basis of Hedgpeth’s supplemental report were purportedly produced on March 12, 2025, which was before Arnett’s expert designation deadline.
Arnett asserted that Hedgpeth reviewed the materials and produced the supplement “as quickly as practicable,” which allowed Arnett to serve the supplemental report on Defendants on May 6, 2025 – ten days after the discovery deadline.
Rule 702 and Daubert
Defendants also contended that Hedgpeth’s opinions in his supplemental report are unreliable under Rule 702 and Daubert because they are facially speculative. Specifically, Defendants pointed to Hedgpeth’s statements that he “is unable to come to an accurate conclusion as to speed and hours of service” and that the “information and data is inconclusive.”
But Arnett’s response persuasively addressed Hedgpeth’s qualifications, methodologies, materials reviewed, and summary of his opinions as it relates to his supplemental report. And, so, the Court found that Hedgpeth’s supplemental report satisfied Rule 702 and Daubert and that it should not be excluded on that basis.
Held
The Court denied the Defendants’ motion to partially strike the testimony of transportation safety expert, David Hedgpeth.
Key Takeaway:
Insofar as Arnett’s supplemental disclosure fell short of Rule 26’s requirements, the Court found that such non-compliance – on considering the arguments that Arnett persuasively lays out in his response – was harmless.
Plaintiff, Luvelle James alleged that during a winter storm on January 6, 2022, his car was struck on Interstate 55 by an Aramark truck being driven by Steven Moore. As a result of this crash, Plaintiff alleged injuries to his back, neck, and head. He sought damages for past and future medical bills, past and future mental and physical pain and suffering, past and future lost wages, the loss of earning capacity, and loss of enjoyment of life.
James alleged claims of negligence (Count I), negligence per se (Count II) and negligent hiring, training and supervision against Defendants Steven Moore and Aramark Uniform & Career Apparel, LLC. He also sought punitive damages against both Defendants.
Plaintiff’s expert Michael Connelly testified that Defendant Moore failed to meet industry standards of care for a commercial driver in his operation of the Aramark truck on the day of the accident. Second, that Defendant Aramark failed to meet industry standards of care for a motor carrier with respect to Aramark’s training, supervision, and monitoring practices over its employee, Steven Moore. Defendants filed a motion to exclude Connelly’s testimony.
Transportation Safety Expert Witness
Michael Connelly is the president of Transhield, Inc. He and the Company specialize in providing third party safety and compliance solutions to transportation, distribution, and logistics companies nationwide.
A graduate of Clemson University, Connelly has been in the transportation industry for over 20 years. A licensed CDL driver, he has served many operational roles in both the Truckload and LTL industry sectors. Upon entering the field of transportation safety, he quickly rose to the top of an industry leading fleet in Western Maryland.
Defendants did not challenge Connelly’s qualifications. Instead, Defendants argued that Connelly’s opinions were not based on sufficient facts to be reliable and helpful to the jury.
Failure to Consider Deposition Testimony
First, Defendants contended that Connelly’s opinions were unreliable because Connelly did not consider or even review the testimony of Plaintiff James, and that Connelly therefore inaccurately stated that the road conditions were disputed at the time of the accident. Defendants maintained that James admitted the road was not snow-covered until he stopped on the interstate immediately before the accident. Similarly, Defendants pointed out, Defendant Moore testified there was no snow or ice on the road until just before the accident.
Both parties therefore appeared to agree that there was no snow on the roadway until just before the accident; however, what they mean by those statements could be different. Plaintiff James’s actual testimony is that “when I got to the major incident and stopped the car, the road was snow covered because there wasn’t – wasn’t nothing moving.”
Defendants also asserted that Connelly improperly relied on a Missouri Highway Patrol officer’s testimony regarding the severity of the road conditions. Defendants argued that the officer could not have known the road conditions at the time of the accident because he did not arrive at the scene until sometime later.
Because Connelly based his opinions on this allegedly incomplete or misleading information, Defendants said that his testimony should be excluded. However, the Court held that Connelly’s opinion was not fundamentally unsupported and that the Defendants’ concerns about any “cherry-picked” facts may be addressed through cross-examination.
Other Accidents on the Interstate
Next, Connelly’s opinion stated that Defendant Moore would have passed at least four accidents prior to the collision with Plaintiff.
However, Connelly admitted he was mistaken, and the four accidents to which he referred actually happened after the parties’ collision.
The Court held that Connelly may therefore not testify as to the existence of the four accidents.
Opinion Regarding when to Slow Vehicle
Next, Defendants addressed Connelly’s opinion that Defendant Moore waited too long to slow his vehicle. Defendants complained that Connelly improperly “assumed that Moore encountered hazardous weather conditions well before” the time and location of the accident. Defendants quibble again with the testimony from the Plaintiff, Defendant, and the highway patrol officer. Again, as with the question of when the roads became snow-covered, the Court held that the factual basis for Connelly’s opinion was subject to cross-examination.
Citation for driving too fast
Defendant objected to Connelly’s report stating that Defendant Moore was ‘cited’ for driving too fast. Connelly now admits that Defendant Moore received no citation or ‘ticket’ for driving too fast for conditions. The Court held that Connelly may not testify that such a citation exists.
Held
The Court granted in part and denied in part the Defendants’ motion to exclude the testimony of Michael Connelly.
Key Takeaway:
Because Connelly’s opinion is not fundamentally unsupported, Defendants’ concerns about any “cherry-picked” facts may be addressed through cross-examination. After all, the factual basis of an expert opinion goes to the credibility of the testimony, not the admissibility, and it is up to the opposing party to examine the factual basis for the opinion in cross-examination.
Plaintiff, William Harrison Sims’ claims arise out of an October 24, 2019, two-vehicle collision involving Plaintiff, who was operating the 2004 BMW (“Subject BMW”). Tameca Harris-Jackson (“Harris-Jackson”) was operating the Hyundai that collided with the Subject BMW. Plaintiff alleges he sustained “severe, permanent, and life-altering injuries” due to the driver-side Takata airbag unexpectedly rupturing and shooting “metal shrapnel into his face and body.”
Defendants procured and installed the airbag inflator during the process of “designing, manufacturing, assembling, and producing” the vehicle. Plaintiff brought this action for damages against both Defendants BMW of North America (“BMW NA”) and Bayerische Motoren Werke AG (“BMW AG”), alleging strict liability and negligence from procuring and installing the airbag.
Amanda Duran, P.E. is the Defendants’ accident reconstruction expert. Plaintiff argued that Duran postulated several scenarios regarding how Harris-Jackson was driving and elected, without a rational basis, to endorse the theory that best suited the defense.
Accident Reconstruction Expert Witness
Amanda Duran, P.E. has been working in the automotive engineering field, primarily focusing on the investigation and reconstruction of motor vehicle crashes.
From 2003 until the present, she has been an Engineer at Carr Engineering, Inc. In this role, she performed investigations to determine the causes, conditions, and circumstances of motor vehicle crashes. To date, she has personally been involved in analyzing the various aspects of more than 600 crashes, including more than 500 vehicle inspections and more than 400 scene inspections.
Plaintiff sought to exclude Duran’s opinion that someone failed to yield the right of way because she cannot determine who that someone is. Next, Plaintiff moved to exclude Duran’s opinion that he was driving in the southbound right-hand lane when the crash occurred, as opposed to the left-hand lane. Plaintiff argued Duran ignored the physical evidence that contradicts her opinion, rendering it unreliable, unhelpful, and irrelevant. Plaintiff also sought to eliminate Duran’s opinion that the driver of the Sonata, Harris-Jackson, accelerated from a stop at a slow or moderate rate before the collision.
A. Someone Failed to Yield the Right of Way
The defense conceded that Duran did not determine whether Plaintiff or Harris-Jackson failed to yield the right of way before the two vehicles collided. The defense added that Duran did conclude that “the impact speed of Harris-Jackson’s vehicle [is] consistent with her testimony that her vehicle was stationary before proceeding into the intersection.”
The Court was tasked with determining whether her testimony that somebody failed to yield the right of way survives the rigors of Daubertbut Duran’s opinion that Harris-Jackson’s vehicle was stationary before she turned to enter the highway was of little assistance.
Duran’s inability to determine which driver failed to yield the right of way failed the helpfulness prong of Daubert. The accident only occurred because one of the driver’s failed to yield the right of way. A jury does not need an expert to explain this fact. A collision at an intersection controlled by a traffic light occurs when one of the driver’s fails to yield the right of way. Accordingly, the Court held that Duran’s testimony did not concern a matter that is beyond the understanding of the average lay person.
The defense argued that Duran’s testimony that she was unable to determine which driver failed to yield the right of way is helpful simply because the parties disagree on who is at fault. The Court held that Duran’s testimony that she does not know who failed to yield the right of way does not have a tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. In other words, Duran has no opinion as to which driver is at fault.
B. Lane of Travel
Plaintiff challenged Duran’s opinion that he was driving in the southbound right-hand lane when the accident occurred, contrary to Trooper Ndoumbe’s assessment that Plaintiff was traveling in the left-hand lane.
Plaintiff argued that Duran’s opinion was not only unreliable, but also unhelpful because she conceded that Harris-Jackson could have accelerated from a stop at the stop bar with light or moderate acceleration rates and impacted Plaintiff’s BMW in either the right-hand or left-hand lanes.
Duran’s Methodology is Unreliable because She Failed to Account for Physical Evidence Placing the Plaintiff’s Vehicle in the Right Lane
Duran stated in her report that she did not identify any remaining evidence at the crash site relating to this accident. She did, however, review the accident report prepared by law enforcement. Duran also noted in her bullet-point summary of deposition testimony that Trooper Ndoumbe determined the area of impact by a “gouge on the roadway,” but the roadway has since been repaved. It should be noted that Duran did not factor the gouge mark and fluid identified by Trooper Ndoumbe into her analysis. It was never mentioned again in her expert report.
Duran Offered No Explanation for her Decision to Ignore Physical Evidence and the Troopers’ Testimony in Favor of Harris-Jackson’s Version of Events
Trooper Ndoumbe testified that the gouge mark and fluid were consistent with Plaintiff’s vehicle in the left lane at the moment of impact, as documented on his crash diagram.
While the parties did not explain the significance of Plaintiff traveling in the right lane versus the left, it appears from the above that if Plaintiff’s vehicle was in the left lane, this would support Harris-Jackson’s testimony that she proceeded from a stopped position and proceeded slowly. Hence, Duran’s observation that “[r]epeating the above analysis with lower separation speeds and the adjusted post-impact trajectories, the speeds were more consistent [if Plaintiff was in the right lane] with witness testimony and typical driving behavior.” Duran ignored the gouge marks and fluid identified by Trooper Ndoumbe.
Duran emphasized Harris-Jackson’s version of the events over physical evidence, thereby violating her working premise that “[t]he first step in reconstructing the subject crash and performing appropriate calculations to determine the speeds and Delta-Vs is to reconcile the physical evidence on the roadway, the photographs, and the vehicles.” Moreover, Duran offered no explanation for her decision to ignore physical evidence and the Troopers’ testimony in favor of Harris-Jackson’s version of events.
Analysis
The Court held that Duran failed to consider or account for contradictory data, which consisted of a gouge mark and fluid placing the initial point of impact in the left lane. Duran acknowledged in her report that “the first step” in reconstructing the accident and calculating the Delta-Vs is to reconcile the physical evidence with the analysis. She failed to do so, rending her analysis flawed.
Duran stated in her report that “if the Hyundai accelerated from a stop at the stop bar to the area of impact in either lane, with either light or moderate acceleration rates, it could have reached the range of both of our [Ponder and Duran’s] calculated speeds (13 to 24 MPH).” Whether Plaintiff was traveling in the left lane or right was of no consequence to Duran’s speed calculations.
C. Vehicle Speed
Plaintiff challenged Duran’s methodology in calculating the speed of the Hyundai and whether that speed was reached from a stopped position.
It was noted that Duran measured the radius of the typical path for a left turn onto the entrance ramp to be a radius of about 80 feet. Next, Duran calculated the force exerted on Harris-Jackson if she employed Plaintiff’s speed calculation as .05 G and ruled out this aggressive maneuver based on the forces and Harris-Jackson’s testimony.
Duran then used her speed calculation (13 to 25 MPH) and concluded that o.255 G would be applied if Harris-Jackson made the turn without stopping and the maximum speed would be approximately 18 MPH. Similarly, if Harris-Jackson proceeded to turn from a stopped position, applying light or moderate acceleration rates, the speed would be between 13 to 24 MPH.
Plaintiff was correct that Duran offered two competing opinions: either Harris-Jackson proceeded into the intersection from a stop or drove through. In both scenarios, Harris-Jackson would reach speeds within Duran’s calculated range and below the speed calculated by Ponder. The Court held that Duran’s opinion is helpful to the jury tasked with evaluating Harris-Jackson’s credibility. If Harris-Jackson testified she came to a stop before entering the intersection, Duran’s calculations support that testimony. Secondly, Duran’s calculations and opinions countered those of Plaintiff’s expert and went to the weight the jury will accord Ponder’s testimony. Alternative opinions are not per se unreliable or unhelpful.
Held
The Court granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiff’s motion to exclude the testimony of Amanda Duran.
Key Takeaway:
Duran committed the sin of omitting data—the gouge mark, fluid spill, the Trooper’s testimony, and cherry-picking data—giving undue weight to Harris-Jackson’s version of the events. Additionally, as Plaintiff noted, Duran’s opinion was unhelpful. Whether Plaintiff was traveling in the left lane or right was of no consequence to Duran’s speed calculations.
While Duran’s opinion regarding Plaintiff’s lane of travel ignored physical evidence, the opinion that Harris-Jackson proceeded into the intersection from a stopped position was, however, supported by a reliable methodology.
Plaintiff is correct that Duran offered two competing opinions: either Harris-Jackson proceeded into the intersection from a stop or drove through. However, Duran’s opinion is helpful to the jury tasked with evaluating Harris-Jackson’s credibility.
Please refer to the blogs previously published about this case:
