Expert Witness Profiler

Tag: standard of care

  • Law And Legal Expert Allowed to Opine on Competent Representation

    Law And Legal Expert Allowed to Opine on Competent Representation

    This legal malpractice action arises from Defendants’ representation of Plaintiffs in an eminent domain proceeding involving the Westside Connector project. Defendants retained Kannon Conway, Esq., an experienced eminent domain attorney, to opine on the applicable standard of care and the viability of a challenge to the taking. Conway concluded that any such challenge would have been futile.

    The Plaintiffs, however, filed a motion to exclude Conway’s testimony and expert report, citing Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1).

    Law And Legal Expert Witness

    Kannon C. Conway, Esq. routinely advises and represents property owners whose property is being taken by governmental entities under the power of eminent domain.

    Conway is also the current Tennessee-affiliate member of the Owners’ Counsel of America, a nationwide network of leading eminent domain lawyers dedicated to representing property owners.

    Get the full story on challenges to Kannon Conway’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Discussion by the Court

    Conway opined that: the Defendants complied with the duty they owed to the Plaintiffs as their clients in an attorney-client relationship; the Defendants acted within the scope of their engagement by the Races; the Defendants provided sound legal advice and adequately communicated this advice; they took appropriate steps to protect the Races’ financial interests; they provided competent representation in the Underlying Case; and the Races did not suffer harm as the result of any alleged breach of duty by the Defendants.

    Analysis

    The Court found, as an initial matter, that the Plaintiffs’ motion to exclude is not in compliance with Local Rule 7.01(a)(1), which requires a certification that counsel has conferred with counsel for the opposing party before filing the motion and a statement of whether the relief requested is opposed. On that basis alone, the motion is subject to denial.

    Further, the Court found, based on its review of the motion to exclude and the documents filed by both parties, that neither exclusion of the Defendants’ expert’s report nor any other sanction is warranted under Rule 37(a). The Plaintiffs simply have not identified any discovery violation. At most, they contended that the Defendants did not supply all available discovery materials to their expert, but they do not contend that the Defendants withheld discovery from them (though it appears that the Plaintiffs may have withheld documents from the defendants).

    As for exclusion under Rule 702, the Court, in performing its gatekeeping function under that rule, found that Conway is qualified to testify on the subject matter of his report and that his proffered opinions are both reliable and relevant.

    Regardless, Conway’s report and deposition testimony made clear what documents he did rely on, and the purported factual discrepancies identified by the Plaintiffs are not material, were adequately explained and resolved during Conway’s deposition, or are not factual discrepancies at all. His opinions clearly “rest upon a reliable foundation, as opposed to, say, unsupported speculation,” and there is no mismatch between those opinions and the facts of this case. Supplementation is not warranted at this juncture, and the Plaintiffs have failed to show that the defendants were required to include with their expert disclosures any documents not already disclosed.

    Held

    The Court denied the Plaintiffs’ motion to exclude the testimony of Kannon Conway.

    Key Takeaway

    An expert cannot be expected to review documents that were not produced in discovery, nor is he necessarily required to review every document produced in the case.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Race V. Gault
    Docket Number: 3:24cv1437
    Court Name: United States District Court, Tennessee Middle
    Order Date: July 17, 2026
  • Cardiology Expert Allowed to Opine on the Need for Additional Treatment

    Cardiology Expert Allowed to Opine on the Need for Additional Treatment

    This medical-negligence/wrongful-death case resulting from the tragic death of Formeka Ball. Ms. Ball was admitted to the River Oaks Hospital Emergency Room complaining of chest pain and shortness of breath that started earlier that morning. After she died, Plaintiff Patricia Ball, Ms. Ball’s mother and the administratrix of her estate, sued River Oaks.

    Defendants challenged Plaintiff’s experts, Dr. Todd A. Parker and Dr. Ronald H. Wharton.

    Emergency Medicine Expert Witness

    Todd Allen Parker is a board-certified emergency-medicine physician and an attending physician. He is an editor and chapter author of a major Emergency Medicine board review textbook published by the American Academy of Emergency Medicine.

    Get the full story on challenges to Todd Parker’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Cardiology Expert Witness

    Ronald Howard Wharton is board certified in cardiovascular disease, completed a residency in internal medicine and a fellowship in cardiovascular disease, and is an associate professor of cardiology at the Zucker School of Medicine of Hofstra University in New York.

    He is also an attending cardiologist at a hospital in Manhasset, New
    York.

    Want to know more about the challenges Ronald Wharton has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Defendants mostly accepted their qualifications but said that their testimony is unreliable and thus inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 702.

    Parker and Wharton offered similar core opinions. Though Ball was given a troponin test in the ER to determine whether she was having a heart attack, they believe she should have received a second troponin test after more observation. Had that test been done, they believe it would have detected the need for additional treatment and that she would not have died from cardiac arrest later that night.

    1. Speculative and Conclusory Opinions

    Both Parker and Wharton offered opinions on the standard of care, breach, and causation. According to Defendants, Parker and Wharton failed “to take into account facts established by the family members’ depositions” regarding the onset of symptoms and have “no autopsy, no abnormal EKG, and no abnormal laboratory testing which factually supports the experts’ opinions.”

    Parker’s initial report indicated that Ball “presented to the ED with a history & physical that is a ‘textbook’ case of how cardiac ischemia presents.” He then described that history and those symptoms, including Ball’s score on a clinical guideline (the HEART score and Heart pathway).

    Parker also conducted a differential diagnosis, ruling in cardiac arrest and ruling out other causes of her symptoms. The Court found the methodology sufficiently reliable to meet Plaintiff’s burden under Rule 702.

    According to Defendants, Parker and Wharton missed evidence and had no autopsy to consider. Neither is dispositive. Because Plaintiff met Rule 702’s burden, Defendants’ other factual arguments go to weight.

    2. Wharton’s Qualifications

    According to Wharton, Ball would have survived if given treatment, including “medications and reperfusion therapy (either percutaneous coronary intervention or bypass surgery).”

    Defendants said that Wharton is unqualified to give this opinion because he is neither an interventional cardiologist nor a cardiovascular surgeon.

    Even assuming he did not currently perform the procedures he noted, Defendants have not explained why a cardiologist with his knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education would lack the expertise to explain how heart attacks are treated.

    Defendants next complained that Wharton lacked the qualifications to agree with the coroner’s finding that cardiac arrest caused the death.

    This was a new argument. While Wharton addressed the issue again in his new affidavit, his original report noted the coroner’s finding and stated that “more likely than not, Ball died from complications of an acute myocardial infarction.” Thus, Defendants could have initially argued that Wharton needed to be a pathologist to testify regarding the cause of death. That argument would have allowed Plaintiff an opportunity to respond.

    This qualifications argument is untimely, and the Court will not strike Wharton based on qualifications.

    3. Failure to Identify Specific Life-Saving Treatment

    After arguing that Wharton is unqualified to address the specific procedures he believes would have saved Ball, Defendants fault Plaintiff’s experts for failing to “establish that timely diagnosis would have led to an identified course of treatment and that treatment would more likely than not, have prevented death within the relevant time window.”

    But the experts’ initial reports did not mention specific treatment, so Defendants could have faulted the experts for this omission in their opening brief. The argument is therefore untimely.

    Held

    The Court denied the Defendants’ motion to strike the testimony of Todd Parker and Ronald Wharton.

    Key Takeaway

    The Court should make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Ball V. River Oaks Hospital, LLC
    Docket Number: 3:24cv632
    Court Name: United States District Court, Mississippi Southern
    Order Date: June 11, 2026
  • Real Estate Expert Not Allowed to Opine on Undue Hardship

    Real Estate Expert Not Allowed to Opine on Undue Hardship

    On September 24, 2024, Plaintiff Pharilyn Chhang filed the operative second amended complaint against Defendants West Coast and Sergio Madrigal, alleging causes of action under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), wrongful eviction; invasion of private right to occupancy; and breach of duty. Plaintiff claimed that she is a disabled person who requires her emotional support animal, Onyx, to reside with her.

    Defendants intended to call Robert S. Griswold to testify as an expert witness “regarding the standard of care for a property owner/manager as it relates to accommodation requests, insurance issues and costs, ineligible risks and liability exposure and related issues.” However, Plaintiff filed a motion to exclude Griswold.

    Plaintiff also filed a motion to preclude Defendants’ expert witness Kevin J. Valine.

    Real Estate Expert Witness

    Robert Stephen Griswold is a recognized expert on management of all types of residential real estate. He has actively managed over 70,000 residential units and several million square feet of commercial, industrial, self-storage, and retail properties nationally in the last 40+ years.

    He is a 3-time graduate of the distinguished Marshall School of Business at the University of Southern California with a BS (’81), MBA (’86), and MSBA (2nd Masters) (’88) in real estate and related disciplines.

    Get the full story on challenges to Robert Griswold’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Insurance Expert Witness

    Kevin J. Valine has more than 45 years of experience in the field of property/casualty insurance and risk management.

    He has been licensed by the California Department of Insurance to transact Property and Casualty insurance since 1983.

    Discover more cases with Kevin Valine as an expert witness by ordering his comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

    Discussion by the Court

    I. Robert Griswold

    The Court found that the standard of care is not relevant to the claims at issue. Additionally, the expert did not appear to have expertise in disability accommodations consistent with the claims herein, nor did it appear that the expert reviewed the insurance policy exclusions.

    As a result, the motion was granted as to Griswold’s opinions that Plaintiff’s request for an emotional support animal was denied on “legitimate grounds,” and that Defendants met the applicable standard of care in their ownership, operation, property management, and maintenance with respect to Plaintiff’s request. The motion was further granted as to Griswold’s opinion regarding undue hardship, the feasibility of a reasonable accommodation, and that Defendants acted reasonably by offering to temporarily allow Plaintiff to keep Onyx on the property while Plaintiff sought to relocate. Finally, the motion was granted as to Griswold’s opinion that allowing Plaintiff to keep Onyx on the property would have violated the insurance carrier’s exclusions.

    However, the Court denied the motion as to Griswold’s opinion that the property’s insurance could have been non-renewed or canceled for allowing an animal on a breed-restriction list; that permitting Plaintiff to keep such an animal would expose Defendants to financial repercussion; and that a loss of insurance would have imposed a significant burden on the property’s residents and occupants, subject to Defendants laying a proper foundation that the applicable insurance policy excluded the animal in question.

    II. Kevin Valine

    The Court also found that Valine’s opinions regarding the appropriate standard of care for a reasonably prudent insurance broker were not relevant to the claims at issue.

    Although Defendants argued at the hearing that Valine had opined that granting Plaintiff’s accommodation would have exposed Defendants to an “uninsured exposure to risk of catastrophic proportion,” that statement appeared within his broader analysis that “D&D met the standard of care for a reasonably prudent insurance broker.”

    As a result, the Court concluded that expert testimony on this issue is unnecessary, as it would not assist the trier of fact given the irrelevance of the standard of care.

    Held

    • The Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to preclude Defendants’ expert witness Kevin J. Valine.
    • The Court granted in part and denied in part Plaintiff’s motion to preclude Defendants’ expert witness Robert Griswold.

    Key Takeaway

    Certain expert opinions offered by Griswold and Valine were deemed inadmissible because the standard-of-care analysis had no bearing on the claims at issue.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Chhang V. West Coast USA Properties LLC
    Docket Number: 1:23cv1335
    Court Name: United States District Court, California Eastern
    Order Date: June 02, 2026
  • Environmental Expert Was Allowed to Opine on the Impact of PCBs

    Environmental Expert Was Allowed to Opine on the Impact of PCBs

    The Burlington School District (“BSD” or “Plaintiff”) commenced this action after discovering polychlorinated biphenyls (“PCBs”) at Burlington High School (“BHS”). Defendants Monsanto Co., Solutia, Inc., and Pharmacia LLC (collectively “Monsanto” or “Defendants”) are allegedly successors to the old Monsanto company, which was the primary manufacturer of PCBs in the United States for several decades. BHS was constructed in the 1960s, and testing recently revealed the presence of PCBs in its buildings. The BSD concluded that because of PCB contamination, BHS had to be demolished.

    Defendants filed a motion to exclude all testimony of Plaintiff’s experts Wendy Pearson and Robert A. Wanat.

    Environmental Expert Witness

    Wendy N. Pearson is a licensed engineer who has worked at Matson & Associates for over 25 years.

    Pearson has bachelor’s and master’s degrees in civil engineering and environmental science and engineering. She has also conducted peer-reviewed research relating to environmental contamination, chemical manufacturing industry standards and practices, and chemical releases from manufacturing and industrial facilities.

    Discover more cases with Wendy Pearson as an expert witness by ordering her comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

    Chemistry Expert Witness

    Dr. Robert Adam Wanat holds an M.S. and a Ph.D. in chemistry from Cornell University. He has more than 30 years’ experience working for major chemical companies overseeing research and development of various chemical products. Since 2018, he has owned his own consulting company which specializes in the development, manufacture, and application of polymers, plastics, materials, and adhesives.

    Want to know more about the challenges Robert Wanat has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    I. Monsanto’s Knowledge

    Defendants first argued that opinions about what Monsanto should have known should be excluded. Their contention is that these witnesses’ testimonies about the environmental impacts of PCBs — based in part on information from Monsanto’s own archives — are “mere pronouncements” based on “subjective or speculative opinions” and would constitute a subjective interpretation “based on nothing more than a review of decades-old documents.”

    Pearson reviewed the state of the science related to PCBs over several decades, beginning in the 1930s. Pearson also explained the chemical nature of PCBs and what was known about their dangers. She did offer opinions about what Monsanto could have done to expand its knowledge. Those opinions are based on studies that were known in the scientific community and, in certain instances, by Monsanto itself.

    As a result, the Court found that Pearson’s testimony is not based on speculation. Nor did it constitute merely subjective narrations. Instead, they appeared to be supported by a substantial documentary record that provided a foundation for their opinions. 

    Wanat’s report is similarly supported. He will testify about chemical evaporation generally, and with respect to PCBs specifically. He will also reference Monsanto’s documents, including patents and technical bulletins.

    II. Standard of Care

    Defendants next argued that Pearson’s and Wanat’s opinions regarding industry standards cannot be admitted because they are not supported by sufficient facts, are not based on any methodology, and constitute improper legal conclusions.

    Pearson intended to testify that Monsanto defined its own standard of care and failed to live up to that standard. Wanat’s report is more limited, citing Monsanto’s adherence to American Conference of Government Hygienists thresholds.

    The Court questioned whether the materials in question establish a standard of care, or whether they instead constitute general statements of corporate responsibility. Regardless of the distinction, the Court found no reason to exclude the testimony of either Pearson or Wanat, insofar as their testimony is based on Monsanto’s own statements about its responsibilities.

    Defendants’ final argument is that testimony about the standard of care consisted of improper legal conclusions and stood in the shoes of the jury.

    Here, Plaintiff submitted that Wanat will use the term “reasonable” in its “ordinary, non-legal sense.” Defendants have not identified an element of a pending cause of action that would render the term “reasonable” an impermissible legal conclusion. Consequently, the Court declined to bar such testimony.

    Held

    The Court denied Defendants’ motion to exclude the expert testimony of Wendy Pearson and Robert Wanat.

    Key Takeaway

    To determine when a question posed to an expert witness calls for an improper legal conclusion, the district court should consider first whether the question tracks the language of the legal principle at issue or of the applicable statute, and second, whether any terms employed have specialized legal meaning.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Burlington School District V. Monsanto Co.
    Docket Number: 2:22cv215
    Court Name: United States District Court, Vermont
    Order Date: April 07, 2026
  • Emergency Medicine Was Expert Allowed to Opine on Correctional Oversight

    Emergency Medicine Was Expert Allowed to Opine on Correctional Oversight

    Approximately 30 hours after Mark Beckner was booked into the Santa Cruz County Jail, he was found dead in his cell. Beckner’s son, Brandon Beckner, and his estate (“Plaintiffs”) filed suit asserting that the County of Santa Clara, correctional officers, and jail personnel were deliberately indifferent to Beckner’s serious medical needs in violation of federal and state law.

    Plaintiffs filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Patrick Ennis, M.D., who is one of California Forensic Medical Group (“CFMG”) Defendants’ expert witnesses. CFMG Defendants filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Jeffrey E. Keller, M.D., one of Plaintiffs’ expert witnesses.

    Correctional Healthcare Expert Witness

    Patrick K. Ennis, M.D. is a general physician and withdrawal specialist working in the field of corrections in Chicago, Illinois.

    Get the full story on challenges to Patrick Ennis’ expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Emergency Medicine Expert Witness

    Jeffrey Ernest Keller, M.D. is an emergency medicine physician licensed to practice in Idaho. He has experience providing direct clinical care to incarcerated patients and supervising medical programs in both jails and prisons.

    Want to know more about the challenges Jeffrey Keller has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    1. Testimony of CFMG Defendants’ Expert Patrick Ennis, M.D.

    CFMG Defendants designated Ennis “to provide expert testimony on the standard of care and actions and inactions of CFMG staff during Beckner’s medical care at the Santa Cruz County Jail.”

    However, Plaintiffs argued that (1) Ennis lacked the requisite qualifications to testify to specific standards of care, likely course of treatment in an emergency room, and the likely outcome of those treatments, and (2) Ennis’ opinions are not sufficiently reliable. The Court disagreed. First, Ennis is sufficiently qualified to testify to the proffered topics given his experience working “as an attending physician for the Department of Correctional Health Services/Cermak Health Services of Cook County in Chicago, Illinois since 2017” and as “the Medical Director of the Cermak Health Services of Cook County Opioid Treatment Program since March of 2022,” where he “works with correctional nurses everyday.”

    CFMG Defendants pointed out that Ennis’ testimony concerning the likely course of treatment in an emergency room and the outcome of those treatments is offered only in rebuttal to Plaintiffs’ expert Keller’s testimony. The Court found that Ennis’ education, training, credentials, and experience as a medical doctor in a correctional setting qualifies him as an expert to discuss standards of care and to rebut Keller’s testimony. Second, Ennis’ opinions are based upon sufficient facts and data given that Ennis conducted a blind review of the records in forming his opinion. Accordingly, the Court found that his opinions are sufficiently reliable.

    2. Testimony of Plaintiffs’ Expert Jeffrey Keller, M.D.

    Plaintiffs designated Keller to testify to correctional medical systems and oversight, clinical correctional care, emergency department care services and procedures, and emergency transport.

    CFMG Defendants did not challenge Keller’s qualifications as a medical professional in a correctional setting. CFMG Defendants instead argued that: (1) Keller’s opinions that Beckner’s death was preventable and that he suffered unnecessarily are speculative, contradict well-established scientific fact, and, as such, are unreliable and more prejudicial than probative; and (2) Keller’s opinions that any actions or omissions by Defendant CFMG caused any harm to Beckner are speculative and are unsupported by sufficient facts. The Court disagreed with both arguments.

    Keller based his opinions on his personal experience as an emergency room physician and his personal experience treating ruptured arteries (though not splanchnic artery ruptures). This is a sufficiently reliable basis for his opinions. Further, Keller’s opinions about Defendant CFMG’s actions are based on the operative complaint, grand jury testimony submitted with the complaint, Beckner’s medical chart, CFMG’s “policies and nursing protocols,” and the testimony of nurse Defendant Sarah Hewett, among other sources. Again, this is a sufficient factual basis for Keller’s opinions in this case. The Court found that Keller’s opinions are sufficiently reliable when coupled with his experience and credentials.

    Held

    The Court denied both Plaintiffs’ motion to exclude the testimony of Patrick Ennis and Defendants’ motion to exclude the testimony of Jeffrey Keller.

    Key Takeaway

    Expert opinion testimony is relevant if the knowledge underlying it has a valid connection to the pertinent inquiry. And it is reliable if the knowledge underlying it has a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of the relevant discipline.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Beckner V. County Of Santa Cruz
    Docket Number: 5:23cv5032
    Court Name: United States District Court, California Northern
    Order Date: March 26, 2026
  • Corrections Expert Was Allowed to Opine on Lack of Protective Custody

    Corrections Expert Was Allowed to Opine on Lack of Protective Custody

    This case arises from Pierce County’s failure to protect Nathaniel Woods from an assault by another inmate at the Pierce County Jail.

    The jail acknowledged that “individuals who commit sex offenses against children get assaulted in jail.” The Plaintiff asserted that Pierce County was negligent because it failed to place Woods in protective custody, even though he was a convicted sex offender.

    Defendants filed a motion to strike the declaration of Plaintiff’s expert, Robert Ayers.

    Corrections Expert Witness

    Robert L. Ayers, Jr. has over 50 years of experience in the corrections environment. He was employed as a correctional officer for San Quentin California State Prison for 18 years, working a variety of assignments through the rank of Lieutenant.

    For eight additional years, Ayers worked in a women’s prison and in departmental headquarters, where his responsibilities included budget and fiscal oversight. In 1994, Ayers was appointed as the Chief Deputy Warden at Pelican Bay State Prison. Ayers retired from California State service in 2000 but continued to be involved in administrative oversight of the California prison system. In 2005, Ayers was appointed Warden of the San Quentin prison. Ayers retired in 2008 but has remained active as a corrections consultant in a variety of forums.

    Get the full story on challenges to Robert Ayers’ expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Discussion by the Court

    Ayers opined that “it is common knowledge throughout law enforcement and corrections that sex offenders, especially those involving children, are universally subjected to predation by other inmates.” It also is commonly known that inmates demand to see other inmates’ court documents “to identify inmates who, because of their charges, are either unwelcome or will be assaulted.” Ayers also took issue with the jail’s failure to offer protective custody.

    Defendants did not challenge Ayers’ qualifications to offer opinions on the standard of care nor do they assert Ayers has failed to reliably apply any principles or methods to the fact of the case. They asserted only that Ayers was offering impermissible legal conclusions.

    In general, expert testimony is required when an essential element in the case is best established by an opinion beyond the expertise of a lay person. Here, the Court found that Ayers offered appropriate standard of care opinions and that such opinions did not amount to impermissible legal conclusions.

    Held

    The Court denied Defendants’ motion to strike the testimony of Robert L. Ayers, Jr.

    Key Takeaway

    The question of whether prison officials acted reasonably to secure the safety of an inmate is not one within the realm of the everyday experiences of a lay person.

    Thus, expert testimony or supporting evidence is necessary to establish whether reasonable care was exercised.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Pessanha-Maule V. Pierce County
    Docket Number: 3:24cv5601
    Court Name: United States District Court, Washington Western
    Order Date: March 06, 2026
  • Emergency Medicine Expert Was Allowed to Opine on Medical Management

    Emergency Medicine Expert Was Allowed to Opine on Medical Management

    On September 27, 2022, Plaintiffs Aislyn Batista Acevedo, Ina Ruth Kessler Krugman, and minor A.D.S.B. (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed the instant suit on behalf of the late David Suárez (“Suárez”) against Ashford Presbyterian Hospital (“Presby”) and various other Defendants (collectively, “Defendants”).

    From September 29, 2021, until his death on October 23, 2021, Suárez was hospitalized at Presby and Doctors’ Center Hospital Bayamón (“Doctors’”). Plaintiffs alleged that, during the time that Suárez was hospitalized, Defendants failed to properly screen and treat Suárez in violation of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (“EMTALA”).

    Plaintiffs also alleged that all Defendants are liable under Puerto Rico law for negligence and medical malpractice. To prove their claims, Plaintiffs intended to introduce at trial the expert testimony of Dr. Dainius A. Drukteinis regarding medical management. Defendants moved the Court to rule the proffered testimony of Drukteinis inadmissible.

    Emergency Medicine Expert Witness

    Dr. Dainius Albertas Drukteinis has been practicing emergency medicine for over twenty years.

    He graduated from Cornell Medical School in 2004. Drukteinis completed his emergency medicine training at NYU/Bellevue Hospital in New York City, finishing a four-year residency in 2008. He has served as an attending emergency medicine physician since 2008. He has previously served as an Assistant Professor of Emergency Medicine with the University of South Florida.

    Want to know more about the challenges Dainius Drukteinis has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Drukteinis provides a detailed account of his medical opinion that the physicians and staff at both Presby and Doctors’ breached the prevailing standard of care by failing to perform an MRCP or ERCP procedure, conducting poor transitions of care between medical providers during the time that Suárez was hospitalized, and transferring Suárez to another hospital facility when there was no valid reason to do so.

    A. The expert report of Drukteinis reliably identifies a standard of care applicable to Defendants

    Defendants argued that the expert witness opinion of Drukteinis is lacking in relevance and reliability because it assigned the same standards of care as to all seventeen medical practitioners sued by Plaintiffs: “notwithstanding the gamut of specialties involved in this case,” Defendants argued, “Drukteinis’ report did not identify the specific standard of care applicable to each physician, specialist, nurse practitioner, professional service corporation, or hospital.”

    Defendants’ argument is belied by the content of the report, which expressly sets forth three standards of care broadly applicable to all physicians who were responsible for the care of Suárez.

    It is therefore unclear why Defendants would argue that the expert report is deficient; indeed, the report specifically identified each Defendant physician in an account of the “chain of responsibility,” and identified three specific standards of care applicable to all of them.

    Moreover, Defendants identified no legal authority holding that, in multi-defendant medical malpractice cases, an expert report must set forth its conclusions regarding the standard of care with particularity as to each respective Defendant. Nor did Defendants explain why the fact that the conclusions adopted by Drukteinis are broadly applicable to various Defendants would render those opinions any less reliable or relevant under Rule 702.

    B. Defendants failed to identify any additional legal grounds for the exclusion of the proffered testimony of Drukteinis

    Next, Defendants moved the Court to exclude Drukteinis as a witness for “failing to provide opinions regarding causation vis-à-vis each Physician Defendant.”

    Defendants were incorrect when they claimed that an expert witness in a medical malpractice case “must” articulate an opinion regarding causation in order to testify.

    Drukteinis is not a party to this case and did not bear the burden to prove anything; instead, in civil litigation it is the Plaintiff who bears the burden to prove all three elements of a negligence claim. Accordingly, the Court declined to exclude the testimony of Drukteinis from evidence.

    Held

    The Court denied Defendants’ motion in limine seeking a ruling that the proffered testimony of Dr. Dainius Drukteinis was inadmissible.

    Key Takeaway

    Defendants fundamentally misapprehended the purpose of Rule 702 and the role of expert witnesses in federal court.

    Even assuming for the sake of argument that Defendants are correct that Drukteinis provided no opinion regarding causation in his expert witness report — a conclusion that the Court did not adopt — Defendants failed to explain why that would render his proffered testimony relating to the duty and breach elements of Plaintiffs’ negligence claim unreliable. The Court found that it would not.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Batista-Acevedo V. Presbyterian Community Hospital, Inc.
    Docket Number: 3:22cv1468
    Court Name: United States District Court, Puerto Rico
    Order Date: February 10, 2026
  • Law And Legal Expert Allowed to Opine on Firm Management

    Law And Legal Expert Allowed to Opine on Firm Management

    This case features a collapsed Ponzi scheme, more than 200 investor-victims, and a federal equity Receiver. The Receiver sued Baker Donelson law firm and two of its former employees— individuals now with federal criminal convictions—for aiding and abetting, civil conspiracy, and other claims under Mississippi law. She seeks to hold them accountable for “the unsustainable liabilities inflicted by the Ponzi scheme” that harmed Madison Timber Properties’ “ability to repay [its] investors.”

    The Receiver hired Marta-Ann Schnabel to provide expert opinion on law practice management. Baker Donelson moved to exclude Schnabel’s opinion.

    Law And Legal Expert Witness

    Marta-Ann Schnabel is the managing director of O’Bryon & Schnabel, PLC, a firm established 25 years ago at the turn of the millennium.

    Over the last ten years, she has focused on defending professional (primarily legal) malpractice matters and assisting lawyers and judges with legal ethics issues. She is a 1978 graduate of Memorial University of Newfoundland, Canada, with a B.A. Honours in History. She received her Juris Doctorate from Loyola University College of Law in 1981, where she served as a member of Law Review and of the National Moot Court Team.

    Schnabel served as President of the Louisiana State Bar Association and of the New Orleans Bar Association. She has been a member of the LSBA’s Rules of Professional Conduct Committee for 20 years, and she was a member of the LSBA’s Ethics Advisory Service Committee for 15 years.

    Want to know more about the challenges Marta-Ann Schnabel has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.  

    Discussion by the Court

    The Receiver hired Schnabel to offer expert opinion on law firm management. Schnabel provided the following opinions:
    (1) Baker Donelson’s managerial and supervisory controls did not match the standards set by Baker Donelson’s Employee Handbook/Code of Business Conduct, By-laws, or good practice. The firm took no steps to enforce its own rules to supervise or limit the work of Jon Seawright and Brent Alexander.

    (2) Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8 prohibits lawyers from entering into business transactions with clients, but Baker Donelson did not inquire about potential conflicts of interest based on the open and obvious way Seawright and Alexander conducted their timber business at the Baker Donelson Jackson office. Baker Donelson had a duty pursuant to Rules of Professional Conduct 5.1 and 5.3 to know about and supervise Alexander’s business activities, and there should have been concern that the relationship between Seawright and Alexander brushed up against Rule 5.4(b). Baker Donelson’s managerial and supervisory controls did not match the standards intended by the Rules of Professional Conduct.

    (3) Baker Donelson should have known that Alexander and Seawright were operating this investment enterprise out of the Baker Donelson Jackson office. Baker Donelson did not take any adverse action, which demonstrates a lack of management and supervisory controls and falls below the standard of care required by Baker Donelson’s internal policies, the Rules of Professional Conduct, and the standard of care for law firms.

    Analysis

    Qualification

    The firm argued that Schnabel is not an expert on Baker Donelson policy, that argument misapprehends her proffered area of expertise. She is offered as an expert in firm management. As part of developing her opinions, she reviewed Baker Donelson’s internal policies, to develop an opinion on firm management practices at Baker Donelson with respect to its internal procedures. Upon review, the Court is satisfied that Schnabel is qualified to offer expert opinion on law firm management.

    Relevance

    Baker Donelson challenged Schnabel’s proffered opinions of grounds of relevance and reliability. The Court first dispenses with the issue of relevance. Schnabel’s opinions are relevant to matters in this case.

    Issues before the jury include whether Baker Donelson impliedly or otherwise authorized Seawright’s and Alexander’s timber business and whether, after the fact, Baker Donelson ratified that business by failing to take any adverse action. Whether, for instance, Baker Donelson followed its own internal procedures, including supervisory and disciplinary procedures, with respect to Alexander and Seawright could tend to show failure to supervise, authorization, and/or ratification of their actions. The Court found that these opinions satisfy the relevance requirement imposed by Daubert.

    Reliability

    As for reliability, Schnabel testified that the majority of her knowledge comes from a variety of professional experiences. She may draw on those experiences to inform the standard of care about which she intends to testify.

    Baker Donelson also attacked Schnabel’s opinion as lacking a basis with respect to the firm’s failure to take action against Seawright and/or Alexander. There appears to be a basis for this opinion in, for example, admissions and interrogatory responses given by Seawright and Alexander. Likewise, Baker Donelson raised other attacks on Schnabel’s proffered opinions, but none rise to the level of defeating the presence of relevance or reliability. Testimony offered by Schnabel must still comport with the rules of evidence and may not veer outside the proper scope of expert testimony, but the Court is satisfied that her proffered opinions comply with the rules and guidelines set forth by the Supreme Court in Daubert such that exclusion is not required.

    Held

    The Court denied Baker Donelson’s motion to exclude the testimony of Marta-Ann Schnabel.

    Key Takeaway

    No one denies that an expert might draw a conclusion from a set of observations based on extensive and specialized experience. A witness’ experience, studies and education, combined with a review of the relevant materials can provide a reliable basis for expert testimony.

    Please refer to the blog previously published about this case:

    Law And Legal Expert Was Not Allowed to Opine on Notaries

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Mills V. Baker
    Docket Number: 3:18cv866
    Court Name: United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, Northern Division
    Order Date: February 06, 2026
  • Emergency Medicine Expert’s Standard of Care Testimony Excluded

    Emergency Medicine Expert’s Standard of Care Testimony Excluded

    Plaintiff Chanada Robinson (“Plaintiff Robinson”) is the mother of Anthony J. Thompson, Jr., who was involved in an incident at East Austin Magnet High School (“Austin East”) that ended his life on April 12, 2021.

    Plaintiff Robinson alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment, deliberate indifference to Thompson’s medical needs, assault and battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

    Plaintiff filed the expert witness report of James A. Wilson, M.D. According to Wilson, “the purpose of [his] report is to assess the physical and psychological impact upon Thompson when he was denied medical care following being shot in the chest at close range by [Defendant] Clabough.”

    Defendants filed a joint Daubert motion to exclude Wilson’s opinions pursuant to Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.

    Emergency Medicine Expert Witness

    James Andrew Wilson, M.D. is a recent member of US Acute Care Solutions. From 2018-2023 he worked for Envision Physician Services, where he was an Assistant Medical Director of an Emergency Department and an EMS Medical Director for several local agencies.

    Wilson received an MD and MBA in one of the first joint degree programs in the country. He completed a residency in emergency medicine at Christ Hospital and Medical Center (also in the Chicago area).

    Want to know more about the challenges James Wilson has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Defendants contended that Wilson cannot offer an opinion about any breach of standard of care because (1) it is a legal conclusion, (2) he is not qualified to offer an opinion about the conduct of law enforcement officers, and (3) his opinion is not reliable.

    A. Qualifications

    Defendants argued that Wilson cannot offer any opinion about the breach of standard of care because he is not qualified to provide an opinion about the conduct of law enforcement officers.

    Wilson opined that the individual Defendants “failed to meet the standard of care for first responders interacting with a gunshot victim.”

    Plaintiff outlined Wilson’s educational and experience, which includes experience with first responder triage and teaching about the standard of care for first responders. But Plaintiff has not provided any evidence that Wilson is qualified to testify about the standard of care as it relates to a law enforcement officer.

    B. Legal Conclusion

    Defendants asserted that Wilson cannot offer an opinion that they breached the standard of care because that is a legal conclusion.

    Plaintiff did not respond to this argument. Given that, the Court found it unopposed and the proposition conceded.

    C. Reliability

    Defendants argued that Wilson’s opinion that they “breached the standard of care by not providing pain medication or by not ensuring that the paramedics (allegedly at the scene) gave pain medications to Thomspon” is unreliable.

    Plaintiff, once again, did not respond to Defendants’ argument. Therefore, it too is unopposed and the proposition conceded.

    But the Court would also exclude the opinion because it is unreliable. Wilson stated that a person must be conscious to feel pain and that Thompson was conscious between 3:15:28 and 3:19:22.

    Defendants have submitted evidence showing that EMS personnel were not at the scene until about 3:20:30, after Thompson became unconscious, and that Officer Willson left with the assistance of KPD officers at 3:18:20.

    Held

    The Court granted Defendants’ joint Daubert motion as to Plaintiff’s expert Dr. James Wilson, M.D.

    Key Takeaway

    An expert’s opinion must be supported by ‘more than subjective belief and unsupported speculation’ and should be supported by ‘good grounds,’ based on what is known.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Robinson V. Baldwin
    Docket Number: 3:22cv125
    Court Name: United States District Court, Tennessee Eastern
    Order Date: December 29, 2025
  • Ophthalmology Expert’s Standard of Care Testimony Admitted

    Ophthalmology Expert’s Standard of Care Testimony Admitted

    Plaintiff Raymond Dean Brown, a federal inmate confined at the Federal Correctional Center in Terre Haute, Indiana (“FCC Terre Haute”), brought this action against the Defendants, Dr. Elizabeth Trueblood, Dr. William E. Wilson, and Dr. David Lukens, alleging that they were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical conditions in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights.

    Brown’s expert witness, Charles Howard, testified that Brown’s February 15, 2019, optometrist visit that indicated he had potentially suffered a stroke “should have immediately resulted in a hospital trip because these complaints had already occurred several times. Brown clearly was experiencing clots thrown from his atrial fibrillation.”

    According to Brown, other practitioners viewed Wilson’s actions as falling far short of the standard of care.

    Defendants argued that Howard’s opinions are unreliable because (1) Howard cannot provide legal conclusions or opinions on causation; (2) Howard is not qualified in cardiology, pulmonology, or neurology, and he therefore cannot testify as to these specialists’ determinations for Brown’s care; and (3) Howard provides no reliable scientific methodology for his opinions.

    Ophthalmology Expert Witness

    Charles Howard, MD, MMM, is retired from the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), having served twenty (20) years as a Medical Officer. He joined the US Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Prisons as a Medical Officer and National Ophthalmology Consultant in 2002 at the Federal Medical Center in Devens, Massachusetts.

    Moreover, Howard earned a Master of Medical Management degree (MMM) from the HJ Heinz School of Public Management at Carnegie Mellon University in Pittsburgh. He is a Board-Certified Fellow of the American Board of Quality Assurance and Utilization Review Physicians (FABQAURP) and a Fellow of the American Institute of Health Care Quality Management (FAIHCQM).

    Want to know more about the challenges Charles Howard has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    In this case, Howard is a trained ophthalmologist and served as a Medical Director for the BOP, the same role Wilson held when supervising the care of inmates with complex medical conditions like Brown. He need not be a specialist in cardiology or neurology to review the care Brown holistically received just as Wilson would have done.

    Specifically, the Court found that Howard is sufficiently qualified to give opinions regarding Brown’s holistic care under Wilson as a Clinical Director and ophthalmological care involving Lukens.

    Moreover, Howard’s medical opinions are not based on ‘junk science,’ but more than twenty years of medical experience. Although the Defendants contended that Howard did not have a firm foundation for basing his opinions regarding the appropriate standard of care, the Seventh Circuit has found that a doctor can rely on medical history, including a review of medical records.

    Defendants filed a separate motion to exclude Howard’s opinions at trial, which the Court denied as moot. The Court considered Howard’s testimony and evidence in connection with Defendants’ summary judgment motions. Ultimately, the Court granted those motions, and final judgment was entered in favor of the Defendants.

    Held

    The Court denied the Defendants’ partial motion to strike the testimony Charles Howard.

    Key Takeaway:

    Brown has therefore established by a preponderance of evidence that Howard meets the prerequisites of admissibility to offer a reliable opinion on the standards of care within his report and testimony.

    And due to his specific knowledge of the circumstances and experience in the field, Howard’s testimony and report will assist the Court in understanding the evidence and determining the facts at issue in this case.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Brown V. Wilson
    Docket Number: 2:21cv240
    Court Name: United States District Court, Indiana Southern
    Order Date: September 24, 2025