The claims against La-Norma Ramirez and Washington County stem from Plaintiff Danyale Blackmore’s booking and release at the Washington County Jail.
Blackmore alleged that her constitutional rights were violated when she was allegedly strip-searched at the Jail.
Elisabeth York was disclosed to address Danyale’s mental health symptoms and her diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD).
Defendant challenged York’s qualifications as an expert and the reliability of her methods and opinions. Defendant also argued that York’s anticipated testimony was unfairly prejudicial.
Mental Health Expert Witness
Elisabeth York is a licensed clinical mental health counselor (“LCMHC”) with a robust background in mental health and trauma counseling. She holds a Master’s of Science in Clinical and Mental Health Counseling from the Grand Canyon University.
Defendant argued that York was not qualified to offer expert testimony because she was an associate LCMHC, which required a supervising provider to consult on and approve her diagnoses.
However, the record plainly demonstrates that a supervising provider signed off on each of York’s therapeutic sessions with Plaintiff.
York is now an LCMHC, and Defendant did not challenge her current qualifications as an expert. Therefore, there is nothing in the record to suggest that York lacked the requisite specialized knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.
York’s anticipated testimony is reliable
York demonstrated that she obtained sufficient information from Plaintiff to make her diagnoses. The Court held that the timing of such diagnoses, whether more information would have been helpful to the diagnoses, and York changing the diagnoses are subjects for cross-examination. York could also rely on information relayed to her by Plaintiff in making her diagnoses, just as any medical or mental health provider relies on information given to them by their patients. While some of these facts are vigorously disputed by the parties, Defendant pointed to no evidence or legal authority requiring exclusion of a treatment provider’s testimony because the provider’s diagnosis relied on information offered by their patient. Moreover, York’s reliance on information Plaintiff provided did not render York’s testimony and opinions unreliable.
Also, York’s deposition testimony demonstrated that she applied the specific criteria required for Plaintiff’s PTSD diagnosis. Defendant’s expert may disagree with that diagnosis. But that disagreement did not render York’s conclusion unreliable.
York’s anticipated testimony is relevant and admissible
York did not have personal knowledge of whether Plaintiff was strip searched. The Court held that York will not be permitted to testify that Plaintiff was strip searched or that the strip search caused Plaintiff to have PTSD or other mental health diagnoses. But this did not mean that York’s anticipated testimony and opinions were not relevant to the trial issues.
While York is not permitted to vouch for Plaintiff, she can testify to her observations of Plaintiff during their therapy sessions. York can also testify regarding her communications with Plaintiff during their therapy sessions. Such testimony is generally not hearsay. And, provided adequate foundation and the testimony being otherwise admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence, York may testify that the circumstances, as described to her by Plaintiff during their therapy sessions, are sufficient to meet the criteria for certain mental health diagnoses and lead to York’s diagnoses of Plaintiff. The Court held that this anticipated testimony and opinions are highly relevant to damages issues.
Defendant raised concern that York’s testimony and opinions may cause unfair prejudice by causing the jury to give greater weight to Plaintiff’s credibility, and created a danger of misleading or confusing the jury regarding issues of causation.
But these concerns are nearly always risks when a non-retained treatment provider offers expert testimony regarding a diagnosis. And they are limited and avoided through vigorous cross-examination, the presentation of contrary evidence, carefully crafted jury instructions, and appropriately targeted closing arguments.
Held
The Court denied the Defendant’s motion to exclude or limit at trial the testimony of Plaintiff’s expert, Elisabeth York.
Key Takeaway:
York is qualified to offer expert testimony. Her methods and opinions are sufficiently reliable, and her anticipated testimony is relevant and its probative value is not substantially outweighed by a risk of unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.
However, as necessary or appropriate based on what evidence and how such evidence is admitted at trial, specific objection may be raised at trial to specific questions posed to York.
Defendant Michael Johnson is charged with the following: unlawful imprisonment, assault of a domestic partner by strangulation and suffocation, interstate domestic violence, witness tampering, and assault.
Johnson claimed that the Government has not filed a notice to call Holly Rosen, provided her curriculum vitae, a statement of her expected testimony, or the basis and methodology for her opinion. Johnson argued that, in any event, both Holly Rosen and Kelly Berishaj’s testimony is more prejudicial than probative, and therefore should be excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence, and unduly encroaches on the jury’s function to determine credibility issues.
Social Work Expert Witness
Holly Rosen has experience as an expert or opinion witness for family and criminal cases involving domestic violence, sexual assault and human trafficking victimization cases; adult and child victims. Certified as a licensed social worker with a LMSW since 1987, she has spent over forty years working with two domestic violence, stalking and sexual assault programs.
Kelly Berishaj’s teaching, service, practice, and scholarship focus is in the specialty of forensic nursing. Berishaj has been a faculty member in the School of Nursing at Oakland University since 2007 and was instrumental in the development and implementation of the graduate forensic nursing program.
The Government did file a notice summarizing Rosen’s proposed testimony on July 12, 2022, and provided subsequent updates. As reflected, Rosen’s testimony is expected to explain the dynamics of domestic violence to the jury, such as explaining why victims may act inconsistently, including engaging in self-blame, concealing the abuse from others, reconciling with the abuser, delay reporting abuse, and staying with the abuser. Rosen also will testify regarding batterer tactics. Rosen will not opine on whether the victim in this case, C.J. is a victim of domestic violence.
To the extent Johnson intends to challenge the veracity of C.J.’s testimony based on any of these typical victim behaviors—as happened at the initial trial—the Court held that Rosen’s testimony is relevant and not unduly prejudicial. Such testimony, as the Government sets out in its response brief, is routinely admitted in trials involving domestic violence, including in Johnson’s first trial here. If, however, Johnson did not attack the veracity of her testimony through this manner, the Court may conclude that Rosen’s testimony is not relevant.
At this time, however, the Court is denying Johnson’s motion to preclude this testimony.
Kelly Berishaj
The Government is planning to present Berishaj as an expert in forensic nursing to testify regarding strangulation and strangulation injuries. She will explain to the jury such things as what strangulation is, the methods of strangulation, and the difference between suffocation and strangulation. The Court held that this evidence is relevant, as Johnson is charged with inter alia strangulation and suffocation of C.J. In conclusion, It is not unduly prejudicial.
Held
The Court is denied Michael Johnson’s motion to preclude the Government’s expert witnesses, Holly Rosen and Kelly Berishaj from testifying at trial.
Key Takeaway:
If the case involves domestic violence, testimony about the dynamics of domestic violence to the jury, such as explaining why victims may act inconsistently, including engaging in self-blame, concealing the abuse from others, reconciling with the abuser, delay reporting abuse, and staying with the abuser is relevant and not unduly prejudicial. So is testimony explaining what strangulation is, the methods of strangulation, and the difference between suffocation and strangulation.
Case Details:
Case Caption:
United States of America v. Johnson
Docket Number:
1:18cr20794
Court:
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division
This case involved two buildings in downtown Burley, Idaho, located at 1222 and 1226 Overland Avenue which burned in late January 2018 and were subsequently demolished in mid-February 2018. A small portion of the debris from the buildings was hauled away to a local gravel pit which also operated as a landfill. Rising concerns about the possible presence of asbestos in the building debris caused the work to cease. Testing at the demolition site after the buildings were demolished was why the presence of asbestos in some of the demolition debris was allegedly confirmed during a clean up by an EPA contractor some six months later. Therefore, the Government asserted that asbestos was present in the buildings before they were demolished. The charges in this case arose from the demolition and clean up of the buildings, which began on February 17, 2018. The fire that damaged the buildings occurred during the early morning hours of January 29, 2018. The cause of the fire was investigated by state and federal law enforcement. Arson was suspected because of circumstances surrounding the fires, including the discovery of an undetonated pipe bomb at the front door of a restaurant located directly across the street from the burned buildings. The presence of this pipe bomb necessitated the involvement of a bomb squad to render it safe. Various individuals were interviewed during the law enforcement investigation of the cause of the fire including Pilling and his former business partner, Brian Tibbets. Pilling and Tibbets were owners of the restaurant where the pipe bomb was found and both were thought to be owners of the Overland buildings that burned. For his part, Pilling was out of the country on a ski trip at the time of the fire. No one was ever criminally charged with causing the fire or for involvement with the pipe bomb found across the street. Pilling was charged by indictment on December 14, 2022, with seven criminal counts related to the demolition and cleanup of the buildings. The Clean Air Act (CAA) provided for criminal penalties if a person knowingly violated the National Emissions Standard for Hazardous Air Pollutants (“NESHAP”) for asbestos that governed the removal of asbestos as the result of demolition and renovation activities. Pilling was charged with failure to thoroughly inspect 1222 and 1226 Overland for asbestos before the demolition commenced (Count One), failure to notify the EPA ten days prior to the commencement of demolition activity (Count Two), failure to remove asbestos prior to demolition (Count Three), failure to have an on-site representative trained in compliance with asbestos work practices (Count Four), failure to adequately wet the asbestos before it was disposed of (Count Five), discharge of visible emissions to the outside air from asbestos-containing waste material (Count Six), and failure to deposit asbestos and components covered with asbestos as soon as practical in a disposal site authorized to accept asbestos (Count Seven).
The parties have filed various motions in limine, all of which have been addressed by the Court.
The Defendant filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude six categories of evidence of which the Government opposed the motion as to four of the following categories: (1) Evidence that arson caused the fire at the buildings located at 1222 and 1226 Overland Avenue in Burley, Idaho, in late January 2018, that the buildings caught fire under suspicious circumstances, that a pipe bomb was discovered, or any inference that Pilling was responsible for any of the foregoing; (2) Evidence of any other crime, wrong, or act” of Pilling, if any, pursuant to F.R.E. 404(b); (3) Evidence that asbestos, which was allegedly found in very limited amounts in the Overland buildings debris, is “deadly,” that it may bring on serious diseases, or that “no level of exposure is considered safe;” and (4) Unsubstantiated belief or opinion held in the local community that Pilling was an “owner” of the buildings or demolition company.
The Government also filed two motions in limine in response. The first motion sought to limit the scope of the Defendant’s cross-examination of Richard Martinez, a Government witness, while the second motion requested a ruling on the admission of certain expert testimony by John Pavitt.
Chemistry Expert Witness
Richard Martinez is a Chemist at the United States Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) National Enforcement Investigations Center (NEIC), where his areas of work included inorganic and organic chemical analyses and asbestos identification. Martinez has held this position since 2000. He previously held the position of Physical Science Technician at NEIC from 1994 to 2000. Martinez received his Bachelor of Sciences Degree in Biology from the University of Southern Colorado in 1990.
Environmental Expert Witness
John Pavitt is a Clean Air Act Inspector and Case Officer with the United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) and has held that position since 1993. He earned a Bachelor of Science degree in Environmental Studies from Western Washington University in 1986. He has training with respect to the collection of samples for asbestos analysis, and intimate knowledge of the regulations surrounding asbestos treatment and disposal.
Discussion by the Court
Defendant sought to prevent the Government from presenting evidence or suggesting that arson caused a fire in Burley, Idaho, in January 2018; the buildings caught fire under suspicious circumstances; a pipe bomb was discovered nearby; or that Defendant was responsible for it. Defendant argued that it was irrelevant and substantially outweighed by the considerations set forth in Rule 403. The Government responded by contending that it needed to provide a coherent and comprehensible story regarding the commission of the crime as well as context for its other evidence such as statements made by the Defendant during an interview with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) investigators, but it never intended to present evidence of alleged arson as other-act evidence under Rule 404(b). The Court ruled that the Government could not suggest or offer evidence of arson, discovery of a pipe bomb nearby, suspicious circumstances surrounding the fire, or the Defendant’s involvement in it. However, the Government was permitted to briefly explain the context of the interview with ATF agents without implying any connection to the fire or suspicious circumstances.
The Defendant also sought to prevent the Government from offering evidence that asbestos is “deadly,” that it may cause serious diseases, and that “no level of exposure is considered safe.” The Government responded that the dangerousness of asbestos was relevant to the Defendant’s motive for not undertaking proper abatement and demolition measures. The Court held that the dangers of asbestos inhalation were not relevant to any element of the charged offenses. And, to the extent, that those dangers may have been indirectly relevant to the Defendant’s alleged motive, that relevance was substantially outweighed by the undue delay and unfair prejudice that would have accompanied the presentation of such evidence.
The Defendant sought to exclude evidence of any “unsubstantiated belief or opinion” held in the “local community” about his ownership of the buildings or demolition company. He argued that such “speculative” and “uninformed” testimony would be irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. In response, the Government explained that it would not offer any “unsubstantiated” beliefs or opinions of community members, but it did intend to introduce an email from the Defendant’s father to the Defendant which ostensibly revealed the father’s belief that the Defendant owned the buildings.
At first blush, evidence indicating that the Defendant’s father believed the Defendant to be an owner of the buildings did not appear relevant to whether he actually was an owner. However, the Court observed that both parties indicated that the Defendant’s alleged ownership of the buildings and demolition company would be a key issue at trial. And, to the extent that the direct evidence bearing on ownership was inconclusive, evidence of the father’s belief may have had probative value as circumstantial evidence. Moreover, whatever prejudice that evidence may have had against the Defendant would not have been unfair considering the defense counsel would have the opportunity to challenge the weight of the evidence.
Accordingly, the Court agreed to allow the Government to offer evidence indicating that the Defendant’s father believed the Defendant to be the owner of the buildings.
As for the motions in limine filed by the Government, the Government sought to prevent the Defendant from cross-examining Richard Martinez, who analyzed samples for asbestos content in this case.
In 2020, Martinez was suspended from work for five days in connection with failures in his duties as a Waste Control Officer at the NEIC. Following a related investigation, the EPA Office of Inspector General (OIG) issued a report (the “OIG Report”) addressing “Staffing Constraints, Safety and Health Concerns” at the NEIC laboratory. And, in June of 2023, the EPA’s Office of Criminal Enforcement, Forensics and Training Professional Integrity and Quality Assurance (PIQA) disclosed a summary of a statement (the “PIQA Statement”) that Martinez made to investigators about his suspension and the matters addressed in the OIG Report. The PIQA Statement primarily focused on waste-handling concerns at the NEIC but included one reference to the NEIC’s “failing asbestos program.”
According to the Government, anything related to Martinez’s suspension, the OIG Report, and the PIQA Statement were irrelevant and did not implicate Martinez’s character for truthfulness. The Defendant responded by arguing that all three subjects were relevant. Namely, the suspension bore on Martinez’s expert qualifications and reliability, and the OIG Report and PIQA Statement reflected the “state of affairs at the NEIC at the time of its involvement in this case.”
The Court held that Martinez’s suspension arguably bore on the reliability of his expert testimony yet how much weight to give, or not give, the Defendant’s credibility challenges was the jury’s call. The Court noted that Martinez was suspended for his duty-related failures while employed at the NEIC, and that the fact of his suspension did appear to have some tendency to discredit his performance of other job duties, such as testing asbestos content.
The Court, based on the information now available to it, decided that the OIG Report and PIQA Statement addressed largely—if not entirely—unrelated concerns about the NEIC’s waste-disposal program and that the Report and Statement were irrelevant and off-limits on cross-examination to the extent it was true.
The Court determined that the OIG Report and PIQA Statement were fair game on cross-examination to the extent they addressed problems (1) at the NEIC testing facility and (2) within the asbestos program.
The Government also argued that Federal Rules of Evidence 404(a)(1) and 404(b)(1) precluded the Defendant from cross-examining Martinez about his prior suspension. Those rules barred the use of character and other act evidence to prove that a person acted in accordance with a certain character trait on a particular occasion. The Court held that the evidence of the suspension was not being offered to prove the witness’s character, but instead to rebut the Government’s representation of Martinez as a reliable expert whose testimony should be given special weight in light of his experience and expertise.
Next, the Government sought to introduce Pavitt as a “regulatory expert” in order to “orient the jury as to the ‘requirements of federal regulations and what routine practices’ of the regulated community should be ‘according to the regulations.” Pavitt was hired to (1) Explain that the Clean Air Act regulates the handling and removal of asbestos through NESHAP; (2) Explain “the applicability of the asbestos NESHAP;” (3) Provide and explain the regulatory definitions of various terms, such as “facility component,” “owner or operator of a demolition or renovation activity,” “demolition,” “facility,” “regulated asbestos-containing material,” “friable asbestos material,” and “waste generator;” and (4) Explain “what the work practice standards required.”
Defendant objected that Pavitt’s proposed testimony consisted of legal conclusions, usurped the Court’s role of instructing the jury, usurped the jury’s role of applying the law to the facts, was unhelpful, and created a risk of confusing the jury.
The Court held that Pavitt may not opine on the applicability of the asbestos NESHAP, what he believes the work practice standards require, or what he believes owners and operators “should” do to comply with those requirements because opinions about the applicability and meaning of the requirements constitute “legal conclusions.” Moreover, testimony about what owners and operators “should” do to comply with the requirements would also invade the province of the jury to apply the law to the facts. The Court observed that allowing Pavitt to explain when the legal requirements apply and what they require would create a risk of juror confusion, were the witness’s interpretation or description to differ in any respect from the Court’s final instructions.
Pavitt was, however, allowed to explain technical terms and concepts within the regulations that were likely unfamiliar to the jury and that were pertinent to his testimony considering the asbestos work practice standards contained several technical terms that are likely unfamiliar to the average juror.
The Court held that Pavitt will be allowed to explain the meaning of technical terms used in the NESHAP to the extent it is necessary for the jury to understand his testimony but will not be allowed to interpret ordinary terms that the average juror is likely to understand.
Held
The Defendant’s motion in limine to exclude evidence related to the cause of the fire, evidence related to the dangers of asbestos and beliefs and opinions about ownership of the buildings and demolition company was granted in part and denied in part by the Court. Both the motions in limine filed by the Government to limit cross-examination of EPA Witness and introduce regulatory expert testimony was, once again, granted in part and denied in part by the Court.
Key Takeaways:
Key takeaways regarding expert testimony include ensuring its relevance to the case, with a focus on addressing pertinent issues and clarifying complex matters for the jury. Challenges to expert qualifications and reliability are admissible, particularly concerning incidents in their professional history that may impact credibility. Limitations exist on the scope of expert testimony, notably restricting it from offering legal conclusions or assuming the role of the court or jury in interpreting and applying the law. Clarity is essential to avoid confusing the jury, with technical terms explained as needed, while overly complex or confusing testimony risks being excluded. Courts balance the probative value of expert testimony against the risk of prejudice, confusion, or misleading the jury, potentially excluding irrelevant or confusing testimony. Ultimately, the jury decides the weight and credibility of expert testimony, applying the law to the facts presented in the case.
Case Details:
Case Caption:
United States v. Pilling
Docket Number:
4:22cr282
Court:
United States District Court for the District of Idaho
