The claims against La-Norma Ramirez and Washington County stem from Plaintiff Danyale Blackmore’s booking and release at the Washington County Jail.
Blackmore alleged that her constitutional rights were violated when she was allegedly strip-searched at the Jail.
Elisabeth York was disclosed to address Danyale’s mental health symptoms and her diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD).
Defendant challenged York’s qualifications as an expert and the reliability of her methods and opinions. Defendant also argued that York’s anticipated testimony was unfairly prejudicial.
Mental Health Expert Witness
Elisabeth York is a licensed clinical mental health counselor (“LCMHC”) with a robust background in mental health and trauma counseling. She holds a Master’s of Science in Clinical and Mental Health Counseling from the Grand Canyon University.
Discussion by the Court
York is qualified to offer expert testimony
Defendant argued that York was not qualified to offer expert testimony because she was an associate LCMHC, which required a supervising provider to consult on and approve her diagnoses.
However, the record plainly demonstrates that a supervising provider signed off on each of York’s therapeutic sessions with Plaintiff.
York is now an LCMHC, and Defendant did not challenge her current qualifications as an expert. Therefore, there is nothing in the record to suggest that York lacked the requisite specialized knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.
York’s anticipated testimony is reliable
York demonstrated that she obtained sufficient information from Plaintiff to make her diagnoses. The Court held that the timing of such diagnoses, whether more information would have been helpful to the diagnoses, and York changing the diagnoses are subjects for cross-examination. York could also rely on information relayed to her by Plaintiff in making her diagnoses, just as any medical or mental health provider relies on information given to them by their patients. While some of these facts are vigorously disputed by the parties, Defendant pointed to no evidence or legal authority requiring exclusion of a treatment provider’s testimony because the provider’s diagnosis relied on information offered by their patient. Moreover, York’s reliance on information Plaintiff provided did not render York’s testimony and opinions unreliable.
Also, York’s deposition testimony demonstrated that she applied the specific criteria required for Plaintiff’s PTSD diagnosis. Defendant’s expert may disagree with that diagnosis. But that disagreement did not render York’s conclusion unreliable.
York’s anticipated testimony is relevant and admissible
York did not have personal knowledge of whether Plaintiff was strip searched. The Court held that York will not be permitted to testify that Plaintiff was strip searched or that the strip search caused Plaintiff to have PTSD or other mental health diagnoses. But this did not mean that York’s anticipated testimony and opinions were not relevant to the trial issues.
While York is not permitted to vouch for Plaintiff, she can testify to her observations of Plaintiff during their therapy sessions. York can also testify regarding her communications with Plaintiff during their therapy sessions. Such testimony is generally not hearsay. And, provided adequate foundation and the testimony being otherwise admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence, York may testify that the circumstances, as described to her by Plaintiff during their therapy sessions, are sufficient to meet the criteria for certain mental health diagnoses and lead to York’s diagnoses of Plaintiff. The Court held that this anticipated testimony and opinions are highly relevant to damages issues.
Defendant raised concern that York’s testimony and opinions may cause unfair prejudice by causing the jury to give greater weight to Plaintiff’s credibility, and created a danger of misleading or confusing the jury regarding issues of causation.
But these concerns are nearly always risks when a non-retained treatment provider offers expert testimony regarding a diagnosis. And they are limited and avoided through vigorous cross-examination, the presentation of contrary evidence, carefully crafted jury instructions, and appropriately targeted closing arguments.
Held
The Court denied the Defendant’s motion to exclude or limit at trial the testimony of Plaintiff’s expert, Elisabeth York.
Key Takeaway:
York is qualified to offer expert testimony. Her methods and opinions are sufficiently reliable, and her anticipated testimony is relevant and its probative value is not substantially outweighed by a risk of unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.
However, as necessary or appropriate based on what evidence and how such evidence is admitted at trial, specific objection may be raised at trial to specific questions posed to York.
Case Details:
| Case Caption: | Blackmore Et Al V. Carlson Et Al |
| Docket Number: | 4:21cv26 |
| Court Name: | United States District Court, Utah |
| Order Date: | May 23, 2025 |
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