This action arises from allegations that Fluor Corporation, Inc., and Fluor Intercontinental, Inc. (collectively, “Fluor”), submitted false or misleading information to the United States Government in connection with performance and award-fee determinations under the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program IV (“LOGCAP IV”). Specifically, LOGCAP IV was a multiple-award, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract administered by the United States Army to provide logistics and life-support services to U.S. and coalition forces in contingency environments, including Afghanistan.
Within this contractual framework, Fluor was awarded Task Order 0005 (“TO5”), a cost-plus-award-fee contract governing the provision of base operations and support services at numerous sites in Afghanistan. Under TO5, Fluor was required to provide a broad range of services, including food services, billeting, laundry, transportation, power generation, maintenance, and supply and property management, all in an austere and dynamic operational environment.
Importantly, as a cost-plus-award-fee contract, TO5 permitted Fluor to recover allowable costs and to earn an additional fee based on performance exceeding contractual requirements. Accordingly, award-fee determinations were made periodically and were intended to incentivize superior performance rather than mere compliance with minimum contractual standards.
To that end, award-fee determinations under TO5 were governed by an Award Fee Plan, which established evaluation criteria, performance periods, and scoring methodologies. Pursuant to this plan, performance was assessed by an Award Fee Evaluation Board (“AFEB”), composed of Government officials who reviewed Fluor’s performance across multiple functional areas, including cost control, technical performance, schedule, and program management.
Relators retained Colonel (Ret.) John Lyle to offer expert testimony concerning the LOGCAP IV award-fee process and Fluor’s performance under TO5.
Fluor Corporation, Inc., and Fluor Intercontinental, Inc. filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Relators’ expert John Lyle pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and the Daubert standard.
Public Contracts Expert Witness
Colonel John Lyle retired from Government service after more than four decades in military and civilian contracting and acquisition roles, including senior leadership positions within the Air Force, the Army, and the Defense Contract Management Agency. His experience includes participation in, oversight of, and decision-making authority related to award fee contracts and award fee evaluation boards.
Lyle has substantial experience in government contracting and acquisition.
Discussion by the Court
Fluor filed a motion to exclude Lyle’s testimony in whole or in part, arguing that portions of his proposed testimony exceeded the scope of his expertise, are not based on reliable principles or methods, or improperly speculate about Government decision-making, intent, or hypothetical award-fee outcomes, including opinions regarding award-fee denial or other contractual consequences.
A. Qualifications
Fluor first argued that Lyle is not qualified to offer several opinions contained in his expert report. Fluor did not dispute that Lyle has substantial experience in government contracting and acquisition. Instead, Fluor contended that his background did not qualify him to testify on certain specialized subject areas addressed in the report—particularly opinions concerning property and materials management, service order response and repair practices, and suspension or debarment consequences.
Lyle retired from Government service after more than forty years in military and civilian acquisition and contracting roles, including service as a warranted contracting officer, senior executive within the Defense Contract Management Agency, and participant in—and, at times, decision-maker for—award fee contracts and award fee boards. His experience included drafting award fee plans, serving on award fee evaluation boards, advising fee determining officials, and acting as a fee determining official himself. He has also worked with LOGCAP contracts in multiple capacities during his career. Based on this record, the Court found that Lyle is qualified to offer testimony explaining the structure and purpose of award-fee contracts, the mechanics of the award-fee process, and the general types of information that are ordinarily relevant to award-fee evaluations.
However, qualification under Rule 702 is not unlimited. Fluor’s challenges to Lyle’s qualifications concerned particular subject-matter opinions beyond the general award-fee framework—most notably opinions concerning property management, service order practices, and suspension/debarment—as well as opinions framed in terms of Fluor’s intent, honesty, or corporate culture.
Accordingly, the Court concluded that Lyle is qualified under Rule 702 to offer expert testimony on the structure and operation of award-fee contracts and the award-fee evaluation process, subject to limitations.
B. Scope of Permissible Expert Testimony
Although the Court has determined that Lyle is generally qualified to testify regarding award fee contracts and the award fee evaluation process, that determination does not resolve the admissibility of all opinions contained in his report.
Fluor argued that substantial portions of Lyle’s testimony exceeded the permissible scope of expert opinion. In particular, Fluor challenged opinions that: (1) address Fluor’s intent, honesty, or corporate culture; (2) speculate about how members of the Award Fee Evaluation Board (“AFEB”) or other Government officials would have acted had they been presented with different information; and (3) assert that Fluor would have received lower award fee scores or no award fee at all under hypothetical circumstances.
While the Court agreed that expert testimony explaining the structure and operation of award fee contracts, the role of award fee evaluation boards, and the general types of information ordinarily considered in award fee determinations may assist the jury, the Court also agreed with Fluor that Lyle’s testimony must be carefully circumscribed.
Accordingly, Lyle may not offer opinions that purport to determine Fluor’s intent, honesty, or state of mind, or that characterize Fluor’s conduct as fraudulent, deceptive, or unethical. Nor may he testify that particular AFEB members—or a hypothetical “prudent” or “reasonable” AFEB member—would have altered their scores, recommendations, or fee determinations had they been provided with additional or different information. Likewise, opinions asserting that Fluor “would have” lost award fees or received lower award fee ratings under hypothetical scenarios lack a sufficient factual foundation and reliable methodology and therefore exceeded the permissible scope of expert testimony under Rule 702.
C. Reliability and Methodology
Fluor argued that Lyle’s opinions are not grounded in any identifiable methodology beyond his personal views and hindsight assessment of the record. Fluor contended that Lyle did not rely on evidence from the actual award-fee decisionmakers or any materials reflecting how individual board members weighed or evaluated information, and instead reconstructed the award-fee process retrospectively based on his own assessment of the record.
The Court agreed that experience-based testimony may satisfy Rule 702 where the expert explains how that experience informs the analysis. Lyle reviewed the LOGCAP IV contract, the TO5 Award Fee Plan, award fee materials, and other contemporaneous records, and he drew upon his experience serving on award fee boards and acting as a fee determining official.
However, the Court also found that portions of Lyle’s analysis lacked the methodological rigor required by Rule 702. In several instances, Lyle moved from identifying information he believes to be significant to asserting conclusions about its impact on award fee determinations without articulating a reliable analytical bridge between the two.
This methodological deficiency is reinforced by Lyle’s own testimony acknowledging that award-fee determinations are inherently subjective and that, even after reviewing the record, he could only “guess” as to why individual board members assigned the scores they did.
The Court is mindful that the award fee process itself involves discretion and judgment. But Rule 702 does not permit an expert to replace that discretion with his own, particularly where the expert’s conclusions depend on speculation about hypothetical decision-making by others. Where Lyle’s opinions rest on generalized assertions untethered from a consistent application of the Award Fee Plan’s criteria, they do not reflect a reliable application of principles to the facts.
D. Summary of Excluded Opinion Testimony (Trial Limitations)
The following categories of opinion testimony by Lyle are excluded under Rule 702 based on the Court’s analysis above.
1. Opinions on Intent, Honesty, or State of Mind
Lyle may not offer opinions regarding Fluor’s intent, honesty, motive, credibility, or state of mind. This prohibition applies whether such opinions are stated expressly or implied through characterizations, narrative framing, or evaluative language describing Fluor’s conduct or alleged motivations. Testimony characterizing Fluor’s conduct as deceptive, misleading, unethical, or undertaken with an improper motive is not a proper subject of expert testimony and would invade the province of the jury.
2. Opinions Predicting Government or AFEB Decision-Making
Lyle may not offer opinions speculating about how specific Government officials, exercising discretionary authority, or members of the AFEB would have acted had they been presented with different or additional information. This prohibition includes testimony predicting how particular AFEB members, a hypothetical “prudent” or “reasonable” AFEB member, the Fee Determining Official, or other reviewing authorities would have exercised their discretion under hypothetical circumstances. Such opinions are inherently speculative and lack a reliable methodological foundation.
3. Opinions Predicting Award-Fee Outcomes Under Hypothetical Scenarios
Lyle may not testify that Fluor would have received lower award fee scores, forfeited award fees, or otherwise suffered adverse award fee outcomes under counterfactual scenarios. Because award fee determinations are the product of discretionary judgments by Government decisionmakers, opinions predicting altered outcomes necessarily depend on impermissible speculation about how those officials would have acted. While Lyle may explain the types of information that are generally relevant to award fee evaluations, he may not opine on the ultimate effect of such information on specific award fee determinations.
4. Legal Conclusions and Opinions Applying Legal Standards
Lyle may not offer legal conclusions or opinions concerning whether Fluor violated contractual, regulatory, or statutory obligations, including whether Fluor engaged in fraud, submitted false claims, or failed to comply with disclosure or reporting requirements. This prohibition applies both to explicit legal conclusions and to opinions that effectively instruct the jury how to apply legal standards to the facts. Such determinations are reserved for the jury and the Court and are not appropriate subjects for expert testimony.
5. Opinions Outside Lyle’s Qualifications -Property Management and Service Orders
Lyle may not offer opinions concerning the adequacy of Fluor’s property or materials management practices, service order response or repair time compliance, or the operation of specialized systems governing those functions. As explained above, Colonel Lyle lacks the specialized training or experience necessary to render expert opinions on these technical subject areas, and such testimony therefore falls outside the scope of his qualifications under Rule 702.
6. Opinions Predicting Collateral Administrative or Contractual Consequences
Lyle may not offer opinions predicting collateral consequences of Fluor’s alleged conduct, including suspension, debarment, or other administrative or contractual remedies. Such opinions are speculative, irrelevant to the issues the jury must decide, and fall outside the scope of permissible expert testimony under Rule 702.
Held
The Court granted in part and denied part the Defendants Fluor Corporation, Inc., and Fluor Intercontinental, Inc.’s motion to exclude the testimony of John Lyle.
Key Takeaway
As a threshold matter, expert testimony may not speculate about a party’s intent or credibility, nor may it opine on how particular decisionmakers would have acted under counterfactual circumstances. Accordingly, Lyle’s testimony is admissible only to the extent it provides general, experience-based explanatory context regarding the award-fee process and the relevance of performance information within that process. Conversely, testimony that crosses the line into speculation about intent, credibility, or hypothetical government decision-making is not permitted.
Please refer to the blogs previously published about this case:
Logistics Expert’s Fraud-Related Opinions Excluded
Finance Expert’s Testimony on Corporate Ethics Excluded
Case Details:
| Case Caption: | United States ex rel. Shepherd V. Fluor Corporation |
| Docket Number: | 6:13cv2428 |
| Court Name: | United States District Court, South Carolina |
| Order Date: | January 14, 2026 |
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