Tag: Supplement

  • Social Work Expert Was Not Allowed to Opine on Trauma and Mental Health

    Social Work Expert Was Not Allowed to Opine on Trauma and Mental Health

    This matter concerns Claudia Arias’ removal from the University of Washington Tacoma Bachelor of Arts in Social Work (“BASW”) Program.

    Defendants filed motions to exclude Plaintiff’s expert witnesses Allison Osborne and Merrill A. Cohen.

    Social Work Expert Witness

    Allison Osborne, MSW, LICSW, SUDP is a forensic social worker with almost a decade of experience working with clients that are justice involved. Since January 2022, Osborne has been employed as an owner, clinical social worker, and substance use disorder professional at Forensic Social Work Services in Mount Vernon, Washington.

    Get the full story on challenges to Allison Osborne’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Vocational Rehabilitation Expert Witness

    Merrill Ann Cohen, MC, CRC, CLCP has spent over thirty years of experience as a vocational consultant. She has spent nearly twenty of those years as a vocational consultant and life care planner with Strategic Consulting Services, Inc. In her role with Strategic Consulting Services, Inc., Cohen provided vocational rehabilitation assessments and conducted earning capacity analyses.

    Want to know more about the challenges Merrill Cohen has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    A. Osborne’s Opinions

    Defendants sought to exclude Osborne’s opinions because “(1) she impermissibly offers legal opinions; (2) her opinions are not based on reliable principles or methodology; (3) she failed to disclose the required materials in violation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1); and (4) her opinions are irrelevant and would be substantially more prejudicial than probative.” The Court held that each of Osborne’s three conclusions—on the First Amendment, on Social Work Ethics and Standards, and on Trauma and Mental Health—is excludable.

    Analysis

    To begin with, Osborne’s opinion that “the Defendants in this case ultimately infringed upon Plaintiff’s freedom of speech by denying her ability to speak freely while in the process of learning through muting information that demonstrated Plaintiff was not being discriminatory,” amounts to an impermissible legal opinion.

    Moreover, as to Osborne’s opinion that Defendants “did not adhere to social work ethical standards while interacting with” Plaintiff, such opinion is irrelevant as to Plaintiff’s remaining claims. Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim turns on whether Defendants ultimately removed Plaintiff from the BASW Program based on defined professional standards or based on personal disagreements.

    As for Osborne’s opinion that Plaintiff suffered from adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed mood, Plaintiff failed to properly disclose all evidence relied upon and all documents supporting these opinions. The failure to fully disclose expert opinions as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a) results in exclusion “unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless.”

    Osborne did not produce her handwritten notes from her interview of Plaintiff and did not produce the empirical screening tool forms she completed in evaluating Plaintiff. Osborne also did not produce the notes she took while reviewing the depositions of various witnesses.

    Notwithstanding, Plaintiff sought to excuse her failure to timely produce various documents by arguing she appropriately supplemented her expert disclosure under Rule 26(e)(2) on March 11, 2026. However, the supplemental disclosure did not obviate the harm caused by the delay as the disclosure occurred after Osborne’s deposition and after the discovery cutoff, which eliminated Defendants’ ability to engage in further discovery.

    Finally, Osborne’s opinions also are not based on sufficient data or facts. Osborne incorrectly asserted that Plaintiff was removed from a certain course when she was in fact allowed to continue and passed the course.

    B. Cohen’s Opinions

    Defendants asserted that Cohen’s opinions should be excluded because “(1) she relied upon insufficient or incomplete data, (2) her opinions are purely speculative, and (3) her opinions are not based on reliable principles or methodology.”

    Analysis

    Cohen conducted a “vocational assessment and/or prepared a Life Care Plan” for Plaintiff. In preparing an assessment, Cohen normally requests discovery materials, employment history, medical records, earning records, and educational records for every client, although she noted that not all clients will have all these types of materials and not all materials will be relevant in every matter. Of these, Cohen reviewed only Plaintiff’s educational records.

    The Court found that information about a person’s employment, earning history, and discovery materials are relevant to performing a vocational assessment. And although in certain instances such information may not be required, Cohen failed to identify why the information she requested, but did not receive or review, was unnecessary to formulate her opinions in this case.

    In addition, Cohen’s opinions are unduly speculative because Cohen assumed what Plaintiff’s career path could have been had Plaintiff graduated from the BASW program. Cohen identified that upon graduation Plaintiff would (1) apply for and be accepted into a masters of social work program, (2) attend and complete that program, (3) take and pass the social worker licensing examination, (4) complete 3,000 to 4,000 hours of supervised social work, and (5) then apply for and obtain a full-time employment earning approximately $80,000 annually. First, it is impossible to determine with any reasonable degree of certainty that Plaintiff would follow Cohen’s assumed educational and employment path. And second, Plaintiff repeatedly emphasized that her damages were based on the loss of her bachelor’s level degree, which contradicted the educational and employment future Cohen assumed.

    Finally, Cohen’s report is not based on a reliable application of principles or methods. While Cohen identified tests such as RAPEL and VADRE, she did not identify how those tests were applied in this case.

    Held

    The Court granted Defendants’ motions to exclude Allison Osborne and Merrill Cohen.

    Key Takeaway

    The Court will not permit supplemental expert disclosure when what is set forth in the supplemental disclosure is the information, reasoning, and opinions that Rule 26 requires be disclosed in the critical initial disclosure. The duty to supplement did not provide the opportunity to add information that should have been initially provided under Rule 26(a).

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Arias V. University Of Washington Tacoma
    Docket Number: 3:25cv5079
    Court Name: United States District Court, Washington Western
    Order Date: May 13, 2026
  • Toxicology Expert’s Report Exceeds the Bounds of Permissible Supplementation

    Toxicology Expert’s Report Exceeds the Bounds of Permissible Supplementation

    Michelle Young, the surviving spouse of Ernest James Young and Amanda Fries, the daughter and heir of Young filed the underlying lawsuit alleging that Young’s death from pancreatic cancer was caused by his exposure to radioactive contaminants that were released by the Defendants’ negligent operation of a uranium processing plant in Gore, Oklahoma, near where Young grew up.

    On December 6, 2024, Plaintiffs disclosed and provided the expert report of James Clark, Ph.D. On March 6, 2025, Plaintiffs submitted a report entitled ‘Supplemental Opinions’ of Clark, Ph.D. (“March Report”).

    Defendants filed a motion to strike the March Report pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1), arguing it is an improper attempt to supplement the December Report because it is an unauthorized sur-rebuttal expert report.

    Toxicology Expert Witness 

    James Clark is a well-recognized toxicologist, air modeler, and health scientist specializing in dose reconstruction. He has 30 years of experience in tying together environmental contaminants measurements to human health impacts.

    Want to know more about the challenges James Clark has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report. 

    Discussion by the Court

    Propriety of Clark’s March Supplemental Report

    Defendants argued that Clark’s March Report is an improper supplement because it did not correct any inaccuracies or complete an incomplete disclosure in his December Report. Instead, Defendants argued, Clark’s March report added a completely new analysis regarding Young’s radionuclide absorption and exposure and offered four or five new sweeping opinions.

    Plaintiffs first argued that Rule 26(a)(2)(D)(ii) expressly allowed rebuttal reports and that the March Report was Clark’s rebuttal response to criticisms set out in the opposing expert’s report. Plaintiffs next argued that Clark’s March Report was an appropriate supplement to his December Report because he simply filled in an incomplete aspect of his December Report – calculated the previously uncalculated radionuclide absorption in Young’s cremains. Finally, Plaintiffs argued that Clark’s March Report was timely because Rule 26(a)(3) provides for such supplement no later than the required pretrial disclosures.

    Analysis

    The Court noted that Plaintiffs sought neither to amend the schedule nor leave to file the March Report.

    Moreover, Clark’s March Report was not a proper supplement to his December Report. In the December Report, Clark opined that Young’s cremains contained from 2 to 4.5 times as much radiation when compared to the average value in cremains of other Colorado residents. In his March Report, Clark took the additional step of calculating the additional radiation exposure by year experienced by Young based on the analysis of radiation in Young’s cremains as compared to other Colorado residents.

    Since Clark merely attempted to “strengthen” or “deepen” his opinion expressed in the December Report by making calculations that he could have made in the December Report, the Court held that Clark’s March Report exceeded the bounds of permissible supplementation and is subject to exclusion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1).

    Whether a Rule 26(a) Violation is Justified or Harmless

    Defendants argued that they are prejudiced because of the late disclosure of Clark’s opinions in the March Report and because they will have to seek leave to file a sur-sur rebuttal report. Plaintiffs argued that Defendants will not suffer any prejudice or, to the extent they do, it is easily curable because the discovery deadline was extended by ninety days. While Plaintiffs are correct that the discovery and related deadlines were extended, the expert disclosure and rebuttal deadlines were not. It is apparent that permitting Clark’s March Report will likely disrupt the trial of this case.

    Moreover, Clark acted willfully in that he knew or should have known that his opinions regarding Young’s radiation exposure would be stronger if accompanied by a radionuclide absorption analysis. After all, Clark could have performed the radionuclide absorption analysis as part of his December Report.

    Held

    The Court granted the Defendants’ motion to strike the Plaintiffs’ purported supplemental expert report of James Clark.

    Key Takeaway:

    A supplemental expert report that states additional opinions or rationales or seeks to “strengthen” or “deepen” opinions expressed in the original expert report exceeds the bounds of permissible supplementation and is subject to exclusion under Rule 37(c)(1).

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Young Et Al V. Sequoyah Fuels Corp. Et Al
    Docket Number: 6:22cv280
    Court Name: United States District Court, Oklahoma Eastern
    Order Date: June 02, 2025