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Category: Law Enforcement Expert Witness

  • Psychology Expert Allowed to Opine on False Confessions

    Psychology Expert Allowed to Opine on False Confessions

    Plaintiff Mark T. Craighead brought this action in connection to a 2002 wrongful conviction of manslaughter and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony for the 1997 homicide of his friend Chole Pruett.

    Craighead was exonerated twenty-one years later, then he filed this federal civil rights action for malicious prosecution and violations of his constitutional rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments against Defendants City of Detroit, Investigators Barbara Simon and James Fisher, Lieutenant Bob Jackson, and Polygraph Operator Andrew Sims.

    The parties offered the opinions of their respective experts on issues concerning general police practices; investigative decisions and techniques; polygraph examinations and false confessions.

    The parties filed cross-motions to exclude each other’s experts concerning investigation of the underlying crime, including the decision to pursue Craighead as a suspect, the conditions of his detention and/or arrest, the administration of a polygraph examination, and the circumstances surrounding his false confession.

    Law Enforcement Expert Witness

    Todd L. Mutchler has 38 years of law enforcement experience. He has vast knowledge and deep understanding of law enforcement operations; two years working in dispatch and 36 years as a sworn law enforcement officer with four different police departments.

    Discover more cases with Todd Mutchler as an expert witness by ordering his comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

    Polygraph Expert Witnesses

    Bradford J. Beyer, Ph.D. is a retired Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) where he was employed for 27 years. He was certified by the FBI as a Polygraph Examiner for 18 years and as a Crisis Negotiator for 8 years.

    Want to know more about the challenges Bradford Beyer has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    James B. McCloughan is experienced examiner with a demonstrated history of working in the law enforcement industry and over 25 years of experience in polygraph.

    Gain a comprehensive understanding of James McCloughan’s qualifications and casework history with his Expert Witness Profile report.

    Sleep Medicine Expert Witness

    Michel A. Cramer Bornemann was the former co-Director of the Minnesota Regional Sleep Disorders Center at Hennepin County Medical Center in Minneapolis, Minnesota. He was an Assistant Professor holding joint appointments in the Departments of Neurology and Medicine at the University of Minnesota Medical School. He was also a faculty instructor in the Department of Biomedical Engineering at the University of Minnesota Graduate School, Twin Cities.

    Bornemann has several ongoing research projects in the field of Sleep Disorders and has received funding from a wide variety of sources, including the National Institutes of Health, the Academic Health Center at the University of Minnesota, as well as from medical technology and pharmaceutical industries.

    Get the full story on challenges to Michel Cramer Bornemann’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Psychology Expert Witness

    Dr. Melissa Beth Russano is a professor of criminal justice and a research psychologist whose principal areas of research are investigative interviewing, interrogations, and confessions in law enforcement, military, and human intelligence settings.

    She has conducted research in those areas since 2002, published numerous peer-reviewed articles and chapters, developed a widely used laboratory paradigm for studying true and false confessions, trained local, state, and federal law enforcement officers, and received federal funding from the U.S. Department of Justice and U.S. Department of Defense for interrogation research.

    Gain a comprehensive understanding of Melissa Russano’s qualifications and casework history with her Expert Witness Profile report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Todd Mutchler

    Plaintiff retained Todd Mutchler to “provide his professional opinions regarding the investigation, arrest, and prosecution of Craighead” by “assessing whether there were deviations from generally accepted police practices in [DPD Investigators’] the investigation” into the June 27, 1997, shooting that resulted in the death of Chole Pruett.”

    Defendants sought to strike Mutchler’s opinions and exclude his testimony at trial because (1) he is unqualified and his opinions are unreliable; (2) he utilizes an incorrect standard to form his opinion; (3) he has not disclosed the standards and authorities upon which he relies; and (4) portions of his opinion are irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial.

    Analysis

    First, despite over 38 years of police experience, Mutchler is apparently unqualified to serve as Plaintiff’s police practices expert. Defendants seemed to misunderstand the function of Mutchler’s testimony, which is to “educate the jury as to standard police procedures in conducting investigations.”

    Under the same false premise, Defendants maintained that Mutchler failed to apply “specialized knowledge” to the fact of this case.

    Here, the Court is satisfied that Plaintiff has shown that Mutchler is qualified to address not just one, but several issues in this case within the scope of the expertise for which Plaintiff has offered him.

    Second, Defendants asserted that Mutchler applied a negligence, rather than intentional, affirmative conduct standard to Defendants’ conduct. Considering Plaintiff has already clarified the scope of his expert’s testimony, the Court is satisfied that Mutchler’s opinions will not exceed this scope.

    Third, Mutchler allegedly failed to satisfy the requirements outlined in Rule 26 because he did not disclose the standards and authorities upon which he relied.

    Plaintiff contended that the basis for Mutchler’s opinion is clear, and the Court agreed. In fact, looking to Mutchler’s expert report itself, he expressly stated that his “approach involves assessing the actions of law enforcement officers against widely accepted police practices, policies, and legal standards.”

    Finally, Defendants asserted that Mutchler provided opinions on the conduct of Non-Defendant officers, which is irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. At this stage of the litigation, before the parties have fully briefed the motions in limine and the Court has ruled on those motions, the Court found Plaintiff’s concerns premature.

    The Court, however, granted Defendants’ request to strike any of Mutchler’s opinions regarding application of a negligence standard to the Complaint.

    Bradford Beyer

    Defendants retained Dr. Bradford Beyer to author two reports in this case. At a high level, he was to conduct a review “in light of the polygraph technique, law enforcement interview and interrogation methods, and the phenomenon of false confessions.”

    The Court found that given Beyer has “considerable experience in the field of criminology and because he will be testifying concerning a discrete area of police practices about which he has specialized knowledge,” his testimony is admissible.

    By the same token, the Court is also satisfied that Beyer’s background is sufficient to qualify him as an expert on investigative techniques and decisions, false confessions, and the associated risk factors.

    As for Plaintiff’s argument that Beyer offered opinions bearing on Plaintiff’s credibility, the Court agreed with Plaintiff and found such opinions improper.

    The Court’s preclusion also extends to any of Beyer’s opinions on ultimate issues in this case to the extent that those opinions include determinations of Defendants’ liability in this case, or lack thereof.

    Finally, Plaintiff argued that Beyer employed an improper methodology and he offered opinions that lacked foundation. The Court found otherwise. Plaintiff is correct that “police practices experts may opine on proper police procedure, but they must employ an appropriate methodology.”

    However, the Court did not find that Beyer relied upon improper methodology. As an example, Plaintiff pointed to Beyer’s opinion that “Investigator Fisher and Lt. Jackson’s investigative decision to start with Craighead bore obvious fruit as he went on to confess to the murder of Pruett and was then subsequently charged and convicted for his crime.” At most, the Court found that this implicates potential impermissible credibility determinations, which the Court has already precluded.

    Michel Bornemann

    Bornemann is a medical doctor who specializes in sleep medicine. Defendants retained him “to review case files in an attempt to provide an unbiased objective expert medical opinion as to whether sleep deprivation (and subsequent cognitive impairment) was a primary influence accounting for Mark Craighead’s false confession and subsequent wrongful conviction in 2002 pertaining to the 1997 murder of his friend, Chole Pruett.”

    Analysis

    According to Plaintiff, Bornemann relied on an incorrect sleep timeline in assessing whether Plaintiff experienced sleep deprivation that contributed to his false confession, therefore, the Court should bar his opinions.

    Bornemann considered Plaintiff’s Complaint and his witness statements; transcripts of the 2001 Walker hearing, jury trial, and evidentiary hearing, and October 1, 2025 hearing; and 2013 photographs of DPD’s 9th floor cells in preparing his report.

    As a result, the Court will not bar Bornemann’s opinions on this ground.

    Next, Plaintiff accused Bornemann of “making factual determinations regarding whether the Defendants engaged in conduct that prevented Craighead from sleeping while in custody.”

    Upon an independent review of the report in its entirety, the Court found that Bornemann’s opinions improperly entered the territory of questions reserved for the jury.

    To that end, Bornemann was precluded from offering any testimony regarding whether (1) Defendants were responsible for Craighead’s sleep deprivation or (2) there is “compelling evidence to support that insufficient sleep was a significant influence that eventually lead to Mark Craighead’s false confession.”

    James McCloughan

    Plaintiff retained McCloughan as a polygraph expert “to offer opinions on the propriety of polygraphing a subject who was as sleep-deprived as Plaintiff, and the impacts that Plaintiff’s sleep deprivation could have on his polygraph results.”

    A review of McCloughan’s expert report reveals that the entirety of his opinions concerns Sims’ alleged acts and overall conduct. The Court has determined that Sims was entitled to qualified immunity which means he is no longer a Defendant in this action.

    Accordingly, McCloughan’s opinions and any related testimony are not directed at any of the remaining issues in the case.

    Melissa Russano

    Craighead retained Russano as a false confessions expert to opine on the psychology behind interrogations, confessions, and the risk factors associated with false confessions.

    Russano’s expert report generally offers three categories of opinions. First, she explains the phenomenon of false confessions and the relevant social science research. First, she explained the phenomenon of false confessions and the relevant social science research. Second, she identified known risk factors for false confessions and discusses their potential application here. These risk factors include: “(a) prolonged custody, isolation, and interrogation; (b) physical abuse/threats of physical harm/physical discomfort/deprivation of basic necessities; (c) sleep deprivation; (d) multiple interrogators; (e) guilt-presumptive approach; (f) presentation of false/unreliable evidence; and (g) threats and promises.” Lastly, Russano explained a framework for assessing the reliability of confession evidence by considering dependent and independent corroboration.

    Analysis

    A. Qualifications

    Defendants argued that Russano is not qualified to offer case-specific opinions because she is a research psychologist rather than a clinician, has not personally evaluated Plaintiff, has not conducted a custodial interrogation, and is not a sleep-medicine specialist.

    The Court disagrees. The relevant inquiry is not whether an expert possesses every form of experience that might bear on a subject, but whether her “qualifications provide a foundation for [her] to answer a specific question.”

    Russano’s education, research, publications, laboratory work, law-enforcement training, and more than two decades of specialized study directly concerning the psychology of interrogations and confessions. That foundation qualifies her to explain false-confession research, recognized interrogation-related risk factors, and the significance of those factors within her discipline.

    Defendants’ objections also misstate the nature of the proposed opinions. Russano does not purport to diagnose Plaintiff, assess his clinical condition, or offer a medical diagnosis concerning sleep deprivation. She proposes to explain how conditions such as fatigue and sleep deprivation are treated in the false-confession literature and how those conditions may affect a person undergoing interrogation. Nor was she required to personally interview Plaintiff or conduct the interrogation herself.

    B. Reliability

    Defendants contended that Russano’s opinions are unreliable because the prevalence of false confessions is unknown, her assessment of Plaintiff’s confession has not been empirically validated and has no known error rate, and no fixed standard governs how the identified risk factors are weighed.

    Plaintiff has demonstrated that Russano’s opinions draw from peerreviewed case studies, observational and laboratory research, meta-analyses, and accepted principles of cognitive and social psychology concerning conditions associated with an increased risk of false confession.

    Her corroboration analysis likewise distinguishes details independently verified or unknown to investigators from details that may have originated with investigators. These methods are transparent, grounded in the literature identified in her report, and capable of being tested against the record through cross-examination and contrary evidence.

    In sum, Russano applies recognized research to the disputed circumstances of an actual confession without claiming that the identified factors themselves establish its falsity. Plaintiff has therefore shown that Russano’s testimony rests on sufficiently reliable principles and methods.

    C. Helpfulness and Speculation

    Defendants separately argued that Russano’s opinions are too speculative to assist the jury.

    Russano did not intend to testify that the alleged interrogation conditions caused Plaintiff to confess falsely or that the confession was in fact false. Rather, her testimony will explain the phenomenon of false confessions, identify conditions that research associates with an increased risk of false confession, and explain which factors would be implicated under the facts found by the jury.

    Moreover, the conditional nature of Russano’s application did not make it speculative. An expert may rely on assumed facts that have support in the record; and disputes or weaknesses in those assumptions ordinarily affect weight, not admissibility.

    Here, Plaintiff’s account of prolonged isolation, food and sleep deprivation, a late-night polygraph, threats concerning his job and family, and a promise of release implicates the risk factors identified in Russano’s report. Her testimony therefore fits the disputed evidence and may assist the jury, while Defendants remain free to challenge its factual premises through cross-examination and contrary evidence.

    D. The Role of the Jury

    Defendants also contended that Russano intends to tell the jury which evidence to credit and how to weigh Plaintiff’s confession.

    Russano’s conditional application of the research to each account does not tell the jury which version to believe. It leaves the predicate factual and credibility determinations where they belong, with the jury, and supplies specialized knowledge concerning the significance of the facts the jury may find.

    That said, the Court clarified the permissible scope of Russano’s testimony at trial. She may explain the phenomenon of false confessions, recognized risk factors, the psychological mechanisms associated with those factors, the factors potentially implicated under the parties’ competing factual accounts, and the concepts of dependent and independent corroboration. But she may not offer a conclusive opinion that Plaintiff’s confession was false or unreliable, state that the jury should not rely on the confession, or otherwise tell the jury what conclusion to reach on that ultimate factual question. This limitation does not warrant excluding her testimony altogether.

    E. Rule 26 Disclosures

    Defendants finally argued that Russano’s disclosures are deficient because she did not retain notes from her review of the record and because her report did not include opinions concerning the report of Defendants’ sleep expert, Michel Bornemann.

    Bornemann’s report did not exist when Russano prepared her report. After reviewing it, she made notes that were produced to Defendants in response to their subpoena before her deposition. Defense counsel then questioned her about those notes and elicited her opinions concerning Bornemann’s report.

    Accordingly, Russano’s produced notes and deposition testimony made the opinions known to Defendants during discovery and in writing. Questions asked during an expert deposition may also bear on the permissible scope of the expert’s trial testimony.

    Even assuming a technical supplementation requirement remained, the timing of Bornemann’s report substantially justified the absence of the opinions from Russano’s initial report, and Defendants’ receipt of the notes and examination of Russano rendered any omission harmless under Rule 37(c)(1). The Court will not exclude Russano’s testimony on this basis.

    Nor did Russano’s failure to retain separate notes from every portion of her review, standing alone, establish that her report omitted the facts, data, bases, or reasons supporting her disclosed opinions.

    Held

    • The Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ motion to strike expert Todd Mutchler.
    • The Court granted in part and denied in part Plaintiff’s motion to bar the testimony of Defendants’ expert Dr. Bradford Beyer.
    • The Court granted in part and denied in part Plaintiff’s motion to bar opinions of Defendants’ retained expert Dr. Michel Bornemann.
    • The Court denied as moot Defendant’s motion to strike the testimony of James McCloughan.
    • The Court denied the Defendants’ motion to strike the testimony of expert Melissa Russano.

    Key Takeaway

    It is not an expert’s role to apply the law to the facts—that task is reserved for a jury. Rather, an expert’s testimony is relevant when it “will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”

    An expert’s qualifications—let alone that of an expert with nearly four decades of experience—is not “in the abstract, but whether those qualifications provide a foundation for a witness to answer a specific question.”

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Craighead V. Simon
    Docket Number: 2:23cv12243
    Court Name: United States District Court, Michigan Eastern
    Order Date: July 19, 2026
  • Law Enforcement Expert Allowed to Opine on Mental Health

    Law Enforcement Expert Allowed to Opine on Mental Health

    This case concerns a fatal officer-involved shooting that took place on February 5, 2023. Plaintiff Matilde Garza alleged that Defendants County of San Bernardino, Bill Abernathy, and Nicholas Krinder (collectively, “Defendants”) used excessive deadly force by shooting and killing Plaintiff’s son Antonio F. Garza, Jr. (the “Decedent”).

    Defendant filed motions to preclude the testimony of Plaintiff’s experts, John C. Hiserodt and Scott A. DeFoe.

    Pathology Expert Witness

    John Chatfield Hiserodt has performed over 12,000 autopsies in his career, including many cases of in-custody deaths and various types of shooting cases.

    He has been qualified as a Forensic Pathology Expert in determining cause, manner and mechanism of death in numerous trial venues throughout California and the country, including providing opinions regarding bullet trajectory in many shooting-related deaths.

    Get the full story on challenges to John Hiserodt’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Law Enforcement Expert Witness

    Scott Allen DeFoe has twenty-eight years of law enforcement experience where he responded to hundreds of calls where subject may be barricaded, mentally ill, suicidal, experiencing a mental health crisis and worked almost 20 years with L.A.P.D’s mental evaluation unit.

    DeFoe also volunteered for five years with a suicide prevention hotline.

    Want to know more about the challenges Scott DeFoe has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    John Hiserodt

    Defendant sought to preclude Hiserodt from offering opinions regarding bullet trajectories and the position of the shooting officers relative to Garza. 

    Defendants argued that Hiserodt is not qualified in ballistics or crime-scene reconstruction so as to testify about such opinions and therefore, this evidence is inadmissible.

    Hiserdot has demonstrated his qualifications in similar cases and in medicine to form the basis of his opinion. Therefore, any probative value of such evidence is not substantially outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury.

    Scott DeFoe

    Defendant sought to exclude any opinions by DeFoe regarding Garza’s alleged mental health crisis or mental illness. 

    Plaintiff submits evidence that beginning in 2020, Garza began to suffer mental health issues, and was experiencing a mental health crisis on the date of the incident.

    Defendant argued that DeFoe lacked the background, training, experience, or qualification to provide expert opinion testimony regarding Garza’s mental health status because DeFoe is not a psychiatrist, psychologist, counselor, or other individual with specialized knowledge which would allow him to opine on Garza’s mental health status at the time of the incident or his mental health history.

    At his deposition DeFoe stated he will not offer any opinion diagnosing Garza but rather how police officers in California are trained to recognize behavioral indicators associated with mental illness.

    The Court has reviewed DeFoe’s curriculum vitae and there is no reference to him being a medical provider but it stated that DeFoe has experience in crisis negotiations/mental health training.

    The Court found based on DeFoe’s resume, testimony and report that his experience is relevant to Plaintiff’s causes of action under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act.

    Held

    The Court denied the Defendants’ motions in limine to preclude the testimony of John C. Hiserodt and Scott Defoe.

    Key Takeaway

    Experts must be qualified to form the opinions that make up their testimony. DeFoe has sufficient experience in crisis negotiations/mental health training.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Matilde Garza V. County Of San Bernardino
    Docket Number: 5:23cv1849
    Court Name: United States District Court, California Central
    Order Date: February 19, 2026
  • Law Enforcement Expert Not Allowed to Opine on Training And Supervision

    Law Enforcement Expert Not Allowed to Opine on Training And Supervision

    Plaintiff Fernando Villanueva-Galvez claimed that Officer Eliseo Anaya’s use of a police canine to locate and arrest him constituted excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

    Villanueva-Galvez proposed to present Ernest Burwell‘s testimony regarding police canine practices. Defendants did not challenge Burwell’s qualifications. Nor did the Defendants seek to preclude Burwell from testifying entirely. Rather, Defendants argued that Burwell should not be permitted to testify about legal conclusions regarding the severity and reasonableness about the use of force in this case, how disputed factual issues should be resolved by the jury, police canine practices for which he cites no reliable data or other support, and purported deficiencies in the City’s canine training and supervision practices for which he cites no relevant professional standards or reliable principles.

    Law Enforcement Expert Witness

    Ernest Burwell has decades of experience as a police officer, including twenty years of K9 handling and tactical training to K9 units. Burwell holds a POST Advanced Certification and even worked as a canine unit statistical data manager, keeping track of bite ratios, injuries, length of time the dog bit the suspect, and other information required by supervision, about the search, handler, dog, and suspect.

    Discover more cases with Ernest Burwell as an expert witness by ordering his comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

    Discussion by the Court

    A. Legal Conclusions Regarding Use of Force

    Defendants sought to exclude Burwell’s opinions regarding the lawfulness and reasonableness of the force used, specifically that Anaya’s deployment of a police dog here constituted “deadly force,” that the “type, degree, and duration of the force were unreasonable and excessive,” and that Anaya’s release of the dog was “unwarranted” and “excessive.”

    Whether Anaya’s actions were “objectively reasonable” in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him is a question for the jury.

    The Court has carefully reviewed Burwell’s expert report, and while the report did recite standards and best practices, the challenged opinions are not tied to those standards and practices. Instead, Burwell proposed to testify, categorically, that Anaya used “deadly,” “excessive,” “unreasonable,” and “unwarranted” force, without explaining what a particular standard requires and how such standard applies to a specific assumed or hypothetical factual scenario.

    B. Interpretation of Disputed Facts

    Defendants sought to exclude Burwell’s opinions regarding his interpretation of Anaya’s body-worn camera (“BWC”) video and other evidence in the record, arguing that such testimony usurps the fact-finding role of the jury.

    As explained above, while it is generally permissible for an expert to testify about whether a specific set of assumed or hypothetical facts does or does not meet relevant standards, the challenged opinions are not tied to any such standards or set of facts. While Burwell included excerpts of different standards in his expert report, he did not link his opinions with any such standards or explain why particular assumed or hypothetical facts did not meet those standards.

    C. Police Canine Practices

    Defendants sought to exclude Burwell’s opinions that “many agencies are not using the police dog as it was intended” and that the “average length of time” of a police canine bite is “10 seconds or less” as “unsupported by any reliable methodology and untethered to the facts of this case.” Villanueva-Galvez initially opposed Defendants’ motion and argued that Burwell’s opinions are based on “decades of law enforcement experience, advanced knowledge of POST standards, and specific work with K9 tactics.”

    However, at the hearing, Villanueva-Galvez conceded that Burwell should not be permitted to testify that “many agencies are not using the police dog as it was intended” and that the “average length of time” of a police canine bite is “10 seconds or less.”

    D. Severity of Force

    Defendants sought to exclude Burwell’s opinion that the use of a police canine “is the most severe use of force of all the less lethal tools/options,” arguing that such testimony is not grounded in identifiable professional standards or reliable analysis.

    The Court agreed. Burwell’s expertise on police-canine practices does not entitle him to tell the jury, as an expert, which non-lethal force is the greatest.

    E. Training and Supervision

    Defendants sought to exclude Burwell’s opinion criticizing the practice of using police canines generally and, in particular, his opinion that the City failed to properly train and supervise its canine handlers and ensure that handlers maintain control of their dogs.

    The Court has carefully reviewed Burwell’s expert report. While the report excerpts certain standards from the SJPD Manual, the challenged opinion is not tied to those standards or explained. Instead, Burwell proposes to testify, categorically, that Ronin was not properly trained.

    Held

    The Court granted the Defendants’ motion to exclude the challenged testimony offered by Ernest Burwell.

    Key Takeaway

    It is generally permissible for an expert to testify regarding best practices and standards and whether an officer’s conduct complies with those best practices and standards. Such testimony could include whether deployment and handling of the police canine here did or did not comply with such practices or standards. The problem here is that it is not clear to the Court whether such an opinion is actually disclosed or on what basis Burwell intended to provide such testimony.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Villanueva-Galvez V. City Of San Jose
    Docket Number: 5:24cv9055
    Court Name: United States District Court, California Northern
    Order Date: June 04, 2026
  • Law Enforcement Expert Allowed to Opine on Civilian Participation

    Law Enforcement Expert Allowed to Opine on Civilian Participation

    This action arises out of the execution of search warrants on three properties owned by one or more of the Plaintiffs, John Andros and his wife, Julie Andros (together the “Androses”), Kings Parkway, LLC d/b/a 67 Motors (“67 Motors”), and Ideal Transport, LLC. The locations searched were the Androses’ home located at 172 Primrose Lane, Homerville, Georgia (“Residence”), the office and real estate on which 67 Motors is located at 67 West Plant Ave., Homerville, Georgia, and the office and real estate on which Ideal Transport is located at 174 Primrose Lane, Homerville, Georgia.

    Although the three warrants were later quashed, an employee of National Insurance Crime Bureau (“NICB”), Special Agent Trent Van Lannen (“Van Lannen”), participated in the search at 67 Motors. Van Lannen was not physically present for the searches conducted at the Residence nor at Ideal Transport. Although Van Lannen used the title Special Agent he is not a law enforcement officer. NICB is a private company put together by large insurance companies to combat fraud. During the time he was present at 67 Motors, Van Lannen did not inform employees present at 67 Motors that he was not a law enforcement officer. Nor did any of the employees inquire whether he was a law enforcement officer.

    NICB sought to exclude the testimony of Plaintiffs’ expert witness Gary Vowell.

    Law Enforcement Expert Witness

    Gary Vowell has been a certified police officer in Georgia since 1977. He retired as the head of the Georgia Department of Public Safety in 2020. He has taught numerous courses dealing with policing in classrooms across the State of Georgia.

    Discover more cases with Gary Vowell as an expert witness by ordering his comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

    Discussion by the Court

    NICB did not contest Vowell’s expertise. Nor did it contend that he is unqualified to opine on police procedures. Rather, NICB argued that Vowell’s testimony should be excluded because his opinions (1) on Van Lannen’s actions create duties where none exist in the law, (2) go to the ultimate issue in the case, and (3) are speculative to the extent he opines that had Van Lannen read the warrant, Van Lannen would have known he was not allowed to participate in the search. NICB also asserted that Vowell’s opinions are not helpful to the jury and are unnecessary because there are no aspects of Vowell’s opinions that cannot be adequately argued by counsel and understood by the jurors.

    Plaintiffs argued that Vowell’s opinions provide information about law enforcement practices in a specialized professional context; i.e., law enforcement standards and the scope of permissible civilian participation.

    While the full extent of Vowell’s testimony is unclear at this time, it appeared that it is intended to provide the jury with knowledge of law enforcement practices and procedures when a private citizen is involved in execution of search warrants as well as the responsibilities and reasonableness of actions taken by such private citizen. At this point, the Court found that it is not appropriate to preclude such testimony.

    Held

    The Court denied Defendant National Insurance Crime Bureau’s motion to exclude the testimony of Plaintiffs’ expert Gary Vowell. Of course, as permitted, the Court may reconsider upon the actual evidence presented at trial and each party continues to bear the responsibility to raise necessary or appropriate objections.

    Key Takeaway

    The standard to determine helpfulness is whether the expert testimony “concerns matters that are beyond the understanding of the average lay person.” Here, a lay juror would not know the practices and procedures regarding allowing private citizens to be present at, or to participate in, the execution of a search warrant, whether Van Lannen’s actions were consistent with those practices and procedures, or whether those actions were reasonable, considering Van Lannen’s own assertion of expertise in assisting law enforcement.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Andros v. National Insurance Crime Bureau Inc.
    Docket Number: 7:23cv135
    Case Name: United States District Court, Georgia Middle
    Order Date: June 04, 2026
  • Law Enforcement Expert Allowed to Opine on Taser Use

    Law Enforcement Expert Allowed to Opine on Taser Use

    Plaintiff Angelo Black brought this civil rights and state tort damages action in October 2023 against former Gwinnett County Police Officer, Chase Weber. Black was seriously injured during the course of a police foot chase that occurred in October 2021. The foot chase ultimately ended with Officer Weber deploying a taser to immobilize Black, resulting in Black sustaining a serious head injury and lasting health issues.

    Plaintiff presented expert testimony from Natasha Powers-Marakis, an expert in police practices and taser usage. Based on her experience and professional training, Powers proffered testimony concluding that Black was in an elevated position when Officer Weber tased him. Weber filed a motion to exclude the opinion of Powers.

    Law Enforcement Expert Witness

    Natasha Powers-Marakis retired from fourteen years as a law enforcement officer in 2011, when she began consulting on matters related to policing.

    Since her retirement in 2011, she has received certifications in taser instruction, police practices, force science, management of chaotic events and prevention of arrest-related-in-custody deaths, and defensive tactics. Powers has trained police academy recruits and in-service police officers in defensive tactics, use of non-lethal force, and the use of deadly force. She has advised law enforcement agencies on the use of force and options relative to the use of force. She also has written policies on law enforcement’s use of force.

    Want to know more about the challenges Natasha Powers-Marakis has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Weber challenged the admissibility of Powers’ opinion on several grounds, including that, in his view, Powers is unqualified to render her expert opinion, that the methodology she used to reach her conclusions is unreliable, and that her opinion would be unhelpful to a jury’s understanding of the issues in the case.

    I. Powers’ Qualifications

    Powers far surpassed the “minimally qualified” standard; her extensive experience certainly qualified her to render her opinions concerning police practices and the use of force and tasers in the instant case.

    Weber argued that Powers is unqualified to provide her opinion because she is not an “expert in forensic video analysis,” and therefore, her opinions that are based, in part, on a review of the body camera footage are inadmissible. Weber is correct that Powers is not an expert in forensic video analysis. But she does not have to be an expert in forensic video analysis in order to be qualified to opine on whether Weber’s use of force against Black was appropriate or excessive under the circumstances. Powers’ opinions about Weber’s use of force are not based solely on a forensic analysis of the body camera footage. Rather, her opinions are based on her “education, training, experience, and review of the information and materials related to this case,” including the body camera footage of the incident.

    Powers additionally testified that she has been trained in forensic video analysis and regularly reviews body camera footage in civil cases to draw conclusions regarding police use of force.

    II. Reliability of Powers’ Principles and Methods

    The Court found that Powers’ overall scope of law enforcement experience, her review of this case’s evidentiary record and relevant law, and her knowledge and expertise in the field of police practices, standards, and taser use provide a reliable foundation upon which she based her findings and conclusions. 

    Weber argued that Powers’ reliance on the body camera footage “does not comport with the well-recognized standards for reviewing officers’ split-second decisions in hindsight,” and that her method “cannot be properly applied to the facts at issue.”

    The Court here must consider in its excessive force analysis the severity of the crime at issue, whether Black posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and the fact that Black was attempting to evade arrest by flight at the time of the use of the officer’s use of force. Weber is correct that Powers’ opinion addresses these factors through the lens of police training and policy. 

    It is true that courts must judge an officer’s reasonableness in a way that allows “for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments,” rather than judging reasonableness “with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” However, that omission in her analysis goes to the weight a jury would give to her opinion— not to admissibility. 

    Finally, Weber challenged the reliability of Powers’ methodology because he disagreed with the conclusion she drew. This is not an appropriate reason for the Court to deem Powers’ testimony inadmissible. The Court’s analysis as to reliability is limited to focusing “solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.” 

    III. Helpfulness of Powers’ Opinions

    Weber argued that Powers’ opinion that his use of force was “unreasonable and excessive” is unhelpful because it is an improper legal conclusion.

    However, Powers’ use of terminology such as “excessive,” “unreasonable,” and “disproportionate” in her report did not necessarily render her opinion an impermissible legal conclusion. In using this language, she did not tell the jury what legal result to reach. Rather, she emphasized that her use of such terminology was “intended to and should be read as references to the professional and generally accepted standards in policing, not as references to or the application of legal standards within the scope and sole province of the factfinder or judge.”

    The Court found that Powers’ opinion is certainly relevant to the issue of the degree of force used in this case. Moreover, her expert testimony is based on information that the average lay person is not aware of, such as the length and nature of a taser cycle, model policies and procedures regarding use of force, and national policing standards.

    Held

    The Court denied Defendant’s motion to exclude the opinions of Plaintiff’s expert Natasha Powers-Marakis.

    Key Takeaway

    Courts routinely admit expert testimony opining on whether a police officer’s use of force violated police practices and policies, as such opinions are not legal conclusions.

    As Powers’ use of such terminology is limited to the context of police practices and policies, her opinion is not an improper legal conclusion and is admissible at trial.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Black V. Weber
    Docket Number: 1:23cv4640
    Court Name: United States District Court, Georgia Northern
    Order Date: March 30, 2026
  • Law Enforcement Expert Allowed to Opine on Massage Business Inspections

    Law Enforcement Expert Allowed to Opine on Massage Business Inspections

    Plaintiff Dai Trang Thi Nguyen brought this action against Defendant City of San Jose and Individual Supervisor Defendants Joseph Hatfield and Rachel Roberts alleging that a former City Code Inspector William Gerry sexually assaulted and extorted Plaintiff during his code enforcement inspections of her massage business, and Defendants allowed Gerry’s conduct to occur in deliberate indifference to her rights to due process and equal protection.

    It is undisputed that former City Code Inspector Gerry repeatedly raped and extorted Plaintiff while inspecting her massage business in 2019.

    Defendants filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Officer Antonio Flores and Leonard Powell pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 while Plaintiff filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Dr. John M. Greene under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26.

    Law Enforcement Expert Witnesses

    Antonio “Tony” Flores has been a police officer with the San Francisco Police Department (“SFPD”) since 1982. During his career, Flores has conducted and supervised “several hundred” massage business inspections, often as many as fifty to sixty per year.

    Discover more cases with Antonio Flores as an expert witness by ordering his comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

    Leonard Powell served as the Code Enforcement Manager, Zoning Administrator, and Deputy Building Official for Dangerous Building Enforcement for the City of Fremont from 2001 to 2020, where he supervised officers enforcing zoning, housing, sanitation, and building codes.

    As part of this role, he developed processes and managed investigations in massage business regulation and enforcement, trained and supervised officers, and implemented ethics and accountability systems.

    Get the full story on challenges to Leonard Powell’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Psychiatry Expert Witness

    Dr. John M. Greene is board certified in both General and Forensic Psychiatry. He began practicing in the San Francisco Bay Area in 1997. He became a member of Stanford University’s Adjunct Clinical Faculty in 2005, and currently teaches topics on psychiatry and the law to the residents in the Department of Psychiatry at Stanford.

    With extensive training and expertise, Greene is regularly relied upon to provide expert testimony in civil and criminal cases regarding mental illness.

    Want to know more about the challenges John Greene has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Leonard Powell

    a. Helping the Jury Decide the Case

    Defendants argued that Powell’s testimony will not help the jury decide whether the City was deliberately indifferent. Powell’s report identified several “best practices” in the code enforcement industry that San Jose was not implementing at the time of Plaintiff’s injury, including: using partner systems for inspections; random supervisory audits; rotation of inspectors across industries; direct supervisory contact with regulated businesses; and formal post-action debriefs. However, during his deposition, Powell testified that he does not believe code inspectors are “likely” to extort or sexually assault people absent those “best practices.”

    The Court found that this did not disqualify Powell from testifying as an expert in this case. Although Powell declined to use the word “likely” in his deposition, he also testified there is “a high probability” that lone male enforcement officers would commit sexual assault and corruption, and that lone code enforcement officers going into massage businesses is an outdated practice because “there is a high probability” that something may go wrong.

    b. Reliability

    Defendants argued that Powell’s opinions are narrowly based on his experience in the City of Fremont and the City of San Rafael, which is insufficient to opine on industry-wide practices.

    The Court found Defendants’ arguments unpersuasive. Defendants’ assertion that Powell’s experience is limited only to Fremont and San Rafael is taken out of context and contradicted by his documented experience. As author of the California Code Enforcement Officer Standards Act and CACEO guidelines, Powell drafted California legislation and regulations that established statewide training and ethical standards for code enforcement officers, and he implemented these standards in Fremont. When asked about which other jurisdictions have implemented these standards, he listed San Rafael as one of the “other Bay Area cities” with similar practices.

    As for his reliance on external written documents, this is not necessary for Rule 702 purposes.

    Powell served as a code inspector supervisor for nearly two decades and authored the California legislation and regulation that established statewide training and ethical standards. In his report and his deposition, he has sufficiently explained how this experience formed his opinions on best practices in this industry, and he relied on that experience to opine on the facts of this case.

    c. Common Sense

    Finally, Defendants argued that Powell’s opinions on code inspector supervision amount only to “common sense,” not the opinion of an expert.

    Defendants also highlighted Powell’s testimony that his reassignment protocols are not specific to code enforcement, but rather are “kind of everywhere in life,” such as in consumer transactions: “If one person has a conflict with somebody else in a commercial setting, the general approach is, ‘Can I talk to somebody else?’”

    But, as Plaintiff highlights, Defendants’ excerpts of Powell’s deposition are taken out of context. For example, the phrase “common sense supervisory assessment” was counsel’s, not Powell’s.

    And before discussing his general observations of re-assignments in commercial settings, Powell testified that his knowledge of re-assignment practices for code enforcement inspectors was based on his experience in the code enforcement field.

    Upon reviewing the whole record, the Court found that Powell sufficiently used his expertise in the code enforcement industry, rather than common sense available to any lay person, to provide his opinions.

    Antonio Flores

    a. Expertise

    Defendants first argued that Flores lacked the code enforcement expertise necessary to offer opinions about the industry because he is a police officer, not a code enforcement inspector.

    The Court found that, despite his role as a police officer, Flores possessed the expertise required under Rule 702 to testify on code enforcement practices in massage businesses. Though Flores has never been a code inspector, Flores has worked extensively with code enforcement inspectors in his “several hundred” massage business inspections. Flores also testified that he has seen code inspectors operate with enforcement powers akin to those of police officers, particularly in the eyes of certain vulnerable communities including illicit massage business employees, such that the distinction between police officer and code enforcement investigator may be immaterial in this context.

    b. Reliability

    Next, Defendants argued that Flores lacked reliable support for his opinion that sexual assault or extortion is the likely outcome of a solo male code inspector working in massage businesses.

    Defendants contended that Flores testified he was not aware of any other instance in his experience in which a code enforcement inspector assaulted or extorted a massage business worker; he is not aware of any standards applicable to supervising code inspectors; he is not aware of any jurisdiction that actually supervises code enforcement inspectors the way he opines they should be supervised; and he could not point to any written standards that suggest re-assigning an employee about whom a complaint has been made.

    Analysis

    First, whether similar conduct has occurred in the past is not necessarily relevant to the theory of Plaintiff’s case—that the risks of exploitation were so obvious and well-known in the industry that the City did not need a pattern of similar instances to be on constructive notice.

    Second, Flores’s lack of experience in code enforcement supervision could foreseeably render some opinions on code enforcement inadmissible, but it does not render his entire testimony unreliable. Flores still sufficiently explained how he formed his opinions on code enforcement best practices based on his observations, trainings, and teachings conducted over forty-three years in the SFPD overseeing code enforcement inspections in massage businesses—including observations of employees vulnerable to exploitation, power dynamics, intimate spaces, and code enforcement investigators’ use of police powers.

    Third, as the Court noted above, written standards on re-assigning code inspectors after receiving complaints is unnecessary to forming a reliable opinion. The Court found that Flores may rely “solely or primarily on experience” because he has sufficiently explained how his experiences have led to his conclusions on code enforcement best practices in massage businesses, why that experience is a sufficient basis for his opinions, and how his experience is reliably applied to the facts of this case.

    c. Common Sense

    Finally, Defendants also argued that Flores’ opinions are no more than “common sense.” But upon review of the cited potions of Flores’ testimony, it appeared that Flores’ use of “common sense” referred to “common sense” among industry professionals.

    Upon reviewing Flores’s report and testimony in its entirety, the Court is satisfied that his opinions are based on his relevant experience, including experience conducting massage business inspections, rather than on the common sense available to any lay person.

    Accordingly, the Court also found that Flores is qualified as an expert by his knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education in the field of massage business inspections.

    John Greene

    Unlike Powell and Flores, Plaintiff did not challenge the admissibility of Greene’s opinions under Rule 702.

    Defendants first disclosed Greene during fact discovery on August 19, 2025, as the person who would conduct a psychiatric independent medical examination (“IME”) on Plaintiff. Plaintiff argued that Greene’s opinion must be excluded because Greene is not a “rebuttal” expert, but rather an initial expert, and he should have been disclosed as such prior to the deadline for initial expert disclosure on September 22, 2025.

    The Court agreed with Plaintiff that the timing of the IME and Greene’s report was unusual. However, Plaintiff has not provided any authority prohibiting the use of prior findings to rebut the opinion of an initial expert during trial. So long as Greene’s testimony only uses his IME findings to narrowly contradict or rebut the initial expert’s opinions on the same subject matter, the Court sees no reason for exclusion.

    Held

    • The Court denied the Defendants’ motion to exclude the testimony of Antonio Flores and Leonard Powell.
    • The Court also denied the Plaintiff’s motion to exclude the testimony of John Greene.

    Key Takeaway

    So long as the witness “explains how that experience leads to the conclusion reached, why that experience is a sufficient basis for the opinion, and how that experience is reliably applied to the facts,” than the witness may rely “solely or primarily on experience.”

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Dai Trang Thi Nguyen V. City of San Jose
    Docket Number: 5:21cv92
    Court Name: United States District Court, California Northern
    Order Date: January 22, 2026
  • Law Enforcement Expert Allowed to Opine on Penological Practices

    Law Enforcement Expert Allowed to Opine on Penological Practices

    This case arises out of excessive force and retaliation that Plaintiff allegedly
    suffered while incarcerated at Dixon Correctional Institute.

    Plaintiff requested the Court to exclude the testimony of Kerry Najolia, Defendants’ expert on “police practice, procedure, training, officer survival/defensive tactics, officer use of force and police canines.”

    Law Enforcement Expert Witness

    Kerry J. Najolia has 42 years of law enforcement experience, including patrol work, investigations, SWAT, and law enforcement consulting. His academic instructional background spans the last 28 years, including roles as POST Academy Staff Instructor, Assistant Training Director, and Training Director for the Jefferson Parish Sheriffs Office Training Academy.

    Want to know more about the challenges Kerry Najolia has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    A. Whether Najolia is Qualified

    First, Plaintiff argued that Najolia has no expertise in penological practices and procedures because he has never worked in a prison setting.

    The Court found Najolia to be unquestionably a qualified expert in the area of law enforcement, training and use-of-force. Although Najolia’s experience in prison settings, or lack thereof, is a topic that Plaintiff may explore on cross-examination, it did not form a basis for the wholesale exclusion of Najolia’s testimony.

    B. Whether Najolia’s Testimony Will Assist the Trier of Fact

    Second, Plaintiff argued that Najolia’s expert report did what the jury alone is allowed to do: weigh evidence and make credibility determinations. Plaintiff contended that there is no role for an expert such as Najolia in this case, which asks the jury to believe certain facts and disbelieve or ignore others.

    Defendants argued that the purpose of Najolia’s testimony is to provide the jury with guidelines of customary and proper procedures by which to judge the Defendants’ actions for reasonableness.

    According to the Court, Najolia may testify generally about the appropriate use of force in the prison setting. Once the facts necessary for Najolia to render an opinion are in evidence, he may assume those facts as a hypothetical and give opinion testimony based on the assumption of those facts. Najolia may not, without more, offer the following opinions, which simply accept Defendants’ version of events and reject Plaintiffs version of events.

    C. Whether Najolia May Offer Legal Conclusions

    Third, Plaintiff argued that the question of whether Defendant was justified in his use of force “imposed legal questions that Najolia cannot testify to without invading the province of both the jury and the Court.”

    In accord with other courts that have considered this issue, the Court found that Najolia may not opine on the ultimate issue of whether Montgomery’s actions were “reasonable” under the applicable legal standard.

    D. Whether Najolia May Rely on Medical Summary

    Finally, Plaintiff argued that Najolia improperly relied on a medical summary in forming his opinions, which constituted hearsay.

    Najolia’s reliance on a medical summary did not support exclusion of Najolia’s opinion at this time. Instead, once the facts necessary for Najolia to render an opinion are in evidence, he may assume those facts as a hypothetical and give opinion testimony based on the assumption of those facts.

    Held

    The Court granted in part and denied in part Plaintiffs’ motion in limine to exclude the testimony of Kerry Najolia.

    Key Takeaway

    Whether the officers’ actions were reasonable or they used excessive force is an ultimate question for the jury to decide after they have heard the evidence and this Court has instructed them on the law at the conclusion of the case. Testimony that tells the jury what conclusion to reach or merely states a legal conclusion is not helpful to the jury.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Dunams V. Montgomery
    Docket Number: 3:24cv838
    Court Name: United States District Court, Louisiana Middle
    Order Date: March 23, 2026
  • Law Enforcement Expert Not Allowed to Opine on Excessive Force

    Law Enforcement Expert Not Allowed to Opine on Excessive Force

    Following a traffic stop, Plaintiff Emily Sizemore was arrested and tased several times by a City of Montgomery police officer. Sizemore asserted claims for excessive force, assault and battery, and negligence against the arresting police officer Richard Dorman.

    Defendant Dorman filed a motion seeking to exclude Sizemore’s proposed expert witness, Nathaniel Allen.

    Law Enforcement Expert Witness

    Nathaniel Allen is a retired police chief with 36 years of law enforcement experience.

    Want to know more about the challenges Nathaniel Allen has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Allen sought to testify about whether Dorman used excessive force during his arrest of Sizemore. Whether the force that an officer used was excessive is a pure question of law. Accordingly, Allen’s opinion about whether Dorman used excessive force is not a matter subject to expert testimony.

    The Court provisionally denied Dorman’s motion in all other respects until it hears Allen’s proposed testimony outside the presence of the jury.

    Held

    The Court granted in part and denied in part Defendant Richard Dorman’s motion to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff Sizemore’s expert Nathaniel Allen.

    Key Takeaway

    In an excessive force case a qualified expert can testify about matters like the prevailing standards in the field of law enforcement, but not about whether an officer used excessive force.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Sizemore V. City of Montgomery
    Docket Number: 2:23cv198
    Court Name: United States District Court, Alabama Middle
    Order Date: March 27, 2026
  • Law Enforcement Expert Was Not Allowed to Opine on the Suspect’s Flight

    Law Enforcement Expert Was Not Allowed to Opine on the Suspect’s Flight

    Hakim Ledbetter was charged with: attempted possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine, 5 kilograms or more of cocaine, and 1,000 grams or more of PCP and aiding and abetting; possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime; and possession of a firearm by a felon.

    The Government intended to present at trial evidence of Ledbetter’s flight, and “argue that his flight establishes his consciousness of guilt.”

    Ledbetter thus sought to introduce Chuck Rylant‘s testimony “regarding psychological and physiological factors that affect human responses to threatening stimuli,” so that the jury could “understand alternative reasons for flight in situations of perceived threat.”

    The Government moved in limine to exclude Rylant’s testimony, or in the alternative, for a pretrial Daubert Hearing, arguing that his opinion is irrelevant and inadmissible.

    Law Enforcement Expert Witness

    Chuck J. Rylant is a former police officer who has investigated and reviewed crimes of violence—including fights, attacks, and homicides—committed with various weapons.

    He earned a doctorate in clinical psychology in addition to completing numerous master’s level classes in psychology.

    Want to know more about the challenges Chuck Rylant has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Qualifications

    Rylant is not qualified to testify as to Ledbetter’s psychology. Rylant received his “Psy.D.” degree from “California Southern University,” an exclusively online, unaccredited school. While Rylant purports to be an expert on the psychological and physiological limitations of what humans are capable of, the defense presented nothing to establish that Rylant is trained to evaluate the psychological basis for a suspect’s flight from the police. Most of Rylant’s teaching and lecturing occurred when he had earned only an MBA degree—well before he received his “Psy.D.” in 2020.

    Rylant’s curriculum vitae confirmed that his specialty is limited to police use of force decisions and self-defense. Moreover, Rylant purportedly could not recall in how many federal criminal cases he was qualified to testify as an expert. Although he initially said that his “understanding” was five cases, he then acknowledged it was three. In those cases, he opined only on the decision to use force. Finally, Rylant acknowledged that he had never before offered an expert opinion on the psychological reasons for a person’s flight from police.

    This case does not concern whether police use of force was reasonable, but whether Ledbetter’s flight from police showed consciousness of guilt. In other words, Rylant’s “specialized knowledge” otherwise has nothing to do with Ledbetter or this case. His work on police use of force aside, Rylant has authored two series of books: one titled “How to Be Rich,” and the other, a jiu-jitsu primer.

    Reliability

    According to the Court, Rylant’s “expert report”—which he drafted in an hour—was exceedingly general, including virtually no mention of the facts of this case. Indeed, Rylant testified that he had essentially cut and pasted his Ledbetter report from strikingly similar reports he had prepared for other cases having nothing to do with flight from the police.

    Rylant did not base his “expert” opinion respecting flight from police on reliable methodology. Indeed, Rylant never explained his methodology.

    He never spoke with Ledbetter or anyone else about why Ledbetter fled. He never visited the neighborhood where Ledbetter was arrested. Indeed, although he purported to be uncertain, he apparently has never visited Philadelphia. Rylant offered no studies that he or anyone else conducted about flight from police.

    Fit – Rule 403

    It is apparent that the “fit” of Rylant’s opinion to Ledbetter is poor. He sought to opine that something (which he never clearly identified) other than consciousness of guilt could cause someone in Ledbetter’s circumstances to flee in the manner Ledbetter did. Yet, in forming this opinion, Rylant was ignorant of circumstances that could well have caused Ledbetter to flee from the police. On October 15, 2024, Ledbetter:

    • was in violation of his parole because he had left the state of Georgia
    • effectively possessed three loaded handguns;
    • as a parolee, and a convicted felon, was prohibited from possessing any weapons;
    • was driving a truck containing drugs valued at over $1 million;
    • had previously fled from police when they executed a warrant;
    • had previously been convicted of federal drug charges; and
    • had previously shot someone and been convicted of aggravated assault.

    Rylant then reluctantly acknowledged that this new information could have provided reasons for why someone in Ledbetter’s circumstances would run from police. The potential for prejudice and jury confusion arising from the Government’s “other reasons for flight evidence”—with its attendant cautionary instructions—would plainly outweigh the probative value of Rylant’s unreliable opinion, which he was not qualified to give.

    Rule 704

    Rule 704(b) still prohibits an expert from opining about the “possible” mental state of a Defendant. Accordingly, the Court determined that the defense’s attempt to end-run Rule 704(b) was impermissible.

    Held

    The Court ruled that because Chuck Rylant’s proffered opinion did not pass muster under Rules 702, 704, and 403, he could not testify at trial.

    Key Takeaway

    Although proffered to opine on Hakim Ledbetter’s psychology, Rylant is not and has never been a psychologist. His “Psy.D.” was conferred in 2020 by an unaccredited, exclusively online institution. He appears never to have testified, written, or lectured on the issue he was called to address: the psychology of a suspect fleeing from police. The three federal cases in which he purportedly testified bear no resemblance to Ledbetter. Rylant’s methodology is unknown.

    Although he purported to base his opinion only on generalities, he “revised” that basis and impermissibly strayed into his belief that Defendant lacked mens rea in fleeing from police. Admitting Rylant’s opinion would thus likely open the door to other explanations highly damaging to Ledbetter—about why he fled, as well as cautionary instructions, which would certainly confuse the jury.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: United States V. Ledbetter
    Docket Number: 2:24cr423
    Court Name: United States District Court, Pennsylvania Eastern
    Order Date: April 02, 2026
  • Law Enforcement Expert Not Allowed to Opine on Tattoo Appearance Policy Standards

    Law Enforcement Expert Not Allowed to Opine on Tattoo Appearance Policy Standards

    Benjamin Torres is a Captain with the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department. He claimed that he was retaliated against by the Department for having a station tattoo. Specifically, he alleged that he had been passed over for promotion because of a Department “policy” that prevents individuals with station tattoos from being promoted to Commander.

    Defendants sought to exclude Plaintiff’s expert, David Reynoso, on the basis that he is unqualified to testify on First Amendment issues and Department policies, which are the subjects of the opinions disclosed in his Rule 26(a)(2)(B) report.

    Law Enforcement Expert Witness

    David R. Reynoso has more than 35 years of policing experience (beginning in 1990), including experience in gang and gang subculture investigations since 1992, with an “awareness and understanding” of tattoos in subcultures.

    Want to know more about the challenges David Reynoso has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Reynoso disclosed seven topics he plans to opine on in his Rule 26(a)(2)(B) report. Opinions one, two, three, four, and five in his report deal with First Amendment issues and other issues of law.

    Plaintiff has not proven that Reynoso is qualified to testify on such matters, as required by FRE 702. It is unclear how Reynoso is qualified to speak on such constitutional issues. Reynoso is not a lawyer, nor did his resume or report list experience related to First Amendment issues.

    Furthermore, at Reynoso’s deposition, Reynoso failed to identify any relevant First Amendment experience. Because Reynoso has not identified any knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education that would qualify him to speak on such First Amendment and constitutional issues, the Court deemed him unqualified to speak on opinions one, two, three, four, five, and six.

    Regarding opinion seven, which is Reynoso’s opinion that Plaintiff possesses the necessary qualifications to be promoted to Commander, the Court finds him unqualified to testify as to that opinion as well. Reynoso never worked for the Department and has not been involved with the Department’s policies and procedures.

    Plaintiff argued that Reynoso should instead be allowed to testify on topics such as tattoo appearance policy standards in policing, the operational reality of “policy” vs “practice,” promotion process norms, and law-enforcement subculture context. Yet, these opinions were not disclosed in Reynoso’s Rule 26(a) Report. Although Rule 37(c)(1) allows the party bearing the sanctions to use information not properly disclosed if the party’s failure was substantially justified or harmless, Plaintiff made no attempt to justify why Reynoso’s additional opinions are substantially justified or harmless. As a result, the Court prohibited Reynoso from testifying on these opinions at trial.

    Held

    The Court granted the Defendants’ motion to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff’s expert David Reynoso.

    Key Takeaway

    It is unclear to the Court how Reynoso could competently opine on necessary qualifications for promotion in the Department since he has no experience related to the Department’s promotion procedures nor has he worked in the Department.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Benjamin Torres V. County Of Los Angeles
    Docket Number: 2:25cv4155
    Court Name: United States District Court, California Central
    Order Date: February 03, 2026