Defendants Brandon Washington and Maria Georgianna Palm are charged with various crimes arising out of their scheme to recruit, entice, harbor, transport, provide, obtain, and maintain vulnerable women, and to perform commercial sex acts for their financial benefit via threats of force, fraud, and coercion.
The United States of America filed a motion in limine to exclude the testimony of Defendant Brandon Washington’s expert, Dr. Justin J. Lehmiller.
The Government asked the Court to exclude the testimony of Lehmiller as an expert for several reasons: First, he is not qualified to educate the jury on the topic of sex trafficking, or commercial sex work. Second, he failed to comply with Rule 16(b)(1)(C)(iii) by failing to identify the opinions he will offer. Third, his proposed testimony will attempt to define the law, or it is irrelevant and not likely to assist the jury in deciding the facts in this case. And fourth, it violated Rule 403 because his proposed testimony is substantially outweighed by the danger it would confuse and mislead the jury.
Psychology Expert Witness
Dr. Justin J. Lehmiller is a social psychologist, author, and senior research fellow at the Kinsey Institute at Indiana University. Lehmiller received his Ph.D. in Social Psychology from Purdue University. He has authored books such as Tell Me What You Want: The Science of Sexual Desire and How It Can Help You Improve Your Sex Life and The Psychology of Human Sexuality (third edition published in 2023). The Psychology of Human Sexuality is a textbook that is used in college classrooms around the world. He has also published extensively in peer-reviewed journals on sexual behavior, marginalized and stigmatized relationships, casual sex, and consensual non-monogamy.
While Lehmiller’s disclosure suffered from some deficiencies, primarily the lack of specific opinions, the Court did not find them so limiting as to warrant exclusion. The fact remains that he did identify the subject-matter topics he proposed to testify about. In essence, he provided notice of his expert opinions in summary fashion via general categorizations.
Next, the Government suggested that Lehmiller’s testimony will impermissibly attempt to define the law and usurp the role of the Court by defining coercion or sex trafficking concepts. The Court will not tolerate this practice from any expert or the Government’s expert. Lehmiller will be permitted to provide testimony about the voluntary adult sex-worker subculture. He will not be permitted to define legal terms or attempt to tell the jury what the law is. Nor will he be allowed to opine on what he believes constitutes illegal coercion, or define what situations constitute “voluntary” sex work from “exploitation” or “trafficking” or attempt to redefine statutory terms.
It appeared to the Court that Lehmiller’s expert disclosure was timely, and the Government has been provided with adequate notice and is not claiming surprise. Moreover, there are no allegations that the defense seeks to introduce undisclosed areas of his testimony.
Moreover, the Government is free to attack Lehmiller’s qualifications or the lack thereof. It will be up to the jury to determine how much weight should be accorded to his opinions, but the remedy of outright exclusion is not warranted.
Finally, the Court did not find that Rule 403 would be violated by allowing this testimony. Providing testimony to provide background, contextual testimony to assist the jury in understanding subject matter outside common experience is relevant and not prejudicial to justify exclusion.
Held
The Court denied the Government’s motion to exclude the testimony of Dr. Justin Lehmiller.
Key Takeaway
While Lehmiller’s background may be deficient in having exhaustive knowledge of the sex trafficking industry, that is not the standard for Rule 702 admissibility. The Court finds that while not overwhelming, when considering the totality of his education, research and training, Lehmiller’s proposed testimony meets the thresholds of relevance and reliability.
Please refer to the blog previously published about this case:
Plaintiff Casey A. Drake sued the Defendants Crete Carrier Corporation and Reuben Robert Shaffer for personal injuries arising from a vehicle collision. Drake was riding in a car driven by his niece, Erica Diehl. Shaffer was driving a tractor-trailer. As the two drivers passed a wrecked vehicle, they collided.
Drake retained Robert Kelly and Jack Leifer as experts to testify that Shaffer caused the collision. The Defendants filed motions to exclude their testimony.
Transportation Expert Witness
Robert P. Kelly was a police officer for ten years. During that time, he investigated more than 300 collisions involving commercial vehicles. He has certifications specific to traffic enforcement and is certified as a driving instructor for commercial vehicles.
Jack Leifer is a mechanical engineer who has taught university courses relating to dynamics, kinematics, and statics and has published multiple works related to the relationships between impacts and force.
He is an affiliate of the Society of Accident Reconstructionists and a member of the Texas Association of Accident Reconstruction Specialists. Leifer is responsible for numerous publications and presentations about topics related to accident reconstruction, and he has participated in continuing education courses dedicated to accident reconstruction.
The Defendants argued that Kelly is not qualified to opine on the cause of the collision because he is not an accident reconstructionist.
A police officer may testify about the cause of a traffic accident if he has sufficient skill and knowledge. As a result, the Court held that Kelly has sufficient experience working with commercial vehicles and investigating collisions involving them to opine on the cause of the collision at issue here.
B. Reliability
The Defendants also argued that Kelly’s testimony would be unreliable because he based his opinion solely on two photographs and did not visit the accident scene, conduct any interviews, or take any measurements.
Kelly based that opinion on his review of footage recorded by a responding police officer’s body camera, two frames of which are reproduced in his report. Those frames appear to show the hood and front tires of the disabled vehicle extending into the right lane over the dashed white line that divides the road. Kelly also reviewed the responding officer’s crash report, which repeated Diehl’s claim that Shaffer moved from the right lane into the right-hand shoulder and struck her car.
Whether a vehicle has space to maneuver is the kind of determination an expert can make based on his review of photographs and videos alone. By reviewing the images available here, Kelly could see the amount of unobstructed space in the right lane of traffic and, applying his knowledge, determine whether or not a tractor-trailer would be able to safely traverse the lane without moving into the shoulder.
C. Irrelevance of Crete’s conduct
Kelly also stated his opinions about Crete’s hiring of Shaffer, Shaffer’s qualifications, whether Crete kept adequate records, and whether Shaffer was adequately trained. The Defendants challenged those opinions as unreliable and as irrelevant to the central issue of causation. Drake did not assert a direct negligence claim against Crete. He sought to hold Crete vicariously liable for Shaffer’s alleged negligence at the time of the collision.
Whether Shaffer was qualified, whether Crete kept adequate records, and whether Shaffer was adequately trained do not bear on whether Shaffer was negligent at that time. Evidence that has no tendency to make a material fact more or less probable is not admissible. As such, the Court excluded Kelly’s opinions about hiring, qualifications, record keeping, and training.
Jack Leifer
A. Qualification
The Defendants argued that Leifer, like Kelly, is not qualified to opine on the cause of the collision because he is not an accident reconstructionist.
His report discusses, based on the damage to Diehl’s car and the conditions of the roadway, the forces that likely applied to the vehicles and the relative speeds that would probably have generated those forces.
Leifer’s observations are based in physics, and his CV reflects substantial knowledge and experience in the relevant scientific fields. The Court held that he is well-qualified to opine and reasonably apply his observations to the facts of this case.
B. Reliability
The Defendants made three arguments that Leifer’s methods and data are unreliable. First, they asserted that Leifer relied on a scientific study that is old and distinguishable from the facts of this case. Second, they argued that, during his deposition, Leifer could not “state with certainty” how the collision occurred. Finally, they noted that Leifer could also not initially state at his deposition what source supported his opinion that lanes of traffic are generally 11–12 feet wide.
Analysis
As to the first argument, both the study Leifer relies on and his own opinion are grounded in physics. The laws of physics operated the same way in 2002, when the challenged study was published, as they did when the collision at issue here occurred.
As to the second argument, Leifer testified that the collision might have occurred in one of three ways: Shaffer’s tractor-trailer was moving to the right, Diehl’s car was straddling the fog line, or Diehl was moving to the left. Although Leifer conceded that any of those three scenarios was possible, he testified that it is most likely that Shaffer was moving to the right at the time of the collision. That opinion was based on his opinions that Shaffer’s vehicle was likely moving faster than Diehl’s and that it would have been unsafe for Shaffer to drive straight through the right lane without moving to the shoulder.
As to the Defendants’ final argument, Leifer’s inability to recite, on the spot during his deposition, a source stating that traffic lanes are generally 11–12 feet wide did not impugn his report’s validity. Leifer testified that he used the standard width of a traffic lane to calculate an approximate location of the collision. Although he also testified that traffic lanes are generally 11–12 feet wide, that figure does not appear in his report.
It would be unreasonable to deem his testimony unreliable just because he had not memorized the citation for a figure, particularly one that did not appear in his report.
Held
The Court granted in part and denied in part the motion to exclude Robert Kelly’s testimony and denied the motion to exclude Jack Leifer’s testimony.
Key Takeaway
As with an expert’s qualifications, whether an expert’s methodology is reliable depends on the particular circumstances of each case. Reviewing photographs, especially where, as here, that review is bolstered by other materials, is not necessarily an unreliable method. In appropriate circumstances, photographs can provide sufficient information for an expert to apply his knowledge and experience and form an opinion.
This case arises under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA), which provides victims of sex trafficking a civil remedy against the perpetrators and beneficiaries of their trafficking. Plaintiff C.L.F. filed this action to recover for alleged harm she experienced from being trafficked at a Motel 6 in Wichita, Kansas, that she claims was owned and operated by the Defendants.
On August 21, 2025, C.L.F. filed the motion sub judice, seeking to exclude as irrelevant the testimony of Defendants’ designated law-enforcement expert witness Bill Woolf.
Law Enforcement Expert Witness
William “Bill” Woolf has spent over 15 years of experience in law enforcement, specializing in the investigation of human trafficking, organized criminal enterprises, narcotics, and gang-related crime.
He has conducted extensive fieldwork in identifying, investigating, and dismantling human trafficking networks, with a focus on both sex trafficking and labor trafficking operations occurring in a variety of settings, including hospitality environments.
Woolf is the Principal and Founder of The Woolf Group, a national consulting firm providing expert guidance on human trafficking prevention, investigation, training, and public policy.
C.L.F. asked the Court to exclude all four opinions offered by Woolf. Namely, Woolf’s opinions that:
(1) “There is no evidence that trafficking involving CLF was identified or interdicted by law enforcement during the relevant period;”
(2) “Hotel staff are not trained, equipped, or authorized to investigate or intervene in suspected trafficking operations;”
(3) “In transient lodging environments, the investigative and intervention burden for human trafficking rests with law enforcement, not hotel personnel;” and
(4) “It is unreasonable to retroactively impose a higher duty of detection on hotel staff than the standard applied by law enforcement at the time.”
C.L.F. claimed that “all of Woolf’s opinions are red herrings that draw the jury’s attention to topics that have no bearing on the actual issues that must be decided in this case.”
Opinion 1
Woolf may not tell the jury there was “no evidence that trafficking involving C.L.F. was identified or interdicted by law enforcement during the relevant period.” This is irrelevant to understanding whether hotel staff knew or should have known of sex trafficking at the Wichita Motel 6. It is also misleading. Hearing that police officers had “frequent engagement with the subject properties” and that they made no reports or arrests for sex-trafficking related crimes would lead a juror to conclude that such conduct was absent. That distracts the jury from the pertinent inquiry. Numerous arrests for sex trafficking might put hotel employees on notice, but that logic does not follow from a total absence of arrests. Law enforcement may not have arrested anyone for trafficking at the Wichita Motel 6, but that in no way precludes hotel management and staff from being aware of ongoing sex-trafficking-related activity.
As such, the Court struck Woolf’s opinion as irrelevant and misleading.
Opinion 2
The Court struck Woolf’s second opinion as misleading. Investigating and/or intervening in human trafficking is not an element of the TVPRA and to suggest that Defendants’ employees were not trained or able to investigate, identify, or interdict trafficking injects elements into C.L.F.’s burden of proof that simply are not there. All that is required for C.L.F. to show is that Defendants’ employees were negligently aware of sex-trafficking-related activity on the property.
Opinion 3
The jury cannot hear Woolf’s third opinion. It would tell the jury that, since hotel staff lack the “access to confidential intelligence, interagency data, investigative tools, and legal mechanisms such as warrants and subpoenas” that police officers have, hotel staff are unable to “reliably assess” potential trafficking red flags.
This would seriously undercut the jury’s factfinding role. As said, hotel staff cannot escape imputing knowledge from their own observations of sex-trafficking-related activity just because they lack military-grade investigative tools. A janitor’s inability to petition a judge for an arrest warrant has no bearing on his awareness of sex trafficking if there were observable signs of trafficking in the hotel hallways. The jury, who “is solely responsible for determining the weight and credibility of the evidence,” should assess how Defendants’ staff interpreted those signs without assessing how a police officer would react.
Further, pointing out hotel staff’s lack of crime-prevention tools might mislead the jury to think that the TVPRA excuses liability where a defendant is unable to prevent sex trafficking. As the parties know, making that suggestion to the jury would be wholly inappropriate because “the TVPRA does not impose an affirmative duty to police and prevent sex trafficking” (nor excuse sex-trafficking liability because no duty to prevent exists). The relevant inquiry is whether hotel staff knew of trafficking, not if they prevented, or attempted to prevent, it.
Opinion 4
Woolf’s fourth opinion is simply a summary of his already discussed testimony. His claim that it is “unreasonable to retroactively impose a higher duty of detection” on hotel staff than law enforcement highlights the irrelevance of his other opinions. Discussion of law enforcement’s knowledge or lack thereof regarding trafficking at the Wichita Motel 6 has no effect on that of hotel management and staff. Referring to it would only mislead the jury. Woolf’s testimony appears designed to imply that Defendants were unaware of sex trafficking because law enforcement, with all its law-enforcement techniques, was also unaware. While sensible to think that a layperson would not detect an ongoing crime if a police officer in the same situation could not, that analogy is “non-helpful” here.
The standard is whether hotel staff knew of sex trafficking at their hotel. As explained, hotel staff are in a much different position than police officers to observe the day-to-day happenings at a hotel. The ways in which law enforcement and hotel staff acquire knowledge of sex trafficking at a hotel are completely different and to conclusively suggest to the jury that what was not observable to law enforcement was not observable to hotel staff is both untrue and unhelpful.
Rebuttal Opinions
Defendants pointed out that Woolf also offered rebuttal testimony to C.L.F.’s experts, and that C.L.F.’s motion did not request those rebuttal points to be excluded. C.L.F. responded that, if the Court excludes Woolf’s opinions, then it should also exclude his rebuttal opinions.
All four opinions asserted that it would be unreasonable to find that hotel staff were aware of sex trafficking at the Wichita Motel 6 because law enforcement, with its greater resources, tools, and training, was not. As explained, such testimony would only confuse the jury.
Rebuttal Opinion 2 responded to C.L.F.’s expert witnesses’ claims that hotel training was inadequate by pointing out that no industry standards about sex-trafficking awareness, such as the DHS Blue Campaign Hospitality Toolkit, existed until after this case’s relevant trafficking period.
The opinion also pointed out how “assertions by [C.L.F.’s law-enforcement expert] Christi Decouflé that G6 policies actively discouraged reporting to law enforcement are not substantiated by the record.” But this is straightforward impeachment. It did not help the jury to have Woolf provide such testimony. Impeaching a witness by highlighting inconsistencies between their testimony about documents and facts contained in and relating to those documents does not require specialized knowledge, nor even a live witness; instead, that is the role of counsel.
This Ruling Remains Good for Both the Goose and the Gander
Woolf’s testimony could only muddle things, as he would not testify about red flags observable or known to hotel employees. Instead, he wants to advise the jury on what law enforcement would or would not have known. This would not help the jury.
While Woolf’s testimony goes to Defendants’ actual or constructive knowledge about the trafficking, it is inappropriate as compared to other experts.
Decouflé’s testimony here is based on Defendants’ own policies, guests’ online reviews, and what potential sex-trafficking-related facts the hotel workers, not police, saw during the relevant time. She would testify to hotel-staff knowledge based on hotel-staff observations while Woolf would compare hotel-staff knowledge and training to police-officer knowledge and training. For a jury deciding what the hotel staff knew or should have known, the former is helpful; the latter is not. Woolf’s testimony is irrelevant.
Held
The Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to strike or exclude the testimony of Bill Woolf.
Key Takeaway:
The perspective of a trained law enforcement officer experienced in identifying, investigating, and intervening in cases of human trafficking—even within hospitality settings—would not help the jury understand or determine whether G6’s management or staff knew, or should have known, that sex trafficking was occurring at the Wichita Motel 6.
While Woolf indicated that he considered “the observable signs and behaviors that might have been available to hotel staff,” his opinions address only what law enforcement would understand and/or do in response to those observations.
Please refer to the blog previously published about this case:
Johnson is charged with three counts relating to sex trafficking or transportation of a minor for purposes of engaging in sexual activity: sex trafficking of a minor, coercion and enticement of a minor to engage in sexual activity, and interstate transportation of a minor for criminal sexual activity.
On October 3, 2025, the government notified counsel for Johnson that it intended to introduce the expert testimony of FBI Special Agent James E. Hardie who is alleged to be an expert in sex trafficking involving minors.
On October 14, 2025, Johnson filed the present motion in limine to preclude the government from introducing Hardie’s “so called ‘expert’ testimony.” He argued that Hardie’s proposed testimony is inadmissible because “it is not an area of any actual expertise,” and that “in effect, what the Government has proposed to do is elicit testimony from a law enforcement officer wherein the officer testifies that Johnson’s behavior is that of a sexual predator.”
Law Enforcement Expert Witness
James E. Hardie is a member of the FBI’s Critical Incident Response Group, National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime, Behavioral Analysis Unit – 3. In that role, he is responsible for providing operational support to local, state, federal, and international law enforcement agencies investigating crimes against children, including sex trafficking.
Previously, Hardie served in other roles within the FBI, including supervising a squad of FBI special agents who were responsible for conducting sex trafficking investigations, working as an FBI liaison to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (“NCMEC”), and investigating child and adult sex trafficking cases as an FBI special agent.
On one hand, the government painted Hardie’s testimony as more general and described it as including: “(1) methods and techniques used in the management and procurement of commercial sex and (2) common characteristics and factors of victims of sex trafficking.” Whereas Johnson maintained that Hardie planned to testify specifically to his “expert opinion that Johnson behaved like a sexual predator.”
Having reviewed the statement of Hardie’s anticipated testimony, the Court found that his testimony included opinions of a general nature rather than opinions specific to this case, Johnson, or Minor Victim. However, to be clear, the Court agreed with Johnson that Hardie may not testify that “ Johnson behaved like a sexual predator” or that he “must be a sexual predator.” This testimony would be tantamount to Hardie providing legal opinion and usurping the role of the jury, which is impermissible.
Again, considering Hardie’s proposed testimony as contained in the government’s notice, the Court has no reason to anticipate that Hardie will testify impermissibly.
b. Qualifications, Reliability, and Relevance
The Court found no support for Johnson’s suggestion that Hardie’s specialized knowledge is not a valid area of expertise or that his extensive experience cannot render him an expert pursuant to Rule 702.
Based on Hardie’s qualifications, and like the other courts have found with respect to Hardie’s background testimony regarding sex trafficking, the Court found that Hardie’s testimony is reliable.
The Court also found that Hardie’s testimony is relevant to the issues in this case and will be helpful to the jury. The “culture and dynamics of sex trafficking are ‘not the subject of common knowledge.’”
For these reasons, the Court made a preliminary determination that Hardie’s testimony is admissible. Furthermore, after reviewing the above-cited caselaw, the Court found that a pre-trial Dauberthearing is unnecessary.
Held
The Court denied the Defendant Johnson’s motion in limine to preclude the testimony of James Hardie.
Key Takeaway:
Hardie’s testimony will assist the jury in understanding the behaviors and dynamics of trafficking victims and traffickers as well as assist it in assessing the credibility of the witnesses.
This case arises under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA), which provides victims of sex trafficking a civil remedy against the perpetrators and beneficiaries of their trafficking.
Plaintiff Doe (C.L.F.) filed this action to recover for alleged harm she experienced from being trafficked at a Motel 6 in Wichita, Kansas, that she claims was owned and operated by the Defendants.
Defendant Kisan, Inc. filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Dr. Katy Fowler Sutton, one of C.L.F.’s designated expert witnesses.
Psychology Expert Witness
Kathryn Fowler Sutton graduated with a Master of Science in Clinical Psychology and in 2004 received her Doctor of Clinical Psychology (PsyD). She has been a Licensed Specialist in School Psychology (Texas) since 2005 and a Licensed Clinical Psychologist (Texas) since 2006. In her twenty years of clinical practice, approximately 15% of her patients have been survivors of sex trafficking. As part of her annual license renewal requirements, she has to complete mandatory training in human trafficking.
She also has fourteen years of experience being an expert witness and has never before been struck. In addition to being an expert witness, she also currently continues to see patients, some of whom are sex trafficking survivors.
Kisan and the G6 Defendants sought to exclude Sutton’s opinions that
(1) C.L.F. meets the criteria of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and other specified trauma-and-stressor-related disorders; and
(2) C.L.F.’s PTSD is caused by her having been sex-trafficked rather than any other previous traumatic experiences.
Defendants claimed that these opinions should be excluded because they are both irrelevant and unreliable.
A. Relevance
Defendants argued that the testimony of Sutton is inadmissible because it is irrelevant.
According to Defendants, the fatal flaw in Sutton’s report is that “the word ‘motel’ does not appear.” Worse yet, the report stated that C.L.F.’s alleged trafficking was “facilitated by social media platforms.” In this case, the alleged trafficking occurred only at motels owned and operated by Defendants, and C.L.F. “met her trafficker at a gas station,” not on social media. This might be problematic as expert testimony must be connected to “the facts of the case.”
While a report based on social-media-facilitated sex trafficking at no specific locations may not be tied to the facts of this case, Sutton’s report is. Sutton interviewed C.L.F. for 5 hours and 12 minutes. During that time, Sutton and C.L.F. discussed C.L.F.’s early life in detail, C.L.F.’s experiences during the alleged trafficking, and C.L.F.’s recovery in recent years. They specifically talked about her “thoughts and feelings” associated with the alleged trafficking, and Sutton collected enough information to provide diagnoses of and recommended treatments to C.L.F.
Further, in her deposition Sutton explicitly confirmed that she tied her interview with C.L.F. to the facts of this case. Sutton used the complaint during the interview to “refer specifically to the incident[s] in question” at the motels in issue. When asked if they discussed the relevant motels “where [C.L.F.] had a traumatic experience,” Sutton responded: “Yes.” During the interview, Sutton ensured to “very specifically explain to C.L.F. what events [she was] referring to.” In the Court’s view, Sutton’s methodology was “sufficiently tied to the facts of the case.”
The Court held that her testimony was relevant under Rule 702.
B. Reliability
Defendants asserted that the two opinions they want stricken should be excluded because they are unreliable. To Defendants, Sutton’s opinions are not the product of a reliable methodology and do not reflect a reliable application of psychology to the facts of the case.
1. Sutton’s Diagnosis of C.L.F.’s PTSD and Other Trauma Disorders
Defendants objected to Sutton’s opinion that C.L.F. met the criteria for PTSD and other specified trauma-and-stressor-related disorders.
First, Defendants argued that Sutton’s diagnosis is unreliable because she “did not follow accepted medical practice in selecting or administering tests” for PTSD in her interview of C.L.F.
The Court understood Defendants’ stance, but ultimately their attacks are best left for “[v]igorous cross-examination.” To admit Sutton’s testimony, C.L.F. “need not prove to th[is court] that the expert’s testimony is correct;” she simply must “prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the testimony is reliable.” Even with its alleged flaws, Sutton’s opinion that C.L.F. met the criteria for PTSD is reliable by a preponderance of the evidence.
Defendants also found fault with Sutton’s administration of the CAPS-5, specifically her failure to use the Life Events Checklist (LEC-5) during CAPS-5 Step 1. They said that because Sutton did not use the LEC-5 for the Step 1 inquiry, her opinions are unreliable to the point of inadmissibility. But CAPS-5 allows the practitioner to administer the LEC-5 or some “other structured trauma screen” to begin. Sutton’s report, as noted, details information about C.L.F.’s history of trauma gleaned from the hours-long interview Sutton conducted of C.L.F., which in the Court’s view qualifies as a structured trauma screen.
Second, Defendants argued that Sutton’s diagnosis of C.L.F. with PTSD is unreliable because Sutton’s conclusion contains conflicting diagnoses. However, the Court did not accept that Sutton’s “conflicting diagnoses” are so unreliable that they defy the “methods and procedures of science.”
2. Sutton’s opinion that sex-trafficking, not other traumatic experiences, caused C.L.F.’s PTSD
Defendants took issue with Sutton’s opinion that C.L.F.’s “history of trafficking,” not any of her other previous traumatic experiences, caused her PTSD.
As Sutton noted in her report (and as Defendants state in their motion), the stressors with potential to cause PTSD for C.L.F. other than her trafficking experiences are the death of her grandmother, her placement in foster care, the incarceration of her first child’s father, her abusive relationship circa 2020, and apparent substance abuse. Defendants claimed that Sutton only ruled out C.L.F.’s grandmother’s death and her placement in foster care before declaring that C.L.F.’s trafficking experiences were the sole cause of her PTSD. Sutton certainly did rule those stressors out; she concluded “within a reasonable degree of scientific certainty” that C.L.F.’s PTSD responses are associated with her history of trafficking, not the “grief” she experienced from her grandmother’s death or foster care.
Now Sutton did not explicitly rule out all potential causes, but her report evidences that she was aware of these other stressors when opining on the cause of C.L.F.’s PTSD. While the Court felt that Sutton should improve her recordkeeping and notetaking as it pertains to conducting diagnoses for litigation, her extensive experience with evaluations, her five-hour interaction with C.L.F., her deposition testimony, and the conclusions in her report all favor reliability here.
C. Scope
Though Sutton can testify as to her opinion that C.L.F.’s PTSD was caused by the trafficking-related trauma discussed during the evaluation, the Defendants pointed out that Sutton may not characterize any incidents C.L.F. experienced as “sex trafficking.” Sutton’s report and testimony is rife with her calling the incidents C.L.F. discussed “sex-trafficking.” The Court agreed. Defendants are right to point out that Sutton is not permitted to opine on ultimate legal issues.
In other words, Sutton may provide her opinion that C.L.F. suffers from PTSD and other trauma disorders, and she may provide her opinion as to what caused C.L.F.’s PTSD. But in describing these causes, she must keep her descriptions within certain limitations.
Held
The Court denied in part the Defendant Kisan, Inc.’s motion to exclude the proposed testimony of Plaintiff’s expert Dr. Kathryn Sutton.
Key Takeaway:
Sutton is free to discuss the trauma-causing incidents concerning C.L.F., but only in permissible ways. The Court is aware that these incidents necessarily involve sex or even commercial sex, but the testimony is permissible so long as it does not characterize any experiences or incidents as sex trafficking or trafficking.
This lawsuit arises out of the designation of Sassine Avenue as a “no truck route.” Plaintiff, Kirk Thomas, engages in various agricultural and commercial pursuits, many of which involve the use of his property. Consequently, commercial vehicles commonly travel to and from Thomas’s property.
Plaintiffs Thomas and KT Trucking and Cattle, LLC, asserted that the only safe way for a commercial vehicle to access Thomas’s property is via Sassine Avenue in Port Arthur, Texas. Port Arthur, however, has designated Sassine Avenue as a “no truck route,” which prohibits large commercial vehicles from using Sassine Avenue to enter Thomas’s property.
On March 15, 2024, Plaintiffs designated Raegan Droddy as a testifying expert. Plaintiffs anticipated that Droddy’s testimony would demonstrate that Sassine Avenue provides the only means for commercial vehicles to access Thomas’s property safely.
Defendants maintained that Droddy should be struck as an expert because he is not qualified to opine on the matters contained in his report. Alternatively, Defendants asserted that Droddy’s report was unreliable because it was based on insufficient facts and data. Therefore, Defendants asked this Court to strike Droddy as an expert.
Safety Expert Witness
Raegan Droddy is a retired Texas State Trooper with approximately 24 years of experience working for the Texas Department of Public Safety (“DPS”).
For 13 of his 24 years of experience, Droddy worked in the Commercial Vehicle Enforcement Service. Droddy also served as a crash scene investigator and taught multiple classes on Texas traffic laws and basic crash Investigations. Droddy currently owns and operates Droddy DOT Safety Consulting, Inc., where he conducts safety assessments and audits, provides safety presentations for trucking companies, and reviews company policies, procedures, shipping papers, driver qualifications, and crash paperwork.
Defendants contended that Droddy was not qualified to testify as an expert on the subject matter contained in his report because he did not have the requisite experience, education, or knowledge. Defendants asserted that Droddy’s report consisted of “numerous engineering opinions regarding the safety and availability of access to Thomas’s property.” Droddy did not have an engineering degree. Consequently, Defendants claimed that Droddy is not qualified to testify on the engineering opinions contained in his expert report.
Plaintiffs successfully neutralized Defendants’ concerns regarding Droddy’s qualifications in one broad-sweeping stroke. Droddy’s report did not contain opinions that require him to have an engineering degree. Droddy bases his report on his knowledge and experience that he acquired during 24 years of service with the DPS. Droddy’s report focused on basic measurements, observations, and data. Droddy’s report then analyzed those facts under the purview of his specialized knowledge of commercial vehicles, traffic regulations, and highway safety hazards. Droddy did not attempt to opine on the structural integrity of the road, nor does he attempt to apply complex mathematical formulas beyond his training and expertise. At its core, Droddy’s report opined on matters of traffic safety, not matters of engineering. Moreover, an engineering degree is not required to evaluate the safety of certain vehicular maneuvers.
Furthermore, the Court held that Plaintiffs have met their burden of demonstrating, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Droddy is qualified to testify on matters of traffic safety and commercial vehicles. Droddy has extensive education regarding commercial vehicles, including his attendance at the Commercial Vehicle Crash Inspection School as recently as 2023. Consequently, in light of Droddy’s extensive experience with commercial vehicles, commercial crash scene investigations, and highway law enforcement, the Court concluded that Droddy is qualified to testify on matters of traffic safety.
Droddy’s Reliability
Droddy discussed safety issues associated with commercial vehicles utilizing different roads to access Thomas’s property. As a result, the Court must evaluate whether Droddy’s report is predicated on sufficient facts and data. In his report, Droddy relied on his personal observations of Spur 93 and Sassine Avenue, the measurement of a KT Trucking vehicle, the width of the proposed access point on Spur 93, the relevant speed limits and traffic signals, photographs of Thomas’s property, online maps, and the Texas Department of Transportation and Safety’s most recent average daily traffic count for Spur 93. A review of Droddy’s report demonstrated that he methodically gathered facts to form the basis of his opinion. Additionally, Droddy’s report outlines the interplay between various facts and states the impact of those interactions on the safety of certain vehicular maneuvers. Accordingly, the analytical gap between the facts Droddy gathered and the conclusions he reached is narrow. Therefore, Plaintiffs have established that Droddy’s report is substantiated by sufficient facts and data.
Defendants, however, contended that Droddy’s report was unreliable because Droddy admitted that he was unsure whether he reviewed a map of Port Arthur’s “no truck” routes and that he did not review its zoning ordinances. Defendants also emphasize that Droddy failed to interview anyone besides Thomas when gathering facts and data.
The Court held that Droddy’s lack of consideration of certain documents and sources did not render his opinion unreliable.
Held
The Court denied the Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiffs’ expert Raegan Droddy.
Key Takeaway:
Droddy is qualified to testify on matters of traffic safety considering his extensive experience with commercial vehicles, commercial crash scene investigations, and highway law enforcement.
Droddy’s report outlines the interplay between various facts and states the impact of those interactions on the safety of certain vehicular maneuvers. Accordingly, the analytical gap between the facts Droddy gathered and the conclusions he reached is narrow. The Court held that Droddy’s lack of consideration of certain documents and sources did not render his opinion unreliable.
Case Details:
Case Caption:
Thomas V. City Of Port Arthur, Texas
Docket Number:
1:23cv282
Court:
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas
This case arose when Defendant Jacob Salamon, a police officer for the City of Loveland, Ohio, arrested Plaintiff Amanda Caton, an off-duty police officer for the City of Cincinnati, Ohio, for operating a vehicle when intoxicated (“OVI”). Plaintiff Patrick Caton, Amanda Caton’s husband and also an off-duty police officer for the City of Cincinnati, was a passenger in the vehicle when Amanda Caton was pulled over and arrested, and he was present when Officer Salamon later dropped off Amanda Caton at their home. The Catons have sued Officer Salamon, former Loveland Police Chief Dennis Rahe, Officer Shawn Parks, and the City of Loveland for violating their civil rights.
Joseph Suhre is the owner and principal of Suhre & Associates DUI and Criminal Defense Lawyers. Suhre has dedicated his practice to the defense of OVI cases and other criminal offenses. Suhre has over 20 years of criminal defense experience and an additional 5 years of experience as a police officer. He has handled hundreds of DUI cases before dozens of judges in numerous counties. Because of this, Joe is uniquely qualified to defend his clients against DUI and criminal charges.
As an attorney, he completed training in OVI detection through courses with the Nation Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) and Advanced Roadside Impaired Driving Enforcement, both likely more than fifteen years ago.
Tony Corroto served the City of Atlanta Police Department as a police officer for 17 years, spending 14 of them as a senior police officer assigned to the driving under the influence (DUI) task force. He specialized as a standardized field sobriety test (SFST) and drug recognition expert (DRE) instructor. He taught 46 police recruit classes DUI enforcement at the Atlanta Police Academy (APA).
Plaintiffs first argued that Suhre is not qualified to testify as a police practices expert. The Court agreed with Defendants that Plaintiffs framed the issue too broadly. The issue is whether Suhre is qualified to offer expert testimony on police practices involving investigations into potential instance of OVI by applying the NHTSA’s OVI-detection standards.
Though Suhre has not offered expert testimony in a court of law before, he has been retained to instruct about NHTSA standards by the publishing industry, attorneys, and law enforcement organizations. The Court finds that he is qualified with specialized knowledge in the application of NHTSA standards that “will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.
First, Plaintiffs criticized Suhre’s statement in his expert report that Officer Salamon observed what the NHTSA refers to as a “vigilance problem” when there was “a 4-second delay between the [traffic] light turning green and Caton’s vehicle proceeding forward.” The NHTSA Visual Detection publication does not define what amount of time is “normal” versus “unusually long.” With no further guidance, the Court cannot say that Suhre’s opinion applying his own judgment to the NHTSA standard is unreliable.
Elsewhere, Suhre opines that Officer Salamon had probable cause to pull Amanda Caton over for traffic violations. However, the Court held that Suhre’s opinion that she did violate a certain traffic provision will not help a factfinder “determine a fact in issue” for purposes of Rule 702(a).
Second, Plaintiffs objected that Suhre cannot testify about whether Officer Salamon had reasonable suspicion or probable cause to pull over Amanda Caton for a violation. The Court agreed because Suhre’s opinions constituted inadmissible legal conclusions.
The Court also excluded Suhre from testifying on the application and meaning of statutes and case law generally.
Tony Corroto
Defendants do not challenge his Corroto’s qualifications to offer expert testimony. Rather, they moved to strike his testimony to the extent that he states in his report that Officer Salamon did not have probable cause to stop or arrest Amanda Caton. The Court already held in regard to Suhre’s testimony that an expert witness cannot testify about whether probable cause exists.
Therefore, the Court will strike and not consider Corroto’s report to the extent that he opines that Officer Salamon did not have probable cause to stop or arrest Amanda Caton. However, the Court refused to exclude Corroto’s report or testimony in full because of the improper opinion about probable cause.
Held
The Court limited the opinions of both Joseph Suhre and Tony Corroto. Suhre will not be excluded from testifying because he is unqualified to give opinion testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. Corroto will not be permitted to testify about whether probable cause existed to stop or arrest Amanda Caton, but his report will not be otherwise excluded.
Key Takeaways:
Expert witnesses may not testify to legal conclusions or to the applicability or interpretation of a particular statute or regulation. Courts are “capable” of interpreting statutes “without the assistance of an expert.
Although an expert’s opinion may ’embrace an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact, the issue embraced must be a factual one.
Courts permit experts to testify about discrete police-practice issues when those experts are properly credentialed and their testimony assists the trier of fact.
Case Details:
Case Caption:
Caton V. Salamon
Docket Number:
1:22cv345
Court:
United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Western Division
