Expert Witness Profiler

Tag: methodology

  • Cybersecurity Expert Not Allowed to Opine on ADA Compliance Requirements

    Cybersecurity Expert Not Allowed to Opine on ADA Compliance Requirements

    In May 2025, Plaintiff Richard Paul Merrell filed the operative putative class action complaint against Defendant Ralph Lauren Corporation. Plaintiff is visually impaired and legally blind, and he uses screen-reading software to read website content using his computer.

    Screen-reading software (or a “screen reader”) allows blind and visually impaired users to access websites using a combination of a keyboard and “software that vocalizes the visual information found on a computer screen.”

    Plaintiff alleged that Defendant’s website, including but not limited to https://www.ralphlauren.com/, “is not fully or equally accessible to blind and visually impaired consumers.”

    According to Plaintiff, “Defendant’s failure to properly code its website” to be accessible means that he and other class members “have been and are still being denied equal and full access to Defendant’s retail stores and the numerous goods, services, and benefits offered to the public through Defendant’s website in conjunction with Defendant’s brick-and-mortar retail store locations.”

    Defendant filed motions to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff’s experts, Dr. Jon A. Krosnick and Dr. William C. Easttom, II. Plaintiff filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Defendant’s expert, Aaron Cannon.

    Psychology Expert Witness

    Jon Alexander Krosnick is a Stanford professor and a research psychologist at the U.S. Census Bureau with a degree in psychology from Harvard University and an M.A. and Ph.D. in social psychology from the University of Michigan.

    He has taught classes and trainings on research methods, received awards for research and psychology, authored or co-authored hundreds of articles and presentations, and otherwise conducted extensive research on survey research methods.

    Want to know more about the challenges Jon Krosnick has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Cybersecurity Expert Witness

    Dr. William Charles Easttom, II has Ph.Ds in technology and computer science, a Doctor of Science in cyber security, and multiple related master’s degrees. He has authored 44 computer science books and dozens of research papers and is an inventor of 27 computer science patents. He is as an adjunct lecturer at Georgetown University and Vanderbilt University. 

    Easttom has published three books specifically on JavaScript (a coding language for web development), holds a Certified Professional in Accessibility Core Competency certification, and has taken two accessibility courses.

    Get the full story on challenges to William Easttom’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Web Accessibility Expert Witness

    Aaron Cannon has “been working in the field of web and mobile app accessibility for over seventeen years and [has] been developing software for twenty-nine years.” He is a “Certified Professional in Web Accessibility” and holds multiple accessibility-related certificates.

    Cannon is totally blind and has been using screen readers since 1988, including JAWS for Windows, NVDA, TalkBack, VoiceOver, and the Orca screen reader. He also co-founded and served as chief accessibility officer for a company that provided accessibility auditing of websites and mobile apps. 

    Discover more cases with Aaron Cannon as an expert witness by ordering his comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

    Discussion by the Court

    A. Dr. Jon A. Krosnick

    Based on his review of the complaint, literature and documentation about methodologies employed in past surveys of blind people, past surveys of visually impaired people, studies of accessibility challenges faced by blind people when using computers, and other information, Krosnick conducted a survey and concluded that “the number of legally blind people living in California who used a screen reader and were prevented from doing business with a physical store due to problems related to accessibility with the Ralph Lauren webpage is 3,243.”

    Defendant argued that Krosnick’s testimony should be excluded in full because (1) his opinions are unreliable and not based on sufficient facts or data; (2) his survey results are inadmissible hearsay; and (3) his survey is irrelevant and will not help the trier of fact.

    Analysis

    First, Defendant argued that Krosnick’s survey did not use a random probability sample and instead “recruited non-representative survey respondents from Facebook groups for visually impaired people.” But Krosnick made clear that he combined a primarily randomized probability sample with some respondents from Facebook groups oriented toward visually impaired people, and that this kind of “blended” probability sample “is a widely accepted practice in contemporary survey science.”

    Defendant also contended that Krosnick’s survey had a low response rate, leading questions, self-interest bias, recall bias, and a lack of verification of unreliable answers.

    The Court also is not persuaded that the survey involved leading questions or self-interest bias just because it asked participants if they wanted to “help improve the experiences of blind people using the Internet,” and then listed potential problems the respondents may have experienced.

    Even if the survey’s wording did implicate some level of bias, this would not be so substantial as to render the survey unreliable.

    B. Dr. William C. Easttom, II

    Despite his extensive background, Defendant argued that “Easttom is not qualified to opine on website accessibility,” since general education in computer science is not interchangeable with competence in website accessibility. Even if Easttom has a relatively limited amount of experience with website accessibility, he plainly is an expert on website design and computer science, and the Court is not persuaded that his extensive background is insufficient to qualify him as an expert.

    Defendant also argued that Easttom’s testimony should be excluded in full because (1) his report relied on the wrong website; (2) his methodology is unreliable; and (3) he impermissibly offers legal conclusions.

    Analysis

    First, Defendant argued that Easttom failed to test a screen reader version of its website, “despite being prompted to enable accessibility features.”

    The fact that Easttom didn’t test an alternative, enhanced version of the website may undercut the weight of his methodology or Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant, but it did not render Easttom’s opinions completely irrelevant or unreliable.

    Methodology

    Second, Defendant raised various attacks on Easttom’s methodology, including that Easttom (1) did not use two tools he used in another case and (2) makes a “huge inferential leap” that Defendant denied access to its goods and services from the fact that the store locator wasn’t rendered as a clickable website attribute.

    First, any questions about the tools used go to weight, rather than admissibility. Second, the Court disagreed that Easttom’s conclusions are that large of an inferential leap, or that they are irrelevant to answering the question of whether Defendant’s website violated the ADA. And to the extent another expert said that visually impaired customers could locate Defendant’s brick-and-mortar stores through its website, that is a battle of the experts to be resolved by the trier of fact.

    Legal Conclusions

    Third, Defendant argued that Easttom improperly offered legal conclusions. In particular, Defendant took issue with Easttom’s statements suggesting that Ralph Lauren’s website is not ADA compliant.

    The Court agreed with Defendant: Easttom’s opinion and testimony that Defendant’s website did not meet ADA compliance requirements, is an improper legal conclusion, and the Court granted the motion as to these opinions.

    However, one of the purported “legal” conclusions is actually a conclusion about whether Defendant’s website complies with the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (“WCAG”), which are “a set of international standards designed to make web content more accessible.” This is not a legal conclusion just because Easttom made reference to tools that are used for scanning ADA compliance.

    Fourth, Defendant argued that Easttom “conflates Ralph Lauren’s alleged non-compliance with WCAG 2.1 AA guidelines, and alleged non-compliance with the ADA,” and “there is no authority at all for the proposition that websites must comply with the WCAG guidelines.”

    Reliability

    Finally, Defendant argued that Easttom improperly used the Internet Wayback Machine to determine if historical versions of Defendant’s website were inaccessible because the Wayback Machine does not necessarily include full JavaScript functionality and may “not allow a user to evaluate [a website’s] full functionality.” These critiques—and critiques about the sample of Wayback Machine pages that were chosen—go to weight and do not fundamentally undermine the reliability of the opinion. This is especially true where, as here, Defendant has offered no reason to believe that these individual webpages had missing JavaScript functionality.

    C. Aaron Cannon

    Plaintiff first argued that portions of Cannon’s declaration should be excluded as untimely. Plaintiff sought exclusion under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 and 37. 

    Rule 26

    Defendant argued that Cannon disclosed that he had new opinions in his deposition, yet Plaintiff “did not question him about those additional opinions.”

    The Court found that Defendant has not shown harmlessness. Defendant’s argument appears to be that Plaintiff’s counsel should have pushed harder at the deposition, ignoring the fact that Cannon evasively and vaguely mentioned he had some unspecified other opinions, but would not explain what they were. This is especially true where Defendant had already asserted that it would not disclose its rebuttal opinions to Easttom’s report, which it did not perceive to be related to class certification. As a result, the Court rejected Defendant’s suggestion that Plaintiff had the same “free rein” to get additional discovery on these untimely opinions as in Defendant’s cited cases.

    Defendant’s other arguments regarding a lack of prejudice or surprise are unpersuasive. Defendant summarily stated that Plaintiff only cites a “single distinguishable case” supporting his claims of prejudice, and “Plaintiff has also not identified any additional expenses caused by Defendant’s alleged failure to disclose, because there is none.” This flips the burdens: it is Defendant’s burden to demonstrate harmlessness or substantial justification, and it has not done so. Accordingly, the Court will strike the identified portions of Cannon’s declaration, though those portions would have been irrelevant to the remainder of the Court’s order here.

    Rule 702

    Plaintiff next argued that Cannon’s testimony should be excluded in full because (1) his opinions are not based on sufficient facts or data; (2) he did not apply a reliable, testable method to the case; (3) his class certification opinions are unhelpful; (4) his opinions offer impermissible legal conclusions; and (5) he is not qualified to offer “socioeconomic and population-level opinions or reliability engineering opinions.”

    In particular, Plaintiff first argued that Cannon’s opinion should be excluded because he did not “gather any site-specific facts about Ralph Lauren’s website” and instead “offered generalized assumptions based on experience, which Rule 702(b) does not permit.”

    The Court found that Cannon’s opinions about what individualized technical problems may impede a user with a screen reader from accessing a website are adequately based upon his extensive personal knowledge and experience. To the extent Plaintiff believes Cannon’s testing was flawed or didn’t consider enough data or site-specific information, those critiques go to weight, not admissibility.

    The same is true for Plaintiff’s arguments that Cannon did not deploy a reliable methodology.

    Cannon is applying his extensive experience with accessibility-related software and screen readers to make high-level observations about, for example, the differences in hardware, operating systems, and screen reader software, in order to explain why this Court would have to engage in individualized inquiries about each class members’ experience.

    The Court also disagreed that Cannon’s opinions “substitute legal judgment for technical analysis.” The fact that Cannon is identifying individualized issues in a user’s experience with accessibility features—a central part of the predominance inquiry—did not mean that he is impermissibly making legal conclusions.

    Held

    • The Court denied the motion to exclude the testimony of expert Dr. Jon A. Krosnick.
    • The Court granted in part and denied in part the motion to exclude the testimony of William C. Easttom.
    • The Court granted in part and denied in part the motion to exclude the testimony of Aaron Cannon.

    Key Takeaway

    When evaluating specialized or technical expert opinion testimony, the relevant reliability concerns may focus upon personal knowledge or experience.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Merrell V. Ralph Lauren Corporation
    Docket Number: 4:23cv6669
    Court Name: United States District Court, California Northern
    Order Date: July 09, 2026
  • Transportation Engineering Expert Allowed to Opine on Traffic Safety

    Transportation Engineering Expert Allowed to Opine on Traffic Safety

    Plaintiffs Yafeng Zhu and Shuhui Zhang filed this action in March 2024 for damages stemming from a motor vehicle accident that occurred in April 2022.

    Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged that at approximately 12:21 a.m. on April 1, 2022, Plaintiff Zhu was traveling westbound on a two-lane section of Interstate 70 in Bond County, Illinois, as part of his employment. The right lane of the highway contained markings for ongoing construction, but no construction work was being performed at that time.

    At or near milepost 37.6 westbound, there was a manmade pothole (i.e., a cutout) that was only marked by cones in the right lane. According to Plaintiff, however, the pothole protruded into the left lane without any signs or cones signifying the full length of the protrusion. As a result, Plaintiff Zhu’s vehicle crashed into the manmade pothole, causing the vehicle to flip onto its side and Plaintiff Zhu to suffer severe injury and expense.

    Defendant Keeley filed three Daubert motions seeking to exclude the expert reports, testimony, and opinions of Michelle Albers, Dr. Richard G. Bowman, and Dr. Helena Breuer.

    Vocational Rehabilitation Expert Witness

    Michelle J. Albers has a Master of Science degree in rehabilitation psychology from the University of Wisconsin and has obtained numerous licenses and certifications related to rehabilitation counseling and life care planning. In addition, she has practiced vocational rehabilitation counseling for over 27 years, has worked as a vocational and life care planner for over 17 years, and has served as a social security vocational expert since 2004. Albers has also served as an expert witness in numerous cases across various state and federal courts.

    Want to know more about the challenges Michelle Albers has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation Expert Witness

    Dr. Richard Graham Bowman earned his M.D. from West Virginia University, and he specializes in physiatry (physical medicine and rehabilitation). In addition, Bowman has been certified by the World Institute of Pain as a Fellow of Interventional Pain Practice and he has been certified by Capital University School of Law as a Certified Life Care Planner. He has also served on the International Commission on Health Care Certification’s Certified Life Care Planner Board of Commissioners.

    Get the full story on challenges to Richard Bowman’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Transportation Engineering Expert Witness

    Dr. Helena K. Breuer obtained a master’s degree and a bachelor’s degree in civil engineering, both of which included a focus in transportation engineering. In addition, she obtained a Ph.D. in civil engineering with a specialization in transportation engineering.

    Breuer also completed 280 hours of accident reconstruction-related training approved by the Accreditation Commission for Traffic Accident Reconstruction.

    Discover more cases with Helena Breuer as an expert witness by ordering her comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

    Discussion by the Court

    I. Michelle Albers’ Expert Opinions

    Defendant Keeley challenged the sufficiency of the facts and data underlying Albers’ opinions, as well as the methodology and reliability of those opinions.

    However, Albers’ opinions about Plaintiff Zhu’s inability to work and lost earning potential were based on sufficient facts and data. Her expert report considered hundreds of documents including dozens of medical and billing records, depositions, tax returns, photographs and videos, and numerous other discovery documents from this case.

    Defendant Keeley next contended that Albers failed to rely on personal observations of Plaintiff to reach her opinions. Albers conducted a clinical interview of Plaintiff Zhu, relied on the depositions of Plaintiff Zhu and his family, and also relied on the medical records and findings of Plaintiff Zhu’s doctors.

    Next, Defendant Keeley argued that Albers’ testimony should be excluded because she did not follow a reliable methodology, and thus “the opinions included in her report are unreliable because they amount to mere speculation or conjecture.”

    While Defendant Keeley contended that Albers merely explained what those methods entail, without also explaining how they were applied in this case, the Court does not believe that to be true. Rather, Albers’ report demonstrates how she applied those accepted methodologies to the facts of Plaintiff Zhu’s case.

    Finally, Defendant Keeley argued that Albers’ testimony and report should be excluded because her opinions would not assist the trier of fact due to the lack of data underlying her opinions and errors or inconsistencies in her methodology. The Court has already rejected Defendant Keeley’s data and methodology arguments above.

    Thus, all that is left is to determine whether Albers’ opinions may be helpful to the jury. Suffice to say, the Court believes Albers’ expert opinion as to lost earning capacity would be relevant and helpful to the trier of fact in determining damages, if applicable.

    II. Dr. Richard Bowman’s Expert Opinions

    Defendant Keeley first argued that Bowman’s evaluation is not supported by sufficient facts or data. In this regard, Defendant Keeley emphasizes that Bowman “did not perform any physical tests or any kind of investigation” into Plaintiff Zhu’s capabilities and instead relied on Plaintiff Zhu’s subjective self-reporting. However, as shown in Bowman’s report, he relied on extensive medical records from Plaintiff Zhu’s providers and also evaluated Plaintiff Zhu over Zoom.

    Defendant Keeley argued that Bowman relied exclusively on the conclusions of other medical providers, rather than the underlying data generated by them.

    The Court rejected Keeley’s argument that Bowman’s opinion could only rely on the “data generated” by Plaintiff Zhu’s medical providers and not their overall conclusions. To the contrary, had Bowman relied solely on the data Plaintiff Zhu’s doctors generated, that would have raised much greater concerns as to Bowman’s qualifications and methodology, absent a showing that he was qualified to interpret underlying data from every type of medical field at issue in this case.

    Defendant Keeley’s challenge related to whether Plaintiff Zhu has and will continue to avail himself of the treatment Bowman accounted for in his reports is also a question of weight, not admissibility. Admittedly, evidence that Plaintiff Zhu has not, or will not, avail himself of treatment that Bowman anticipated in his life care plan is something that goes to the weight of Bowman’s plan and cost estimates.

    However, Plaintiff Zhu’s alleged treatment noncompliance does not impact the reliability of Bowman’s methodology. And, in regard to methodology, Bowman reasonably relied upon medical opinions as to the care Plaintiff Zhu will need and then expanded upon that information by using his expertise to estimate future costs. That is an appropriate methodology for determining Plaintiff’s care costs.

    III. Helena Breuer’s Expert Opinions

    a. Breuer’s Qualifications as an Expert

    As Plaintiffs admit, this is Breuer’s “first case as an expert.” Obviously, however, the Court’s inquiry focuses on Breuer’s qualifications and not her experience or lack thereof as an expert witness.

    Breuer did not dispute the fact that she is not a licensed engineer, has not designed a traffic control plan, has not assisted or evaluated the setup of an active traffic control plan, and has no prior work experience related to commercial truck drivers in construction zones.

    Here the purpose of Breuer’s investigation and report was “to determine if the temporary traffic controls (TTC) at the time of the incident (1) met the requirements outlined in the approved TTC plans, (2) adequately warned road users of hazards created by work activities, and (3) provided adequate positive guidance for drivers to safely navigate the work zone.” Accordingly, given Breuer’s extensive education in civil engineering with a focus in transportation engineering along with her accident reconstruction training, the Court found that she is qualified and has an adequate foundation to answer the above questions.

    Defendant Keeley has also argued that, even if Breuer is qualified to provide expert opinions on certain transportation related topics, such as passenger vehicles and commercial vehicles at rest, she is not qualified to provide expert opinions for situations involving “extensive interstate construction and commercial vehicles traveling on a busy interstate.”

    Thus, to the extent Breuer has greater specialized experience in passenger vehicles or commercial vehicles at rest, as opposed to “commercial vehicles traveling on a busy interstate,” that distinction goes to the weight of her expert opinions, not their admissibility.

    b. Sufficient Facts and Data

    Defendant contended that Breuer’s report is lacking facts and data because: (1) she never visited the crash site or performed any sort of scene examination; (2) she has no knowledge of how traffic control measures were placed at the end of the construction day; (3) she lacks knowledge as to the reasons for the cutout extension; and (4) her opinions rely on unsupported assumptions. Again, the Court is not persuaded.

    Analysis

    For one, even if the Court assumes that there was value in Breuer visiting the crash site several years after the incident in question, Defendant Keeley’s argument improperly presumes that the failure to personally visit the site renders an expert’s opinions unreliable. This is an argument that has already been rejected in this circuit on multiple occasions.

    Turning to Defendant Keeley’s next contention—that Breuer has no knowledge of how traffic controls were placed at the end of the workday—the Court again found that this challenge would, at most, go to the weight of Breuer’s opinions. For one, Breuer’s report demonstrates that several individuals associated with Defendant Keeley have claimed that their placement of safety barrels was permissible at the time of the accident. Put simply, Breuer’s expert opinion on the placement of safety barrels at the time of the accident is not impacted by the separate question of whether those safety barrels were initially placed in different, suitable locations.

    Defendant Keeley also argued that Breuer’s opinions should be excluded because she lacks knowledge as to the underlying cause for the cutout extension (i.e., the manmade pothole referenced in the Complaint). The Court questions how Breuer’s alleged lack of knowledge as to the underlying reasoning for the extension of the cutout impacts her opinions and testimony related to traffic safety.

    For similar reasons, the Court rejected Defendant Keeley’s argument that Breuer lacked knowledge to provide expert opinion as to the failure to inform the Illinois Department of Transportation about the cutout extension. Undoubtedly, if Defendant Keeley possesses evidence tending to demonstrate that the engineer in question was informed of the extension, they are free to use that evidence to challenge Breuer’s opinion that there is no evidence the engineer was informed.

    c. Methodology

    Defendant Keeley challenged: (1) Breuer’s use of photogrammetry to form her opinion as to the extension of the cutout; and (2) her failure to look at other factors that may have contributed to the incident.

    Breuer’s report first describes the site and the accident. It then lays out the purpose and utility of temporary traffic control measures before discussing the hazard created by the extension of the cutout. Breuer references numerous resources and evidence discussing/specifying what temporary traffic control occurred in this case and what was required under the applicable plans and standards. Her report then outlines the responsibilities the Defendants failed to follow for proper temporary traffic control. Finally, her report lists seven findings related to the traffic hazard at issue and the failure to take appropriate actions to protect drivers from it.

    To the extent Defendant Keeley has even challenged Breuer’s overall methodology, the Court is not persuaded. Breuer’s report provides sufficient context, explains and relies on applicable standards and plans, and analyzes Defendant Keeley’s alleged deviation from those requirements to reach her opinions. In other words, Breuer arrived at her opinions with appropriate soundness and care.

    Moreover, regarding the specific photogrammetry challenge Defendant Keeley has raised, the Court found that such an approach was permissible because it satisfies the reliability requirements specified in Daubert.

    Additionally, the Court is not persuaded by Defendant Keeley’s argument that Breuer’s methodology was inadequate because she failed to use the same methodology to “determine Plaintiff’s lane positioning” or “the width of other cutouts in the construction zone.” If Defendant Keeley wanted an expert to opine on Plaintiff’s lane positioning or the adequacy of temporary traffic controls for other cutouts in the area, it should have retained its own expert to conduct that analysis.

    d. Breuer’s Report is Relevant and Will Assist the Trier of Fact

    Defendant avers that Breuer’s report and opinions are unreliable, provide little to no independent investigation, and can readily be observed through evidence in the record (and underlying standards and specifications cited therein). The Court did not find any of these arguments convincing.

    The Court need not rehash its prior finding that Breuer’s methodology was reliable. It was. Likewise, that methodology demonstrates that Breuer provided ample independent investigation. In fact, the Court found it curious that Defendant Keeley challenged Breuer’s use of, among other things, photogrammetry, while also claiming that she provided no useful independent analysis. Regardless, the Court found that Breuer’s report relied upon useful, independent analysis of temporary traffic control standards and compliance. Moreover, contrary to Defendant Keeley’s argument, the Court did not believe that the pictures and other evidence in the record adequately establish whether traffic control measures were appropriately followed. In addition, contrary to Defendant’s assertions, such a topic is not within the purview of the average juror.

    Held

    The Court denied Defendant Keeley & Sons, Inc.’s Daubert motions seeking to exclude the testimony of Michelle Albers, Dr. Richard Bowman, and Dr. Helena Breuer.

    Key Takeaway

    Medical professionals have long been expected to rely on the opinions of other medical professionals in forming their opinions. This is particularly true in the area of life care planning because it would be virtually impossible to find an expert life care planner who was qualified to opine on every distinct type of underlying injury.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Zhu V. Keeley & Sons, Inc.
    Docket Number: 3:24cv908
    Court Name: United States District Court, Illinois Southern
    Order Date: July 02, 2026
  • Veterinary Medicine Expert Allowed to Opine on Sources of Contamination

    Veterinary Medicine Expert Allowed to Opine on Sources of Contamination

    Plaintiff Kim Gentry trains riders and horses in dressage. This professional negligence case concerns the untimely death of Gentry’s beloved horse, Dantique, and Gentry’s dashed hopes to perpetuate Dantique’s bloodline.

    Plaintiff retained an equine appraiser, Tanja Schnuderl, as well as a veterinary expert, Robert Boswell. Defendants sought to exclude the testimony of both experts.

    Equine Appraisal Expert Witness

    Tanja Schnuderl is a certified appraiser with the American Society of Equine Appraisers and has established her own equine appraisal business.

    She is also the Director of International Services at The Equine Expert LLC and serves as consultant and expert witness with specialties in barn management, horse behavior and appraising.

    Get the full story on challenges to Tanja Schnuderl’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Veterinary Medicine Expert Witness

    Robert P. Boswell is a 1985 graduate of the University of Florida College of Veterinary Medicine and has devoted the entirety of his career to the practice of equine medicine and surgery with an emphasis on equine sports medicine.

    Want to know more about the challenges Robert Boswell has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Tanja Schnuderl

    Schnuderl calculated the value of the oocytes by taking the average price of five embryos (which are fertilized oocytes), multiplying that cost by twenty, which was the number of oocytes removed from Dantique’s ovaries, and then applying a twenty percent reduction “to accommodate for the 80% success rate of embryo transfers and end up at the fair market value per oocyte.”

    Defendants’ beef is with the twenty percent reduction. They argued that this adjustment “is not based upon facts or data, and therefore not reliable.”

    Here, Defendants are not attacking the methodology Schnuderl used—in fact, they concede that “her calculation of the ‘comparable’ figures appears reasonable”—but rather the source of her twenty percent reduction.

    Because attacks on the source of an expert’s opinion go to weight and not admissibility, Defendants have not established a basis to exclude Schnuderl’s opinions as unreliable.

    Robert Boswell

    Boswell’s report stated that because “the ovary acts as an impenetrable ’tissue container’ for the oocytes,” contamination could only have occurred at the Hospital, not when the ovaries were removed. He said that contamination could result from improper cleaning and rinsing of the ovaries, and that the oocytes should have been placed in separate vials of separation media so that if one oocyte was contaminated, it would not contaminate the others.

    At Boswell’s deposition on January 16, 2026, when asked whether he could “identify a breach of the standard of care,” Boswell responded that a breach occurred at some point during the oocyte removal process. More specifically, Boswell pointed to combining all of the oocytes into one vial of separation media and a lack of proper aseptic technique as breaches of that standard. Boswell did not include this ultimate conclusion in his report because he “thought it was self-evident.”

    Analysis

    Defendants first took issue with Boswell’s testimony that Defendants breached the standard of care, arguing that this is a new opinion that was not timely disclosed in Boswell’s report. True, Boswell did not use the words “standard of care” in his report except to describe his view of the Hospital’s failure to investigate the contamination. But he did explain that contamination must have occurred at the Hospital; improper cleaning and rinsing of the ovaries could have caused it, and that the oocytes should have been placed in different maturation media. So Boswell’s deposition testimony is not a new opinion—rather, it is the same opinion reworded in response to questioning from Defendants’ counsel.

    Defendants next argue that Boswell is unqualified because he has never practiced equine reproductive medicine, nor has he fertilized embryos using these procedures. But Boswell is not testifying about the specifics of equine reproductive medicine or embryo fertilization. His opinions relate to proper aseptic technique and sources of contamination—broad principles of veterinary medicine that a veterinarian with forty years of experience is certainly qualified to testify to, even if he has not performed the specific procedure at issue.

    Defendants finally argued that Boswell’s methodology is unreliable because his opinions are based on “his own assumptions, conclusions, and anecdotes” instead of data and studies.

    Here, Boswell reaches his conclusions—on the timing of contamination, causes of contamination, and breaches of the standard of care—through his personal experience as a veterinarian combined with a review of the medical records and relevant depositions, which are reliable bases for his non-scientific opinions.

    As a result, the Court allowed both experts, Schnuderl and Boswell, to testify.

    Held

    The Court denied Defendants’ motions to strike Plaintiffs’ experts, Tanja Schnuderl and Robert P. Boswell.

    Key Takeaway

    An expert may use their experience to reach non-scientific testimony. In this case, Boswell reaches his conclusions—on the timing of contamination, causes of contamination, and breaches of the standard of care—through his personal experience as a veterinarian combined with a review of the medical records and relevant depositions.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Gentry V. Prell
    Docket Number: 5:25cv50
    Court Name: United States District Court, Florida Middle
    Order Date: July 02, 2026
  • Insurance Expert Allowed to Opine on Sales Tax Depreciation Practices

    Insurance Expert Allowed to Opine on Sales Tax Depreciation Practices

    Plaintiffs Melissa Pitkin and Dan Grout own a home together in Healdsburg, California. They hold a homeowner’s insurance policy from State Farm, policy number 57-C4-6752-1 (the “Policy”), which covered certain losses to their home and all of its contents. The Policy included the “main policy form” (FP-7955, CA) as well as a “homeowners endorsement form” (FE-3422). Subject to the Policy’s terms, conditions, and exclusions, the Policy included “Coverage B – Personal Property” limits of $506,574, and other various special limits. Regarding settlement of Coverage B claims, the Policy provides for settlement of damaged personal property in several ways, including actual cash value (“ACV”), market value, and replacement cost (“RC”).

    On August 20, 2020, the Walbridge Fire burned down the Plaintiffs’ home. Having lost their home and personal possessions, the Plaintiffs tendered a claim to State Farm for their losses under the Policy. State Farm accepted the claim and adjusted their losses pursuant to the Policy’s terms, which stated that the plaintiffs are entitled to recover ACV for their personal property losses. On December 16, 2022, and January 24, 2023, the Plaintiffs received partial payments from State Farm for their personal property contents losses. State Farm also sent the Plaintiffs “loss payment worksheets” that showed their ACV benefits for their personal property.

    For all items of property where sales tax was applicable, State Farm depreciated sales tax in calculating ACV.

    The Plaintiffs filed this class action, alleging that State Farm violates California law by depreciating sales tax as a component of RC when calculating ACV.

    State Farm sought to exclude the opinions of Plaintiffs’ experts, Greg J. Regan, David Melzer and Eugene Peterson while Plaintiffs filed a motion to exclude the testimony of State Farm’s primary expert witness, Dr. Duane L. Steffey.

    Accounting Expert Witness

    Greg Joseph Regan is a partner in the Forensic Consulting Services Group of Hemming Morse, LLC, and is a licensed CPA in California.

    Get the full story on challenges to Greg Regan’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Insurance Expert Witness

    David Melzer has worked in the insurance industry since 2011 in various specialist capacities. He worked for Travelers Insurance from 2013 to 2020, where he held positions including adjuster, technical specialist, and claims manager.

    After that, he started his own public adjusting firm, called Property Claims Consultant, Inc., where he handles first and third-party property claims, including personal property claims.

    He has held the position of President of Property Claims Consultant, Inc. since he started the firm in November 2020. He has “significant experience in processing and analyzing personal property insurance claims” and “experience working with industry-standard software used to process and track personal property claims, including Xactimate or XactContents.”

    Want to know more about the challenges David Melzer has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Construction Expert Witness

    Eugene Peterson built his first home in 1974 – and has been a home builder, remodeler, and restoration contractor for over 35 years.
    He is a Past President of the Utah Home Builders Association and the Greater Salt Lake Home Builders Association. He is the CEO of Advise And Consult, Inc., an expert witness & consultant for restoration, personal property & construction related matters in the United States and Canada. Peterson has facilitated peer group meetings for Business Networks, Inc., and was an
    advisor, consultant & certified trainer for Xactware, Inc. (construction estimating software) for several years. He also actively performs insurance appraisals as an umpire or appraiser.

    Discover more cases with Eugene Peterson as an expert witness by ordering his comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

    Statistics Expert Witness

    Dr. Duane Leon Steffey holds a Bachelor of Science in history and mathematics, a masters in statistics, and a Ph.D. in statistics from Carnegie Mellon University. He has served as a consulting statistician for over thirty years, with a “breadth of applications in engineering, health, environmental science, and civil justice.”

    He is an elected Fellow of the American Statistical Association since 2009, as well as an Elected Member of the International Statistical Institute since 2015.

    Gain a comprehensive understanding of Duane Steffey’s qualifications and casework history with his Expert Witness Profile report.

    Discussion by the Court

    1. Greg Regan

    Regan indicated that he was “asked to provide a methodology to calculate available classwide damages.” State Farm produced an Excel file known as the “Combined Pitkin Dataset.”

    If a claim “involves more than a few items or is not settled during a first contact” the claims personnel may “utilize the XactContents® tool to assist in valuing lost property for claim settlement purposes.” Third party entity Verisk owns the XactContents® tool.

    To create the Combined Pitkin Dataset for this litigation, third-party Verisk first created a report containing data regarding personal property claims during the class period with an XactContents® actual cash value estimate.

    Regan clarified that while his “methodology to calculate damages” was laid out in his initial report, the supplemental report was meant to apply the methodology to the Combined Pitkin Dataset. Regan then proposed two alternative “scenarios” for calculating damages. Under the first scenario, damages would equal the amount of Sales Tax Depreciation applied to a claim, capped by any RC benefits available under the policy. Under the second scenario, Regan allocated Sales Tax Depreciation proportionally by comparing the claimant’s remaining RC benefits to the total recoverable depreciation and then applying that percentage to the amount of Sales Tax Depreciation.

    The crux of State Farm’s motion to exclude concerns the reliability of Regan’s opinions. Specifically, State Farm claimed Regan’s opinion hinges on (1) unreliable data, (2) unreliable identification of class members, and (3) incompatible and unreliable damages “scenarios.”

    a. Reliability

    State Farm first argued that Regan’s reliance on the Combined Pitkin Dataset lacked the “foundation” necessary to survive a Daubert motion.

    State Farm’s challenge is best understood as an attack on the assumptions underlying Regan’s analysis—mainly, that XactContents® is an accurate tool for measuring damages in this case.

    Regan indicated that he relied on State Farm’s own records, testimony from State Farm employees, “validation exercises,” “extensive testing,” and “adopting the more conservative input for purposes of measuring damages” when a disagreement in the data arose.

    The Court concluded that Regan has established by a preponderance of the evidence that his opinion is reliable and admissible, subject to cross-examination and presentation of contrary expert testimony.

    According to State Farm, Regan’s “three new groupings of purported class members (not reflected in the class definition or his prior opinions) produce unreliable and patently incorrect results.”

    However, Regan “organized his damage calculations in three groups to reflect the different circumstances of those groups.” While each group may present different factual circumstances, Regan “applied the same methodology to calculate damages across all groups.”

    State Farm finally challenged Regan’s two damages scenarios as unreliable and invalid. Regan sufficiently explained in his Report and Supplemental Report the reason for having two damages “scenarios,” how he reached those scenarios, and the methodological basis for each.

    b.  Untimely Opinions

    State Farm argued in the alternative that Regan’s opinions in the Supplemental Report should be excluded as untimely and improper new opinions.

    Regan’s Supplemental Report was disclosed two months after the Rule 26 disclosure deadline and less than one month before the rebuttal deadline. Because its own expert, Steffey, opined that the Supplemental Report “substantially revised Regan’s opinions,” State Farm urged that the Court find his “new” opinions as untimely under Rule 702. Plaintiffs responded by pointing out that the parties jointly agreed to extend fact discovery and adjust the pretrial schedule to allow for State Farm to produce the Combined Pitkin Dataset. As a result, Regan produced his Supplemental Report on September 25, 2025—a date agreed upon by the parties in their joint request to adjust the pretrial schedule.

    2. David Melzer

    a. Methodology

    Melzer indicated that he was “hired to provide opinions on . . . the frequency of personal property claims with State Farm, the ascertainability of these claims through available databases, and whether the claims of Plaintiffs Pitkin and Grout fall within the proposed class.”

    Melzer’s proposed methodology to estimate the total number of potential class members is as follows. To estimate the total volume of personal property replacement claims for State Farm in California from 2015 to the present, he analyzed the number of claims in a submarket: San Diego. He chose San Diego as a representative example because claims throughout California would “typically be consistent with personal property claims made in San Diego.”

    Using that data, Melzer estimated the total number of insurance claims in San Diego across all insurers by dividing the number of Travelers’ claims by its 3.68% market share (a percentage market share that is available on the California Property and Casualty Market Share Report published by the California Department of Insurance).

    He then consulted the California Property and Casualty Market Share Report (the “Market Report”) issued by the California Department of Insurance from 2015-2023 and determined that State Farm consistently has “over 8.5% of the Property and Casualty Insurance Market in California.”

    Melzer goes on to explain that based on his familiarity with Xactimate and XactContents®, he believes that “given the detailed data that insurance companies maintain and given the flexibility and power of Xactimate/XactContents, it is [his] opinion that State Farm can create a report, or export the necessary data, that will allow for the identification of all personal property insurance claims where State Farm depreciated the taxes. From that report, Plaintiffs will be able to identify the members of the Class.”

    b. Class Member Identification

    State Farm maintained that the Court must exclude any class identification opinion from Melzer, as he “has not purported to identify class members” and instead “conjectures that someone else can.”

    It similarly urged that Melzer’s “conjecture that someone else can reliably and feasibly identify specific class members based solely on the Combined Pitkin Dataset also lacks sufficient foundation, conflicts with Melzer’s other admissions, and is therefore inadmissible.”

    Plaintiffs contended that Melzer did, in fact, “analyze the capabilities of the Combined Pitkin Dataset to ascertain the members of the class.”They highlighted that Melzer provided a “detailed analysis of the capabilities of XactWare products, including XactContents.”

    “While State Farm may disagree” with this analysis, Plaintiffs concluded, “that is not a basis for the Court to exclude Melzer’s conclusions based on his extensive experience.” The Court agreed.

    c. Depreciation Standard Industry Practices

    State Farm similarly sought to exclude Melzer’s opinions on “sales tax depreciation practices for the insurance industry as a whole.”

    Plaintiffs responded by highlighting Melzer’s “more than a decade of experience regarding the adjustment of insurance claims,” including working for Farmers, Travelers, and during his “nearly five years as a public adjuster working with multiple insurers from 2020 to the present.”

    Much of that time was spent working with XactWare products, including XactContents®, which Plaintiffs believe render him qualified to “offer opinions as to the industry standard for adjustment of contents insurance claims.”

    As with his other opinions, the Court found that it is more likely than not that Melzer meets the four requirements. While a fact finder may conclude that State Farm’s sales tax depreciation practices are not what Melzer claims them to be, that does not render his opinion and testimony inadmissible.

    d. Rule 26 Testimony

    Plaintiffs acknowledged that “they, and State Farm, are precluded from offering undisclosed expert opinions.” But they maintained that “Melzer’s opinions as to the typicality of insurers not depreciating sales tax were explicitly disclosed in his report.”

    No party may offer undisclosed expert opinions at trial. The Court held that the example in the preceding paragraph was disclosed and will not be excluded.

    3. Eugene Peterson

    a. Methodology

    Peterson concluded that “XactContents® software contains global and line-item settings that allow an insurance company to apply depreciation based on one of three methods: 1) percentage, 2) by a fixed dollar amount, and 3) by age with an adjusted condition.” He opined, “the software allows complete control over how depreciation is calculated, so each insurance company can set its policies for depreciation without needing to customize the software. From the software’s perspective, a user can determine what line items are to be depreciated and what is to be depreciated in each line item, e.g., sales tax.”

    b. Opinions on XactContents® Data Extraction

    State Farm “did not dispute Peterson’s ability to testify regarding what the XactContents® tool is and how it may be used.” Instead, it sought to exclude Peterson’s “feasibility opinion—that the Combined Pitkin Dataset in this matter can be used by someone else to reliably identify class members or calculate damages.”

    The Court found that Peterson sought to offer a relatively narrow opinion with respect to the structure and abilities of XactContents® to assist Plaintiffs in calculating damages in this case. He has significant experience working with XactContents®. 

    4. Duane Steffey

    Steffey was hired by State Farm to “evaluate the basis and foundation for Regan’s, Melzer’s, and Peterson’s opinions” at class certification. State Farm also disclosed Steffey as a rebuttal expert to Regan’s supplemental report.

    a. Class Membership

    Plaintiffs took issue with how Steffey criticized Regan’s identification of 41,153 class members in his Supplemental Report.

    State Farm countered that Steffey’s rebuttal report criticizing Regan’s “new approach to identifying class members and calculating damages” was “based on his knowledge and education in statistics, previous experience, and the materials he reviewed.”

    The Court agreed with State Farm that exclusion is not warranted. Steffey engaged in a thorough review of the materials provided to him, including all exemplar claims identified by Regan. He then identified at least one “exemplar” Plaintiff who potentially lacked injury and damages, thus raising questions about Regan’s methodology for identifying class members.

    b. Damages Calculations

    Plaintiffs also sought to exclude Steffey’s criticism that Regan’s damages “scenarios” are “unreliable.”

    The Court found that Steffey raised important questions about Regan’s methodology that go to the heart of this dispute—questions regarding standing, injury, and how to identify class membership. His opinions are relevant. They can be tested. And they may assist the trier of fact in resolving the question of damages and standing in this case.

    c. Data Fields Interpretation

    Plaintiffs sought to exclude Steffey’s claim that some of Regan’s “descriptions of certain data fields in the Combined Pitkin Dataset ‘have not been corroborated by anyone with requisite knowledge.’”

    The Court found that Steffey properly critiqued Regan’s assumptions in the Combined Pitkin Dataset, a topic which he, as a statistician, may opine. That Steffey recognized he cannot judge the accuracy of the fields is a different question than identifying Regan’s failure to corroborate the Dataset. 

    d. Substantial Revision Opinion

    Plaintiffs finally sought to exclude Steffey’s opinion that Regan’s supplemental report represents a “substantial revision” to his analysis in the original report.

    Credibility is always an issue for the jury to consider, and Steffey’s opinion about the “drastic” change “underscores the unreliability of Regan’s approach generally.”

    State Farm is entitled to present this opinion as an attack on Regan’s credibility at trial. In sum, the Court will not exclude Steffey’s testimony.

    Held

    The Court denied the parties’ motions to exclude, as each request raises issues of credibility—a question reserved for the factfinder—instead of admissibility.

    Key Takeaway

     Plaintiffs must show it is more likely than not that: “(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert [has reliably applied] the principles and methods to the facts of the case.” Applying this standard, State Farm argues that Plaintiffs have not met their evidentiary burden.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Pitkin V. State Farm General Insurance Company
    Docket Number: 3:23cv924
    Court Name: United States District Court, California Northern
    Order Date: June 30, 2026
  • Geology Expert Was Allowed to Opine on Subsurface Conditions 

    Geology Expert Was Allowed to Opine on Subsurface Conditions 

    This case arises out of Plaintiffs’ claim that structural damage to their home at 496 Southwood Drive in Madisonville, Kentucky, was caused by coal mine subsidence.

    Val Smith and Gwen Smith obtained a homeowners’ policy from American Strategic Insurance Corp. (“ASIC”) and claimed that mine subsidence caused structural movement and cracking.

    ASIC denied the claim based on the findings of NV5, a technical engineering consulting firm. In early 2024, the Smiths requested that ASIC reconsider its 2021 denial of their mine-subsidence claim.

    ASIC reopened the claim and requested that NV5 perform a supplemental evaluation of the AML documentation. NV5 issued a 20-page supplemental report, again concluding that the Smith residence had not experienced mine subsidence. ASIC reaffirmed its denial on February 16, 2024.

    The Smiths brought claims for breach of contract and bad faith under the common law the Kentucky Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act (“UCSPA”).

    Plaintiffs disclosed the expert reports of their causation witness, Harold R. Gaston, as well as the damages opinion testimony of David Garrigan. ASIC disclosed the causation opinion testimony of Norman R. Meeks and Thomas Smith to Plaintiffs.

    Both parties sought to exclude the testimony of the opposing party’s experts.

    Civil Engineering Expert Witnesses

    Harold Ray Gaston received a B.S. in Civil Engineering from the University
    of Kentucky in 1982.

    He has more than 32 years of experience completing civil and structural design and years of experience investigating structural issues with residential and commercial buildings.

    He also has provided engineering reports/ testimony in multiple legal cases.

    Want to know more about the challenges Harold Gaston has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Thomas Walker Smith has 16 years of civil/structural engineering design,
    project management, and construction management experience with
    commercial public building projects, pipeline projects, building mechanical
    system projects and pump station projects.

    Get the full story on challenges to Thomas Smith’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Construction Expert Witness

    David Garrigan is an expert in the field of delivering commercial, institutional, historic renovation, and specialty construction on projects as he works as a commercial builder and contractor with over 30 years of experience. He has been the Founder and Owner of Garrigan Building and Construction since 2013.

    Discover more cases with David Garrigan as an expert witness by ordering his comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

    Geology Expert Witness

    Norman Randal Meeks is a professional geologist with 26 years of consulting experience in environmental and geotechnical applications.

    Get the full story on challenges to Norman Meeks’ expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Discussion by the Court

    1. ASIC’s Motion to Exclude Gaston and Garrigan

    i. Whether Gaston’s Disclosures Satisfy Rule 26

    ASIC did not dispute that Gaston’s opinions and the bases for them were ultimately disclosed through his letters, the reliance materials, and his deposition testimony. Rather, ASIC argued that Gaston’s expert disclosures were not themselves enough to satisfy the disclosure requirements of Rule 26(a)(2)(B). Plaintiffs argued that Gaston’s letters satisfied the disclosure requirements of Rule 26(a)(2)(B), but that even if they did not, the late disclosure of the reliance materials did not warrant exclusion under Rule 37.

    After review of the record, the Cout found that Gaston’s deposition testimony was within the scope of opinions expressed in his expert reports.

    On the other hand, ASIC’s complaint that the Plaintiffs did not actually disclose the materials Gaston relied on to form his opinions until the day before his deposition is well taken. The Court therefore must consider whether this violation was “harmless or is substantially justified.”

    The testimony that Gaston intended to give at trial appears to be within the scope of the opinions disclosed in his report. There is no apparent risk that if Gaston testifies at trial, ASIC will be surprised by his testimony. Nor, as a result, is there a substantial likelihood that allowing Gaston’s testimony would disrupt trial. As for the ability to cure the violation, to the extent ASIC believes that it was prejudiced by Plaintiffs’ late disclosure, ASIC may move to compel additional discovery—but ASIC has not done so here or explained what additional information it might seek and so the Court will not order further discovery at this time.

    ii. Whether Gaston’s Opinions Satisfy Rule 702

    Next, ASIC contended that Gaston’s opinions, and by extension, Garrigan’s, did not “meet Rule 702‘s requirements of reliability and relevance.”

    Here, Gaston testified that he based his opinions on, among other things, the “presence of a large mine void” beneath the Property in relation to its location, and the “pattern and extent of structural damage.”

    Based on this data and his experience in similar cases, Gaston concluded that the damages to the Property were the result of mine subsidence and not soil or water issues alone.

    ASIC has not explained how Gaston’s reliance on core samples, for example, is unreliable, given that the record shows it is also the methodology employed by Kentucky Environmental and Energy Cabinet’s Division of Abandoned Mine Lands Reclamation (“AML”) to determine the presence of a mine subsidence issue.

    ASIC’s final contention that “Gaston’s opinions . . . would not assist the trier of fact” also fails. Essentially, ASIC argued that because Gaston cannot distinguish between damage documented at the Property before Plaintiffs purchased the Property or prior to the Policy period, his opinion would be unhelpful to the jury in determining causation. ASIC is correct that Gaston’s testimony is limited to “whether or not mine subsidence had” occurred and whether it had “affected the [Property].”

    And because nothing in the record shows that Gaston determined when the alleged damage to the Property occurred, it is true that Gaston’s testimony does not resolve the ultimate coverage issue. However, Gaston’s testimony does address the threshold issue of whether the damage to the Property is of the type that the Policy covers—i.e., whether it was caused by mine subsidence or other excluded causes, such as earth movement. As a result, the relevancy requirement of Rule 702 is satisfied.

    iii. ASIC’s Objections to Garrigan’s Opinions

    With respect to ASIC’s request to exclude Garrigan’s opinions under Rule 37, although Garrigan’s “Scope of Work” letter was deficient under Rule 26, the Court found that ASIC learned that Garrigan visited the Property with Gaston and based his report on that visual inspection, his experience as a professional, his knowledge of the Kentucky Building Code, and Gaston’s specific recommendations regarding the foundation. Indeed, ASIC failed to identify any information that it was unable to discover through Garrigan’s deposition.

    ASIC overstated the required qualifications and methodology for Garrigan’s opinions in case. Garrigan’s testimony in this case is limited to providing an estimate of repair costs for the damages Gaston attributes to mine subsidence. Garrigan need not be qualified as “an engineer, geologist, or subsidence specialist” to do so.

    Rather, Garrigan is entitled to rely on Gaston’s opinions as to the cause of the observed damages, as well as the necessity of certain foundational repairs.

    Likewise, while ASIC alleged that Garrigan’s “methodology amounted to walking around, making assumptions, and writing an estimate,” ASIC has not explained how this methodology necessarily renders Garrigan’s estimate unreliable. Garrigan’s methodology is based on his “personal knowledge and experience” estimating the cost of residential repair projects, as well as the engineering opinions of Gaston and other reliance materials discussed at his deposition on which Garrigan’s background knowledge of residential repair is based. Courts regularly admit damages testimony based on similar methodologies.

    2. Plaintiffs’ Motions to Exclude Meeks and Smith

    i. Plaintiffs’ Objections to Meeks’ Opinions

    Plaintiffs sought to exclude the testimony of Meeks pursuant to Rule 702. First, they argued that “Meeks is unqualified to offer his opinions in this case.” Plaintiffs asserted that Meeks’ experience as a “career geologist that works only for insurance companies, state and federal agencies, and hospitals” is insufficient because he lacked certain specialized experience with coal mine subsidence.

    Contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertion, Meeks is not required to have previously “worked for individuals like the Smiths. . . . given a deposition . . . . [or] written or published anything on coal mine subsidence” for him to be qualified to opine in this matter. Nor was Meeks required to have background knowledge of the coal industry. The Court held that Meeks’ opinions are based on his experience as a geologist—not a coal industry professional.

    Second, Plaintiffs contended that Meeks’ opinions are unreliable because he relied on “upon the results he obtained in his [Standard Penetration Testing (‘SPT’)] methodology” to the exclusion of contrary evidence.

    Contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertions, the record shows that Meeks had a sufficient factual basis for his opinions. In addition to the results of the SPT analysis, Meeks conducted a “visual inspection” and put in an “open records request . . . for records pertaining to historical mining activities that potentially occurred beneath the property.”

    Further, Meeks did consider whether there was a void beneath the Property. Meeks found that the AML maps indicated rooms and pillars but disputed “that that room had collapsed” based on the results of his SPT analysis.

    ii. Plaintiffs’ Objections to Smith’s Opinions

    According to Plaintiffs, “Smith’s reports are inadmissible for three independent reasons”:

    First, Smith is unqualified to offer his opinions in this case. Second, Smith’s opinions necessarily require full and complete determination of the existence of coal mine subsidence based solely on SPT soil analysis, without regard to other accepted testing techniques and/or methods to make that determination. This extraordinary analytical gap in his methodology invalidates each of his opinions. Third, Smith’s primary opinion- that the Smith home is not damaged by coal mine subsidence, is unreliable and fails to address the ‘specific practices’ of this case.

    Based on his education and experience as a structural engineer, the Court found that Smith is qualified to offer his opinions that the alleged damage was consistent with structural movement attributable to soil behavior identified by Meeks and other construction-related issues.

    Moreover, the fact that Smith relied on Meeks’ conclusions regarding subsurface conditions does not make Smith’s methodology unreliable under Rule 702. Smith testified that it is standard practice in subsidence investigation to rely on geologists’ findings in conjunction with visual inspections and analysis of other data, such as relative floor elevations, crack patterns, floor deflection, foundation behavior, and construction issues.

    Nor have Plaintiffs shown that Smith’s conclusions were the result of an unreliable application of his methodology to the facts of the case. For instance, the fact that Smith did not return for a site visit after the damage to the Property worsened goes to the weight of his conclusions but does not make his opinion unreliable.

    Held

    • The Court denied ASIC’s motion to exclude the proposed opinion testimony of Harold Gaston and David Garrigan.
    • The Court denied Plaintiffs’ motions to exclude the testimony of Norman Meeks.
    • The Court denied Plaintiffs’ motions to exclude the testimony of Thomas Smith.

    Key Takeaway

    While Rule 26(a)(2)(B) requires a complete statement of all opinions to be expressed and the basis and reasons therefore, it does not require that a report disclose all information that might be elicited on direct examination to establish the admissibility of the expert opinion under Daubert.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Smith V. American Strategic Insurance Corp.
    Docket Number: 4:24cv79
    Court Name: United States District Court, Kentucky Western
    Order Date: June 18, 2026
  • Psychiatry Expert Allowed to Opine on Psychological Injuries

    Psychiatry Expert Allowed to Opine on Psychological Injuries

    Plaintiff Brigid “Bridie” Farrell alleged that Defendant Gabel groomed and sexually abused her from June 1997 to January 1998.

    Plaintiff filed a motion to exclude the expert testimony of Defendants’ expert, Dr. Charles Saldanha, pursuant to Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.

    Psychiatry Expert Witness

    Charles Edwin Saldanha graduated from Emory University with a Bachelor of Arts in Economics and completed his Doctor of Medicine degree at the Duke University School of Medicine. After internship at the Brigham and Women’s Hospital, he completed residency in Psychiatry at the University of California, San Francisco (UCSF) and a fellowship in Forensic Psychiatry at Yale University. He is certified in Psychiatry with Added Qualifications in Forensic Psychiatry by the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology.

    Saldanha has practiced in the areas of emergency psychiatry, inpatient psychiatry, and community psychiatry with a focus on persons with serious mental illness.

    Saldanha has performed over 60 forensic psychiatric evaluations and has testified over 25 times in court proceedings and depositions.

    Want to know more about the challenges Charles Saldanha has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    1. Qualifications

    Plaintiff is an adult who alleged that she suffered from psychiatric conditions due to sexual abuse she suffered as a teenager. She argued that Saldanha is not qualified as an expert “due to his lack of experience in child psychiatry.”

    Saldanha, however, has “superior knowledge, education, experience, or skill” in general and forensic psychiatry. Saldanha describes his work experience to “include clinical work with diverse behavioral health populations spanning a range of ages, primary diagnoses, comorbidities, and psychosocial backgrounds, including persons who have suffered sexual assault and abuse.”

    Accordingly, the Court concluded that, based on Saldanha’s education, experience and skill, he qualifies as an expert to give his opinion on Plaintiff’s emotional injuries as a result of the sexual and mental abuse.

    2. Reliability

    Saldanha opined that, “though Plaintiff’s records indicate that some treaters have also diagnosed PTSD or listed it as a rule out diagnosis, the information available does not support this diagnosis.” To arrive at this conclusion, Saldanha reasoned that, “since the abuse, Plaintiff has not shown a consistent presence of avoidance of stimuli associated with the abuse or marked alterations in arousal and reactivity, domains of symptoms which are present in PTSD.” Saldanha noted that, “since this episode of abuse, Plaintiff has not shown persistent avoidance of or efforts to avoid memories, thoughts, or feelings related to the events or people, places, activities, or situations related to the abuse.” Saldanha further asserted that, although “psychological testing performed as part of the evaluation showed significant emotional distress, it did not support the diagnosis of PTSD.”

    The Court concluded that, by outlining the symptoms that he looks for when identifying cases of PTSD and explaining why, in his opinion, Plaintiff is not experiencing these symptoms, Saldanha adequately explained the methodology he used to reach his conclusion.

    Saldanha explained that, in his opinion, the symptoms Plaintiff described were more consistent with major depressive disorder than with PTSD. Saldanha clearly articulated that, because Plaintiff was not exhibiting avoidance of stimuli or changes in reactivity, he did not believe that a PTSD diagnosis was appropriate.

    Furthermore, the Court concluded that Plaintiff’s contention that Saldanha is merely acting as an “advocate for a cause” and that, therefore, the Court should exclude his testimony as unreliable, is unavailing. To the contrary, in his report, Saldanha acknowledged that Plaintiff is experiencing psychological issues such as major depressive disorder.

    3. Relevance

    In this case, whether Plaintiff suffered psychological injury as a result of Defendant Gabel’s alleged abuse is a critical issue in this case. Saldanha’s expert opinion is directly relevant to both the psychological issues from which Plaintiff suffers and the cause of those problems.

    Accordingly, the Court found that Saldanha’s expert testimony is relevant to the issues in this case.

    Held

    The Court denied Plaintiff’s motion to exclude the testimony of Dr. Charles Saldanha.

    Key Takeaway

    The Court noted that, in assessing reliability, the principles and methodology employed should be assessed, not the outcome of those methods. Moreover, it is not unusual for reasonable minds to differ even when both apply reliable methodology in reaching such differing conclusions. For all these reasons, the Court concluded that Plaintiff’s displeasure with Saldanha’s conclusion is not a ground for excluding him from testifying.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Farrell V. The United States Olympic & Paralympic Committee
    Docket Number: 1:20cv1178
    Court Name: United States District Court for the Northern District of New York
    Order Date: June 17, 2026
  • Accounting Expert Was Partly Allowed to Opine on the Business Relationship

    Accounting Expert Was Partly Allowed to Opine on the Business Relationship

    This case involves a contract dispute between the Douglas and Amy Mottram and Robert Radke. Prior to 2018, the Mottrams entered into four joint ventures with Radke, in which Radke would buy land in California, on which the Mottrams would construct homes to be resold for mutual profit. Beginning in 2018, the Mottrams and Radke decided to pursue a similar strategy in Kauai, purchasing two plots of land (“Lot C” and “Lot D”) using funds from both parties. The parties did not enter into a written contract for this Kauai joint venture, and, perhaps predictably, its exact nature and terms are in dispute.

    What is clear is that by 2023, the business relationship between the Mottrams and Radke had disintegrated due to, inter alia, conflict over the division of profits from Lot D, personal usage of the Kauai properties, and the Mottrams’ alleged siphoning of funds for a separate project with a third-party. On March 17, 2026, the Mottrams filed the instant motion, asserting that the Court should disqualify Radke’s proffered expert witness, Ross R. Murakami, on the grounds that his expert opinions failed to meet the standards of Federal Rule of Evidence 702.

    Accounting Expert Witness

    Ross R. Murakami has extensive experience in the real estate, construction, government, insurance, distribution, and retail industries, with over thirty-five years of experience providing audit, accounting, and consulting services to organizations based in Hawai‘i and the Pacific Basin and on the West Coast.

    Want to know more about the challenges Ross Murakami has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    I. Rule 408

    The Mottrams argued that Murakami’s expert report relied in part on information provided during settlement negotiations in violation of Rule 408.

    The Mottrams argued that the portions of Murakami’s report that rely upon the spreadsheet, namely Tables 7, 8, and 14 of Section III, should be excluded under Rule 408.

    Rule 408 is clear in stating that “a statement made during compromise negotiations” cannot be used to “prove or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim.” Rule 408 is clear in stating that “a statement made during compromise negotiations” cannot be used to “prove or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim.” The spreadsheet, prepared and provided as it was for the purposes of settlement, and used by Murakami to support his damages opinions, is unambiguously protected by Rule 408.

    During oral argument, Radke’s counsel proposed that Murakami be permitted to amend the portions of his report that rely on the spreadsheet. The Court declines to open that window. Put simply, a party is not entitled to correct a problem of their own making, particularly one so glaring as a violation of Rule 408.

    II. Insufficient Facts

    The Mottrams next argued that Murakami’s opinions should be excluded because he relied upon inaccurate interpretations of the record. The Mottrams claimed that those opinions failed to account for contradictory facts in the record and instead relied on mere assumptions provided by Radke’s counsel; therefore, they are not based on sufficient facts and data.

    The Court takes no position as to whether the Mottrams are correct in arguing that there is evidence contradicting Murakami’s opinions, precisely because doing so at this time is unnecessary and contrary to the Court’s assigned role.

    III. Reliability

    The Mottrams argued that Murakami was unable to identify or utilize any reliable accounting standards or authorities supporting his methods.

    Radke, on the other hand, argued that Murakami abided by professional standards in his analysis and that, beyond this, the field of forensic accounting does not have a single, uniform methodology to which he should have adhered.

    To begin, the Court agreed with Radke that Murakami’s expert opinions are not rooted in scientific evidence, given that forensic accounting is a specialized field in which factors like error rates or peer review are not accepted indicators of reliability.

    Accordingly, the focus of the reliability inquiry “depends heavily on the knowledge and expertise of the expert, rather than the methodology or theory behind it.”

    The Court is not convinced, however, by the Mottrams’ arguments. The Mottrams go too far in asserting that Murakami’s deposition testimony is proof of a lacking methodology. Murakami testified that there was not a single “professional standard” for calculating certain figures in his analysis, but-as Radke argued-that is merely a result of forensic accounting not having universal, scientific standards in the same way as other fields of expertise.

    Finally, the Mottrams also asserted that Murakami did not apply his methodology reliably because “Radke’s counsel instructed Murakami to assume that Radke’s share of the profits should be based on his share of capital contributions,” which the Mottrams argue was a flawed understanding of the case. Again, however, whether to exclude an expert does not depend on the “correctness of the expert’s conclusions,” and Murakami’s reliance on an assumption provided by counsel did not offer a basis to find he applied his methodology unreliably.

    The Court found that Murakami’s expert opinions have demonstrated sufficient reliability, and the Mottrams’ motion to disqualify on those grounds is denied.

    Held

    The Court granted in part and denied in part the Mottrams’ motion to disqualify expert witness, Ross Murakami.

    Key Takeaway

    While Rule 703 permits experts some leeway in basing their opinions on inadmissible evidence, courts have determined that it cannot be used to admit evidence excluded by Rule 408.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Mottram V. Radke
    Docket Number: 1:25cv45
    Court Name: United States District Court, Hawaii
    Order Date: June 16, 2026
  • Statistics Expert Allowed to Opine on Over-Detention

    Statistics Expert Allowed to Opine on Over-Detention

    Plaintiffs Alanna Dunn, Reginald Haymon, Adam Day, Eric Zeider, Cameron Leonard, and Jason Wilson filed this class action alleging that the deliberate indifference of Cuyahoga County and the Cuyahoga County Sheriff’s Department caused them to be over-detained in the Cuyahoga County Jail after the legal basis for their detention ceased to exist.

    Plaintiffs retained Lacey Keller, a data scientist, as an expert witness to review and standardize files produced by the County relating to releases occurring between February 23, 2021 and December 31, 2023 while the County retained Dr. Sean Malone, a consultant who primarily works in statistics, finance, and economics, to rebut Keller’s analyses.

    The County sought to preclude Keller’s report while Plaintiffs sought to preclude Malone’s report.

    Data Science Expert Witness

    Lacey R. Keller is a seasoned data scientist with over 15 years of experience applying data to litigation, law enforcement, and investigations.

    She has been deposed nearly 30 times and has testified in over a half-dozen trials. She also joined the Washburn University faculty in 2025.

    Want to know more about the challenges Lacey Keller has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Statistics Expert Witness

    Sean T. Malone is a consultant who primarily works in statistics, finance, and economics. He teaches finance and statistics at Trinity University.

    Discover more cases with Sean Malone as an expert witness by ordering his comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Lacey Keller

    Plaintiffs’ counsel asked Keller to conduct a variety of analyses, including calculating the time it took the County to release individuals after a triggering action, among other analyses on the timing of certain events relating to releases.

    For detainees with release-triggering event and no holds on their release, Keller found most were released in under 6 hours, and 95% were released in under 10 hours.

    In most cases, Keller found a booking hold added an additional 90 minutes to the release time. Once a booking hold was removed, the release usually occurred within the hour.

    Analysis

    The County argued that Keller’s report is unreliable and cannot be used to either (a) show the average time it took to release a detainee; or (b) ascertain whether a person is a member of the proposed class because the detainee’s time to release was greater than 12 hours.

    For the relevant time period, Keller identified 58,091 unique custody sessions. From there, Keller applied a series of exclusions to the data.

    The County argued that Keller’s methodology and opinions are unreliable because they solely rely on limited data not suited for determining release times.

    The County also faulted Keller’s report for not determining whether the data provided by Plaintiffs’ counsel could be used to determine actual time to release.

    First, information counsel provided to an expert does not render the opinions on which the expert relies insufficient. Second, there is a reasonable factual basis for Keller’s opinions. The report explained the sources from which the data came. It explained the exclusions applied to the custody sessions to obtain a sub-dataset that contains only custody sessions where there is an available release triggering event and subsequent release (among other information).

    Keller then explained how she conducted each calculation to arrive at her stated averages and conclusions. While the County vigorously challenges whether the underlying data can be used to calculate release times, those criticisms challenge the ultimate conclusions and not the reliability of Keller’s methodology or analysis.

    Whether the calculations are correct, accurate, or credible, is a separate question. As a result, the Court found that Keller’s methodology was reliable.

    Sean Malone

    Malone’s main conclusions are: Keller’s methodology for calculating time to release is unreliable because it is based on insufficient data and incomplete methods; Keller’s opinion is based on insufficient facts because it does not consider the individualized facts affecting time to release; Keller wrongfully groups together detainees leading to inaccurate time calculations; and Keller inappropriately excluded detainees which creates inaccurate time calculations.

    Analysis

    Plaintiffs argued that Malone is not qualified to opine on how to calculate over-detention of detainees because he is not an expert in release policies.

    Plaintiffs added that Malone’s expert opinions amount to “nothing more than legal conclusions about what facts are relevant and necessary” to an over-detention analysis.

    Lastly, Plaintiffs contended that Malone’s report is not the product of any reliable principles or methods.

    Malone’s experience in statistics plainly relates to his criticisms of Keller’s methodology for collecting data. It is appropriate for an expert in statistical analysis to criticize statistics prepared by another expert witness. And while Plaintiffs argued that Keller’s analysis is merely an “objective” calculation of the “time to release,” Malone’s report properly offered criticism of Keller’s underlying data, including her selection and purported manipulation of data. Malone’s criticism of the “limited” dataset Keller used to develop averages for “time to release” is appropriate rebuttal testimony.

    Because Malone is qualified to criticize the statistical analysis performed by Keller, and because his report properly challenges the data and methods used by Keller, the Court refused to exclude his report.

    Held

    • The Court denied the County’s motion in limine to preclude Lacey Keller’s expert report.
    • The Court denied the Plaintiffs’ motion to strike the expert report of Dr. Sean Malone.

    Key Takeaway

    Malone’s criticism of the dataset Keller used and the methods she used to calculate her “time to release” analysis is proper expert rebuttal.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Dunn V. Cuyahoga County
    Docket Number: 1:23cv364
    Court Name: United States District Court, Ohio Northern
    Order Date: March 31, 2026
  • Pharmacology Expert Allowed to Opine on the Clinical Trial

    Pharmacology Expert Allowed to Opine on the Clinical Trial

    Alzamend Neuro, Inc is a clinical-stage biopharmaceutical company focused on developing treatments for Alzheimer’s disease and other neurodegenerative diseases. To advance the development of a new treatment called ALZN002, Alzamend sought to conduct a phase I/IIA clinical trial to evaluate its safety, tolerability, and preliminary efficacy.

    Biorasi, LLC is a contract research organization or clinical research organization (“CRO”) engaged in the business of providing clinical research services, clinical research professionals, and contract clinical, technical, and other related services.

    Alzamend asserted claims for breach of contract and fraudulent inducement after the ALZN002 Trial was derailed.

    Biorasi filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff’s expert witness Dr. Frederick H. Hausheer while Alzamend sought to exclude the testimony of Biorasi’s rebuttal experts, Emily Friedrich and Aimon Iftikhar.

    Pharmacology Expert Witness

    Frederick Herman Hausheer, M.D. is a physician-scientist and biopharmaceutical research executive with over 37 years of experience in clinical drug development, including extensive Phase I–III clinical trial management under FDA and other international regulatory frameworks.

    He earned his M.D. from the University of Missouri-Columbia (completing medical school in three years), completed his internship and residency training there. He has held board certifications in Internal Medicine (since 1985) and Medical Oncology (since 1987). Hausheer completed a fellowship in Medical Oncology (in two years, with promotion to faculty) at the Johns Hopkins Oncology Center and Hospital, concentrating in Pharmacology and Experimental Therapeutics research and development.

    Discover more cases with Frederick Hausheer as an expert witness by ordering his comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

    Biomedical Engineering Expert Witnesses

    Emily Friedrich is a licensed Project Management Professional certified in Good Clinical Practices. Friedrich also holds a Bachelor of Science in Molecular Genetics and Biochemistry with a minor in Chemistry from the University of Pittsburgh granted in 2007 as well as a Master of Science and a Doctor of Philosophy in Biomedical Engineering from Carnegie Mellon University.

    She completed postdoctoral training at Northwestern University Feinberg School of Medicine in the Department of Surgery and held a Research Instructor position at the University of Illinois at Chicago in the Department of Pharmacology. Friedrich also served as a Biomedical Research Program Manager at a military treatment facility.

    Get the full story on challenges to Emily Friedrich’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Dr. Aimon Iftikhar specializes in clinical research and development of medical devices with a focus on assessing clinical efficacy and accuracy in real-world settings. She has a Bachelor of Science degree in Biomedical Engineering with minors in Mathematics and Materials Science and Engineering from the University of Connecticut, a Master of Science degree in Biomedical Engineering from Carnegie Mellon University, and a Doctor of Philosophy in Bioengineering with a concentration in Tissue Engineering & Regenerative Medicine from the University of Pittsburgh.

    Gain a comprehensive understanding of Aimon Iftikhar’s qualifications and casework history with her Expert Witness Profile report.

    Discussion by the Court

    A. Biorasi’s Motion to Exclude Frederick Hausheer

    i. Methodology

    Though Biorasi contended that Hausheer relied exclusively on assumptions to form his opinions, Hausheer’s report cited an extensive list of references and supporting documents reviewed including training materials, training logs, resumes, protocol deviation logs, emails, meeting minutes, call notes, as well as various plans regarding protocol deviation, quality management, and risk management.

    Biorasi also contended that Hausheer’s opinions are merely ipse dixit, but Hausheer explained that the conduct of the ALZN002-01 clinical trial “is guided by the International Council for Harmonisation (ICH) Good Clinical Practice (GCP) guidelines, which are universally recognized as industry standards of practice and are consistent with FDA regulations.” References to Good Clinical Practice guidelines are frequent throughout Hausheer’s report regarding industry standards for qualified personnel and training, trial plans, monitoring, quality management, and blinding and communication controls.

    The Court found that Hausheer’s opinions are not based on mere ipse dixit, but rather the result of reviewing record evidence and measuring the evidence against established industry standards in the context of his own substantial professional experience.

    ii. Helpfulness

    Biorasi argued that Hausheer’s opinions are not helpful for the same reasons it argued they are unreliable. However, the Court already found Hausheer’s opinions to be based on a reliable methodology. Moreover, the Court found Hausheer’s opinions would assist the trier of fact.

    B. Alzamend’s Motion to Exclude Dr. Emily Friedrich and Dr. Aimon Iftikhar

    i. Qualifications

    The Court found that both Friedrich and Iftikhar possess substantial clinical experience and possess certifications in the industry standards relied on by Alzamend’s expert, Hausheer.

    ii. Methodology

    Alzamend argued that because Biorasi’s proposed experts lack experience in double-blinded trials, their methodology is unreliable.

    However, Alzamend cited no case law or statutory authority for its contention that rebuttal experts who possess both clinical experience and certifications in the relevant industry standards should be excluded because they lack adequate double-blinded clinical experience.

    The Court found this methodology to be sufficiently reliable. Alzamend’s
    assertions of lack of experience in double-blinded studies goes to the weight, not the admissibility of the testimony and may be the subject of cross-examination.

    iii. Helpfulness

    Alzamend argued that the rebuttal experts’ opinions are not helpful because they impermissibly usurp the role of the fact finder.

    However, the Court found that the rebuttal experts’ opinions will assist the trier of fact in this case. The rebuttal experts’ assessment of the double-blinded trial, considering their substantial experience and analysis of industry standards, concerned matters that are beyond the understanding of the average lay person.

    As to Alzamend’s categorical objections to credibility determinations, weighing competing evidence, or rendering factual conclusions, Biorasi contended that the rebuttal experts are merely pointing to evidence that contradicts the assumptions relied on by Hausheer. The Court agreed with Biorasi, and it is permissible for an expert to review facts and extrapolate opinions from those facts based on experience and industry standards.

    Held

    • The Court denied Biorasi’s Daubert motion to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff’s expert witness Dr. Frederick Hausheer.
    • The Court denied Alzamend’s Daubert motion to exclude the testimony of rebuttal experts, Emily Friedrich and Aimon Iftikhar.

    Key Takeaway

    The qualification standard for expert testimony is not stringent and so long as the expert is minimally qualified, objections to the level of the expert’s expertise go to credibility and weight, not admissibility.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Alzamend Neuro, Inc. V. Biorasi, LLC
    Docket Number: 1:25cv20481
    Court Name: United States District Court, Florida Southern
    Order Date: June 16, 2026
  • Political Science Expert Allowed to Opine on Election Ballot Secrecy

    Political Science Expert Allowed to Opine on Election Ballot Secrecy

    This case concerns Plaintiff Alison Kareem’s facial and/or as applied constitutional challenge to “ballot selfie” laws, a categorization of long-standing prohibitions on displaying election ballots. With fingertip access to smartphone cameras, voters can take pictures of their completed ballots and immediately post them on social media sites. This action and the statutes come under review.

    Kareem asserted that the laws did not satisfy the requisite level of scrutiny and are overbroad.

    Plaintiff contested the Court’s ability to consider the report of Dr. E. Scott Adler, the State’s expert, arguing that it is not admissible and did not satisfy the Daubert factors.

    Political Science Expert Witness

    Prof. E. Scott Adler received his Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University in 1996, and has been teaching in the Department of Political Science at the University of Colorado Boulder since 1996. Adler’s specialty is American politics, with a focus on the U.S. Congress, congressional organization and reform, elections, and constituencies. Since 1992, he has taught general courses in American politics, including the history, administration, and implications of elections and voting.

    Want to know more about the challenges E. Scott Adler has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    According to Adler, protecting the secrecy of the individual vote has been a central tenet of electoral law in nearly every state in the U.S. for well over a century. The long-held importance placed on election ballot secrecy in democracies has been motivated by three primary aims: protecting the right to privacy of personal political beliefs; discouraging the use of coercion against voters; and preventing vote buying.

    Adler also clarified that employer-induced political activity is relatively common in contemporary America.

    Plaintiff contended that the report reflected Adler’s personal opinions; relied on anecdotal evidence; is not supported by “legitimate methodology;” has not been peer reviewed; and failed to consider other potential causes or remedies.

    Adler draws from a range of historical sources and contemporary research related to election privacy and integrity, which is sufficiently more than anecdotal evidence.

    The Court found that his methodology is an accepted approach in the field of political science, which reliably supports his opinions.

    Held

    The Court did not discount or exclude Dr. E. Scott Adler’s expert report.

    Key Takeaway

    In making such determinations, courts consider a non-exhaustive list, known as the Daubert factors, which include testing, peer review, publication, known or potential error rates, and “general acceptance within a relevant scientific community.”

    But the Daubert factors are not a checklist, and the reliability inquiry can depend on “the nature of the issue, the expert’s particular expertise, and the subject of his testimony.”

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Kareem V. Cuyahoga County Board Of Elections
    Docket Number: 1:20cv2457
    Court Name: United States District Court, Ohio Northern
    Order Date: June 03, 2026