Expert Witness Profiler

Tag: Qualification

  • Transportation Engineering Expert Allowed to Opine on Traffic Safety

    Transportation Engineering Expert Allowed to Opine on Traffic Safety

    Plaintiffs Yafeng Zhu and Shuhui Zhang filed this action in March 2024 for damages stemming from a motor vehicle accident that occurred in April 2022.

    Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged that at approximately 12:21 a.m. on April 1, 2022, Plaintiff Zhu was traveling westbound on a two-lane section of Interstate 70 in Bond County, Illinois, as part of his employment. The right lane of the highway contained markings for ongoing construction, but no construction work was being performed at that time.

    At or near milepost 37.6 westbound, there was a manmade pothole (i.e., a cutout) that was only marked by cones in the right lane. According to Plaintiff, however, the pothole protruded into the left lane without any signs or cones signifying the full length of the protrusion. As a result, Plaintiff Zhu’s vehicle crashed into the manmade pothole, causing the vehicle to flip onto its side and Plaintiff Zhu to suffer severe injury and expense.

    Defendant Keeley filed three Daubert motions seeking to exclude the expert reports, testimony, and opinions of Michelle Albers, Dr. Richard G. Bowman, and Dr. Helena Breuer.

    Vocational Rehabilitation Expert Witness

    Michelle J. Albers has a Master of Science degree in rehabilitation psychology from the University of Wisconsin and has obtained numerous licenses and certifications related to rehabilitation counseling and life care planning. In addition, she has practiced vocational rehabilitation counseling for over 27 years, has worked as a vocational and life care planner for over 17 years, and has served as a social security vocational expert since 2004. Albers has also served as an expert witness in numerous cases across various state and federal courts.

    Want to know more about the challenges Michelle Albers has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation Expert Witness

    Dr. Richard Graham Bowman earned his M.D. from West Virginia University, and he specializes in physiatry (physical medicine and rehabilitation). In addition, Bowman has been certified by the World Institute of Pain as a Fellow of Interventional Pain Practice and he has been certified by Capital University School of Law as a Certified Life Care Planner. He has also served on the International Commission on Health Care Certification’s Certified Life Care Planner Board of Commissioners.

    Get the full story on challenges to Richard Bowman’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Transportation Engineering Expert Witness

    Dr. Helena K. Breuer obtained a master’s degree and a bachelor’s degree in civil engineering, both of which included a focus in transportation engineering. In addition, she obtained a Ph.D. in civil engineering with a specialization in transportation engineering.

    Breuer also completed 280 hours of accident reconstruction-related training approved by the Accreditation Commission for Traffic Accident Reconstruction.

    Discover more cases with Helena Breuer as an expert witness by ordering her comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

    Discussion by the Court

    I. Michelle Albers’ Expert Opinions

    Defendant Keeley challenged the sufficiency of the facts and data underlying Albers’ opinions, as well as the methodology and reliability of those opinions.

    However, Albers’ opinions about Plaintiff Zhu’s inability to work and lost earning potential were based on sufficient facts and data. Her expert report considered hundreds of documents including dozens of medical and billing records, depositions, tax returns, photographs and videos, and numerous other discovery documents from this case.

    Defendant Keeley next contended that Albers failed to rely on personal observations of Plaintiff to reach her opinions. Albers conducted a clinical interview of Plaintiff Zhu, relied on the depositions of Plaintiff Zhu and his family, and also relied on the medical records and findings of Plaintiff Zhu’s doctors.

    Next, Defendant Keeley argued that Albers’ testimony should be excluded because she did not follow a reliable methodology, and thus “the opinions included in her report are unreliable because they amount to mere speculation or conjecture.”

    While Defendant Keeley contended that Albers merely explained what those methods entail, without also explaining how they were applied in this case, the Court does not believe that to be true. Rather, Albers’ report demonstrates how she applied those accepted methodologies to the facts of Plaintiff Zhu’s case.

    Finally, Defendant Keeley argued that Albers’ testimony and report should be excluded because her opinions would not assist the trier of fact due to the lack of data underlying her opinions and errors or inconsistencies in her methodology. The Court has already rejected Defendant Keeley’s data and methodology arguments above.

    Thus, all that is left is to determine whether Albers’ opinions may be helpful to the jury. Suffice to say, the Court believes Albers’ expert opinion as to lost earning capacity would be relevant and helpful to the trier of fact in determining damages, if applicable.

    II. Dr. Richard Bowman’s Expert Opinions

    Defendant Keeley first argued that Bowman’s evaluation is not supported by sufficient facts or data. In this regard, Defendant Keeley emphasizes that Bowman “did not perform any physical tests or any kind of investigation” into Plaintiff Zhu’s capabilities and instead relied on Plaintiff Zhu’s subjective self-reporting. However, as shown in Bowman’s report, he relied on extensive medical records from Plaintiff Zhu’s providers and also evaluated Plaintiff Zhu over Zoom.

    Defendant Keeley argued that Bowman relied exclusively on the conclusions of other medical providers, rather than the underlying data generated by them.

    The Court rejected Keeley’s argument that Bowman’s opinion could only rely on the “data generated” by Plaintiff Zhu’s medical providers and not their overall conclusions. To the contrary, had Bowman relied solely on the data Plaintiff Zhu’s doctors generated, that would have raised much greater concerns as to Bowman’s qualifications and methodology, absent a showing that he was qualified to interpret underlying data from every type of medical field at issue in this case.

    Defendant Keeley’s challenge related to whether Plaintiff Zhu has and will continue to avail himself of the treatment Bowman accounted for in his reports is also a question of weight, not admissibility. Admittedly, evidence that Plaintiff Zhu has not, or will not, avail himself of treatment that Bowman anticipated in his life care plan is something that goes to the weight of Bowman’s plan and cost estimates.

    However, Plaintiff Zhu’s alleged treatment noncompliance does not impact the reliability of Bowman’s methodology. And, in regard to methodology, Bowman reasonably relied upon medical opinions as to the care Plaintiff Zhu will need and then expanded upon that information by using his expertise to estimate future costs. That is an appropriate methodology for determining Plaintiff’s care costs.

    III. Helena Breuer’s Expert Opinions

    a. Breuer’s Qualifications as an Expert

    As Plaintiffs admit, this is Breuer’s “first case as an expert.” Obviously, however, the Court’s inquiry focuses on Breuer’s qualifications and not her experience or lack thereof as an expert witness.

    Breuer did not dispute the fact that she is not a licensed engineer, has not designed a traffic control plan, has not assisted or evaluated the setup of an active traffic control plan, and has no prior work experience related to commercial truck drivers in construction zones.

    Here the purpose of Breuer’s investigation and report was “to determine if the temporary traffic controls (TTC) at the time of the incident (1) met the requirements outlined in the approved TTC plans, (2) adequately warned road users of hazards created by work activities, and (3) provided adequate positive guidance for drivers to safely navigate the work zone.” Accordingly, given Breuer’s extensive education in civil engineering with a focus in transportation engineering along with her accident reconstruction training, the Court found that she is qualified and has an adequate foundation to answer the above questions.

    Defendant Keeley has also argued that, even if Breuer is qualified to provide expert opinions on certain transportation related topics, such as passenger vehicles and commercial vehicles at rest, she is not qualified to provide expert opinions for situations involving “extensive interstate construction and commercial vehicles traveling on a busy interstate.”

    Thus, to the extent Breuer has greater specialized experience in passenger vehicles or commercial vehicles at rest, as opposed to “commercial vehicles traveling on a busy interstate,” that distinction goes to the weight of her expert opinions, not their admissibility.

    b. Sufficient Facts and Data

    Defendant contended that Breuer’s report is lacking facts and data because: (1) she never visited the crash site or performed any sort of scene examination; (2) she has no knowledge of how traffic control measures were placed at the end of the construction day; (3) she lacks knowledge as to the reasons for the cutout extension; and (4) her opinions rely on unsupported assumptions. Again, the Court is not persuaded.

    Analysis

    For one, even if the Court assumes that there was value in Breuer visiting the crash site several years after the incident in question, Defendant Keeley’s argument improperly presumes that the failure to personally visit the site renders an expert’s opinions unreliable. This is an argument that has already been rejected in this circuit on multiple occasions.

    Turning to Defendant Keeley’s next contention—that Breuer has no knowledge of how traffic controls were placed at the end of the workday—the Court again found that this challenge would, at most, go to the weight of Breuer’s opinions. For one, Breuer’s report demonstrates that several individuals associated with Defendant Keeley have claimed that their placement of safety barrels was permissible at the time of the accident. Put simply, Breuer’s expert opinion on the placement of safety barrels at the time of the accident is not impacted by the separate question of whether those safety barrels were initially placed in different, suitable locations.

    Defendant Keeley also argued that Breuer’s opinions should be excluded because she lacks knowledge as to the underlying cause for the cutout extension (i.e., the manmade pothole referenced in the Complaint). The Court questions how Breuer’s alleged lack of knowledge as to the underlying reasoning for the extension of the cutout impacts her opinions and testimony related to traffic safety.

    For similar reasons, the Court rejected Defendant Keeley’s argument that Breuer lacked knowledge to provide expert opinion as to the failure to inform the Illinois Department of Transportation about the cutout extension. Undoubtedly, if Defendant Keeley possesses evidence tending to demonstrate that the engineer in question was informed of the extension, they are free to use that evidence to challenge Breuer’s opinion that there is no evidence the engineer was informed.

    c. Methodology

    Defendant Keeley challenged: (1) Breuer’s use of photogrammetry to form her opinion as to the extension of the cutout; and (2) her failure to look at other factors that may have contributed to the incident.

    Breuer’s report first describes the site and the accident. It then lays out the purpose and utility of temporary traffic control measures before discussing the hazard created by the extension of the cutout. Breuer references numerous resources and evidence discussing/specifying what temporary traffic control occurred in this case and what was required under the applicable plans and standards. Her report then outlines the responsibilities the Defendants failed to follow for proper temporary traffic control. Finally, her report lists seven findings related to the traffic hazard at issue and the failure to take appropriate actions to protect drivers from it.

    To the extent Defendant Keeley has even challenged Breuer’s overall methodology, the Court is not persuaded. Breuer’s report provides sufficient context, explains and relies on applicable standards and plans, and analyzes Defendant Keeley’s alleged deviation from those requirements to reach her opinions. In other words, Breuer arrived at her opinions with appropriate soundness and care.

    Moreover, regarding the specific photogrammetry challenge Defendant Keeley has raised, the Court found that such an approach was permissible because it satisfies the reliability requirements specified in Daubert.

    Additionally, the Court is not persuaded by Defendant Keeley’s argument that Breuer’s methodology was inadequate because she failed to use the same methodology to “determine Plaintiff’s lane positioning” or “the width of other cutouts in the construction zone.” If Defendant Keeley wanted an expert to opine on Plaintiff’s lane positioning or the adequacy of temporary traffic controls for other cutouts in the area, it should have retained its own expert to conduct that analysis.

    d. Breuer’s Report is Relevant and Will Assist the Trier of Fact

    Defendant avers that Breuer’s report and opinions are unreliable, provide little to no independent investigation, and can readily be observed through evidence in the record (and underlying standards and specifications cited therein). The Court did not find any of these arguments convincing.

    The Court need not rehash its prior finding that Breuer’s methodology was reliable. It was. Likewise, that methodology demonstrates that Breuer provided ample independent investigation. In fact, the Court found it curious that Defendant Keeley challenged Breuer’s use of, among other things, photogrammetry, while also claiming that she provided no useful independent analysis. Regardless, the Court found that Breuer’s report relied upon useful, independent analysis of temporary traffic control standards and compliance. Moreover, contrary to Defendant Keeley’s argument, the Court did not believe that the pictures and other evidence in the record adequately establish whether traffic control measures were appropriately followed. In addition, contrary to Defendant’s assertions, such a topic is not within the purview of the average juror.

    Held

    The Court denied Defendant Keeley & Sons, Inc.’s Daubert motions seeking to exclude the testimony of Michelle Albers, Dr. Richard Bowman, and Dr. Helena Breuer.

    Key Takeaway

    Medical professionals have long been expected to rely on the opinions of other medical professionals in forming their opinions. This is particularly true in the area of life care planning because it would be virtually impossible to find an expert life care planner who was qualified to opine on every distinct type of underlying injury.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Zhu V. Keeley & Sons, Inc.
    Docket Number: 3:24cv908
    Court Name: United States District Court, Illinois Southern
    Order Date: July 02, 2026
  • Plastic Surgery Expert Allowed to Opine on Second Degree Burns

    Plastic Surgery Expert Allowed to Opine on Second Degree Burns

    Plaintiff, Anna Ortega, alleged that hot water from a hotel room shower “caused a large second degree burn on [her] left lower leg.” The incident occurred on February 11, 2024 at the L’Auberge Casino Resort Lake Charles.

    Plaintiff has retained Dr. Derek Lou, a plastic surgeon to provide an opinion on her injuries. Lou opined that Plaintiff sustained second degree burns to her lower left leg and right shoulder/upper back as a result of the February 2024  shower incident. Defendant sought to exclude that testimony under the standards set forth in Rule 702.

    Plastic Surgery Expert Witness

    Derek C. Lou is a Harvard-trained, board-certified plastic surgeon with advanced training and decades of experience in the management of burn injuries.

    He is also an Associate Professor in Plastic Surgery at the UT Medical Branch in Galveston, TX.

    Get the full story on challenges to Derek Lou’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Discussion by the Court

    Defendant did not dispute Lou’s qualifications. Instead, it maintained that his opinions do not adequately account for the discrepancies in the appearance of Plaintiff’s leg injury as it presented to different providers and for the lack of evidence that the shower water was hot enough or on for long enough to cause the claimed injury.

    Defendant first maintained that there is no evidence that Plaintiff was exposed to water that was hot enough to cause a second-degree burn within seconds. But Defendant likewise presented no evidence of the highest possible temperature that could have emitted from its allegedly defective commercial water heater.

    Ortega’s account of the incident, including using the affected leg to turn off the hot water, provided a plausible explanation for several seconds of exposure.

    As for the burn’s delayed healing, Defendant correctly points out that there is no record that Plaintiff ever used Silvadene. Accordingly, Lou’s hypothesis regarding prolonged Silvadene usage is unsupported. But the infection itself might explain any discrepancies. The photographs from the scanned medical records do not show much detail. While her medical records describe blisters and redness, they also note an active infection of the wound and associated itching. Thus, Defendant failed to sufficiently undermine the basis of Lou’s opinions on Plaintiff’s leg injury.

    As for the shoulder/upper back injury, Lou also briefly opined that Plaintiff had suffered a second degree burn to this area. Plaintiff never sought any follow-up care after her urgent care visit on the date of the incident. But she has submitted an affidavit stating that she was simply unaware of the scar because it was on her back, along with a photograph of the affected area.

    The Court found that Lou is sufficiently qualified to offer an opinion based on his examination and Plaintiff’s account of the exposure.

    Held

    The Court denied the Defendant’s Daubert motion to exclude the testimony of Derek Lou.

    Key Takeaway

    Rejection of expert testimony is the exception rather than the rule, and the court’s role as gatekeeper “does not replace the traditional adversary system and the place of the jury within the system.”

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Ortega V. PNK Lake Charles LLC
    Docket Number: 2:25cv653
    Court Name: United States District Court, Louisiana Western
    Order Date: June 18, 2026
  • Geology Expert Was Allowed to Opine on Subsurface Conditions 

    Geology Expert Was Allowed to Opine on Subsurface Conditions 

    This case arises out of Plaintiffs’ claim that structural damage to their home at 496 Southwood Drive in Madisonville, Kentucky, was caused by coal mine subsidence.

    Val Smith and Gwen Smith obtained a homeowners’ policy from American Strategic Insurance Corp. (“ASIC”) and claimed that mine subsidence caused structural movement and cracking.

    ASIC denied the claim based on the findings of NV5, a technical engineering consulting firm. In early 2024, the Smiths requested that ASIC reconsider its 2021 denial of their mine-subsidence claim.

    ASIC reopened the claim and requested that NV5 perform a supplemental evaluation of the AML documentation. NV5 issued a 20-page supplemental report, again concluding that the Smith residence had not experienced mine subsidence. ASIC reaffirmed its denial on February 16, 2024.

    The Smiths brought claims for breach of contract and bad faith under the common law the Kentucky Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act (“UCSPA”).

    Plaintiffs disclosed the expert reports of their causation witness, Harold R. Gaston, as well as the damages opinion testimony of David Garrigan. ASIC disclosed the causation opinion testimony of Norman R. Meeks and Thomas Smith to Plaintiffs.

    Both parties sought to exclude the testimony of the opposing party’s experts.

    Civil Engineering Expert Witnesses

    Harold Ray Gaston received a B.S. in Civil Engineering from the University
    of Kentucky in 1982.

    He has more than 32 years of experience completing civil and structural design and years of experience investigating structural issues with residential and commercial buildings.

    He also has provided engineering reports/ testimony in multiple legal cases.

    Want to know more about the challenges Harold Gaston has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Thomas Walker Smith has 16 years of civil/structural engineering design,
    project management, and construction management experience with
    commercial public building projects, pipeline projects, building mechanical
    system projects and pump station projects.

    Get the full story on challenges to Thomas Smith’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Construction Expert Witness

    David Garrigan is an expert in the field of delivering commercial, institutional, historic renovation, and specialty construction on projects as he works as a commercial builder and contractor with over 30 years of experience. He has been the Founder and Owner of Garrigan Building and Construction since 2013.

    Discover more cases with David Garrigan as an expert witness by ordering his comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

    Geology Expert Witness

    Norman Randal Meeks is a professional geologist with 26 years of consulting experience in environmental and geotechnical applications.

    Get the full story on challenges to Norman Meeks’ expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Discussion by the Court

    1. ASIC’s Motion to Exclude Gaston and Garrigan

    i. Whether Gaston’s Disclosures Satisfy Rule 26

    ASIC did not dispute that Gaston’s opinions and the bases for them were ultimately disclosed through his letters, the reliance materials, and his deposition testimony. Rather, ASIC argued that Gaston’s expert disclosures were not themselves enough to satisfy the disclosure requirements of Rule 26(a)(2)(B). Plaintiffs argued that Gaston’s letters satisfied the disclosure requirements of Rule 26(a)(2)(B), but that even if they did not, the late disclosure of the reliance materials did not warrant exclusion under Rule 37.

    After review of the record, the Cout found that Gaston’s deposition testimony was within the scope of opinions expressed in his expert reports.

    On the other hand, ASIC’s complaint that the Plaintiffs did not actually disclose the materials Gaston relied on to form his opinions until the day before his deposition is well taken. The Court therefore must consider whether this violation was “harmless or is substantially justified.”

    The testimony that Gaston intended to give at trial appears to be within the scope of the opinions disclosed in his report. There is no apparent risk that if Gaston testifies at trial, ASIC will be surprised by his testimony. Nor, as a result, is there a substantial likelihood that allowing Gaston’s testimony would disrupt trial. As for the ability to cure the violation, to the extent ASIC believes that it was prejudiced by Plaintiffs’ late disclosure, ASIC may move to compel additional discovery—but ASIC has not done so here or explained what additional information it might seek and so the Court will not order further discovery at this time.

    ii. Whether Gaston’s Opinions Satisfy Rule 702

    Next, ASIC contended that Gaston’s opinions, and by extension, Garrigan’s, did not “meet Rule 702‘s requirements of reliability and relevance.”

    Here, Gaston testified that he based his opinions on, among other things, the “presence of a large mine void” beneath the Property in relation to its location, and the “pattern and extent of structural damage.”

    Based on this data and his experience in similar cases, Gaston concluded that the damages to the Property were the result of mine subsidence and not soil or water issues alone.

    ASIC has not explained how Gaston’s reliance on core samples, for example, is unreliable, given that the record shows it is also the methodology employed by Kentucky Environmental and Energy Cabinet’s Division of Abandoned Mine Lands Reclamation (“AML”) to determine the presence of a mine subsidence issue.

    ASIC’s final contention that “Gaston’s opinions . . . would not assist the trier of fact” also fails. Essentially, ASIC argued that because Gaston cannot distinguish between damage documented at the Property before Plaintiffs purchased the Property or prior to the Policy period, his opinion would be unhelpful to the jury in determining causation. ASIC is correct that Gaston’s testimony is limited to “whether or not mine subsidence had” occurred and whether it had “affected the [Property].”

    And because nothing in the record shows that Gaston determined when the alleged damage to the Property occurred, it is true that Gaston’s testimony does not resolve the ultimate coverage issue. However, Gaston’s testimony does address the threshold issue of whether the damage to the Property is of the type that the Policy covers—i.e., whether it was caused by mine subsidence or other excluded causes, such as earth movement. As a result, the relevancy requirement of Rule 702 is satisfied.

    iii. ASIC’s Objections to Garrigan’s Opinions

    With respect to ASIC’s request to exclude Garrigan’s opinions under Rule 37, although Garrigan’s “Scope of Work” letter was deficient under Rule 26, the Court found that ASIC learned that Garrigan visited the Property with Gaston and based his report on that visual inspection, his experience as a professional, his knowledge of the Kentucky Building Code, and Gaston’s specific recommendations regarding the foundation. Indeed, ASIC failed to identify any information that it was unable to discover through Garrigan’s deposition.

    ASIC overstated the required qualifications and methodology for Garrigan’s opinions in case. Garrigan’s testimony in this case is limited to providing an estimate of repair costs for the damages Gaston attributes to mine subsidence. Garrigan need not be qualified as “an engineer, geologist, or subsidence specialist” to do so.

    Rather, Garrigan is entitled to rely on Gaston’s opinions as to the cause of the observed damages, as well as the necessity of certain foundational repairs.

    Likewise, while ASIC alleged that Garrigan’s “methodology amounted to walking around, making assumptions, and writing an estimate,” ASIC has not explained how this methodology necessarily renders Garrigan’s estimate unreliable. Garrigan’s methodology is based on his “personal knowledge and experience” estimating the cost of residential repair projects, as well as the engineering opinions of Gaston and other reliance materials discussed at his deposition on which Garrigan’s background knowledge of residential repair is based. Courts regularly admit damages testimony based on similar methodologies.

    2. Plaintiffs’ Motions to Exclude Meeks and Smith

    i. Plaintiffs’ Objections to Meeks’ Opinions

    Plaintiffs sought to exclude the testimony of Meeks pursuant to Rule 702. First, they argued that “Meeks is unqualified to offer his opinions in this case.” Plaintiffs asserted that Meeks’ experience as a “career geologist that works only for insurance companies, state and federal agencies, and hospitals” is insufficient because he lacked certain specialized experience with coal mine subsidence.

    Contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertion, Meeks is not required to have previously “worked for individuals like the Smiths. . . . given a deposition . . . . [or] written or published anything on coal mine subsidence” for him to be qualified to opine in this matter. Nor was Meeks required to have background knowledge of the coal industry. The Court held that Meeks’ opinions are based on his experience as a geologist—not a coal industry professional.

    Second, Plaintiffs contended that Meeks’ opinions are unreliable because he relied on “upon the results he obtained in his [Standard Penetration Testing (‘SPT’)] methodology” to the exclusion of contrary evidence.

    Contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertions, the record shows that Meeks had a sufficient factual basis for his opinions. In addition to the results of the SPT analysis, Meeks conducted a “visual inspection” and put in an “open records request . . . for records pertaining to historical mining activities that potentially occurred beneath the property.”

    Further, Meeks did consider whether there was a void beneath the Property. Meeks found that the AML maps indicated rooms and pillars but disputed “that that room had collapsed” based on the results of his SPT analysis.

    ii. Plaintiffs’ Objections to Smith’s Opinions

    According to Plaintiffs, “Smith’s reports are inadmissible for three independent reasons”:

    First, Smith is unqualified to offer his opinions in this case. Second, Smith’s opinions necessarily require full and complete determination of the existence of coal mine subsidence based solely on SPT soil analysis, without regard to other accepted testing techniques and/or methods to make that determination. This extraordinary analytical gap in his methodology invalidates each of his opinions. Third, Smith’s primary opinion- that the Smith home is not damaged by coal mine subsidence, is unreliable and fails to address the ‘specific practices’ of this case.

    Based on his education and experience as a structural engineer, the Court found that Smith is qualified to offer his opinions that the alleged damage was consistent with structural movement attributable to soil behavior identified by Meeks and other construction-related issues.

    Moreover, the fact that Smith relied on Meeks’ conclusions regarding subsurface conditions does not make Smith’s methodology unreliable under Rule 702. Smith testified that it is standard practice in subsidence investigation to rely on geologists’ findings in conjunction with visual inspections and analysis of other data, such as relative floor elevations, crack patterns, floor deflection, foundation behavior, and construction issues.

    Nor have Plaintiffs shown that Smith’s conclusions were the result of an unreliable application of his methodology to the facts of the case. For instance, the fact that Smith did not return for a site visit after the damage to the Property worsened goes to the weight of his conclusions but does not make his opinion unreliable.

    Held

    • The Court denied ASIC’s motion to exclude the proposed opinion testimony of Harold Gaston and David Garrigan.
    • The Court denied Plaintiffs’ motions to exclude the testimony of Norman Meeks.
    • The Court denied Plaintiffs’ motions to exclude the testimony of Thomas Smith.

    Key Takeaway

    While Rule 26(a)(2)(B) requires a complete statement of all opinions to be expressed and the basis and reasons therefore, it does not require that a report disclose all information that might be elicited on direct examination to establish the admissibility of the expert opinion under Daubert.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Smith V. American Strategic Insurance Corp.
    Docket Number: 4:24cv79
    Court Name: United States District Court, Kentucky Western
    Order Date: June 18, 2026
  • Pharmacology Expert Allowed to Opine on the Clinical Trial

    Pharmacology Expert Allowed to Opine on the Clinical Trial

    Alzamend Neuro, Inc is a clinical-stage biopharmaceutical company focused on developing treatments for Alzheimer’s disease and other neurodegenerative diseases. To advance the development of a new treatment called ALZN002, Alzamend sought to conduct a phase I/IIA clinical trial to evaluate its safety, tolerability, and preliminary efficacy.

    Biorasi, LLC is a contract research organization or clinical research organization (“CRO”) engaged in the business of providing clinical research services, clinical research professionals, and contract clinical, technical, and other related services.

    Alzamend asserted claims for breach of contract and fraudulent inducement after the ALZN002 Trial was derailed.

    Biorasi filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff’s expert witness Dr. Frederick H. Hausheer while Alzamend sought to exclude the testimony of Biorasi’s rebuttal experts, Emily Friedrich and Aimon Iftikhar.

    Pharmacology Expert Witness

    Frederick Herman Hausheer, M.D. is a physician-scientist and biopharmaceutical research executive with over 37 years of experience in clinical drug development, including extensive Phase I–III clinical trial management under FDA and other international regulatory frameworks.

    He earned his M.D. from the University of Missouri-Columbia (completing medical school in three years), completed his internship and residency training there. He has held board certifications in Internal Medicine (since 1985) and Medical Oncology (since 1987). Hausheer completed a fellowship in Medical Oncology (in two years, with promotion to faculty) at the Johns Hopkins Oncology Center and Hospital, concentrating in Pharmacology and Experimental Therapeutics research and development.

    Discover more cases with Frederick Hausheer as an expert witness by ordering his comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

    Biomedical Engineering Expert Witnesses

    Emily Friedrich is a licensed Project Management Professional certified in Good Clinical Practices. Friedrich also holds a Bachelor of Science in Molecular Genetics and Biochemistry with a minor in Chemistry from the University of Pittsburgh granted in 2007 as well as a Master of Science and a Doctor of Philosophy in Biomedical Engineering from Carnegie Mellon University.

    She completed postdoctoral training at Northwestern University Feinberg School of Medicine in the Department of Surgery and held a Research Instructor position at the University of Illinois at Chicago in the Department of Pharmacology. Friedrich also served as a Biomedical Research Program Manager at a military treatment facility.

    Get the full story on challenges to Emily Friedrich’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Dr. Aimon Iftikhar specializes in clinical research and development of medical devices with a focus on assessing clinical efficacy and accuracy in real-world settings. She has a Bachelor of Science degree in Biomedical Engineering with minors in Mathematics and Materials Science and Engineering from the University of Connecticut, a Master of Science degree in Biomedical Engineering from Carnegie Mellon University, and a Doctor of Philosophy in Bioengineering with a concentration in Tissue Engineering & Regenerative Medicine from the University of Pittsburgh.

    Gain a comprehensive understanding of Aimon Iftikhar’s qualifications and casework history with her Expert Witness Profile report.

    Discussion by the Court

    A. Biorasi’s Motion to Exclude Frederick Hausheer

    i. Methodology

    Though Biorasi contended that Hausheer relied exclusively on assumptions to form his opinions, Hausheer’s report cited an extensive list of references and supporting documents reviewed including training materials, training logs, resumes, protocol deviation logs, emails, meeting minutes, call notes, as well as various plans regarding protocol deviation, quality management, and risk management.

    Biorasi also contended that Hausheer’s opinions are merely ipse dixit, but Hausheer explained that the conduct of the ALZN002-01 clinical trial “is guided by the International Council for Harmonisation (ICH) Good Clinical Practice (GCP) guidelines, which are universally recognized as industry standards of practice and are consistent with FDA regulations.” References to Good Clinical Practice guidelines are frequent throughout Hausheer’s report regarding industry standards for qualified personnel and training, trial plans, monitoring, quality management, and blinding and communication controls.

    The Court found that Hausheer’s opinions are not based on mere ipse dixit, but rather the result of reviewing record evidence and measuring the evidence against established industry standards in the context of his own substantial professional experience.

    ii. Helpfulness

    Biorasi argued that Hausheer’s opinions are not helpful for the same reasons it argued they are unreliable. However, the Court already found Hausheer’s opinions to be based on a reliable methodology. Moreover, the Court found Hausheer’s opinions would assist the trier of fact.

    B. Alzamend’s Motion to Exclude Dr. Emily Friedrich and Dr. Aimon Iftikhar

    i. Qualifications

    The Court found that both Friedrich and Iftikhar possess substantial clinical experience and possess certifications in the industry standards relied on by Alzamend’s expert, Hausheer.

    ii. Methodology

    Alzamend argued that because Biorasi’s proposed experts lack experience in double-blinded trials, their methodology is unreliable.

    However, Alzamend cited no case law or statutory authority for its contention that rebuttal experts who possess both clinical experience and certifications in the relevant industry standards should be excluded because they lack adequate double-blinded clinical experience.

    The Court found this methodology to be sufficiently reliable. Alzamend’s
    assertions of lack of experience in double-blinded studies goes to the weight, not the admissibility of the testimony and may be the subject of cross-examination.

    iii. Helpfulness

    Alzamend argued that the rebuttal experts’ opinions are not helpful because they impermissibly usurp the role of the fact finder.

    However, the Court found that the rebuttal experts’ opinions will assist the trier of fact in this case. The rebuttal experts’ assessment of the double-blinded trial, considering their substantial experience and analysis of industry standards, concerned matters that are beyond the understanding of the average lay person.

    As to Alzamend’s categorical objections to credibility determinations, weighing competing evidence, or rendering factual conclusions, Biorasi contended that the rebuttal experts are merely pointing to evidence that contradicts the assumptions relied on by Hausheer. The Court agreed with Biorasi, and it is permissible for an expert to review facts and extrapolate opinions from those facts based on experience and industry standards.

    Held

    • The Court denied Biorasi’s Daubert motion to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff’s expert witness Dr. Frederick Hausheer.
    • The Court denied Alzamend’s Daubert motion to exclude the testimony of rebuttal experts, Emily Friedrich and Aimon Iftikhar.

    Key Takeaway

    The qualification standard for expert testimony is not stringent and so long as the expert is minimally qualified, objections to the level of the expert’s expertise go to credibility and weight, not admissibility.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Alzamend Neuro, Inc. V. Biorasi, LLC
    Docket Number: 1:25cv20481
    Court Name: United States District Court, Florida Southern
    Order Date: June 16, 2026
  • Correctional Healthcare Expert Was Allowed to Opine on Drug Addiction

    Correctional Healthcare Expert Was Allowed to Opine on Drug Addiction

    Pro se Plaintiff Michael Scriven brought this action against Defendants VitalCore Health Strategies, LLC (incorrectly named as “Vital Core LLC”), Jennifer Ehrlich, Tracy Staley, Dr. Harold Stopp, Ryan Fickle, and Dr. John Tomarchio (incorrectly named as “Demarco”) for alleged violations of his constitutional rights while in custody at the Sedgwick County Jail (“SCJ”). Specifically, Plaintiff asserted that Defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights when they denied him narcotic pain medication for his chronic health conditions.

    During discovery, Defendants retained Dr. Thomas D. Fowlkes to provide an opinion regarding the medical necessity of the care and treatment requested by Plaintiff. Plaintiff sought to declare Defendants’ expert report inadmissible.

    Correctional Healthcare Expert Witness

    Thomas DeBow Fowlkes, M.D. is a correctional medicine physician with approximately 25 years of experience in delivering primary care in a correctional setting. He is board certified in both Emergency Medicine and Addiction Medicine. He is also a Certified Correctional Healthcare Professional-Physician (“CCHP-P”).

    Discover more cases with Thomas Fowlkes as an expert witness by ordering his comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Plaintiff asserted eight arguments as to why the Court should declare Fowlkes’ expert report inadmissible.

    Qualification

    First, Plaintiff argued that Fowlkes is not qualified because he is not an “orthopedic,” “nerve specialist,” or “pain management specialist.” However, Fowlkes is not opining on the type of pain medication suitable for Plaintiff’s chronic pain. Instead, he is opining on the appropriate standard of care for managing chronic pain in a correctional setting. Because Fowlkes’ expertise is directly relevant to the issue at hand, the Court found that Fowlkes is qualified to render an opinion in this case.

    Methodology

    Second, Plaintiff argued that Fowlkes’ method is not a sound medical opinion because the x-ray images he looked at are covered in gray and white static. Although these images may be low quality, Fowlkes reviewed the entire medical record, including the official radiology reports associated with the x-ray images. Thus, contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, Fowlkes’ methodology is not flawed, and the Court will not declare it inadmissible on this basis.

    Third-Party Hearsay Statements

    Third, Plaintiff argued that Fowlkes improperly relied upon third-party hearsay statements in Plaintiff’s medical records when crafting his expert report. However, an expert’s reliance on hearsay does not necessarily render the expert’s opinion unreliable.

    Substance Abuse Disorder

    Fourth, Plaintiff claimed that Fowlkes improperly diagnosed Plaintiff with a substance abuse disorder. This argument misrepresents Fowlkes’ report. Fowlkes did not make a new diagnosis regarding substance abuse. Instead, he relied on Plaintiff’s own reported history and prior medical records to document that Plaintiff had a substance abuse disorder in the past. Fowlkes merely opined on Plaintiff’s prior drug addiction.

    VitalCore Policy

    In his fifth argument, Plaintiff asserted that Fowlkes falsely denied the existence of a VitalCore policy in his report. Plaintiff asserted that the medical records showed that Defendant Staley used a VitalCore policy to deny Plaintiff’s medication.

    In response, Defendants argued that Fowlkes did not deny the existence of a VitalCore policy, instead he opined that he saw no VitalCore policy or procedure that precluded the use of opioid medication. This is a factual dispute between the parties. Plaintiff’s disagreement with Fowlkes’ conclusion in his expert report goes to the weight of Fowlkes’ testimony. It is not grounds for exclusion.

    Factual Statements

    In his sixth and seventh arguments, Plaintiff disagreed with two different factual statements in Fowlkes’ report. In his sixth argument, Plaintiff took issue with Fowlkes’ statement that Plaintiff fractured his hand after hitting a door. And in his seventh argument, Plaintiff argued that Fowlkes should have provided the name of the physicians who previously terminated Plaintiff as patient due to his behavior and demeanor. These are both tangential factual issues that are irrelevant to the issues before the Court. Plaintiff’s disagreement with Fowlkes’ statements did not render Fowlkes’ opinion on the central issues of the case unreliable.

    Falsified Medical Records

    In Plaintiff’s final argument, he claimed that Fowlkes relied on medical records that were falsified by Defendant Staley.

    In any event, criticisms regarding the medical providers or the databases on which the expert relies go to the weight, and not the admissibility of the expert’s opinion. Accordingly, this argument is not an adequate basis under which the Court may declare Fowlkes’ report inadmissible.

    Held

    The Court denied Plaintiff’s motion to declare Thomas Fowlkes’ expert report inadmissible.

    Key Takeaway

    Overall, the Plaintiff failed to present a credible challenge to Fowlkes’ qualifications or methodology. His arguments mostly amount to a disagreement with underlying evidence. This disagreement goes to the weight of the testimony, not its admissibility, and is the proper subject of cross-examination.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Scriven V. VitalCore Health Strategies, LLC named as “Vital Core, LLC”
    Docket Number: 5:22cv3282
    Court Name: United States District Court for the District of Kansas
    Order Date: May 20, 2026
  • Biomechanics Expert Allowed to Opine on the Cause of Death

    Biomechanics Expert Allowed to Opine on the Cause of Death

    Plaintiff Tabria Montgomery’s father, Michael Montgomery sustained fatal injuries while operating a Bobst Mastercut 145 PER 2.0 Die-Cutter machine. She asserted claims individually on behalf of herself and her father’s estate against Defendant Bobst Group North America, Inc. (“Bobst NA”) for strict products liability, negligence, wrongful death, and survival.

    Plaintiff sought to exclude the opinions of Bobst NA’s expert Alfred P. Bowles II, M.D.

    Biomechanics Expert Witness

    Alfred Palmer Bowles II, M.D. has a Bachelor of Science in mechanical engineering and is a Doctor of Medicine who was a licensed physician for over twenty-five years in the fields of general medicine and general surgery. He served in the United States Air Force Reserve for twenty-one years as a credentialed general surgeon and flight surgeon. He is also an accredited traffic accident reconstructionist. Bowles received post-graduate education in trauma medicine, accident reconstruction, and biomechanics applied to the investigation of impact trauma.

    Want to know more about the challenges Alfred Bowles has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Plaintiff contended that Bowles is not sufficiently qualified to offer his opinions regarding cause and manner of death and the duration of conscious pain and suffering because he is primarily a biomechanics expert and not a forensic pathologist.

    As Bobst NA explained, Bowles has over twenty-four years of experience in the fields of general surgery, general medicine, and emergency medicine. Bowles also testified that he has previously provided professional expert opinions in litigation matters regarding the duration of conscious pain and suffering.

    He testified that “the duration of conscious activity . . . is where my work starts and ends, with the understanding that once your conscious activity has ended, then you’re no longer able to perceive or process . . . the thoughts or the feelings of . . . pain.” He explained that in the cases that he has worked on, “usually there is some allegation that relates to something or a concept that is like pain or suffering.”

    Given his experience and training, the Court found that Bowles satisfied the liberal standards for expert qualification even if he is not the most qualified expert to opine on the subjects at issue.

    Held

    The Court denied the Plaintiff’s motion to exclude the opinions of Defendant Bobst North America, Inc.’s expert Alfred Bowles.

    Key Takeaway

    A medical degree is not a prerequisite for qualification as an expert capable of testifying regarding the cause of a person’s injuries. In other words, an expert need not possess a particular medical specialty to testify regarding the cause of Montgomery’s death or the duration of any conscious pain and suffering he may have experienced.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Montgomery V. Bobst Mex SA
    Docket Number: 2:24cv367
    Court Name: United States District Court, Pennsylvania Eastern
    Order Date: May 01, 2026
  • Economics Expert Was Not Allowed to Opine on Technical Difficulties

    Economics Expert Was Not Allowed to Opine on Technical Difficulties

    This class action lawsuit arises out of Amazon’s practice of using smart-speaker technology (“Alexa”) to surreptitiously: (a) intercept; (b) eavesdrop; (c) record; (d) disclose; or (e) use millions of Americans’ voices and communications, all without their knowledge or consent. Such conduct blatantly violates Washington’s wiretapping law, which applies nationwide to Plaintiffs and all members of the Class.

    Defendants here, Amazon.com, Inc. and Amazon.com Services LLC (collectively, “Amazon” or “Defendants”), are therefore liable as a result of their egregious violations of the State Wiretapping laws – and are also liable for their violations of the Washington Consumer Protection Act (“CPA”), the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (“Federal Wiretap Act”), and the Stored Communications Act of 1986 (“SCA”). Plaintiffs Kaeli Garner, Jodi Brust, Diane McNealy, Michael McNealy, Ricky Babani, Jeffrey Hoyt, Lorlie Tesoriero, Ronald Johnson, Selena Johnson and Caron Watkins (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) brought this action individually, and on behalf of a Class of similarly situated individuals, to redress those violations of law.

    Plaintiffs filed a motion to exclude Defendants’ expert, Lorin Hitt, because (a) his opinions do not rebut the opinions offered by Plaintiffs’ experts and are untimely, (b) they are not supported by relevant experience, knowledge, or expertise, and (c) they are unreliable.

    Economics Expert Witness

    Lorin Moultrie Hitt has decades of experience teaching and researching “the economics of consumer behavior, firm organization, and market structure, with particular emphasis on the role of information on pricing, performance, and competition.” He received his Bachelor and Master of Science degrees in electrical engineering from Brown University in 1988 and 1989, respectively, with a Ph.D. in management from MIT in 1996 that focused on economics and statistics.

    Hitt has written on the pricing and management of information products/services, the influence of information on consumer behavior in the online retail sphere, and how privacy concerns influence consumer choices. He has also been involved in consumer class actions, using various modeling techniques to measure economic injury, particularly in class actions involving data security incidents and the misuse of personal information.

    Get the full story on challenges to Lorin Hitt’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Discussion by the Court

    A. Knowledge and Expertise

    1. Legal Conclusions

    Plaintiffs argued that Hitt is not qualified to opine on what the law requires to state an invasion of privacy or intrusion upon seclusion claim.

    Hitt is an economist with experience and expertise in the impacts of information and privacy concerns on consumer behavior. He also has experience modeling and measuring damages in consumer class actions. While causation/reliance may be presumed for purposes of a CPA claim where the act or conduct at issue is an omission, the presumption is rebuttable and it may not apply to all of the causes of action asserted by Plaintiffs in this case. Hitt’s opinion that causation and/or damages cannot be accurately determined in this case without considering individualized factors is within his area of expertise and is a legitimate avenue through which to critique Plaintiffs’ damages theory.

    2. Hardware and Computer Processing Opinions

    Hitt offered opinions regarding the technical difficulties Amazon would face in trying to reduce the number of false wakes and the hidden costs of preventing Amazon from relying on and utilizing the voice recordings of Alexa users.

    Hitt studies “markets generally and markets for personal information specifically.” While his expertise and knowledge arguably form a basis for modeling the market for voice recordings (including demand, pricing, and the impact of the seller’s privacy concerns), they are inadequate to support opinions regarding hardware requirements and software limitations or trade-offs. Nor did his regurgitation of “academic literature” serve any purpose or form the basis of any opinion that is within his knowledge and expertise.

    3. Markets and Valuation

    Plaintiffs argued that Hitt lacked the necessary qualifications to opine regarding the market for voice recordings and that his degrees in economics have no bearing on this case. The Court found these arguments unpersuasive given his experience, expertise, and curriculum vitae.

    B. Reliability and Relevance

    1. Use of a Research Team

    Plaintiffs objected to Hitt’s use of a research team from Cornerstone Research to assist in the collection and analysis of documents. An expert’s use of support staff, be they Ph.D. students, employees, or a third-party, in the preparation of a report is neither unusual nor prohibited. Plaintiffs argued, however, that Hitt had nothing to do with the selection or review of the documents on which his report relies and that his proffered opinions are therefore unsupported by any facts or evidence. This argument ignored significant portions of Hitt’s deposition testimony and misquotes others. The actual testimony showed that, after consultations with counsel and Cornerstone Research, Hitt outlined an initial report, identified relevant documents, and indicated areas where additional support and analysis were needed.

    While Cornerstone Research was free to obtain other documents to support the requested analyses, the report was prepared under Hitt’s direction, using an iterative process, and he reviewed any documents on which the report relies. As a result, the Court overruled the Plaintiffs’ objection.

    2. Failure to Conduct Independent Research or Identify Supporting Evidence

    Plaintiffs argued that Hitt’s opinions regarding consumers’ privacy preferences should be excluded because (a) he failed to conduct his own research and (b) the sources on which he relied are irrelevant or contradict his conclusions. Hitt opined that “consumers (in aggregate) do not appear to materially change their behavior when information about Amazon’s retention and use of Alexa Recordings became more available.”

    While Hitt’s conclusions regarding consumer preferences are not unassailable, shaky but admissible evidence is to be attacked by cross examination, contrary evidence, and attention to the burden of proof, not exclusion.

    3. Analytical Gaps and Internal Inconsistencies

    Plaintiffs argued that Hitt’s opinions regarding consumer privacy preferences are inadmissible because the studies he relied upon relate to other forms of personal information disclosed in other contexts. Those studies are used to support the proposition that there is a “privacy paradox” between what individuals say they intend to or are willing to disclose and their actual behavior. Plaintiffs did not explain why the cited studies are insufficient for that purpose.

    Hitt’s opinions regarding consumer privacy preferences are partly based on his analysis of media coverage between 2014 and 2024 regarding how Alexa works and whether there was a change in the number of users or purchases during periods of intensive coverage.

    Plaintiffs pointed out the superficiality of this analysis: Hitt searched “major” news and business publications on “Factiva” for articles that mention “Alexa” and/or “Echo” in conjunction with a wide range of marginally relevant “keywords.” He then reviewed the headlines of the 4,995 hits and excluded articles that seemed to be unrelated to false wakes or Amazon’s retention/use of voice recordings. Once periods of heightened media coverage were identified, Hitt (or his team) attempted to identify what precipitated the coverage and included an example quotation in the chart at Figure 2 of his report. As long as Hitt refrained from suggesting that all of the practices and conduct about which plaintiffs complain were disclosed in the articles represented in Figure 2, Plaintiffs’ other criticisms of his analysis go to the weight of the testimony rather than its admissibility.

    Held

    The Court granted in part and denied in part Plaintiffs’ motion to exclude the testimony of Defendant’s expert, Lorin Hitt.

    Key Takeaway:

    Ultimately, the test under Daubert is not the correctness of the expert’s conclusions but the soundness of his methodology. The Court is a gatekeeper, not a fact finder. Accordingly, the district court is not tasked with deciding whether the expert is right or wrong, just whether his testimony has substance such that it would be helpful to a jury.

    Please refer to the blog previously published about this case:

    Computer Science Expert’s Testimony on the Value of Data Admitted

    Privacy Expert’s Testimony on Alexa Users Limited

    Marketing Expert Not Allowed to Opine on Consumer Reaction

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Garner V. Amazon.Com, Inc.
    Docket Number: 2:21cv750
    Court Name: United States District Court, Washington Western
    Order Date: March 30, 2026
  • Sexual Abuse Expert Allowed to Opine on School Policies

    Sexual Abuse Expert Allowed to Opine on School Policies

    This case arises out of Plaintiff Jane Doe’s claims for child sexual abuse against a well-known, Rhode Island-based boarding school, Portsmouth Abbey School, the institution that hired and retained Plaintiff’s abuser, Michael Bowen Smith (“Smith”). Plaintiff attended Portsmouth Abbey from September 2010 to May 2014. In December 2020, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Portsmouth Abbey in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island, alleging that the school administrators failed to report and prevent the abuse despite receiving warnings.

    The District of Rhode Island ruled that Plaintiff’s claims against the school were procedurally barred by the statute of limitations. In December 2020, Plaintiff also filed this action for professional negligence, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty against Defendant Lewis Roca, based on legal services Lewis Roca provided to Plaintiff in connection with her petition for an order of protection against Smith.

    Plaintiff alleges that Lewis Roca attorneys knew or should have known Plaintiff had potential claims against Portsmouth Abbey arising from the abuse but never advised Plaintiff of these claims or the relevant statute of limitations. Plaintiff also alleges that Lewis Roca never disclosed that the law firm often defended the Catholic Church in claims brought by abuse survivors or explained that this presented a potential conflict of interest.

    Defendant filed Daubert motions to exclude the opinions of Charol S. Shakeshaft and Laurie Fortin, LCSW.

    Sexual Abuse Expert Witnesses

    Dr. Charol Smith Shakeshaft is a professor in the Department of Educational Leadership at Virginia Commonwealth University. She has a Ph.D. in educational administration and has served as a professor in that capacity for over 45 years. Shakeshaft began “studying sexual abuse of students in schools in the 1980s,” has received three grants by the U.S. Department of Education, and has authored a Congressionally mandated report on educator sexual misconduct in the United States, published in 2004.

    Get the full story on challenges to Charol Shakeshaft’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Laurie Fortin is a licensed clinical social worker who has over 30 years of experience conducting, supervising, and providing training for forensic interviews in the context of child abuse.

    Want to know more about the challenges Laurie Fortin has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    I. Defendant’s Motion to Exclude Charol Shakeshaft

    Shakeshaft is expected to testify that Portsmouth Abbey failed to provide clear guidelines or training on how to respond to reports of inappropriate conduct; that Portsmouth Abbey did not have appropriate policies or adequate training to prevent Plaintiff from being sexually abused; that the policies that were in place were not communicated, followed, or enforced; and that the response to reports of abuse was insufficient.

    a. Shakeshaft’s Qualifications

    Defendant objected to Shakeshaft’s qualifications as “lacking on-the-ground knowledge and experience implementing and enforcing policies and procedures in a boarding school setting within a relevant time period.” Defendant also argued that she “conducted little to no investigation into the Portsmouth Abbey environment more specifically, including the size of the student body, its leadership, and/or the layout of the campus and locations where Plaintiff and Smith were purportedly seen to interact.”

    Shakeshaft is offering opinions on a “systemic failure” in Portsmouth Abbey’s policies, training, and response to reports of sexual abuse, not testifying as a legal expert. The reference to “state and federal entities requiring that school employees are responsible for keeping children safe” is not disputed and did not, as Defendant suggested, form a predicate for Shakeshaft’s opinions.

    In addition to her academic credentials and extensive research experience, she has been qualified to provide expert testimony on similar subject matter in other cases in this and other districts.

    b. Reliability and Relevance of Shakeshaft’s Opinions

    Shakeshaft’s opinions on school policies, grooming, and “conflicts of interest” lacked reliable methodology

    First, Defendant challenged Shakeshaft’s opinions on school policies, grooming, and “conflicts of interest” as lacking reliable methodology.

    The Court considered Shakeshaft’s significant experience and research in the field of educator sexual misconduct and her review of an extensive compilation of relevant school documents.

    To the extent that Defendant objected to the use of the term “grooming” in Shakeshaft’s report, Plaintiff is not offering Shakeshaft as an expert on grooming. Moreover, Shakeshaft clarified in her deposition that she was “not looking for grooming” and that references to “grooming” reflected her notes on the records she reviewed.

    Shakeshaft lacked familiarity with the Rhode Island mandatory reporting law

    Second, Defendant objected that Shakeshaft lacked familiarity with the Rhode Island mandatory reporting law and other requirements that would have applied to Portsmouth Abbey during the time period Plaintiff was a student. This appears to refer to a table Shakeshaft created of “items that should be, but were not, included in a specific policy prohibiting and preventing educator sexual misconduct.”

    To the extent that Defendant objected that this list of policies was not mandated by Rhode Island or federal law, the Court did not find that Shakeshaft is testifying that the absence of these policies violated state or federal law between 2010 and 2014.

    Shakeshaft’s criticism of the external investigation of Portsmouth Abbey was speculative

    Defendant also challenged Shakeshaft’s criticism of the external investigation of Portsmouth Abbey as “speculative,” where Shakeshaft’s own report and deposition testimony stated that she “speculates” that Plaintiff was not included in the investigation report as that likely would have been harmful to the school’s standing and reputation. These and similar objections either go to the weight of the testimony, which Defendant is free to address on cross examination, or attack conclusions that Shakeshaft did not offer.

    Shakeshaft is a “school person” and should not be allowed to testify to the standard of care for non-school personnel

    Lastly, Defendant asserted that Shakeshaft is a “school person” and should not be allowed to testify to the standard of care for non-school personnel. The Court agreed that Shakeshaft is not the appropriate witness to testify, for example, to the standard of care for Lewis Roca attorneys. However, by Defendant’s own account, Plaintiff stipulated that Shakeshaft is “not going to offer any opinions about anything having to do with Lewis Roca.”

    II. Defendant’s Motion to Exclude Laurie Fortin

    Fortin offered the following opinions in her report: (1) Smith’s behaviors were highly consistent with grooming techniques and strategies utilized by known child sexual offenders; (2) Smith’s behavior became increasingly characteristic of domestic violence perpetrators; (3) Smith endorsed and utilized cognitive distortions commonly used by known offenders; (4) the manipulative nature of Smith’s grooming process significantly contributed to silencing Plaintiff and delaying her disclosure; and (5) the Portsmouth Abbey school environment and culture facilitated Smith’s ability to use and abuse his power and authority as a staff member to groom and sexually abuse and exploit Plaintiff.

    a. Fortin’s Qualifications

    Defendant did not challenge Fortin’s qualifications to testify on grooming generally but argued that Fortin is not qualified to offer expert testimony regarding school rules, policies, or the boarding school environment.

    However, the Court found that Fortin is qualified to testify regarding environmental or cultural factors that facilitate grooming as disclosed in her report. The record before the Court did not reflect that Fortin is opining on the adequacy of school policies or the standard of care applicable to schools like Portsmouth Abbey.

    b. Reliability and Relevance of Fortin’s Opinions

    Defendant next argued that Fortin did not possess sufficient facts to support her opinions, which must be excluded as speculative.

    Again, the Court did not find that Fortin offered any opinions regarding the adequacy of school policies or the boarding school environment generally. And, as Fortin explained in her deposition, her understanding that Smith violated Portsmouth Abbey rules was based on deposition testimony from Portsmouth Abbey staff. Defendant did not point to any evidence contradicting Fortin’s understanding, but to the extent Defendant wished to show Fortin’s understanding relies on disputed facts, Defendant is free to do so on cross examination.

    Finally, the Court rejected Defendant’s argument that Fortin’s opinions are irrelevant because Smith is not a party to this case. As Plaintiff pointed out, the relationship between Plaintiff and Smith is a key factor in damages. Because the average juror is not familiar with grooming behaviors or their impact on minor victims, the Court found that Fortin’s expertise will aid the jury in understanding the dynamics of that relationship.

    Held

    • The Court denied Defendant’s Daubert motion to exclude the testimony of Charol Shakeshaft.
    • The Court denied Defendant’s Daubert motion to exclude the testimony of Laurie Fortin.

    Key Takeaway

    When ruling on motions to exclude or otherwise limit expert testimony, the Court is mindful that its role as gatekeeper is not intended to serve as a replacement for the adversary system. Ultimately, the rejection of expert testimony is the exception rather than the rule.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Doe V. Lewis Roca Rothgerber Christie LLP
    Docket Number: 1:20cv1365
    Court Name: United States District Court, New Mexico
    Order Date: March 31, 2026
  • Law Enforcement Expert Was Not Allowed to Opine on the Suspect’s Flight

    Law Enforcement Expert Was Not Allowed to Opine on the Suspect’s Flight

    Hakim Ledbetter was charged with: attempted possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine, 5 kilograms or more of cocaine, and 1,000 grams or more of PCP and aiding and abetting; possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime; and possession of a firearm by a felon.

    The Government intended to present at trial evidence of Ledbetter’s flight, and “argue that his flight establishes his consciousness of guilt.”

    Ledbetter thus sought to introduce Chuck Rylant‘s testimony “regarding psychological and physiological factors that affect human responses to threatening stimuli,” so that the jury could “understand alternative reasons for flight in situations of perceived threat.”

    The Government moved in limine to exclude Rylant’s testimony, or in the alternative, for a pretrial Daubert Hearing, arguing that his opinion is irrelevant and inadmissible.

    Law Enforcement Expert Witness

    Chuck J. Rylant is a former police officer who has investigated and reviewed crimes of violence—including fights, attacks, and homicides—committed with various weapons.

    He earned a doctorate in clinical psychology in addition to completing numerous master’s level classes in psychology.

    Want to know more about the challenges Chuck Rylant has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Qualifications

    Rylant is not qualified to testify as to Ledbetter’s psychology. Rylant received his “Psy.D.” degree from “California Southern University,” an exclusively online, unaccredited school. While Rylant purports to be an expert on the psychological and physiological limitations of what humans are capable of, the defense presented nothing to establish that Rylant is trained to evaluate the psychological basis for a suspect’s flight from the police. Most of Rylant’s teaching and lecturing occurred when he had earned only an MBA degree—well before he received his “Psy.D.” in 2020.

    Rylant’s curriculum vitae confirmed that his specialty is limited to police use of force decisions and self-defense. Moreover, Rylant purportedly could not recall in how many federal criminal cases he was qualified to testify as an expert. Although he initially said that his “understanding” was five cases, he then acknowledged it was three. In those cases, he opined only on the decision to use force. Finally, Rylant acknowledged that he had never before offered an expert opinion on the psychological reasons for a person’s flight from police.

    This case does not concern whether police use of force was reasonable, but whether Ledbetter’s flight from police showed consciousness of guilt. In other words, Rylant’s “specialized knowledge” otherwise has nothing to do with Ledbetter or this case. His work on police use of force aside, Rylant has authored two series of books: one titled “How to Be Rich,” and the other, a jiu-jitsu primer.

    Reliability

    According to the Court, Rylant’s “expert report”—which he drafted in an hour—was exceedingly general, including virtually no mention of the facts of this case. Indeed, Rylant testified that he had essentially cut and pasted his Ledbetter report from strikingly similar reports he had prepared for other cases having nothing to do with flight from the police.

    Rylant did not base his “expert” opinion respecting flight from police on reliable methodology. Indeed, Rylant never explained his methodology.

    He never spoke with Ledbetter or anyone else about why Ledbetter fled. He never visited the neighborhood where Ledbetter was arrested. Indeed, although he purported to be uncertain, he apparently has never visited Philadelphia. Rylant offered no studies that he or anyone else conducted about flight from police.

    Fit – Rule 403

    It is apparent that the “fit” of Rylant’s opinion to Ledbetter is poor. He sought to opine that something (which he never clearly identified) other than consciousness of guilt could cause someone in Ledbetter’s circumstances to flee in the manner Ledbetter did. Yet, in forming this opinion, Rylant was ignorant of circumstances that could well have caused Ledbetter to flee from the police. On October 15, 2024, Ledbetter:

    • was in violation of his parole because he had left the state of Georgia
    • effectively possessed three loaded handguns;
    • as a parolee, and a convicted felon, was prohibited from possessing any weapons;
    • was driving a truck containing drugs valued at over $1 million;
    • had previously fled from police when they executed a warrant;
    • had previously been convicted of federal drug charges; and
    • had previously shot someone and been convicted of aggravated assault.

    Rylant then reluctantly acknowledged that this new information could have provided reasons for why someone in Ledbetter’s circumstances would run from police. The potential for prejudice and jury confusion arising from the Government’s “other reasons for flight evidence”—with its attendant cautionary instructions—would plainly outweigh the probative value of Rylant’s unreliable opinion, which he was not qualified to give.

    Rule 704

    Rule 704(b) still prohibits an expert from opining about the “possible” mental state of a Defendant. Accordingly, the Court determined that the defense’s attempt to end-run Rule 704(b) was impermissible.

    Held

    The Court ruled that because Chuck Rylant’s proffered opinion did not pass muster under Rules 702, 704, and 403, he could not testify at trial.

    Key Takeaway

    Although proffered to opine on Hakim Ledbetter’s psychology, Rylant is not and has never been a psychologist. His “Psy.D.” was conferred in 2020 by an unaccredited, exclusively online institution. He appears never to have testified, written, or lectured on the issue he was called to address: the psychology of a suspect fleeing from police. The three federal cases in which he purportedly testified bear no resemblance to Ledbetter. Rylant’s methodology is unknown.

    Although he purported to base his opinion only on generalities, he “revised” that basis and impermissibly strayed into his belief that Defendant lacked mens rea in fleeing from police. Admitting Rylant’s opinion would thus likely open the door to other explanations highly damaging to Ledbetter—about why he fled, as well as cautionary instructions, which would certainly confuse the jury.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: United States V. Ledbetter
    Docket Number: 2:24cr423
    Court Name: United States District Court, Pennsylvania Eastern
    Order Date: April 02, 2026
  • Biogas Expert Allowed to Opine on Oxygen Requirements

    Biogas Expert Allowed to Opine on Oxygen Requirements

    In 2015, the City of Sioux Falls (the “City”) “commissioned the Sioux Falls Water Reclamation Facility Digester Gas Conditioning System Project (the ‘Project’) to add a new digester gas conditioning system to its water reclamation facility that would remove high concentrations of hydrogen sulfide to concentrations below 100 parts per million volume (ppmv), and that would remove siloxane to concentrations below 100 parts per billion by volume (ppbv), which would then enable the City to operate its GE Jenbacher gas engine generator to create electricity for the benefit of the City.”

    For reasons which are disputed by the various parties in this matter, the Project, particularly the Azzuro system meant to remove hydrogen sulfide, was unsuccessful.

    The City brought this litigation seeking damages against some parties involved with the Project. One of those Defendants, Azzuro, Inc., brought a counterclaim against the City.

    The City disclosed Lowell Howard, PE, as a retained expert witness in this matter. Azzuro filed a motion to exclude in part the testimony of Howard.

    Biogas Expert Witness

    Lowell E. Howard, PE has 40 years of experience designing, manufacturing, and installing or supplying biogas treatment systems. He has been involved in 20-40 biogas treatment system projects around the world, including several where the primary goal of the project was to remove hydrogen sulfide from biogas.

    Get the full story on challenges to Lowell Howard’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Discussion by the Court

    Azzuro challenged Howard’s opinions “because he is not qualified as an expert by knowledge, experience, training, or education on issues relating to biological desulfurization systems as required by Rule 702.”

    Azzuro argued that Howard’s testimony demonstrates an unawareness that renders any opinion he may have about a required oxygen level to be a “fundamentally unsupported conclusion based on pure speculation.”

    The City argued that Howard used “his experience and educated understanding of basic biological and chemistry principles and chemical processes at play in the biogas treatment industry, as well as the engineering principles and chemical processes necessary to remove hydrogen sulfide from biogas, to explain why the Azzuro system did not and could not work as designed.” And the City argued that although Azzuro “contended that biological systems are vastly different from media-based systems, it does not cite to any competing expert’s opinion, legal authority, or fact in the record to support that conclusory statement.”

    The City argued that although Howard “has not previously worked on a biological system like the Azzuro system, Howard has certainly demonstrated a sufficient understanding of the biogas industry as a whole, the design of biogas systems, and engineering principles and the chemical processes that must be considered in a biological hydrogen sulfide removal system in order to meet the qualification threshold under Rule 702 and Daubert.”

    Analysis

    The Court is persuaded by the City’s arguments. The Court believed that this is also the case with respect to Azzuro’s argument that Howard’s opinions lack a proper factual foundation. While Howard made the statements quoted above about his unfamiliarity with the Azzuro system, those statements are not automatically fatal to admissibility when the full record is considered. Howard’s report and further testimony suggested that he studied the Azzuro system and that, based upon this review, he does not believe it would work.

    Held

    The Court denied Azzuro, Inc.’s motion to exclude in part the testimony of Lowell E. Howard.

    Key Takeaway

    Howard is a decades-long veteran of the biogas industry. Where he opines on oxygen requirements for hydrogen sulfide removal, he does so relying on concepts of “[b]asic chemistry.” Howard does not hold himself out as an expert on the particular growth media in the Azzuro system or biological solutions in general. Rather, he admits some unfamiliarity with those systems and how they operate except in the broadest sense. Howard supplemented his knowledge by reading a study about biological systems, but he did not start on a clean slate because there are not different periodic tables of elements for fixed-bed media systems and biological systems.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: City Of Sioux Falls V. Azzuro, Inc.
    Docket Number: 4:22cv4052
    Court Name: United States District Court, South Dakota
    Order Date: March 25, 2026