On a foggy night in November 2015, Plaintiff Kedron Gaston, a minor at the time, was heavily injured in a car accident. The car, driven by her aunt, collided with the back of a semi-truck, resulting in her aunt’s death. The Plaintiff’s mother, seated in the front passenger position, suffered severe injuries that made her unable to care for the Plaintiff and her sister. Consequently, Plaintiff entered foster care. She subsequently sued the semi-truck driver, Defendant Jackie Hazeltine (“Hazeltine”) and his employer, Defendant Royal Paper Stock Co., Inc. (“RPS”), for negligence and for causing emotional distress. The Plaintiff also filed a lawsuit against RPS and Hazeltine’s insurer, Defendant Grange Mutual Casualty Co. (“Grange”), for spoliation related to testing performed on the semi’s rear lighting in July 2016 by Grange’s expert Adam Hyde.
Key issues include the functionality and activation of the semi’s rear lighting system at the time of the accident; the handling of the lighting system after the accident, especially the right rear taillight; and the nature and extent of Plaintiff’s loss and injuries as the result of the accident.
The Defendants hired expert witnesses to provide insights on these matters. Forensic psychiatry expert witness Stevan Weine concluded in his expert report dated March 2, 2023, that the Plaintiff did not exhibit any psychiatric condition during her February 2023 interview, despite previous psychiatric diagnoses. Automotive engineering expert witness Erik Anderson determined that the semi’s rear-facing light assembly was well preserved and capable of being tested to determine whether the bulbs were energized at the time of the accident. Accident reconstruction expert witness, Steven Grundhoefer confirmed that the semi’s taillights were functional and illuminated at the time of the accident.
The Plaintiff moved to exclude all testimony from these expert witnesses based on Fed. R. Evid. 702 and the Daubert standard. Alternatively, she argued for exclusion based on the evidentiary balancing test in Federal Rule of Evidence 403.
Forensic Psychiatry Expert Witness
Stevan M. Weine is the Professor of Psychiatry at the UIC College of Medicine, where he’s also the Director of Global Medicine and Director of the Center for Global Health. For 30 years he has been conducting research both with refugees and migrants in the U.S. and in post-conflict countries, focused on mental health, health, and violence prevention.
His work has been supported by multiple grants from the NIMH, NICHD, DHS, NIJ, and other state, federal, and private funders, all with collaboration from community partners. This work has resulted in more than 130 publications and three books. He has been awarded two Career Scientist Awards: “Services Based Research with Refugee Families” from the National Institute of Mental Health and “Labor Migration and Multilevel HIV Prevention” from the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development.
Weine is the 2020 recipient of the Abraham L. Halpern Humanitarian Award of the American Association for Social Psychiatry and the 2023 recipient of the Piergiorgio L.E. Uslenghi Global Engagement Faculty Award.
Automotive Engineering Expert Witness
Erik Selmer Anderson is an automotive engineer with nearly twenty years of professional experience, fourteen of which were spent working directly for automotive manufacturers. He has direct design and testing experience in vehicle structures, crashworthiness, and closure systems engineering. Erik applies his expertise to expert witness investigations pertaining to vehicle crashworthiness, crash reconstruction, vehicle systems performance, and exterior/interior upper body mechanisms.
Upon completion of his degree in Mechanical Engineering, Erik worked for eight years with Nissan. There, he held positions in Body Design, Closures Design, and Crash Safety. As a Crash Safety engineer, he was responsible for ensuring the achievement of dynamic safety targets, both on a component basis and for complete vehicle performance. This included work in both the virtual design phase through simulation analysis, as well as overseeing and analyzing physical crash testing. Erik performed design/test work on sedans, pickup trucks, crossovers, and cargo vehicles throughout the entire development lifecycle and into mass production.
Continuing his automotive career, Erik then worked at Honda Research & Development for six years, where he was responsible for closures design engineering as a design team chief. At Honda, Erik led a team of design engineers in developing all aspects of minivan slide doors. He also served as design chief for minor-model updates on pickup truck door and tailgate closures. Erik has expertise in all elements of upper body design, including structures, dynamic and static crash safety, sealing, NVH, power-door systems, latches, and exterior/interior components, among others.
Erik earned his Engineering degree from the University of Michigan, one of the nation’s most respected programs. Throughout his career, he has accumulated a multitude of patents for key innovations in upper body design. His education and deep industry experience designing and testing vehicles qualify Erik to investigate a broad range of vehicle topics.
Accident Reconstruction Expert Witness
Steven Grundhoefer has 20 years of experience in traffic accident reconstruction. In addition to being ACTAR certified, he is a licensed Professional Engineer in Indiana, Kentucky, Ohio, and Illinois. He possesses extensive trial and deposition experience. He holds a Bachelor’s Degree in Civil Engineering from Purdue University and has approximately 10 years of experience in roadway and site design.
Discussion by the Court
I. Stevan Weine
A. Qualifications
Plaintiff argued that Weine lacked expertise regarding adolescents impacted by traumatic events like car crashes. She pointed out that his CV highlighted experience in global health and refugee issues, but it lacked specific trauma experience related to car accidents involving children. One reference in his CV mentioned “Forensic Psychiatry Practice,” but it did not provide dates to indicate his experience in this area.
However, the Court found that Weine’s CV showed significant experience in analyzing and treating adolescents affected by trauma. He held a fellowship at Yale focused on college students’ mental health and worked as an attending psychiatrist in their Adolescent Partial Hospital. He co-authored articles related to psychiatric care for child and adolescent patients.
In an affidavit, Weine stated he had extensive experience with children and adolescents in traumatic situations. He explained that diagnosing PTSD due to various traumatic events followed a similar approach. His forensic psychiatric practice spanned over 20 years, including cases involving trauma from motor vehicle accidents.
Plaintiff also claimed Weine lacked experience in forensic interviews, citing a failure to discuss informed consent extensively during their interview. However, the transcript along with Weine’s affidavit shows that he discussed the elements of informed consent, including the limits of confidentiality, the extent of his intended disclosures, and the purpose of the interview, with Plaintiff before she agreed to proceed with the interview.
Grange successfully demonstrated that Weine’s qualifications allowed him to address the effects of the Plaintiff’s injuries on her development. The Court held he was qualified to testify as an expert witness under Rule 702.
B. Reliability
The Plaintiff argued that Weine’s opinions from his March 2023 report lacked reliability for two reasons. First, she claimed he did not review enough facts or data before reaching his conclusions about her mental health and history. Second, she criticized his methodology for its inconsistency with ethical guidelines followed in the practice of forensic psychiatry. Based on these points, Plaintiff asserted that Weine’s opinions did not reflect reliable principles in the mental health field.
1. Collateral Information
AAPL Forensic Guideline 5.3 emphasizes the importance of reviewing collateral information in forensic assessments. The Plaintiff claimed Weine violated this guideline by excluding collateral information. However, the argument failed for two reasons.
First, Forensic Guideline 1 clarified that the guidelines do not dictate standards for evaluations. Psychiatrists must use professional judgment to determine appropriate methods of performing a forensic evaluation based on unique circumstances.
Second, the Court found that Weine did consider collateral information. Plaintiff defined collateral information as data obtained from sources other than the subject but did not specify what collateral information Weine excluded from his analysis. According to his report, he reviewed “a variety of documents and videos, including Gaston’s school records from elementary school to present, her employment and training records, medical records, video footage of her deposition, and video footage of the depositions of her guardians, Matthew and Tamara Cochran” in addition to collateral information listed in his report.
Despite these claims, any potential non-compliance with Rule 26(a) was harmless. Courts assess harmlessness based on factors like prejudice to the opposing party and whether the omission disrupted the trial. The Court held that prejudice to Plaintiff is minimal and has been remedied to a degree with Weine’s recent affidavit, which discloses his sources.
2. Context, Frequency, Intensity of Symptoms
The Plaintiff further argued that Weine’s assessment failed to address the context, frequency, and intensity of her symptoms. However, Weine’s notes and report showed he investigated her experiences at school and work. Disagreements between Weine and Westcott about the adequacy of this context relate to substance rather than reliability, making it an issue for the factfinder.
Regarding the frequency and intensity of her symptoms, the Court found that Weine had asked about these aspects during the interview. Though he and Westcott employed different styles, he adequately explored the necessary details.
Plaintiff also contended that Weine did not follow accepted methodologies for diagnosing her potential psychiatric disorders. However, he reported her scores on relevant diagnostic tests consistent with best practices.
The Plaintiff criticized Weine’s report for presenting her history through unattributed quotations, alleging many inaccuracies and typographical errors. However, Weine explained he relied on his notes during the report’s preparation. The discrepancies between his report and the interview transcript were minor and did not undermine his reliability.
Finally, the Plaintiff disputed Weine’s assessment of her quality-of-life post-accident, alleging he manipulated facts. The Court observed that such factual disputes should be explored through cross-examination rather than exclusion of evidence. The evidence showed that Weine’s testimony was admissible under Rule 702 and Daubert.
C. Federal Rule of Evidence 403
Federal Rule of Evidence 403 allows Courts to exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice or confusion. The Plaintiff further argued that Weine’s report could mislead the jury due to alleged mishandling of facts. However, her previous challenges to his reliability had been dismissed, and she presented no further arguments of undue prejudice.
There was no indication that Weine’s testimony would evoke irrational behavior from the jury. His report clearly explained the Plaintiff’s history and his conclusions. Given the central nature of her damages to the case, Weine’s opinions held significant probative value. Therefore, his testimony remained admissible under Rule 403.
II. Erik Anderson
Erik Anderson was retained by Grange to assess whether the rear right trailer taillight bulb could be analyzed for energization during the crash. In forming his conclusions, Anderson reviewed evidence, including video footage and photographs from a visual inspection conducted on November 29, 2022 which he did not attend. This inspection was notice by RPS and Hazeltine on November 17, 2022. The notice aimed to confirm the condition of the light assembly previously inspected by Grange’s expert, Adam Hyde, in July 2016.
The notice outlined a protocol for the inspection. This protocol restricted all contact with the light assembly to Hyde and required electronic recording by an identified individual. It also mandated a certification process for attendees.
In response, the Plaintiff reiterated her stance that Hyde had destroyed the light assembly in 2016, calling the visual inspection a “sham.” However, she did not object to any part of the inspection protocol but repeated her argument that Hyde’s actions precluded further analysis. Neither she nor her representatives attended the inspection.
Plaintiff argued that Anderson’s opinions should be excluded under Fed. R. Evid. 702 and Daubert due to unreliability. She claimed he relied on evidence from an improperly conducted inspection and disregarded conflicting evidence. Alternatively, she contended that his testimony could confuse the jury and should be excluded under Fed. R. Evid. 403.
A. Reliability
The Plaintiff argued that Anderson’s opinions were unreliable because they stemmed from his review of the November 2022 visual inspection, conducted without an agreed protocol or Court order. She claimed RPS and Hazeltine violated local rules by proceeding without proper certification of a discovery dispute. However, their notice did not demonstrate any unresolved dispute that required her involvement.
Moreover, the Plaintiff’s response to the notice did not request any relief regarding the inspection. She did not question the protocol or seek to halt the visual inspection. Instead, she expressed skepticism about RPS and Hazeltine’s motivations. Consequently, her response did not raise any legal issues for the Court. Later, she aimed to undermine Anderson’s reliability based on her previous response, yet she provided no authority to connect her concerns to his methods. Therefore, the Court allowed Anderson’s testimony under Rule 702 and Daubert.
B. Federal Rule of Evidence 403
The Plaintiff’s alternative argument for excluding Anderson’s opinions under Fed. R. Evid. 403 also failed. She focused on this Court’s acceptance of findings from her mother’s case against RPS and Hazeltine regarding spoliation of the light assembly. The Court confirmed that the findings on spoliation applied here and stated that while RPS and Hazeltine could not relitigate the spoliation issue, Grange could.
The Plaintiff suggested that Anderson’s differing opinions would confuse the jury about how the same event could represent spoliation for one party but not another. However, her concern lacked merit. The condition of the light assembly was crucial to the spoliation claim against Grange, making Anderson’s insights highly relevant.
The Plaintiff merely implied that the differences between his opinions and those of other experts would confuse the jury. Yet, the jury’s role is to weigh competing evidence to resolve factual questions. She failed to provide substantial support for her claim that Anderson’s opinions would confuse the jury regarding spoliation.
Thus, the Court determined that the probative value of Anderson’s opinions outweighed any risk of undue prejudice or confusion. Consequently, his opinions and testimony remained admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 403.
III. Steven Grundhoefer
Steven Grundhoefer was hired by RPS and Hazeltine to study and survey the November 2015 collision site. His work aimed to assist in analyzing and reconstructing the accident. Grundhoefer summarized his findings in 43 bullet points. The Plaintiff challenged one of these opinions and requested to exclude Grundhoefer’s entire opinion as unreliable under Fed. R. Evid. 702 and Daubert, or as potentially confusing under Fed. R. Evid. 403.
The Plaintiff contested Grundhoefer’s assertion that the four rear taillights on the semi-trailer were illuminated during the collision. She argued that he based this conclusion on police photographs taken after the crash. Additionally, she claimed this opinion conflicted with Hyde’s expert testimony from her mother’s case before the Wabash Court, which stated the lights were off at the time of the accident. The Plaintiff also pointed to conflicting testimonies from officers present at the scene, suggesting that Grundhoefer selectively used evidence to support his preferred conclusion. She argued that the differing expert opinions indicated Grundhoefer’s findings were unreliable.
The Plaintiff’s arguments highlighted that this case might require a “battle of the experts” to resolve the issue of the lights’ illumination during the crash. Expert testimony would likely help the factfinder assess the conflicting evidence regarding illumination, crucial for determining the Plaintiff’s negligence and spoliation claims. The Plaintiff attempted to undermine Grundhoefer’s opinion without solid support, which did not diminish its relevance to the factfinder.
Moreover, RPS and Hazeltine demonstrated that Grundhoefer considered more than one set of police photographs in forming his opinion about the lights. His amended report and affidavit revealed he reviewed photographs and videos from inspections of the taillights and bulbs, alongside police scene images.
The Plaintiff argued that Grundhoefer selectively ignored key evidence. Specifically, he overlooked the deposition testimony from Detective Sergeant Mike Davis and Trooper Swisher. Officer Davis had testified about the flashers’ illumination while at the scene. The Plaintiff suggested that his testimony contradicted Grundhoefer’s conclusions regarding the lights, but she did not clarify this alleged contradiction.
In contrast, RPS and Hazeltine argued that Officer Davis’s testimony did not contradict Grundhoefer at all. Trooper Swisher noted that he believed the taillight was not functioning before the crash. While this testimony might seem to contradict Grundhoefer, the Plaintiff failed to provide evidence showing that an expert must align with every witness’s account to be deemed reliable. Her concerns highlighted the necessity for the factfinder to consider all evidence, including Grundhoefer’s opinion.
Therefore, Grundhoefer’s opinion about the lights’ illumination and his entire expert report were sufficiently reliable for admission under Rule 702 and Daubert. The Plaintiff’s unsupported claim that Grundhoefer’s opinion could confuse the jury did not justify the exclusion his testimony under Fed. R. Evid. 403.
Held
The Court denied the Plaintiff’s motions to exclude the testimony of Defendants’ expert witnesses Stevan Weine, Erik Anderson, and Steven Grundhoefer.
Key Takeaways:
The Court allowed the testimony of Defendants’ expert witnesses based on their qualifications and the reliability of their methodologies.
The Court determined that each expert witness had extensive relevant experience—Weine in forensic psychiatry concerning trauma, Anderson in automotive engineering with a focus on vehicle safety, and Grundhoefer in accident reconstruction.
The Court also determined that the expert witnesses employed established methods appropriate for their fields. Weine reviewed adequate collateral information, Anderson followed an inspection protocol, and Grundhoefer considered multiple sources in his analysis.
The Court concluded that the probative value of the expert witnesses’ testimonies outweighed any potential for confusion or prejudice, reinforcing the need for juries to assess conflicting evidence in determining facts.
In conclusion, the Court upheld the admissibility of the expert testimony under Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 403.
Case Details:
| Case Caption: | Gaston V. Hazeltine |
| Docket Number: | 3:21cv896 |
| Court: | United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division |
| Order Date: | September 18, 2024 |
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