Expert Witness Profiler

Tag: methodology

  • Environmental Engineering Experts’ Source-Identification Conclusion Excluded

    Environmental Engineering Experts’ Source-Identification Conclusion Excluded

    In this water contamination case, Defendants Dow Chemical Company and Vibrantz Corporation (collectively, “Defendants”) challenge the proof which Plaintiff Suffolk County Water Authority (“Suffolk”) proffers through its expert witnesses that dioxane-stabilized TCA is the source of the contaminant 1,4-dioxane in what it calls the TCA Claim Wells.

    Defendants did so through the opinions of their own expert witnesses John A. Connor and David T. Adamson. Suffolk did not challenge the bulk of the Connor/Adamson opinions, which are rebuttals to Suffolk’s experts. Rather, Suffolk filed a motion to exclude one subset of those opinions, namely, those opinions which affirmatively assert well-by-well conclusions as to source identification of the 1,4-dioxane in the wells.

    Environmental Engineering Expert Witnesses

    John A. Connor has over forty years of experience in environmental engineering, including specialization in “environmental site investigation, human health and ecological risk assessment, corrective action design, water resource development and remediation, and design and permitting of treatment facilities.” 

    He received an M.S. in Civil Engineering from Stanford University and is a registered Professional Engineer, a licensed Professional Geoscientist, and a Diplomate in the American Academy of Environmental Engineering.

    Want to know more about the challenges John Connor has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    David T. Adamson received his Ph.D. in Civil and Environmental Engineering from the University of Iowa and has over twenty-two years of research and environmental consulting experience. He has conducted research and authored technical articles on a wide range of topics related to subsurface contamination, including serving as Principal or co-Principal Investigator on research projects sponsored by the U.S. Department of Defense on topics such as 1,4-dioxane fate, transport, and treatment. Adamson has also consulted on a broad range of topics, including “chemical fate and transport, site investigation, remedy screening, risk assessment, remedial design, drinking water distribution, and litigation matters.”

    Get the full story on challenges to David Adamson’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Discussion by the Court

    II. The Connor/Adamson Report

    Connor and Adamson opined that TCA is the source of the 1,4-dioxane in only a small fraction of the TCA Claim Wells. Rather, they asserted, that the predominant source is septic system and wastewater releases. This conclusion appears in Section 3.3 of their Report, which consisted of pages 70-76 out of 160 pages, plus a mass of appended charts. Connor and Adamson opined that they identified ten relevant “lines of evidence” and that they used a “weight-of-evidence” methodology to assess the likely source of 1,4-dioxane in each of the TCA Claim Wells.

    The lines of evidence include, for example, TCA detections in each well, and land use within the capture zone. Section 3.3 contains an explanation of the lines of evidence as well as the experts’ ultimate conclusions that the weight of the evidence is consistent with a septic system and wastewater source of 1,4-dioxane in the vast majority of well fields containing TCA Claim Wells.

    Upon review of the Connor/Adamson Report and the appended charts, the Court found that there was in fact no well-by-well analysis in the report or in the charts.

    In the Report, Connor and Adamson did not assign numeric weight to the various lines of evidence or follow a decision tree to reach an ultimate conclusion.

    Analysis

    Defendants acknowledged that Section 3.3 contains only (1) a discussion of the ten lines of evidence and (2) Connor and Adamson’s ultimate conclusions as to the likely source of 1,4-dioxane in each of the TCA Claim Wells.

    Indeed, review of these appendices reveals a complete absence of analysis as to how the experts reached those final conclusions. Put another way, it is impossible to glean what the experts’ thought processes were in considering the cumulative effect of the thousands of data points that make up the purported “full form” well-by-well analysis.

    The Court rejected Defendants’ argument that the detailed narratives through which the experts intended to present their testimony, which they estimate could take up to three hours per well, can be discerned merely by looking at the charts. On the contrary, it is clear that Defendants intended to use the trial testimony to supply the missing explanations as to how each line of evidence factored into the ultimate conclusion as to each well.

    Indeed, if the charts themselves were a sufficient basis for understanding the experts’ reasoning in reaching their ultimate source identification conclusions, as the Defendants contended, then—after the experts’ general testimony applicable to all wells—the Defendants would need only to present the charts to the jury. 

    There is no way for the Court to evaluate whether the methods the experts used or the judgment they applied was reliable or not. As an example of why this is important, consider the undisputed fact that, with respect to some wells, the experts’ lines of evidence point to inconsistent or conflicting results as to the source of the 1,4 dioxane. Nowhere did the experts provide any analysis of how they resolved—or can resolve—such inconsistencies or conflicts. Rather, it is clear that their application of judgment is separate for each well, yet no effort has been made in the Report to set forth how those individual judgments were made.

    Finally, Defendants’ suggestion that they can have their experts describe in narrative form how they reached their source identification conclusions well-by-well for the first time at the trial, without having provided their analyses pre-trial, violated fundamental principles of pre-trial expert discovery.

    Held

    The Court granted Suffolk’s motion to exclude John Connor and David Adamson’s well-by-well assessment of dioxane sources.

    Key Takeaway

    The question is not simply whether Connor and Adamson may consider various lines of evidence together in reaching a conclusion. Rather, as explained above, the problem is that their Report does not present any analysis of how the various lines of evidence led them to their ultimate conclusions. In these circumstances, the Court is unable to determine the reasoned bases for Connor and Adamson’s analysis and whether it is truly reliable “at every step.”

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Suffolk County Water Authority V. The Dow Chemical Company
    Docket Number: 2:17cv6980
    Court Name: United States District Court, New York Eastern
    Order Date: March 23, 2026
  • Fire Investigation Expert’s Specific Ignition-Source Opinion Excluded

    Fire Investigation Expert’s Specific Ignition-Source Opinion Excluded

    This subrogation action arises from a fire that occurred on April 10, 2022, involving a dump truck owned by Boggs Transport, Inc. (“Boggs”) and insured by Plaintiff Amerisure Insurance Company (“Amerisure”).

    The fire began in a parked dump truck identified as Truck No. 863 at Boggs’s facility in Pageland, South Carolina, and spread to four adjacent trucks, resulting in damage to five vehicles. At the time of the fire, Truck No. 863 had been upfitted with a tarping system manufactured and installed by Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff Ox Bodies, Inc. (“Ox Bodies”). Amerisure, as subrogee of Boggs, initiated this action asserting claims against Ox Bodies arising from the alleged origin and cause of the fire. Ox Bodies denied liability and disputed both the location of the fire’s origin and the mechanism by which the fire ignited.

    In support of its claims, Amerisure designated two expert witnesses. Kenny A. McClure, P.E., M.S.M.E., CFEI, is offered as an expert in fire origin. McClure opined that the fire originated along the driver’s side of Truck No. 863, in the area of the battery compartment and associated electrical components mounted along the frame rail. Kevin R. Davis, P.E., is offered as an expert in fire causation. Davis opined that the fire was caused by an electrical failure associated with components of the tarping system, including a relay or controller installed as part of the Ox Bodies upfit.

    Ox Bodies filed a motion to exclude the testimony of both of Amerisure’s experts pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 702.

    Fire Investigation Expert Witnesses

    Kenny A. McClure, P.E., M.S.M.E., CFEI holds an Associate of Applied Science in mechanical engineering technology, a Bachelor of Science in engineering technology, a Master of Science in mechanical engineering, and designations as a licensed professional engineer, a certified fire explosion investigator, a certified fire vehicle investigator, and a certified fire and explosion investigator.

    Get the full story on challenges to Kenny McClure’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Kevin Ray Davis, P.E. holds a Bachelor of Science in Electrical Engineering, is a licensed professional engineer, and maintains professional certifications in fire and explosion investigation and vehicle fire investigation. He has also worked for more than fifteen years as a consulting engineer investigating fires and electrical failures.

    Want to know more about the challenges Kevin Davis has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    A. Kenny McClure

    1. Reliability of the Origin Opinion

    Defendant primarily argued that McClure’s testimony is unreliable because his defined origin area is allegedly inconsistent with Defendant’s expert’s electrical arcing theory.

    Defendant framed the issue as a logical dilemma: if McClure’s origin area excluded the arcing location identified by Defendant’s expert, then McClure allegedly failed to consider an obvious alternative ignition source. Conversely, Defendant argued that if McClure’s origin area included that location, the opinion is unnecessary because both parties’ experts would be describing the same origin area. The Court did not find this argument persuasive because it conflates the geographic scope of an origin determination with the identification of a specific ignition source.

    To begin with, McClure is offered as an origin expert, not a causation expert. His opinions concerned the location of the fire’s origin within Truck No. 863, not the specific mechanism of ignition. That distinction frames the Court’s Rule 702 analysis.

    Fire investigators commonly identify an area of origin rather than a single ignition point when the available physical evidence does not permit greater precision. McClure applied this methodology here, concluding that the fire originated “along the driver’s side of Truck 863 in the area where the battery compartment, conductors, and electrical components are mounted along the frame rail.” That conclusion was based on his examination of burn patterns, fire dynamics, and electrical artifacts observed during the investigation. The record reflected that McClure employed the systematic fire-investigation methodology described in NFPA 921. Ox Bodies did not challenge the reliability of that methodology itself. Accordingly, the Court concluded that McClure’s origin analysis rests on a reliable investigative methodology consistent with Rule 702.

    2. Defendant’s Relay-Knowledge Argument

    Ox Bodies also argued that McClure’s opinion is speculative because he did not account for the post-fire location or condition of certain tarping-system relays.

    The Court concluded that this argument improperly conflates origin analysis with ignition-source or causation analysis.

    Under NFPA 921’s scientific method, investigators commonly determine the fire’s area of origin before identifying the specific ignition source. An investigator’s inability to determine the precise ignition mechanism does not invalidate the origin determination so long as the origin analysis is based on observed fire patterns, electrical artifacts, and other physical evidence.

    Here, McClure’s testimony concerns the area where the fire began, not the precise electrical component that initiated it. Defendant’s criticisms regarding relay locations, therefore, go to the weight of the testimony rather than its admissibility.

    3. Helpfulness to the Jury

    Ox Bodies also contended that McClure’s origin opinion is so broad that it amounts to common knowledge and is unhelpful to the jury. The Court disagreed. Although the identified origin area is not confined to a single component, the opinion rests on specialized interpretation of burn patterns, electrical artifacts, and fire dynamics beyond the experience of lay jurors. Interpreting burn patterns, electrical damage, arc mapping artifacts, and other indicators of fire progression requires specialized training and experience. Jurors lack the technical background to interpret such evidence reliably without expert assistance.

    Accordingly, the Court found that McClure’s origin opinions are grounded in accepted fire-investigation principles and satisfy Rule 702.

    Kevin Davis

    1. Reliability of Davis’ Methodology

    Ox Bodies first argued that Davis’ opinions violated accepted fire-investigation methodology because he did not determine ignition temperature, quantify the duration of any electrical fault, or conduct testing to replicate the proposed ignition mechanism.

    The Court agreed that portions of Davis’ analysis lack sufficient methodological support. Davis did not perform testing to confirm that the specific relay installed on Truck No. 863 could produce sufficient heat to ignite surrounding materials. Nor did he quantify the ignition temperature or duration necessary to produce ignition under the conditions present in the vehicle. Davis also relied in part on exemplar relay testing and recall information involving different relay configurations and applications.

    Here, the record does not contain sufficient evidence connecting the exemplar relay testing or recall materials to the specific relay installed in Truck No. 863. Without testing, analysis, or other evidence showing that the relay in question was capable of generating sufficient heat to ignite the surrounding materials under the conditions present in the truck, the Court concluded that the methodology supporting Davis’ specific ignition-source opinion is insufficient under Rule 702.

    2. Application of the Methodology to the Facts

    The Court nevertheless found that Davis’ testimony is not wholly inadmissible. Davis’s report also included engineering analysis concerning the truck’s electrical system, including the condition of the wiring harness, the lack of circuit protection in portions of the tarp-system wiring, and the potential for energized conductors to create ignition sources within the electrical system.

    These opinions are grounded in Davis’s inspection of the physical evidence and his application of electrical engineering principles to it. Such testimony may assist the jury in understanding the electrical mechanisms that could have produced a fire in the relevant portion of the vehicle.

    Accordingly, Davis may testify regarding electrical fire mechanisms, wiring damage, circuit protection, and the potential for energized conductors to act as ignition sources within the electrical system of Truck No. 863. However, Davis may not opine that a specific relay or tarping-system component installed on Truck No. 863 was the ignition source of the fire.

    This limited exclusion reflects the Court’s obligation under Rule 702 to ensure that expert testimony rests on a reliable foundation while permitting otherwise admissible technical testimony that may assist the trier of fact.

    To the extent Davis discussed the circuit breaker during his deposition testimony, the Court found that those statements elaborate on the electrical-fault theory disclosed in his report and are not a new expert opinion requiring exclusion under Rule 26.

    Held

    • The Court denied Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff Ox Bodies, Inc.’s motion to exclude the testimony of Kenny A. McClure, P.E., M.S.M.E., CFEI.
    • The Court granted in part and denied in part Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff Ox Bodies, Inc.’s motion to exclude the testimony of K.R. Davis, P.E. 

    Key Takeaway

    Even assuming McClure’s origin area overlaps with the location proposed by Defendant’s expert, the testimony remains relevant and helpful because McClure explains the fire patterns, burn damage, and electrical artifacts that confine the fire’s origin to a particular structural portion of the vehicle. Such analysis assists the jury in understanding the physical evidence and does not become inadmissible simply because the parties’ experts may partially overlap in their conclusions.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: American Insurance Company V. Ox Bodies, Inc
    Docket Number: 4:23cv2445
    Court Name: United States District Court, South Carolina
    Order Date: March 17, 2026
  • Marketing Expert Was Allowed to Opine on Trademark Dilution

    Marketing Expert Was Allowed to Opine on Trademark Dilution

    Plaintiffs Hyundai Motor Company and Hyundai Motor America, Inc. (collectively “Hyundai Motor” or “Plaintiffs”) are one of the largest automobile manufacturers worldwide, with vehicle sales in over 150 countries.

    Defendant Hyundai Technology is a manufacturer and seller of consumer electronics products including tablets, laptop computers/notebooks, desktop computers, monitors, digital storage, cell phones, and accessories.

    The Plaintiffs filed a trademark infringement suit against the Defendants for “using” the Hyundai name to sell their technology products.

    Defendants offered Mark Keegan‘s testimony to refute Plaintiffs’ allegations that Defendants’ conduct dilutes Plaintiffs’ HYUNDAI Mark. Plaintiffs filed a motion in limine to exclude the testimony of Keegan.

    Marketing Expert Witness

    Mark Thomas Keegan has over 23 years of experience conducting consumer research, including being deposed and testifying at trial. Keegan earned his juris doctorate degree from Brooklyn Law School, has certifications in marketing knowledge and principles, and has completed post-graduate programs addressing market research processes.

    Want to know more about the challenges Mark Keegan has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Keegan concluded that Plaintiffs’ allegations of dilution by tarnishment with respect to Defendant Hyundai Technology’s product user reviews do not “materially impact relevant consumer perceptions of Hyundai Motor, and as such, do not substantively impact the marketplace in which Hyundai Motor operates.” Keegan’s opinion relied on a study he conducted involving 850 participants identified as “likely purchasers of the Defendants’ products” based on their prior technology purchases.

    Keegan stated that he designed his survey in accordance with a combination of guiding principles, including survey research conducted for litigation purposes, relevant treatises in the field, including those from the American Bar Association, and industry leaders in market research.

    Plaintiffs argued that Keegan’s survey failed to employ well-established or reliable methodologies and did not rely on a representative sample because, among other things, 41.8% of respondents were age 61 or older.

    The Court, however, found that Keegan’s opinions are relevant as they address “consumer impressions of the Hyundai Motor brand,” which is a central issue to the underlying case. The arguments made by Plaintiffs are all issues to be decided by the jury based on credibility and weight.

    Held

    The Court denied Plaintiffs’ motion in limine to exclude the testimony of Mark Keegan.

    Key Takeaway

    Expert opinion testimony is relevant if the knowledge underlying it has a valid connection to the pertinent inquiry. And it is reliable if the knowledge underlying it has a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of the relevant discipline.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Hyundai Motor Company V. Hyundai Technology Group, Inc.
    Docket Number: 8:23cv1709
    Court Name: United States District Court, California Central
    Order Date: March 06, 2026
  • Statistics Expert Allowed to Opine on PFAS Exposure

    Statistics Expert Allowed to Opine on PFAS Exposure

    This case arises out of the contamination of surface waters and drinking water in Chattooga County, Georgia, with per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances known as “PFAS.”

    In essence, Plaintiff Earl Parris, Jr., alleged that the Defendants have contaminated his city’s water supply and thus his household water with PFAS. Parris is a resident of Summerville, Georgia, who receives running, potable water to his home from the Summerville Public Works and Utilities Department.

    The City of Summerville—which has intervened in this case—used Raccoon Creek, a tributary of the Chattooga River, as the main source of its municipal water supply. The Defendants are the following companies, which allegedly manufactured and supplied the PFAS discharged into Raccoon Creek: 3M Company (“3M”), Daikin America, Inc., E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company, and The Chemours Company. Parris alleged that Raccoon Creek and—consequently, his household water—have been contaminated with PFAS by the Defendants. PFAS can allegedly cause adverse health effects such as kidney and testicular cancer.

    Parris and Summerville have jointly moved to exclude the testimony of defense expert Laurentius Marais under Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 403.

    Statistics Expert Witness

    Marthinus Laurentius Marais is a consultant specializing in applied mathematical and statistical analysis. He holds graduate degrees in mathematics, statistics and business administration from Stanford University. At the Stanford Graduate School of Business he received a PhD degree for a dissertation on applications of computer-intensive statistical methods to quantitative analyses of topics in business. He has served on the faculties of the University of Chicago and Stanford University.

    Discover more cases with Laurentius Marais as an expert witness by ordering his comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Marais’ expert report examined kidney and testicular cancer rates in counties with and without high PFAS levels in the water supply, including in Chattooga County, and concluded that there is “no statistically detectable, empirically significant indication of an association” between those cancer rates and PFAS exposure.

    A. Relevance

    The Plaintiffs contended that Marais’ conclusions regarding the lack of association between PFAS and cancer are irrelevant because this lawsuit is based on the city’s drinking water being out of compliance with the EPA’s PFAS limits, not based on personal injury damages from health costs.

    However, the Court agreed with the Defendants that Marais’ opinions are relevant.

    First, the Plaintiffs conceded that evidence regarding whether PFAS “can” cause cancer is relevant to this litigation, and Marais’s opinions may help a jury answer this question. Marais’ opinions compare cancer and PFAS statistics across counties in the United States, not just in Chattooga County.
    The Court is not persuaded by the Plaintiffs’ distinction between “general causation” evidence and “specific causation” evidence. That Marais’ opinions on PFAS and cancer included data from Chattooga County, where Summerville residents reside, is not grounds for excluding the opinions altogether.

    Second, the Plaintiffs’ extensive allegations of PFAS’ health risks are material to the relevance question. The Plaintiffs explicitly relied on such allegations in their claims for negligence (Counts V, VII), wanton conduct and punitive damages (Count VIII), and public nuisance (Count IX). Evidence that health risk never materialized is therefore relevant to the Defendants’ liability on those claims. For example, weighing testimony about the nonexistent association between PFAS and cancer in the Plaintiffs’ geographic area may help a jury evaluate whether the Defendants were negligent for manufacturing or failing to warn about PFAS in the first place.

    B. Reliability

    The Plaintiffs took issue with four aspects of Marais’ testimony: (1) it misinterpreted the underlying data, which Plaintiffs argue shows above-average testicular cancer rates despite below-average rates for all other types of cancer; (2) it compared county-level cancer data with city-level PFAS exposure data, which weakens the PFAS–cancer association in the case of Summerville because Chattooga County receives only about 20% of its drinking water from Summerville; (3) it is underinclusive because it did not account for latency effects, such as when a Summerville resident moves to a different county and develops cancer decades later; and (4) it is underinclusive because it did not include data from neighboring states where Summerville residents may have sought cancer treatment (e.g., at a Tennessee cancer center less than one hour’s drive away).

    Analysis

    The Court held that the methodology underlying Marais’ testimony was reliable. To begin with, any issues with the content of Marais’ conclusions in interpreting his own data are improper considerations at the admissibility stage. The focus of the reliability inquiry is on the expert’s “principles and methodology,” rather than his or her ultimate conclusions.

    Second, the county-city mismatch argument that the Plaintiffs identify is better suited for cross-examination than an admissibility challenge. The datasets on which Marais relies are produced by reputable organizations. The cancer data is produced at a county level from the National Center Institute, National Institute of Health, and Centers for Disease Control, and the PFAS data is produced at the public water district level by the EPA.

    Lastly, regarding the possibility that Marais’ dataset is underinclusive due to latency and residency problems, this argument too is more appropriate for cross-examination. Other than attempting to identify hypotheticals, the Plaintiffs have not pointed to any evidence that suggests Marais’ datasets depart from standard industry practice.

    For these reasons, the Court declined to exclude Marais’ testimony as unreliable. Marais has shown his methodology is sufficiently sound and that it is “properly grounded, well-reasoned, and not speculative.”

    C. Prejudice

    The Plaintiffs contended that Marais’ testimony will confuse the jury because it would question “(1) where his testimony fits into the City’s case, and (2) why the City has not offered any rebuttal evidence.”

    Any jury would understand the importance of introducing evidence on the health consequences of an alleged pollutant in a water pollution case, and the lack of rebuttal evidence is plainly not grounds for exclusion under Rule 403.

    Held

    The Court denied Plaintiff Earl Parris, Jr., and Intervenor-Plaintiff City of Summerville’s motion to exclude the testimony of Laurentius Marais. 

    Key Takeaway

    Datasets may be imperfect at times, but that is not grounds to render an entire analysis unreliable. The purpose of Daubert is to ensure that an expert “employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.”

    Please refer to the blogs previously published about this case:

    Polymers Expert Allowed to Opine on PFOS Sources

    Geology Expert’s Testimony on Potential Alternative Sources Admitted

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Parris V. 3M Company
    Docket Number: 4:21cv40
    Court Name: United States District Court, Georgia Northern
    Order Date: March 13, 2026
  • Geology Expert’s Testimony on Potential Alternative Sources Admitted

    Geology Expert’s Testimony on Potential Alternative Sources Admitted

    This case arises out of the contamination of surface waters and drinking water in Chattooga County, Georgia, with per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances known as “PFAS.”

    In essence, Plaintiff Earl Parris, Jr., alleged that the Defendants have contaminated his city’s water supply and thus his household water with PFAS. Parris is a resident of Summerville, Georgia, who receives running, potable water to his home from the Summerville Public Works and Utilities Department.

    The City of Summerville—which has intervened in this case—used Raccoon Creek, a tributary of the Chattooga River, as the main source of its municipal water supply. The Defendants are the following companies, which allegedly manufactured and supplied the PFAS discharged into Raccoon Creek: 3M Company (“3M”), Daikin America, Inc., E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company, and The Chemours Company. Parris alleged that Raccoon Creek and—consequently, his household water—have been contaminated with PFAS by the Defendants. The Plaintiffs jointly filed a motion to exclude the testimony of 3M’s expert witness Andy Davis.

    Geology Expert Witness

    Andrew Owen Davis is a hydrogeologist who holds a Ph.D. in geology and has been involved in investigating a wide range of environmentally contaminated sites for over 40 years.

    Want to know more about the challenges Andy Davis has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Davis concluded that no more than 0.2% of total PFAS load (or 2.9% of perfluorooctane sulfonate (PFOS) load) in the Raccoon Creek watershed originated from 3M’s products.

    This data is extrapolated from sampling data collected downstream of a farm where biosolids traceable to 3M were applied. Using data on the amount of biosolids applied and farm acreage, he calculated that 3M products could contribute approximately 0.052 mg/ton/day of PFOS. He then determined that biosolids traceable to 3M were deposited on two farms in the Raccoon Creek watershed, multiplied the total tons of biosolids applied to those farms by 0.052 mg/ton/day (with some adjustments), and concluded that 3M contributed “at most” 148 mg/day of 5,1000 mg/day (or 2.9%) of PFOS that made its way to Summerville’s water treatment plant.

    Factoring other types of PFAS, Davis found that 3M contributed 0.2% of total PFAS load. To account for the remaining PFAS concentration, Davis pointed to other potential sources of PFAS using existing PFAS literature and additional sampling data. According to Davis, these potential sources include the application of biosolids to farmland post-2000, poultry farms, cotton farms, septic systems, a fish hatchery, lumbar operations, fire retardant from a mill fire, and the household use of certain commercial products.

    Davis’ opinions regarding other ‘potential sources’ of PFAS in Raccoon Creek are speculative and unsupported by data

    Plaintiffs argued that Davis’ methodology amounts to speculation because (a) he relied on studies identifying PFAS in certain products but failed to verify whether those products were actually used in the Raccoon Creek watershed and (b) his sampling data does not adequately support ruling out 3M products as PFAS sources.

    The Plaintiffs advanced a variety of explanations for why Davis failed to prove that some of the potential alternative sources were at work or why they could not account for PFAS concentrations in the Raccoon Creek watershed. But these arguments spoke to the weight rather than admissibility of the evidence.

    For example, with regard to poultry farms, Davis found that several poultry farms in the Raccoon Creek watershed may contribute to PFAS levels because (1) there are several poultry farms in the area, (2) sampling data downstream of one of the farms revealed PFAS concentrations that did not contain the electrochemical fluorination signature of 3M’s products, and (3) studies have found PFAS in “[p]oultry farm bedding materials (litter)” made from recyclable materials and manure. The Plaintiffs did not challenge the sampling data results or the reputability of the studies.

    Instead, they argued that the sampling data and studies are not conclusive, as the PFAS concentrations may be caused by 3M-polluted water purchased by the farms from Summerville and the farms may not even use PFAS-based litter or manure.

    Here, the Court held that Davis’ methodology is adequately reliable for admissibility purposes. First, Davis’ report is not based on bare speculation regarding the potential non-3M PFAS sources. Davis takes his analysis one step further in identifying potential other sources of PFAS, but he is careful throughout his report to refer to these other sources as “potential” sources based on the available PFAS literature and his sampling data.

    Davis did not cherry-pick or conduct impermissible “results-based reasoning”

    The Plaintiffs took issue with Davis’ decision to base his calculation of the 3M-attributable PFOS load on only two farms where biosolids were applied, citing 3M’s and EPA’s supposed statements to the contrary.

    While the Plaintiffs may disagree with Davis’s decision to limit his 3M PFAS calculations to only two farms and may believe it contradicts 3M’s and the EPA’s statements, the Court found that Davis has provided a sufficient basis for his methodological choice.

    According to Davis, he limited his 3M PFAS calculations to two farms because he determined that those farms were the only two where biosolids were applied prior to 2001.

    Regarding cherry-picking certain reports, the Court agreed with the Defendants that Davis is free to rely on facts presented in published reports as well as his own experience and knowledge in forming his opinions where he does not agree with other facts presented in those reports.

    Held

    The Court denied the Plaintiffs’ motion to exclude the testimony of Andy Davis.

    Key Takeaway

    An expert report is not automatically unreliable merely because it agrees with some aspects of an existing report and not others. Therefore, Davis has shown his methodology is sufficiently sound and that it is “properly grounded, well-reasoned, and not speculative.”

    Please refer to the blog previously published about this case:

    Polymers Expert Allowed to Opine on PFOS Sources

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Parris V. 3M Company
    Docket Number: 4:21cv40
    Court Name: United States District Court, Georgia Northern
    Order Date: March 16, 2026
  • Survey Research Expert Was Allowed to Opine on Customer Experience

    Survey Research Expert Was Allowed to Opine on Customer Experience

    State of Connecticut and Federal Trade Commission, sued Chase Nissan LLC, d/b/a Manchester City Nissan (“MCN) and multiple individuals, alleging that MCN, along with others, acted together to defraud thousands of consumers. The Plaintiffs alleged that the Defendants charged consumers for additional products or services (“addons”) that consumers never agreed to purchase. The Plaintiffs claimed that the Defendants effected unauthorized charges in multiple ways, including add-ons inserted into unaware consumers’ closing documents or charging consumers for add-ons that MCN told consumers were free.

    Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Jessica Broome, conducted a customer experience survey about add-on products or services offered at MCN (the “Broome Survey”).

    The Defendants argued that the methodology Broome applied to her survey was significantly flawed, and therefore, the results and conclusions were insufficiently probative.

    Survey Research Expert Witness

    Dr. Jessica Broome received a PhD in Survey Methodology from the University of Michigan, an MS in Applied Social Research from Hunter College of the City University of New York, and a BA in Sociology from Connecticut College. She has worked as a primary researcher for the past 24 years, designing and conducting quantitative (survey) and qualitative (focus groups, ethnographies, interviews) research for clients in a range of sectors.

    Get the full story on challenges to Jessica Broome’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Discussion by the Court

    Specifically, the Defendants argued that (1) the Broome Survey included misleading questions; (2) the Survey disclosed the FTC as the sponsor and the purpose of the survey; (3) that respondents were able to change their previous answers; and (4) that the population selected was underinclusive.

    A. Question A1 is Clear and Unambiguous

    Question A1 stated: “Did you agree to pay extra for any of the following add-on products or services when purchasing this vehicle?” Respondents were then presented with a list of eleven possible add-on products and services and, for each, asked to answer “Yes,” “No,” or “Not Sure.”

    Based upon the responses received to Question A1, Broome concluded that “Manchester City Nissan charged the vast majority of customers surveyed (88%) for at least one add-on that they did not agree to pay extra for or led customers to believe that the add-on was required rather than optional.”

    Broome further concluded, based upon respondents’ answers to Question A1, that “Manchester City charged a substantial percentage of customers surveyed (42%) for multiple add-ons that they did not agree to pay extra for or led customers to believe that the add-ons were required rather than optional.”

    The Defendants asserted that this is an ambiguous question and unclear about the very thing that the survey was trying to measure: whether consumers paid for an add-on product or service without agreeing to do so.

    When an unclear question is included in a survey, it may threaten the validity of the survey by distorting the responses or by error if the respondents do not understand. However, there is no indication that the questions were misleading or that the respondents did not understand the question.

    As explained by Broome, her team conducted two rounds of cognitive interviews to check the understanding of the questions. After a pretest respondent completed each survey question online or over the phone, the interviewer posed a series of follow-up questions, called “probes”, aimed at determining whether the survey questions were understood by respondents as intended.

    Additionally, small ambiguities in surveys go to the weight of the survey as evidence, not to its admissibility.

    B. Disclosure of the FTC as Sponsor is Consistent with Reliable Survey Methodology

    Second, the Defendants argued that the survey disclosed the FTC as the sponsor and thus is unreliable. The Defendants asserted that all the individuals who made up Broome’s survey population knew that the FTC sought the information regarding car purchases. The Defendants claimed that identifying the FTC as a sponsor injects potential bias into the survey by suggesting certain preferred responses.

    Courts from across the country have repeatedly accepted as reliable consumer surveys that disclose the FTC as a sponsor where the surveyor has taken steps to hide the purpose of the survey. Broome asserted that she took steps to hide the purpose of the survey. The invitation included no references to litigation against MCN and stated that the purpose was to learn about general car purchases over the past five years.

    The survey did not focus on MCN but showed a randomized list of four local dealerships. Additionally, the FTC may bring litigation before a consumer survey is published.

    C. Backwards Navigation is Consistent with Reliable Survey Methodology

    Third, the Defendants argued that the backward navigation allowed consumers to change their answers and thus is unreliable. The
    Defendants claimed that later questions could suggest certain conclusions regarding whether the consumer agreed to pay extra for the add-ons. Because the consumers had the ability to navigate backwards on the survey, the responses potentially could be skewed.

    The defense, however, presented no evidence that the backward navigation is a design flaw. The defense retained a survey expert to prepare a rebuttal of Broome’s work, yet they did not use their expert’s opinion in their motion. Plaintiffs argued that Broome utilized standardized and approved methodology.

    The Court held that Broome’s work is consistent with reliable methodology. Further, issues raised by the Defendant would go to weight rather than admissibility.

    D. The Survey Population Selected is Consistent with Reliable Survey Methodology

    Fourth, the Defendants argued that the consumer population was underinclusive; thus, the survey is unreliable.

    The Defendants asserted that the target population was adults who purchased a vehicle from MCN between January 2019 and December 2023 and were charged for at least one add-on. The defense claimed that Broome pulled potential participants from lists provided to her by the FTC for all add-on transactions at MCN, and this population excludes all customers who purchased a vehicle and did not purchase an add-on. They asserted that this population, by design, intentionally excluded customers who, if included, would have greatly decreased Broome’s numbers.

    Broome’s survey was not intended to represent consumers who were not charged for add-ons so there is no reason to include such consumers in the target population. Even if Plaintiffs were to expand the target population as suggested the methodology would find similar results. The Defendants’ argument that Broome should have surveyed all consumers is, therefore, without basis.

    The Court held that Broome’s survey is designed with methodology consistent with the Reference Guide on Survey Research and legal precedent regarding FTC surveys. In other words, Broome’s technique used reliable survey methodology.

    Held

    The Court denied the Defendants’ motion to preclude the testimony of Jessica Broome.

    Key Takeaway

    Broome’s survey followed correct methodology and legal best
    practices. Sponsorship by a governmental third party may not automatically suggest a certain kind of preferred response. Moreover, courts have repeatedly accepted consumer surveys that disclose the FTC as the sponsor.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Federal Trade Commission V. Chase Nissan LLC
    Docket Number: 3:24cv12
    Court Name: United States District Court, Connecticut
    Order Date: March 16, 2026
  • Psychology Expert’s CPTSD Opinions Admitted

    Psychology Expert’s CPTSD Opinions Admitted

    Danesh Noshirvan, an online entertainer and journalist, filed a civil action against Jennifer Couture alleging conspiracy and agency liability, as well as claims for defamation, tortious interference, misappropriation of likeness, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

    Noshirvan alleged that Couture, Dr. Ralph Garramone, M.D. and OMG Realty, LLC , along with the other named Co-Defendants, conspired with a non-party, Joseph Camp (“Camp”) to tortiously interfere with Plaintiff’s business relationship with his former attorney, defame Plaintiff and intentionally inflict emotional distress upon Plaintiff.

    Garramone Plastic Surgery, Jennifer Couture, Ralph Garramone, and OMG Realty, LLC challenged the testimony of Robert M. Gordon, Ph.D., ABPP.

    Gordon diagnosed Noshirvan with Complex Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder “due to the cyberbullying and damage to his reputation by Joey Camp.” He further opined that Noshirvan would “need many years of intensive psychotherapy to help deal with his CPTSD.”

    Psychology Expert Witness 

    Robert M. Gordon, Ph.D., ABPP has practiced forensic psychology for nearly five decades (since 1976) in both civil and criminal arenas. He is board-certified in Clinical Psychology and in Psychoanalysis, and earned his
    doctorate from Temple University.

    He has authored over 100 publications in areas directly relevant to this case. For example, he co-published research on using the MMPI-2 to detect individuals “faking PTSD” after traumatic events.

    Gordon has taught forensic psychology at the Ph.D. level and given international workshops on psychological assessment and trauma.

    Discover more cases with Robert Gordon as an expert witness by ordering his comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

    Discussion by the Court

    A. Reliability of Methodology

    (1) Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder

    Defendants argued that Gordon’s use of the Clinician Administered PTSD Assessment Questionnaire for DSM-5 (“CAPS-5”) is unreliable.

    Specifically, Defendants pointed out that the DSM-5 requires “exposure to actual or threatened death, serious injury, or sexual violence” and the “presence of one or more of certain symptoms associated with the traumatic events, beginning after the traumatic events occurred.”

    Yet Gordon, according to Defendants, bases his diagnosis on the assertion of “cyberbullying and destruction of reputation.” Since Gordon, according to Defendants, failed to strictly adhere to the diagnostic criteria in the DSM-5, the Defendants contended that Gordon’s testimony must be unreliable.

    First, Defendants argued that Gordon lacked any evidence of exposure to actual or threatened death, serious injury, or sexual violence, because he conducted no independent investigation on Noshirvan’s allegations in the Second Amended Complaint and interview. Any quarrel with not independently verifying any of the allegations that Noshirvan presented to Gordon can be appropriately dealt with on cross-examination.

    Defendants next argued that Gordon failed to follow DSM-5 diagnostic criteria because he did not observe at least one month’s worth of PTSD symptoms before diagnosing a patient with PTSD and relied almost exclusively on Plaintiff’s self-reporting. While Defendants contended that the rationale for using these specific tests was not definitively explained, such concern can be considered through cross-examination and is not a reason to exclude Gordon’s testimony.

    Further, Defendants also pointed the Court to the Georgetown Guidelines for Forensic Assessment of PTSD. However, it too is not enough to show the methodology is unreliable since those guidelines were published before the DSM-5 and did not outline any specific examinations that must be given. Accordingly, the Defendants have not shown that Gordon’s methodology was unreliable as it relates to his diagnosis of PTSD.

    (2) Complex Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder

    Defendants also argued that Gordon’s failure to adhere to the diagnostic criteria of Complex Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“CPTSD”) in the ICD-11 as well as his diagnosis being made solely for the purpose of litigation rendered his methodology unreliable.

    Gordon relied on more than mere allegations presented by Plaintiff. Gordon utilized an array of psychological assessments to determine the presence and severity of the symptoms before making any diagnosis. To the extent Defendants disagreed with the diagnosis, they were free to challenge Gordon on cross-examination.

    Defendants next argued that Gordon failed to explain the results of the International Trauma Questionnaire (ITQ) or how he reached the diagnosis of CPTSD.

    However, Defendants failed to show how that the ITQ itself is unreliable, and though how Gordon exactly utilized the ITQ is unknown, it is clear that he still relied upon the underlying PTSD diagnosis in reaching his conclusion.

    Finally, Defendants argued that Gordon’s CPTSD diagnosis was made solely for purposes of this litigation. Defendants contended that while it is not dispositive, it further weighs against the reliability of Gordon’s testimony since Noshirvan only met with Gordon for about an hour via Zoom and was not re-examined in the future. While it is true Gordon only met with Noshirvan for about an hour, this argument went to the credibility of Gordon, not the reliability of his methodology.

    B. Helpfulness

    It is undisputed that Gordon utilized the CAPS-5, ITQ, Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale, Beck Depression Inventory-II, Beck Anxiety Inventory, and Miller Forensic Assessment of Symptoms Test. Although Defendants took issue with the conclusions reached by Gordon as well as the methods utilized, the conclusions went to a crucial issue in this case—whether Noshirvan suffered emotional distress.

    Further, Defendants acknowledged that the diagnostic criteria of PTSD and CPTSD is beyond the understanding of the average lay person. Defendants were able to cross-examine Gordon regarding why he utilized the specific tests in lieu of other examinations they contended are better suited for such diagnosis. These quarrels, however, are not sufficient to exclude the evidence.

    Ultimately, the Court found that Gordon satisfied all three prongs of Daubert, and the Court found that no undue prejudice from the anticipated testimony.

    Held

    • The Court denied as moot Defendant Garramone Plastic Surgery’s motion to exclude the testimony of Robert M. Gordon, Ph.D., ABPP.
    • Jennifer Couture, Ralph Garramone, and OMG Realty, LLC’s motion to exclude the testimony of Robert M. Gordon, Ph.D., ABPP was denied.
    • Garramone Plastic Surgery’s motion to exclude the testimony of Robert M. Gordon, Ph.D., ABPP was denied.
    • Patrick Trainor, Central Park of Southwest Florida, LLC, and Anti-Doxing League, Inc.’s motion to exclude the testimony of Robert M. Gordon, Ph.D., ABPP was denied.

    Key Takeaway

    Gordon satisfied all three prongs of Daubert because he utilized an array of psychological assessments to determine the presence and severity of the symptoms before making any diagnosis.

    Further, Defendants acknowledged that the diagnostic criteria of PTSD and CPTSD is beyond the understanding of the average lay person.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Noshirvan V. Couture
    Docket Number: 2:23cv1218
    Court Name: United States District Court, Florida Middle
    Order Date: March 13, 2026

  • Automotive Industry Expert’s Testimony on Pricing Practices Excluded

    Automotive Industry Expert’s Testimony on Pricing Practices Excluded

    The Plaintiffs in this putative national class action are insureds who filed “total loss” claims for the actual cash value (“ACV”) of their totaled vehicles under their automobile insurance policies sold by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company or State Farm Fire and Casualty Company (collectively, “Defendants” or “State Farm”). Plaintiffs challenged State Farm’s application of a “typical-negotiation adjustment” (“TNA”) in the calculation of the ACV of Plaintiffs’ vehicles, which reduced Plaintiffs’ total loss payments based on the average difference between the list price and a lower price that a dealer would theoretically accept.

    Alleging that this methodology resulted in undervalued payments, Plaintiffs brought various claims, including breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fraudulent concealment, fraudulent inducement, unjust enrichment, and violations of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (“ICFA”) and various other state consumer protection statutes.

    Defendants filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Kirk Felix, Plaintiffs’ expert on used car pricing trends.

    Automotive Industry Expert Witness

    Kirk Felix spent the first 13 years of his career managing the service and parts departments of Honda, Acura, and Toyota dealerships; from 1999 until his 2022 retirement, Felix served as a moderator and consultant at NCM Associates, Inc., where he facilitated meetings—called 20 Groups—for cohorts of non-competing dealerships to “discuss industry trends and best practices for operating efficient, profitable dealerships.”

    Over the course of those two decades, those discussions included over 300 dealerships across 45 states, including Chevrolet, Chrysler, Ford, Nissan, and Honda dealers, two fixed operations director groups, and an Independent Auto Auction group.

    Get the full story on challenges to Kirk Felix’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Discussion by the Court

    A. Felix’s Qualifications

    State Farm first argued that Felix is unqualified to “opine on the pricing and selling of used vehicles, including topics like dealerships’ pricing strategies, consumers’ negotiating behavior, and the Autosource methodology at issue in this case.”

    Felix has never sold a used car, and he admitted that he has never been involved in the used car business. Though Felix occasionally gave information about a car’s reconditioning costs to those individuals at dealerships in charge of used car pricing (during his work from 1986 to 1999), he has never been involved in pricing used vehicles for sale, nor has he managed those who do.

    Here, Felix’s experience comes from the conversations he facilitated at NCM. Yet Felix’s experience with NCM involved meetings only three times a year. Felix’s involvement included putting together the agenda for the meeting after consulting with the group’s executive committee, and then running the meetings alongside the chairman, but he did not take notes at the meetings. It is hard to square this experience with the scope of Plaintiffs’ proposed testimony, which seeks to authoritatively describe the process for pricing and selling used automobiles.

    Basically, Felix admitted to not knowing the number of car dealerships in any state, what percentage of used car dealerships in any state market themselves as no haggle dealerships, what percentage of dealerships in any state will negotiate on the price of a used car, or how many car dealerships have eliminated negotiation.

    Felix never conducted a survey of dealers regarding their pricing practices ahead of this litigation, though he says a survey probably happened during his time at NCM, even if he cannot recall when or what the results were.

    Upon a review of the full record, the Court agreed that Felix has not demonstrated the requisite qualifications.

    B. Reliability of Felix’s Testimony

    Here, Felix has freely admitted that his methodology for opining on the used car pricing and sales market consists of reflecting upon memories of his experiences with NCM.

    Yet NCM’s moderation topics were not even specific to used cars. Rather, the business model involved gathering approximately 20 dealers representing the same manufacturer (i.e. Toyota), compiling 5-7-page financial statements from each of them, and then consolidating the information into a 30-plus page financial comparison document to then discuss in a meeting.

    Even if used cars were discussed at every meeting as a “critical part” of the car business, as Felix testifies, general reference to thrice-annual meetings does not demonstrate the “soundness and care” expected of experts on the facts of the case at hand.

    Felix’s planned testimony is that “vehicles are priced to market and used car dealers do not deviate down from the advertised cash price with limited exceptions.” In depositions, he has estimated that this is the case around 90 percent of the time. This, however, is not a view he can back up by data but rather, it is a product of the information he heard “over 23 years with NCM clients.”

    While it is true, as Plaintiffs contended, that Felix need not commission a study himself to testify to how often vehicles are sold for less than listed price, Felix must still explain how he reaches his conclusions.

    The same goes for Felix’s assertion that Autosource and used car dealers use the same methods to assess the value of used automobiles other than State Farm’s use of the TNA.  The fact that these inputs share labels, however, does not necessarily equate to the inputs themselves  mirroring one another. 

    With an eye for sufficiency and application of methodology, the Court found that Felix’s testimony misses the mark.

    Held

    The Court granted Defendants’ motion to exclude the testimony of Kirk Felix.

    Key Takeaway

    Plaintiffs have not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Felix’s testimony is “based on sufficient facts or data” and “the product of reliable principles and methods.” In other words, the Court found that Felix’s application of his methodology to the circumstances of the case have not met the Rule 702 threshold, in accordance with the 2023 amendments.

    Please refer to the blog previously published about this case:

    Appraisal Expert’s Testimony on Deceptiveness Excluded

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Williams V. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
    Docket Number: 1:22cv1422
    Court Name: United States District Court, Illinois Northern
    Order Date: March 10, 2026
  • Appraisal Expert’s Testimony on Deceptiveness Excluded

    Appraisal Expert’s Testimony on Deceptiveness Excluded

    The Plaintiffs in this putative national class action are insureds who filed “total loss” claims for the actual cash value (“ACV”) of their totaled vehicles under their automobile insurance policies sold by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company or State Farm Fire and Casualty Company (collectively, “Defendants” or “State Farm”). Plaintiffs challenged State Farm’s application of a “typical-negotiation adjustment” (“TNA”) in the calculation of the ACV of Plaintiffs’ vehicles, which reduced Plaintiffs’ total loss payments based on the average difference between the list price and a lower price that a dealer would theoretically accept.

    Alleging that this methodology resulted in undervalued payments, Plaintiffs brought various claims, including breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fraudulent concealment, fraudulent inducement, unjust enrichment, and violations of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (“ICFA”) and various other state consumer protection statutes.

    Defendants filed a motion to exclude the proposed testimony of Jason Merritt, Plaintiffs’ expert on personal property appraisal.

    Appraisal Expert Witness

    Jason W. Merritt has appraised over a thousand vehicles to determine their fair market, or actual cash, value. He is certified through the Bureau of Certified Auto Appraisers to appraise vehicles, including total losses.

    Want to know more about the challenges Jason Merritt has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Plaintiffs retained Merritt to testify about “what an appraisal is,” “how to use the comparable methodology to appraise a vehicle’s [ACV],” and whether State Farm’s (via the company Audatex) application of a TNA in the calculation of the ACV of Plaintiffs’ vehicles is “appropriate when appraising a vehicle using a comparable [“comp”] methodology.”

    A. Merritt’s Qualifications

    State Farm did not challenge Merritt’s experience with appraisals. Rather, State Farm suggested that Merritt is unqualified to opine on Audatex’s methodology for lack of knowledge about the technical inputs on which the Autosource valuation actually runs.

    Merritt’s extensive background in ACV appraisals made him appropriately qualified to opine on how Audatex’s methodology compares to other industry practice even without first-hand experience in the Defendants’ technical systems. State Farm’s grievances with how Merritt applies his experience to the facts of this case are better suited for cross-examination.

    The same cannot be said for State Farm’s arguments about any opinions Merritt may attempt to offer regarding State Farm’s alleged deceptiveness or deceitfulness in this case. Experts generally cannot offer legal opinions or conclusions, and the exceptions to that rule are not applicable here.

    Merritt is free to testify to his view that there must be a specific evidence-based reason for making value deductions in a proper comp appraisal, and that Audatex’s TNA deviates from that standard.

    The same goes for his emphasis on the TNA being “baked in” rather than “explicitly applied to the valuation of the insured vehicle” in a visible way, which may make it hard for a consumer to identify the use of the TNA on their vehicle’s ACV determination. That, however, must be the end of the road for his testimony.

    Merritt cannot veer into legal conclusions, including but not limited to observations about deception. Any opinions that do so should be excluded under Rule 702. The Court thus granted State Farm’s motion to exclude Merritt’s testimony to the extent that it speaks to legal conclusions such as deception.

    B. Reliability of Merritt’s Testimony and Methodology

    i. Merritt’s First Opinion

    Defendants argued that Merritt’s opinion that Audatex’s typical negotiation adjustment conflicts with typical appraisal standards is unreliable for three reasons: that Merritt 1) compares Audatex’s work to general principles and not specific appraisal standards, 2) has insufficient knowledge about how Audatex calculates its TNAs, and 3) operates from the false premise that a used vehicle’s advertised cash price always equals its ACV.

    State Farm’s second contention amounts to a recycled version of its arguments about Merritt’s qualifications, addressed above, and can be disposed of accordingly. Further, State Farm did not suggest that Merritt’s actual report—which thoroughly addresses all aspects of the Audatex methodology it intended to dispute—actually gets anything wrong about how Audatex operates, instead primarily taking issue with his lack of internal company knowledge about how the TNA “was developed or is calculated.”

    State Farm’s third contention also missed the mark: nowhere did Merritt’s report indicate that he believes “a used vehicle’s advertised price always equals its actual cash value,” as State Farm puts it. Merritt espouses advertised internet prices as “an objective criterion for determining what the comparable vehicle would sell for on a particular day to a buyer purchasing a vehicle outright, without providing a trade in, financing the purchase through the dealership, or buying optional warranties or service plans.”

    That leaves State Farm’s first argument: that Merritt should be excluded because he compared Audatex’s work to general principles and not specific appraisal standards. Merritt, however, clearly outlined the comp appraisal methodology against which he is comparing Audatex’s methodology—moreover, he found that Audatex is “consistent with” his general methodology aside from the application of the TNA.

    ii. Merritt’s Second Opinion

    Defendants also argued that Merritt’s opinion that Audatex’s methodology, absent the TNA, produces a sound estimate of a vehicle’s ACV is unreliable for three reasons: Merritt 1) once again operated from the false premise that a used vehicle’s advertised cash price always equals its ACV, 2) utilized insufficient intellectual rigor because he is litigation-driven, and 3) incorrectly assumed that he can remove the TNAs without impacting other variables in the Audatex Reports.

    The first of these contentions was addressed and disposed of in this Court’s earlier analysis. The second argument incorrectly aims to merge two distinct practices of Merritt’s: his work as an individual appraiser, and his testimony as to how insurance companies will often appraise cars. In his individual practice, Merritt has been called upon to perform vehicle-specific appraisal verification after an insurance company uses third-party software to determine ACV.

    The lack of individualized inquiry in his report does not derive from that methodology’s likeliness to “sound a death knell to certification,” but rather the fact that insurance companies themselves do not utilize it, presumably believing it would be a death knell to their own bottom lines. It is not impermissibly “litigation-driven” for Merritt to compare and contrast his individualized inquiry approach with the standardized algorithmic approach common to insurance companies.

    Finally, State Farm’s argument that Merritt incorrectly assumed that he can remove the TNAs without impacting other variables in the Audatex Reports is best suited for cross-examination. Merritt permissibly made reasonable inferences to reach his conclusions and ultimately “stayed within reliable . . . bounds” in so doing. The Court has found that Merritt’s application of his methodology to the circumstances of the case have met that threshold, in accordance with the 2023 amendments.

    Held

    The Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ motion to exclude the testimony of Jason Merritt.

    Key Takeaway

    From the outset, it is clear that Merritt familiarized himself with—and relied upon—the relevant facts of this case. Among other things, he highlighted the way Audatex comes to its ACV calculations and compares that to the “take-price” adjustment that some appraisers utilize, ultimately finding that Audatex’s approach is insufficiently specific compared to that approach. His explanation about a generally accepted vehicle valuation methodology will help a trier of fact decide a central issue in this case—whether it is appropriate to apply a TNA while appraising a used vehicle.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Williams V. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
    Docket Number: 1:22cv1422
    Court Name: United States District Court, Illinois Northern
    Order Date: March 09, 2026
  • Valuation Expert Allowed to Opine on Stock Drop

    Valuation Expert Allowed to Opine on Stock Drop

    In this defamation action, Plaintiffs Techtronic Industries Company Limited and Techtronic Industries Factory Outlets, Inc. (“Plaintiffs” or “TTI”) sued Defendant Victor Bonilla (“Defendant” or “Bonilla”) for statements made about TTI and its business practices by Bonilla in two reports he authored and published on his website Jehoshaphat Research in February and June 2023.

    Bonilla filed a motion to exclude TTI’s expert Jeffrey W. Kopa, CFA under Fed. R. Evid. 702, arguing that Kopa’s qualifications and opinions failed to meet the standards required by Daubert and the Federal Rules of Evidence.

    Valuation Expert Witness

    Jeffrey William Kopa, CFA is a partner and managing director at AlixPartners in the Investigations, Disputes and Risk practice. He holds a Bachelor of Business Administration degree with an emphasis on finance and accounting from the University of Michigan and a Master of Business Administration degree and Master of Science degree in Finance from Indiana University School of Business. Kopa has developed an extensive litigation-consulting, financial, valuation, and investing practice over his past 20 years of professional experience.

    He has analyzed damages through his litigation-consultant services in a variety of areas including antitrust, audit malpractice, breach of contract, false advertising, intellectual property litigation, purchase price and transaction disputes, shareholder disputes, fraudulent conveyance, and preference actions. Kopa has experience examining damages and lost profits caused by alleged wrongful acts and has been qualified as an expert to present damages opinions and statistical analyses in state, federal, and bankruptcy courts. In addition to performing damages analyses, he has performed accounting investigations, assessed credit worthiness, advised creditors and board members, participated in capital raising efforts and worked to restructure and refinance companies.

    Get the full story on challenges to Jeffrey Kopa’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Discussion by the Court

    In his initial report, Kopa offered the following opinions:

    • The market for the common stock of TTI was open, developed, and efficient before and around the time of the Jehoshaphat Reports (“JR”) were publicly issued based on the results of standard market efficiency tests.
    • The share price of TTI’s common stock declined in February 23, 2023 and June 6, 2023, following the First Report and Second Report, respectively, and the negative abnormal return following the First Report’s publication was highly statistically significant.
    • Defendant profited from trading activity associated with the JR Reports.
    • TTI incurred approximately US$152 thousand in incremental professional fees to address the JR Reports.
    • TTI’s incremental compensation plans have a total attributable value to the JR Reports of approximately US$23.6 million.

    Defendant challenged Kopa’s second, fourth, and fifth opinions referenced above. Defendant noted that, with respect to the third opinion, Bonilla’s profits are not an item of damages that Plaintiffs may claim, but he did not otherwise challenge Kopa’s analysis or conclusion that Bonilla profited from trading activity associated with the reports.

    Qualifications

    Bonilla contended that Kopa offered no testimony on the salient issues that would be helpful to the jury, such as identifying which damages resulted from the alleged false and defamatory statements and whether the LTIP executive compensation program was necessary. This argument appeared to go to the last prong of the Daubert analysis and not to Kopa’s qualifications to offer a damages opinion in this case. As courts in this Circuit have noted, “the qualification standard for expert testimony is ‘not stringent’ and ‘so long as the expert is minimally qualified, objections to the level of the expert’s expertise go to credibility and weight, not admissibility.’”

    Given Kopa’s education, experience, and credentials, the Court found that Kopa is at least minimally qualified to offer damages opinions in this case.

    Methodology

    In formulating his opinions, Kopa utilized the methodology of an “event study” to analyze the impact of Bonilla’s reports on TTI’s stock. An event study is a statistical regression analysis that examines the effect of an event—such as the release of information—on a dependent variable, such as a corporation’s stock price. Kopa testified that he combined a quantitative analysis of the change in TTI’s stock with a qualitative loss causation analysis of TTI-focused news. 

    Bonilla argued that although Kopa purports to conduct an event study to show the connection between the First and Second Reports and the stock drop, he did not use any methodology to determine if the stock drops were due to the alleged false and defamatory statements, as opposed to being due to true statements or opinions in the reports.

    As event studies are a “common method” of establishing loss causation, the Court found Kopa’s methodology to be generally accepted in the scientific community and therefore reliable.

    Kopa also used the net present value technique, a commonly accepted methodology, to calculate TTI’s damages. Bonilla argued that Kopa’s analysis of the legal and accounting bills did not use an accepted methodology at all; rather, he just added them up. Bonilla complained that Kopa did not analyze whether the legal and accounting work performed was necessary.

    For the same reason, he challenged Kopa’s testimony about the executive compensation issue contending Kopa merely asserts a but-for test that is unscientific and unreliable. Whether or not the services were needed does not appear to be an opinion that Kopa is offering.

    Net present value analyses are an acceptable and common methodology used by financial experts. Basically, the Court found that Kopa’s causation assumption did not render his damages opinion inadmissible.

    Helpfulness to the Jury

    TTI contended that Kopa did not simply look at a stock market drop as Bonilla suggests. TTI represented that Kopa’s opinions are formed based upon a statistical causal analysis utilizing an event study. Bonilla’s arguments to the contrary in an effort to exclude the opinions go more to the weight the jury should give the opinions and not to their admissibility. Finally, Bonilla complained that some of the calculations are simple math calculations for which an expert is not needed. However, this is not a basis to exclude the expert.

    Held

    The Court denied Defendant Bonilla’s Daubert motion with respect to Jeffrey W. Kopa’s damages opinions.

    Key Takeaway

    Relevant expert testimony logically advances a material aspect of the proposing party’s case and fits the disputed facts.

    While performing simple mathematical calculations or conversion of money from Hong Kong to U.S. dollars may not necessarily require expert testimony, to the extent that Kopa is permitted to testify, his performance of these calculations and conversions will be helpful to the jury.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Techtronic Industries Company Limited V. Bonilla
    Docket Number: 8:23cv1734
    Court Name: United States District Court, Florida Middle
    Order Date: March 06, 2026